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Abstract 
This dissertation principally analyses: (i) the privatisation of Zambia’s copper mines; 
(ii) the impact of state and private ownership and control of the mines on development; 
and (iii) the roles of mining TNCs in the Zambian economy. The research covers the 
period from independence in 1964 to 2006/7, but mainly focuses on the 1991 to 2006/7 
period. The validity of several neo-classical theoretical views and counter-arguments 
pertaining to the social and economic benefits of privatisation and the private ownership 
and the activities of mining TNCs is tested in the mining sector study. The methodology 
is based on a case study comprising fieldwork and literature research, utilising a 
qualitative approach and an inductive method. The conclusions of the study could 
enhance knowledge from which other developing countries intent on privatising their 
SOEs could draw, as privatisation studies of sub-Saharan countries have mostly 
overlooked analyses of the social impact of the private ownership of enterprises. Key 
findings of the study are that the privatisation and private ownership of the mines by 
TNCs have failed to produce net positive socio-economic outcomes for Zambia. 
Furthermore, under private ownership of the mines, the political-economic benefits 
have shifted, mainly concentrating the surpluses from mining in favour of mining 
TNCs. The primary recommendations from the study are that certain measures, in 
particular a strong state capacity, are fundamental in enabling greater and more 
equitable redistribution of benefits for the country from privatisation, private ownership 
and the economic activities of mining TNCs. 
 
Keywords: Zambia, mining, privatisation, private ownership, state ownership, TNCs, 
state capacity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The dissertation investigates the changing roles of the state and transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in the development of mining in Zambia. The investigation 
includes an evaluation of influences in the transition from state to private ownership of 
the mining sector. The shifts in economic and political power (viz. the political 
economy) and the social impact linked to these policy changes further represent 
important components of the study. The copper mining sector of Zambia is used as a 
case study to examine these economic issues.  
 
Copper mining has been the backbone of the Zambian economy as the major earner of 
Zambia’s exports and historically as a significant generator of economic activity and of 
development. Furthermore, the mining sector and its backward linkages in the 
Copperbelt have employed a large number of the workforce. This has further 
contributed to the Copperbelt acquiring substantial political significance. The ownership 
of the mines shifted from private to state ownership and reverted to private ownership in 
2000. Anglo American possessed full ownership of a sizable part of the mines under 
private ownership. Moreover, prior to the privatisation of the mines under majority state 
ownership, Anglo American still retained just over a quarter of the shareholding in the 
mines. 
 
The large-scale privatisation of the mines in Zambia and the consecutive changes in 
ownership and management control that the mining sector has undergone between the 
state and TNCs, make the Zambian mining sector a pertinent case study for 
investigating issues such as privatisation and state and private-sector control of 
enterprises. The mining TNCs’ majority ownership of the Zambian copper mines also 
renders this sector suitable for a study of the roles of TNCs. The research paper has 
adopted a case study approach to the Zambian copper mines and mainly tests observed 
events in the sector against various theoretical arguments pertaining to the issues under 
investigation. An overview of the study, the context of the Zambian mining sector and 
the chapter outline are set out below. 
  
2 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY  
 
This section delineates the research aims and questions, definitions, the rationale, scope, 
main theoretical arguments and the contributions of the study. 
 
1.1.1 Research aims and research questions 
 
The core research aims of the study are to investigate (i) the privatisation process of the 
copper mines; (ii) the influence of changes in ownership and management control on the 
development of Zambia; (iii) the roles of significant actors, in particular the state and 
the mining TNCs, in the mining sector; and (iv) the socio-economic and political-
economic impact of the roles of TNCs and of the government on the copper mines and 
the Zambian economy.  
 
The main secondary research questions the study aims to answer are as follows:  
• What were the various policy approaches of the different governments for the 
mining sector in particular under state and private ownership of the mines and in the 
privatisation of the mining sector and what were their development consequences? 
• What were the outcomes of changing ownership and management control for the 
growth and socio-economic development of the mining sector? 
• What roles did the mining TNCs play in the copper mining sector within a weak 
state and how did their activities affect the development of the mining sector and the 
Zambian economy? 
• What was the capacity of the Zambian state in ensuring positive outcomes for 
Zambia from the privatisation of the copper mines and from the activities of mining 
TNCs? 
• How did different government policies and the activities of mining TNCs influence 
the political economy of Zambia? 
 
1.1.2 Definitions and clarification of terms 
 
Since the mining of copper and cobalt, a by-product of copper, accounts for over 90% 
of the total mining contribution to the Zambian economy, making it highly 
representative of the mining industry in Zambia, references to the mining sector in the 
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study pertain largely to copper mining. Furthermore, the term ‘development’ for the 
mining sector as employed in the paper, implies a combination of higher output levels, 
increases in employment, higher government revenue from mining (net of subsidies and 
concessions), and the viable operation of mining without subsidies. Broadly, the author 
has used the term ‘privatisation’ to refer to the processes involved in transferring 
ownership of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the public to the private sector; it 
therefore precedes private ownership. Private ownership refers to the enterprise under 
the ownership of the private sector. 
 
1.1.3 Rationale for the study  
 
The widespread privatisation of the majority state-owned copper mining sector in 
Zambia makes the sector a useful case study for examining the privatisation process and 
its consequences in the context of a weak state. Moreover, comparisons afforded 
through the changes in ownership and management controls of the Zambian copper 
mining sector from 1963, the year before independence, to 2008, also make the 
Zambian mining sector a suitable case study for gaining broad insight in the roles of 
different combinations of ownership and management controls. The study further 
provides clarity on the impact of the changes in ownership and management structure 
on the development and the political economy of Zambia.  
 
The ownership of the mines in Zambia shifted from private ownership during colonial 
rule, extended into the ‘Accommodation Period’ until 1969, and to majority government 
ownership of the mines, from 1969 to 1996. Zambia experimented from 1969 to 1973 
with private management and majority government ownership of the mines. 
Subsequently, both majority ownership and the management of the mines were 
transferred to the government until the mines were privatised under Chiluba’s 
government. The privatisation of the mines took place from 1997 until 2000. TNCs took 
over majority ownership and management control of the mines since the mines were 
privatised. 
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Furthermore, the majority ownership of the copper mines by TNCs, under private 
ownership before the mines were nationalised in 1969 and again from March 2000,1 
makes the copper mining sector a pertinent case study for examining the roles of large 
mining TNCs as powerful actors in the economies of developing countries. Moreover, 
the study enables the identification of various shortcomings in the capacities and 
policies of the government in the privatisation process and in its dealings with mining 
TNCs. The identification of these provides an insight into the preconditions for ensuring 
more favourable gains for a country from the privatisation of SOEs and from the 
participation of TNCs in host countries. Additionally, an understanding of the political-
economic outcomes linked to the changes in ownership and the activities of TNCs in the 
mining sector informs on the shifts in economic power linked to the changes in 
ownership, manager control and to the reallocation of the returns from surpluses of 
copper sales with the participation of mining TNCs in Zambia.  
 
1.1.4 Scope of the study 
 
The focus of the dissertation is primarily on the period from 1991, when the Chiluba 
government came into power, until 2006/7. The investigation is nevertheless evaluated 
in the context of state policies and other significant factors that affected the mining 
sector during Kaunda’s rule (1964-91). Some of these policies and factors also 
influenced events after 1991. The case study approach enables the unravelling of the 
influences of significant actors and elements other than ownership that affected the 
performance of the mining sector. A greater understanding of these influences enables a 
more accurate and holistic account of the complex interplay of the various issues that 
affect the performance and development of the mining sector.  
 
Methodological and statistical challenges render the effects of private ownership on 
performance difficult to determine within the confines of the study. Challenges include 
the difficulties of comparing the performance of enterprises pre- and post-privatisation 
or to obtain a counterfactual scenario (what would have happened in the absence of 
privatisation). Moreover, the selection of appropriate variables to assess performance is 
                                                 
1
    The first mines were privatised in 1997. It is also important to note that Anglo American possessed minority shares in the mines 
under state majority ownership. 
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not obvious. Other factors apart from ownership, in particular the price of copper, are 
also likely to affect enterprise performance, making it difficult to isolate the influence of 
ownership on performance (Buchs, 2003:16). The reluctance of several private mining 
companies to divulge information on their profits and losses has also precluded profit-
based analyses of performance within the confines of the study. Performance measures 
may furthermore suffer from a demonstration effect, in which case short-term trends in 
performance improvements may be misleading, as these may not necessarily play out in 
the longer term (Villalonga, 2000, cited in Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005:56).  
 
A lack of adequate statistics has prevented a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of 
performance. Moreover, at times, gaps in statistics obstruct the construction of trends on 
a continuous time-series basis, also making comparisons difficult. However, the study 
uses statistics mainly to describe events, rather than to analyse causality. 
 
1.1.5 Theoretical arguments employed in the study 
 
The dissertation mostly tests the validity of various theories, literature reviews and 
empirical studies against events in the mining sector case study, enabling the 
identification of theories that provide the best explanation of observed trends. The 
research question on the privatisation of the mining sector is mainly assessed against 
certain institutional and legal prerequisites and government policies considered by 
several theorists as crucial for ensuring more beneficial outcomes from privatisation. 
Kenneth Arrow’s groundbreaking work concludes that privatisation is secondary in 
importance to competition (which is, however, not relevant in the resource sector)2 and 
the creation of institutional infrastructure for a market economy (Stiglitz, 1998:19, 20; 
2002:182). The prerequisites noted by Stiglitz (1998, 2002) and extracted from 
empirical studies identifying the strengths and weaknesses of privatisation policies, 
especially of sub-Saharan Africa (Buchs, 2003), Eastern European countries and of 
China, are mostly employed to assess the privatisation of the mines in Zambia.  
 
                                                 
2
    As the price is determined on the LME. 
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The development outcomes of privatisation policies of the mines in Zambia are 
primarily examined against the neo-classical argument (also of the World Bank) that 
privatisation and private ownership of SOEs improve public finances, and counter-
arguments that gains in public finances are not inevitable. Rather than merely owing to 
privatisation and private ownership, improvements in public finance are also 
significantly influenced by the sale price of the SOEs (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a; 
Pennings, 2008) and sufficient tax payments from the newly privatised enterprise 
(Buchs, 2003). Moreover, privatisation has been less decisive than profound tax 
administration reform for revenue performance. Tax evasion tactics of private firms and 
weaker tax administration of the government under private ownership would lower tax 
revenue (Buchs, 2003). Tax concessions would also reduce tax revenue under private 
ownership (World Bank, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b). Benefits in public 
finance are further more likely if investments are made compulsory and if the 
government retains shareholdings (Pennings, 2008).  
 
The main theories and empirical studies deployed in addressing the second research 
question pertaining to the influences of changing management structure and ownership 
on the growth and socio-economic development of the mining sector are:  
(i) The neo-classical argument that changing objectives under different ownerships, 
namely the electoral-maximising motives of the government in SOEs and the 
profit-maximising motives of the shareholders in private companies, promote 
greater x-efficiency in private companies over SOEs. Greater x-efficiency 
contributes to the better performance of private-owned enterprises (Lopez-de 
Silanes, 1997, cited in Pennings, 2008; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). 
(ii) The view of property rights theorists (that focus on the principal-agent relation) that 
better manager incentives are fundamental in improving company performance. 
This view also has applicability under government ownership, according to various 
theorists (see, for example, Bardhan & Roemer, 1992, cited in Chang et al., 2003). 
(iii) The neo-classical perspective that organisational weaknesses further account for 
poorer company performance under government ownership, namely: (a) lack of 
management autonomy; (b) internal inefficiencies in bureaucracies; and 
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(c) multiple and contradictory government objectives (cited in Vickers & Yarrow, 
1988; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a). 
(iv) The neo-classical view that superior monitoring and control of managers under 
private ownership, because of capital markets and the takeover constraints that 
operate in the private sector, which are absent under government ownership, also 
account for the poorer performance of SOEs (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000a). The applicability of counter-arguments that uncompetitive 
markets curtail better monitoring and control of private companies in developing 
countries is also briefly assessed against the mining sector (see, for example, Craig, 
1991, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b). 
(v) The argument that sustainable improvements in the standard of living and the 
welfare outcome, including economic growth, distribution and poverty effects of 
privatisation, in lower-income economies may not necessarily be positive in the 
long run, as private enterprises tend to neglect the economic, political and social 
consequences of their activities (Kiken, 1998, cited in Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005; 
Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b). 
 
The third research question in the mining sector case study regarding the roles of TNCs 
within a weak state and the development outcomes, is analysed by testing the validity of 
various theoretical arguments of both pro-TNC theorists (neo-classical and neo-
fundamentalist) and anti-TNC theorists (Global Reach and neo-imperialist theorists), 
against observed events in the mining sector of Zambia. These entail an assessment of 
both the neo-classical (Vernon, 1979; Buckley & Casson, 1985) and neo-
fundamentalists’ (Warren, 1980) views that TNCs play a pivotal role in supplementing 
the capital and technology of the host country and of the counter-perspective of the 
Global Reach and neo-imperialist theorists (Lenin, 1917; Helleiner, 1989) that TNCs 
drain the resources and undermine the development of the host country (cited in 
Jenkins, 1987:27, 28). 
 
In addition to such capital and technological contributions, the third research question 
further assesses whether the returns to Zambia from mining TNCs were optimal. 
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Optimal returns are crucial for ensuring more favourable outcomes in the case of 
exhaustible resources, according to various theorists. Exhaustible resources require an 
adequate capturing of rent by the government and the reinvestment of the capital 
allowance component in alternative forms of capital assets, to promote national 
development and to maximise long-term revenue (Blignaut & Hassan, 2002).  
 
Moreover, the roles of the government in its relationship with TNCs in the Zambian 
mining sector are analysed against government measures considered by various 
theorists as necessary to attract TNCs and in guiding the activities of TNCs to more 
advantageous outcomes for the host country. The government’s role is further assessed 
through its bargaining leverage compared to those of mining TNCs. Mining sector 
activities, which demand high technological and capital requirements and where the rent 
element is expected to collect major returns, require strong government bargaining 
skills to ensure that the greatest possible share of the rent element accrues to the host 
country (Chang, 1998:238). Developmental theorists consider a strong government 
bargaining leverage (a corporatist role) against TNCs as pivotal also to enable the 
government to direct the activities of TNCs to more favourable outcomes.  
 
The locational decisions of TNCs are assessed through views of neo-classical theorists 
that unrestricted trade and industrial policies are crucial for attracting TNCs (Rugman, 
1981, cited in Jenkins, 1987). These decisions are further examined against the counter-
arguments that restrictive government policies, as long as they are not excessive but 
remain stable and predictable, are not significant in determining the locational decisions 
of TNCs (Chang, 1998).  
 
The fourth question, pertaining to the capacity of the state in ensuring positive outcomes 
for the host countries, also in its relationship with mining TNCs, draws heavily on 
theories of the developmental state. Developmental theorists favour a greater 
interventionist role of the state, while neo-classical theorists favour a minimalist role. 
The capacity of the government in the mining sector is evaluated alongside certain 
criteria identified by Leftwich (1995), Chang (1998) and Amsden (1989, 1997) as 
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important in enhancing the capacity of development states (although confined to those 
that have relevance to Zambia’s mining sector). Such an evaluation involves a deductive 
use of theory which aids analyses of the Zambian state. The bargaining leverage of the 
government and the debate whether a minimalist or an interventionist role of the state is 
the better option in its relation with TNCs are important sub-elements in the assessment 
of the capacity of the state. 
 
Finally, the question pertaining to the influences of different government mining 
policies and of the activities of mining TNCs on the political economy of Zambia 
mainly tests the validity of the neo-classical argument that a minimalist role of the state 
is necessary to attain higher economic growth. The contrasting views of Fine and 
Stoneman (1996) that minimalist government policies are not neutral are also examined 
against the case study. These theorists further argue that minimalist policies, subsumed 
in liberal policies and favoured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, have especially benefited private capital.  
 
In addition, the research question tests the applicability of the argument of Bond and 
Manyanya (2002) that an increasing acceptance of IMF and World Bank policies, 
together with corrupt practices, signifies a realignment of the government away from 
the more marginalised, including workers, towards alliances with those that would assist 
them to remain in power. These policies especially favour foreign capital and the 
government elite over the workers, according to these theorists. The various theoretical 
arguments and literature reviews employed in the study are detailed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.1.6 Contributions of the study 
 
The study contributes to a greater understanding of the privatisation process of the 
Zambian mining sector during the transition from majority state ownership to private 
ownership. Such an investigation has not been comprehensively assessed because of the 
novelty of the privatisation process, with the mines only being fully privatised in 2000. 
Moreover, an unravelling of the costs and advantages of private ownership of the mines 
and of the roles of mining TNCs, in the context of a weak state, a liberalised economy, 
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and powerful actors, contributes towards greater knowledge in these areas. Such an 
understanding also has wider application from which other developing countries, in 
particular African countries with comparable contextual realities and faced with the 
prospect of having to privatise their SOEs to TNCs, could draw. Empirical studies on 
the social aspects and on the impact of privatisation in sub-Saharan countries have 
largely been overlooked, owing to tendencies to focus on privatisation transactions 
rather than sector reorganisation, including wider social objectives (Buchs, 2003:1, 40). 
 
The study further identifies the consequences arising from a poorly planned 
privatisation process. The identification of the preconditions for enabling more 
advantageous consequences for Zambia from the privatisation process and from the 
activities of TNCs could also serve as a reference from which other developing 
countries could draw to ensure more favourable outcomes from privatisation policies 
and from the activities of TNCs in their countries. Additionally, the illumination of the 
political-economic consequences of the privatisation policies and of the activities of 
TNCs in the mining sector in Zambia that would likely replicate in other African 
countries, with weak states, could play an important role in aiding policy formulation in 
these countries. 
 
1.2 CONTEXT OF THE MINING SECTOR IN ZAMBIA 
 
The Kaunda administration, governing Zambia under the banner of the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) from 1964 to 1991, nationalised the copper mines in 1969. 
However, management control of the mines remained with the two private mining 
TNCs that had also enjoyed ownership of the mines before independence, namely 
Anglo American and Roan Selection Trust, until 1973. After 1973, management control 
of the mines by the state was introduced. Subsequent to the nationalisation of the mines 
in 1969, the Kaunda government had adopted strong interventionist policies.  
 
The copper mines were not nationalised outright. The government initially took over 
ownership of only 51% of the mines and at the point of privatisation, the copper mining 
conglomerate, the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), still comprised of a 
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combination of state and private interests. Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 provides a full 
explanation of the shareholding structure of the mining sector under government 
ownership of the mines. Accordingly, the economy for most of Kaunda’s rule could 
more accurately be described as mixed, with a strong state presence. Government 
mining policies and the influence of multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and World 
Bank, also had a significant impact on the development of the mining sector and the 
Zambian economy.  
 
The Chiluba government, which came into power at the end of 1991 under the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), embraced the full-scale neo-liberal 
policies prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990s and implemented these 
policies more rigorously than the Kaunda government. The policies caused major 
changes in the operations and the political economy of the mining sector. The neo-
liberal policies continued under the MMD platform, for the period of Mwanawasa’s 
rule.  
 
During Chiluba’s government, majority private ownership of the mines by foreign 
companies was fully instituted in 2000 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:54). The privatisation of 
the ZCCM entailed the breaking up or unbundling of the ZCCM (then one of the five 
largest copper-producing companies in the world), dividing its operating assets into 
packages and advertising each of these packages for sale (Craig, 2002:364). However, a 
long delay occurred from the passing of the Privatisation Act in 1992 (that sanctioned 
the privatisation of state assets in Zambia) and the privatisation of the ZCCM,3 which 
commenced in 1997 and was only completed in March 2000 (Kaunda, 2002:27; World 
Bank, 2002a:4; Craig, 2002:Endnote 1:364; ZPA, 2000b:15). Table 1.1 summarises in 
greater detail and in chronological order, the various economic policies that the 
Zambian governments adopted for the period under investigation. 
 
                                                 
3
    A parastatal conglomerate that specialised in mining and in the processing of copper and cobalt. 
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Table 1.1: Chronology of changes in economic policies in the mining sector of 
Zambia 
 
Independence (1964-
69) 
Accommodation period: mining remains under the control and management 
of TNCs  
1969-73 State majority ownership but continued TNC management of the mines  
1973 – December 1982 Centralised planning and controlled regime 
December 1982 – 
October 1985 
Decontrol and deregulation 
October 1985 – April 
1987 
Considerably liberalised regime 
May 1987 – November 
1988 
Return to controlled regime under the New Economic Reform Policies 
(NERP) 
November 1988 – June 
1989 
Relaxation of some controls 
July 1989 – September 
1991 
Return to a highly flexible regime, with movement towards full-scale 
liberalisation 
October 1991 President Chiluba’s MMD government took over power from the UNIP 
government of President Kaunda, through elections 
November 1991 – 2001 Fully-fledged structural adjustment programme and stabilisation measures 
2002-08 Continuation of Chiluba’s neo-liberal policies during President 
Mwanawasa’s rule, also under the MMD platform 
Source: Adapted from Saasa (1996:45). 
 
On a macro-economic level, the strategic significance of the copper mining sector in 
Zambia resides chiefly in its role as the major contributor to Zambia’s foreign exchange 
earnings. Mining (mainly copper mining that accounted for 96.5% of total mining 
exports in 1987) has for the most part consistently contributed over 90% of Zambia’s 
exports until the mid-1990s (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:27; World Bank, 
2004a:48; Saasa, 1987:7). From independence to the mid-1970s, mining further 
contributed significantly to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. 
 
The role of Zambia, as a leading producer of unrefined copper, in the late 1960s, greatly 
assisted towards establishing the country as one of the most developed and urbanised 
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countries on the continent in the 1970s during Kaunda’s government. However, the 
economic growth trends subsequently lost momentum and declined over the following 
decades (Van Buren, 2003:1152; The Economist, 2002b:1; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 1; 
World Bank 1996:1, 2002a:4, 2003b:134). Moreover, the country’s high dependence on 
the mining sector, a non-renewable resource, accounts for the poor diversity or the weak 
development of the rest of the Zambian economy. It also renders the Zambian economy 
highly vulnerable to the price of copper. 
 
The significant drop in the price of copper in the mid-1970s contributed to the 
considerable decline in the contribution of mining to GDP and to a chain of negative 
influences on the Zambian economy. Copper production fell and the consequent high 
balance of payment deficits led the Zambian economy into debt, forcing the government 
to seek lending from the IMF and the World Bank. Subsequently, for most of the 1980s, 
the Zambian government was forced to adopt Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) from the IMF and the World Bank, entailing more liberal policies.  
 
Most notably in the 1990s, a significant decline took place in the mining sector’s 
contribution to the Zambian economy, namely its contribution to GDP, employment and 
to government revenue. This was also the case in the short term, under private 
ownership of the mines. Under private ownership of the mines, the most important 
contribution of the mining sector to the Zambian economy continues to subsist in its 
dominance as the major foreign exchange earner in the country, albeit at a lower level 
than during Kaunda’s government. Moreover, a visible trend under private ownership of 
the mines, especially prior to the copper price boom, was the conspicuously poorer 
contribution of mining to government revenue, than under government ownership of the 
mines immediately before the mines were privatised.  
 
Although copper mining under private ownership seems unlikely under the present 
conditions to continue dominating the economic development of Zambia in the long 
term, it is nevertheless likely to remain important in the short to medium term. This is 
because a closure of the mining sector would have a devastating socio-political and 
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economic effect on the country.4 Also, in the absence of significant improvements in the 
development of other sectors, a more effective performance of Zambia’s mining sector 
remains crucial to the development of the economy. 
 
1.3 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
Chapter One presents an introduction to the study. The research methodology of the 
study is discussed in Chapter Two. The literature reviews and theoretical frameworks 
employed to guide analyses in the study are expounded upon in Chapter Three. Chapter 
Four provides background information of the Zambian mining sector. This encompasses 
an overview of the Zambian economy; the policies of the Kaunda and the Chiluba 
governments and of the IMF and the World Bank that affected the mining sector; the 
political-economic implications of government policies; and an assessment of various 
economic indicators. Chapter Five evaluates the privatisation of the mining sector and 
the impact of changing ownership and management structure on the economy. Chapter 
Six considers the roles of TNCs in the mining sector in Zambia within a weak state. 
Chapter Seven presents a summary, recommendations as well as concluding remarks of 
the study. 
                                                 
4
    Interview with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methodology elaborates on the research methods and the limitations of the 
methodology of the study. 
 
2.1 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The research methods outline the research approach, the techniques employed in the 
study, the roles of theory and data, the nature of the data and the research strategy. 
 
2.1.1 Research approach 
 
The research adopts a case study approach. A case study approach is the most 
appropriate method to explore rather novel events. These include the privatisation 
process of the copper mines, the roles of significant actors, especially the state and the 
mining TNCs in the mining sector of Zambia and the development and political-
economic impact of the changes in policies and actions of different actors on the copper 
mines. The mines in Zambia were fully privatised only in 2000 and the consequences of 
the privatisation of the mines to TNCs are as yet not well documented. The case study 
approach also enables a greater understanding of the various factors that relate to the 
core research issues and their impact on the development of the mining sector.  
 
2.1.2 Techniques  
 
The predominant techniques employed in the study involve literature research and 
fieldwork. Moreover, the study principally adopted a qualitative approach, rather than a 
statistical analysis of causality. The statistics employed in the research serve mainly to 
describe the various issues and trends under consideration. A further technique used in 
the study is a triangulation technique entailing a combination of various data collection 
techniques, which overlap to investigate the same issues.  
 
The fieldwork was pursued mainly to gain information on more recent events affecting 
the mining sector in Zambia. The information was gathered to obtain greater insight 
mainly on the research questions relating to the privatisation of the mines, the 
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operations of the mines under private ownership and the roles of TNCs in the mines, 
which are also not yet well documented. The fieldwork involved in-depth interviews of 
persons with expert knowledge on the various issues, especially those pertaining to the 
more recent period. Sixty people were interviewed for the study.  
 
The officials that were interviewed in Zambia were from the Ministry of Mines and 
Mineral Development, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the 
Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, the Bank of Zambia (BoZ), the 
Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), the IMF, the World Bank, the Zambia 
Association of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), academics, journalists 
and senior personnel of mining TNCs. An official from the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) was interviewed in South Africa. Some interviews were also 
conducted at the end of 2001, as part of a study for the Sociology Department of the 
University of the Witwatersrand, to obtain background knowledge of more current 
events. The list of people that were interviewed is detailed in the Table attached to the 
Reference section.  
 
Different questions were generally employed for interviewing the various officials, 
focusing largely on their areas of expertise. However, the same questions were also at 
times posed to different officials, enabling the cross-referencing of information and 
improving the reliability of information. In instances where opinions were given, 
additional and more objective information (from statistics, literature and newspapers 
etc.) was sought to check their accuracy. The interviews were audio-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim.  
 
2.1.3 The role of theory 
 
The appropriate theoretical arguments are principally employed to map out avenues 
against which the various issues under investigation are analysed. As such, the theory 
guides the analyses of the study. The analytical approach is largely exploratory in 
nature, in that the theories are treated mainly as ‘preformulated questions’ (indicating 
feasible avenues of explanation), rather than as ‘preformulated answers’ (suggesting 
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well-defined specific hypotheses) (Wuyts, 1992:13). Accordingly, the role of theory in 
the study is to provide guidance as well as to raise questions concerning the issues under 
consideration, which are then followed up with the analyses of data.  
 
2.1.4 The role of data and empirical evidence 
 
Rather than testing for well-defined specific hypotheses, the different theories are 
compared in the study against actual evidence that enable the extraction of plausible 
theoretical explanations. This is accomplished through the elimination of implausible 
explanations, while retaining those that constitute possible explanations for the issues 
under investigation (Wuyts, 1992:4). Accordingly, data analyses and empirical evidence 
serve as means against which the plausibility of competing theories are compared and 
evaluated. This process contributes towards improving existing theories. 
 
2.1.5 Nature of data 
 
The statistical data employed in the study were largely obtained from secondary 
sources, principally through published statistics from Zambia’s Central Statistics Office, 
the BoZ, the World Bank, the IMF and The Economist Intelligence Unit. Most of the 
information supplied by the BoZ was obtained from the Zambian Central Statistical 
Office. Other information was acquired from literature and the more recent information 
that is not well recorded in the literature was in a few instances obtained from primary 
sources, especially through interviews. 
 
2.1.6 Research strategy 
 
The research strategy employed for analysing the research encompasses, as a starting 
point, the development of a theoretical framework, achieved through comparing various 
appropriate complementary and rival theories. The comparison enables the 
identification of different views on the problem and the exposure of loose ends of the 
different theories, which improve the explanatory depth of the issues under 
consideration. Subsequently, the data and empirical evidence are analysed by way of 
constantly testing them against appropriate literature and theoretical arguments for the 
different issues under consideration, which facilitate the identification of more plausible 
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explanations of the theories. The philosophical foundation of this method of analysis is 
‘the principle of inference to the best explanation’, entailing the inferring of hypotheses 
(or preformulated questions in the case of the study) that correctly provide the best 
explanation for the available evidence (Wuyts, 1992:4-5).  
 
An inductive approach is largely employed in the study, through the process of 
eliminating those aspects of theory that are considered implausible in explaining events, 
while retaining those that provide a more plausible explanation. In this way, the data 
and empirical evidence contribute to theory building. Also, since theory is not 
considered in the study to offer definitive answers but to provide only possible 
conclusions to be tested against empirical evidence, the approach of the study is largely 
positivist, rather than rationalist. The inductive approach employed in the study in 
particular encompasses the testing of issues, drawn from the theoretical perspectives 
and literature reviews on privatisation and private- and state-owned enterprises, the 
roles of TNCs and the roles of the state and the market, against the Zambian mining 
sector.  
 
A deductive method involving the use of certain theoretical criteria as the standard, 
against which actual events are compared is also employed, but to a lesser extent. The 
deductive method is mainly utilised to enable an evaluation of government policies 
against the preconditions several theorists consider pivotal for ensuring more beneficial 
privatisation and activities of TNCs in developing countries. A deductive method is also 
employed to assist analysis of the capacity of the Zambian government. 
 
2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY 
 
Notable weaknesses of the methodology entail the possible shortcomings and 
inaccuracies of certain statistical data. The inaccuracies and shortcomings arise from the 
fact that statisticians of national income accounting in many developing countries often 
having to resort to intelligent guesswork to fill the gaps and because of difficulties in 
obtaining statistical information as a continuous series for the period under investigation 
(1964 to 2006/7), especially for the earlier years. Significant weaknesses also exist in 
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more recent national statistics from the 1990s, reflected in the major discrepancies 
between official figures and those of multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank.  
 
In particular, the non-monetary statistics of the BoZ are questionable. Accordingly, 
rather than employing statistics only from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and from 
the BoZ, several other sources of information were also used in instances where the 
official figures appeared to be inaccurate. The study relies heavily on the Economist 
Intelligence Unit for several sets of data. Allowances should therefore be made for 
inaccuracies that occurred as a consequence of possible statistical imprecision at the 
source or from having to switch to different sources to fill the gaps.  
 
More specifically, data on GDP by expenditure and of the balance of payments possibly 
have shortcomings, owing to inadequate methodology and unreliable data sources in 
Zambia. Imports from Zimbabwe were under-reported, with official figures likely to 
capture less than half the total (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:42, 49, 
2008b:25). Moreover, official GDP growth data fail to adequately capture the activities 
of smaller sectors, such as wholesale and retail, trade and business services (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:25). 
 
The sectoral contribution from 1989 to 1994 also varies greatly among different 
sources. Furthermore, while the IMF and the Economist Intelligence Unit disaggregated 
the contribution of mining and of manufacturing to GDP before the 1990s, these were 
subsequently lumped together under the ‘contribution of industry to GDP’, making it 
difficult to disaggregate the trends in the contribution of mining and manufacturing to 
GDP. The national statistics further do not capture structural changes in the economy, 
since calculations of the data are still based on 1994 weightings (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:49, 2008b:25).5 While the official monetary data correspond 
fairly closely to the IMF figures, these are often substantially revised and not published 
                                                 
5
    However, a new economic census is currently under way (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:25). 
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elsewhere, other than the monthly fiscal data provided to the IMF (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008b:25).  
 
In addition, although the mining companies provide annual or periodic reports to the 
Mines Safety Department, the Ministry of Mines, the Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA), the BoZ and the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) and others, these 
reports are not publicly accessible (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:17). Furthermore, the 
investment, employment and profit figures for some of the firms are not recorded 
clearly in annual reports, and the data on contributions to national tax from each of the 
mining companies are difficult to obtain. An assessment of the performance of the 
mining sector, based on profit, was therefore not possible within the scope of the study.  
 
Problems encountered during the fieldwork in Zambia encompassed frequent 
cancellation and postponement of pre-arranged interviews that tended to be the rule 
rather than the exception. Managers at Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), under 
government majority ownership, following Anglo American’s departure, also cancelled 
pre-arranged interviews on the basis that the interviews might jeopardise the sale of the 
company. Moreover, officials mostly neglected to respond to queries concerning 
discrepancies or likely inaccuracies in the statistics. However, since the statistics are 
largely used for descriptive, rather than for analytical econometric purposes, minor 
imprecisions are unlikely to significantly influence the accuracy of interpretations. 
Furthermore, since the privatisation of the mines was only completed in 2000, the 
longer-term effects of the privatisation and private ownership of the mines by the TNCs 
on the economy have not as yet played out and are difficult to predict because of the 
influences of various variables, not least the international demand for copper, on the 
development of the mining sector. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The main groups of theoretical arguments and literature reviews drawn on to address the 
research questions are: (i) privatisation and private and state ownership of enterprises; 
(ii) the roles of TNCs; and (iii) the roles of the state. 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE 
AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
Privatisation involves the transfer of ownership of SOEs from the public to the private 
sector; often termed divestiture6 or denationalisation (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:220; 
Low, 1991:1). The theoretical investigation of privatisation and private and state 
ownership firstly entails an evaluation of the privatisation of SOEs and of private and 
state ownership. This is followed by a consideration of the preconditions for ensuring a 
more successful privatisation. 
 
3.1.1 Evaluation of the privatisation of SOEs and of state and private ownership  
 
Pro-privatisation proponents ascribe two central advantages to the privatisation and the 
private ownership of SOEs. These include:  
i. An augmentation of government revenue from the sales of the SOEs, from taxing 
private companies and from the elimination of state subsidies that would, by 
reducing fiscal imbalance, improve public finances (public finance effect). 
ii. Improvements in the performance of the company, partly owing to greater x-
efficiency objectives of private companies (Pinheiro, Buchs, Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
Adam, et al., 1992, cited in Bova, 2009:4; World Bank, 1992, cited in Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000b:8). 
 
(i) Increases in government revenue 
 
The argument of the pro-privatisation proponents, also of the World Bank, that 
privatisation would increase government revenue and subsequently improve the fiscal 
imbalance, is not invariably correct. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, government 
                                                 
6
    Divestiture is more narrowly concerned with the sale of equity or assets of (SOEs) as well as the outright liquidation of 
enterprises as legal entities (Bennell, 1997:1786). 
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budgets received only a fraction of the proceeds from privatisation and the contributions 
of the proceeds to the budget were, in some instances, wiped out. Moreover, the effects 
of privatisation in these countries tend to be confined more to a damage-limitation 
exercise, rather than an economic booster. The poor gains were mainly owing to 
proceeds being channelled, by law, to extra-budgetary funds to finance specific 
activities or operations, such as settling liabilities and retrenchment or severance 
payment costs (Buchs, 2003:11, 12, 40, 41). 
 
Increases in government revenue from privatisation would also significantly depend on 
the sale price of the SOEs (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:221; Pennings, 2008:484). If the 
SOE is sold at a price below the net income flow7 that the enterprise would have created 
if it remained in the public sector, without reform, in the long run, the state will gain 
financially only if it obtains sufficient tax payments from the newly privatised 
enterprises (Buchs, 2003:12, 13; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:221). The auction design is 
also important in determining government revenue from privatisation (Pennings, 
2008:484).  
 
For instance, higher government revenue would be obtained when the privatisation 
involves a cash-only bid over pledged investment. However, compulsory investment 
and retained shareholding by the government, if both are announced before the auction, 
would also hold considerable benefits for the government (Pennings, 2008:489). Cash 
payments would however have limited benefits if corrupt practices are involved in the 
privatisation process. As the winners of the privatisation process are likely to transfer 
money to safe havens, especially when deep depressions contribute to low returns, or 
when large-scale corruption was involved in the privatisation process, resources might 
also leave the country (Stiglitz, 2002:144).  
 
Under private ownership, an increase in government tax revenue from private 
enterprises will depend on the level of pre-privatisation subsidisation and on the overall 
efficiency of the tax system (Buchs, 2003:13). Moreover, higher profitability and 
                                                 
7
    Some SOEs are sold well below the maximum that rational private buyers would offer, partly due to incorrect financial records, 
to speed up the process, or due to a wish to subsidise the private sector (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 2000b:23). 
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efficiency at private firm level may not necessarily translate into improved tax revenue. 
Tax evasion tactics of private firms and weaker tax administration of the government 
under private ownership, pertaining to several sub-Saharan countries, may lower tax 
revenue. Privatisation has been less decisive than profound tax administration reform 
for revenue performance (Buchs, 2003:12, 13). Potential tax revenue under private 
ownership would further be eroded if the new private owners receive benefits, such as 
tax deductions, duty free imports, tariff protection and priority access to credit and other 
scarce inputs (World Bank, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:20, 21).  
 
(ii) Performance improvement of companies 
 
Dominant factors that neo-classical theorists attribute to the superior performance of 
private companies over SOEs, assessed below, are: (i) the different performance 
objectives of respective principals (the owner, recipient of dividends, or a shareholder 
of residual profits); (ii) the superior incentive arrangements and control of managers 
under private ownership; and (iii) greater weaknesses in the organisational structures of 
SOEs over private companies (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:7, 36).  
 
• Objectives of principals 
 
The different interests of the shareholders and of the wider public, the respective 
principals of private- and state-owned firms, force agents (managers) of private and 
public enterprises to promote dissimilar economic outcomes, according to neo-classical 
theorists. At times, managers in SOEs also serve the interests of government 
departments for which they are responsible, in which case the government is the 
principal (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:7). The government, as an agent of the wider public, 
in their dealings with industry, pursues electoral-maximising motives over profit-
maximising and cost-reduction objectives. In pursuing the interests of its voters, the 
government is encouraged to maximise economic welfare objectives, by way of 
maximising allocative efficiency (whereby the output level of the firm is maximised at a 
socially optimal level, within a given cost structure) but limits enterprise efficiency.8 
This is in line with public interest theory (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:8, 27, 36).  
                                                 
8
    Which is defined by some form of welfare function (the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses). 
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On the other hand, privatisation involves a change in both the principals’ objectives 
from welfare maximisation to profit maximisation. Profit-maximisation objectives 
under private ownership are achieved through greater internal or x-efficiency motives of 
private companies, over SOEs that are considered as invariably inefficient, according to 
neo-classical theorists. X-efficiency implies a lower total cost of production for a given 
output level (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:20, 21).  
 
Company performance would, therefore, improve under private ownership, mainly 
owing to more efficient use of an asset than under government ownership (Lopez-de 
Silanes, 1997, cited in Pennings, 2008:489). Accordingly, ownership matters in 
determining company performance, in the view of neo-classical theorists (Commander 
& Killick, 1988, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:22). Privatisation would, though, 
affect a fall in output, since the government no longer subsidises the newly privatised 
firm to maintain inefficiently high output levels, according to Boycho et al. (1993, cited 
in Boubakhri & Cosset, 1999:20). However, in the case of mining resources, where the 
price is determined on the London Metal Exchange (LME), the role of the government 
in sustaining high production levels is less clear than the case with the utility sectors. 
 
Some theorists argue that theoretical and empirical evidence that SOEs are pervasively 
inefficient, by virtue of ownership per se, are unconvincing (Millward, 1988:157, cited 
in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:219; Chang & Singh, 1992:42, cited in Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000b:24). Depending on the effectiveness of the state as an agent and 
principal, SOEs may not necessarily be inefficient. For instance, in South Korea and 
Kenya, SOEs achieved significant profitability and efficiency and were sustained for 
lengthy periods (Song, 1993; Grosh, 1992, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:24).  
 
Moreover, privatisation per se would not automatically promote greater x-efficiency; 
and the conditions under which privatisation can achieve efficiency and equity are very 
limited, according to Sappington and Stiglitz (cited in Stiglitz, 1998:19). On the 
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contrary, when privatisation occurs with capital market liberalisation,9 rather than 
enhancing efficiency, growth and re-investment in the country, the incentive for 
corporate theft and asset stripping by insiders increases (in particular, when new firms 
are uncertain of their future). In such instances, growth might, in fact, be depressed. 
Local governments also have the incentive to strip the assets of newly privatised firms 
(Stiglitz, 2002:144, 155, 157, 158). Furthermore, regulatory reforms in transition 
economies in Eastern and Central Europe seem less an instrument of promoting 
efficiency and competition than a means for attracting private investment, by ensuring 
through regulation that private firms make an adequate return on their capital (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000b:18).  
 
Enterprise performance also needs to be viewed in the broader context, taking into 
account the economic, social and political reforms and of long-term sustainable 
improvements in the standard of living and the welfare of the country (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000b:24). The social aspects of privatisation have largely been overlooked 
in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily due to the tendency to focus on privatisation 
transactions, rather than sector reorganisation, including social objectives (Buchs, 
2003:40). Additionally, foreign ownership may be politically, economically and socially 
destabilising (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005:531). Accordingly, the welfare outcome of 
privatisation in a lower-income economy, in particular economic growth and the 
distribution of wealth and the poverty effects, is uncertain (Kikeri, 1998, cited in 
Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005:529).  
 
Furthermore, efficiency may be improved at the cost of employment, as was the case 
with the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The GDP of that country also fell by 54% and 
industrial production declined by almost 60% between 1990 and 1999 (Kemal, 1993, 
cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:21; Stiglitz, 2002:143). The decline in the GDP of 
the Soviet Union challenges the argument of pro-privatisation proponents that 
privatisation is expected to benefit growth by raising the returns to private capital 
accumulation (Stiglitz, 2002:143). Accordingly, overall efficiency, which is only 
                                                 
9
    Especially when an effective legal infrastructure to ensure good governance is absent. 
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possible if workers move from low-productivity jobs to high-productivity employment, 
might not always materialise with privatisation (Stiglitz, 2002:143).  
 
In cases where privatisation has failed to achieve economic efficiency or if the quality 
of human capital is adversely affected, for instance through reduced training and worker 
health, it would hinder growth (see, for example, Pineda & Rodriguez, 2002, cited in 
Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005:528). The negative impact of privatisation on some services 
and on net employment likely affected mainly the middle-lower income groups in sub-
Saharan countries (Buchs, 2003:40). However, the reduction in employment might have 
been necessary in sub-Saharan Africa as a damage control exercise and because SOEs 
are usually overstaffed (Buchs, 2003:21). Also, in growing sectors, the newly privatised 
firms could absorb surplus labour through new capital investment and more productive 
use of existing assets (Hikery, Nellis & Shirley, 1992, cited in Boubakri et al., 1999:28).  
 
• Incentives 
 
In addition to the stronger profit-maximisation objectives of their principals and 
property rights, the superior incentives that principals provide to agents in private 
companies, over SOEs, also account for the better performance of private enterprises, 
according to neo-classical theorists (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:7; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 
2000a:217). This is accomplished through the superior incentives ensuring a more 
effective principal-agent relation, by way of encouraging a modification of manager 
behaviour to align more closely to the objectives of the principal, namely, to strive for 
performance improvements (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:217; Low, 1991:27). In 
particular, property rights theorists, who reject profit-maximisation as the behavioural 
guide, place the emphasis more on the principal-agent relationship than on ownership, 
in determining company performance (Low, 1991:27). In their view, managers, rather 
than owners, pursue their own interests in firms. Incentives provided to managers of 
private firms considered to promote profit-maximising objectives, include the linking of 
rewards for manager performance to the companies’ share prices, via share ownership, 
or option schemes (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:7).  
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The contention as to the relative importance of the two arrangements, viz. incentives or 
ownership, in improving efficiency has led various theorists to argue that privatisation is 
not the only way of handling incentives and agency problems in the management of 
public firms. Rather, since managerial incentives do not pertain exclusively to private 
ownership but could also be directed to state managers to improve efficiency in SOEs, 
other types of incentives or the creation of effective incentives would improve 
efficiency under any type of ownership and are not exclusive to private ownership 
(Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:210, 2000b:24). The favourable outcomes of industrial 
reforms in China, as opposed to the poor performance of the Soviet Union under private 
ownership, are often used to support the argument that the privatisation would not 
necessarily result in improved enterprise efficiency, especially when widespread 
imperfections exist (Jefferson & Rawski, 1994:64; Lin et al., 1996, cited in Chang, 
McCall & Wang, 2003:416).  
 
Greater management autonomy, while the government still maintains overall control, is 
considered by some theorists as a sufficient incentive for socialist firms to become as 
efficient as their capitalist counterparts (Bardhan & Roemer, 1992:102, cited in Chang 
et al., 2003:415). Corporatisation of public firms10 in New Zealand and the reforms of 
large SOEs in Poland have had a positive influence on their performance (Hume & 
Pinto, 1993, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:24). In contrast, other theorists argue 
that ownership and control rights matter and have significant efficiency implications 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990, cited in Chang et al., 2003:415). The 
argument is somewhat supported by an empirical study on China’s Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), showing that management incentive contracts have positive 
but a less significant impact on efficiency, over well-defined stock-based ownership 
rights (Chang et al., 2003:426).11 However, more studies are necessary to investigate the 
effects of alternatives to total privatisation.  
 
                                                 
10
    Essentially involving a reorganising of a government body into a company that would still be owned by the government but the 
corporatised entity would be subjected to the discipline of the marketplace, encompassing also a more streamlined and responsive 
civil service (Low, 1991:188, 189). 
11
    This was the case even during the transition period when market-supporting institutions were still developing. 
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Under state control with performance contracts, the lack of financial discipline and 
performance accountability may undermine the efficiency of enterprises (Bennell, 
1997:1800). Reforms of SOEs, through performance contracts, require commitment by 
both parties, some recapitalisation of the enterprise, enforceable targets, incentives and 
censure or financial punishment in the event of poor performance that are not always 
easily achievable (World Bank, 1994, cited in Bennell, 1997:1800). SOEs would 
nevertheless be desirable over private firms, in instances involving ‘strategic’ activities 
(activities possessing strong positive externalities, such as technological development, 
labour training and public health provision)12 in competitive markets (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000a:211-212). 
 
Furthermore, since improvements in the performance of enterprises are also dependent 
on factors other than ownership, an assessment of the differences in the performance of 
firms based solely on ownership is simplistic and highly misleading, according to 
empirical studies on the relative performance of public and private industries in the UK 
(Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:8, 9). A complex of additional contributing factors, besides 
ownership, also influences management incentive structure and economic performance. 
These factors include the age, scale and technological progressiveness of the industry, 
market structure,13 organisation, institution building (including forms of external 
regulation)14 and political economy (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:211; Chang & Singh, 
1992:54, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:24).  
 
• The monitoring and control of managers  
 
Less effective monitoring and control of managers by the principals under state 
ownership over private ownership of companies are further responsible for the poorer 
performance of SOEs in comparison with that of private firms, in the view of property 
rights theorists. This is because the less effective monitoring and control of managers 
contribute to public managers being less motivated to maximise the value of the assets 
of public enterprises (Hanke, 1986:16, cited in Low, 1991:27; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 
                                                 
12
    Private firms would be unable to recover the full social benefits created by such activities. 
13
    Or the degree of competition in the market. 
14
    Include the effectiveness of monitoring systems, which is influenced by the availability of the relevant institutional 
environment. 
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2000a:210). Constraints on managers pursuing their own objectives or interests and on 
poor financial performance under private ownership include shareholder monitoring and 
the possibility of takeovers if firms perform badly, and of bankruptcy in the case of 
default (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:11; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:210).  
 
On the other hand, the absence of incentives under SOEs15 and the lack of deterrents, 
such as a bankruptcy and takeover constraint (since SOEs, by nature, cannot be taken 
over) for poor financial performance preclude capital markets and the takeover 
constraints from being employed to promote and to control manager performance under 
public ownership (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:210; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988:27). 
Under government ownership, the diffusion of property rights among a large number of 
shareholders diminishes the incentive to individuals to incur the substantial information 
costs needed to monitor and control management and employees’ behaviour in SOEs. In 
instances where control is exercised under state bureaucracy, the control is either weak 
or the objectives pursued may contradict enterprise efficiency, according to property 
rights theory. Moreover, it is argued that the roles of the state, often as both the 
principal and agent (since the government is both the manager and the recipient of 
dividends under state ownership), further reduce the effective control and monitoring of 
managers of SOEs, as compared to those of managers under private ownership (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000a:210). 
 
The neo-classical argument that capital markets and the possibility of a takeover act as 
constraints to discipline poor management performance under private ownership may 
not necessarily operate in developing countries. The general absence of or the poor 
levels of competitiveness of capital markets, especially in developing countries, render 
them ineffective as regulators of manager performance within private firms in these 
countries (Craig, 1991, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:17). Moreover, the rule of 
takeover (which encourages internal or manager efficiency) is considered to apply only 
to smaller firms that are more vulnerable than larger firms to takeover constraints. This 
implies that takeover threats cannot act as a reprimanding device against the manager 
                                                 
15
    By virtue of the government being both the owner and recipient of dividends. 
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inefficiencies of larger firms (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:210-211; Vickers & Yarrow, 
1988:24).  
 
• Weaknesses within organisational structures of SOEs 
 
Weaknesses within organisational structures of SOEs represent an additional reason for 
the poorer performance and management of SOEs, according to pro-privatisation 
proponents. The weaknesses firstly include the lack of management autonomy16 in 
government bureaucracies, since politicians tend to intervene directly in managerial 
decisions, which is likely to stifle decision-making (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:209, 
216, 217; Low, 1991:25; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:32). Secondly, internal inefficiencies 
in bureaucracies, such as inadequate staffing, especially at managerial level (the likely 
outcome of poor terms and conditions under state ownership), act as a disincentive for 
attracting capable managers, which also contribute to the poorer performance of SOEs 
(Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:209). The private sector is considered as better able to 
attract and mobilise skilled talent than the government (Low, 1991:25). The above 
discussion nevertheless shows that incentives can also improve under SOEs. 
 
A third weakness that pro-privatisation proponents ascribe to the poorer performance of 
SOEs relates to the multiple and contradictory government objectives. These objectives, 
forcing the government to trade off commercial profit and social objectives, render it 
difficult for the government to achieve both goals simultaneously, with commercial 
profits likely to suffer. Social objectives may also be displaced by political objectives 
under state ownership, according to neo-classical theorists. Fourthly, tendencies of 
corruption and nepotism under government ownership are further considered to 
undermine the performance of SOEs (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:209, 216, 217; 
Vickers & Yarrow, 1988:30, 34). However, the very privatisation that is often sold as a 
solution to the endemic corruption that plagues SOEs, has created new patronage 
opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that privatisation did not eliminate rents 
(Buchs, 2003:41). 
 
                                                 
16
    Which is necessary to take decisions in response to market opportunities. 
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3.1.2 Preconditions for more successful privatisation 
 
Certain preconditions, often absent in developing countries, are necessary for 
privatisation to have a more positive impact on development. Privatisation is generally 
less successful in sub-Saharan countries, compared to that in the developed and East 
Asian countries (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000b:15). Kenneth Arrow’s groundbreaking 
work on the dynamics of why and when market economies work and how economies 
change concludes that privatisation is secondary in importance to competition and the 
creation of an institutional infrastructure for a market economy (Stiglitz, 1998:19, 20, 
2002:182). Competition is, however, not relevant in the case of the mining sector in 
Zambia, as the copper price is determined on the LME and foreign countries are the 
predominant consumers of Zambia’s copper. Effective legal structures (covering 
contracts, bankruptcy and corporate governance) and institutional structures for strong 
corporate governance and corporate restructuring have great relevance (Stiglitz, 
2002:157, 220).  
 
Without adequate legal and institutional structures, the significant management 
autonomy and discretion that private companies possess would expose private firms to 
organisational challenges not dissimilar to those of public enterprises. The discretion 
that private companies possess is mainly on account of shareholders’ lack of direct 
contact with the daily activities of the enterprise (similar to the legislature in public 
companies). Also, a World Bank study of transition economies shows that privatisation 
without effective institutional infrastructures for corporate governance has no positive 
effect on growth (Stiglitz, 2002:19, 20). Institutional transformations have been the 
weakest link in the reform agenda and undermined the credibility of privatisation in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Buchs, 2003:46). Enforcement problems have also greatly limited 
the effectiveness of institutions in sub-Saharan countries. Institution and capacity 
building need to be part of the reform agenda in a more systematic way in these 
countries (Buchs, 2003:1, 44).  
 
Moreover, privatisation will gain greater legitimacy and would likely be more 
successful if measures are introduced to reduce its negative impact on the broader 
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society, such as benefits to the unemployed and adjustment to pensions and salaries in 
line with inflation. These measures, together with the creation of an institutional 
infrastructure,17 account to some extent for Poland’s more effective market economy, 
compared to those of other East European countries (Stiglitz, 2002:181, 262). In the 
case of China the more successful transition was also as a result of the democratic 
support for reform and of the creation of institutional infrastructures such as an effective 
Securities and Exchange Commission, bank regulation and safety nets. This is an aspect 
to which the IMF gives insufficient consideration. Democratic support for the reforms 
in China was largely attained through the maintenance of social stability at the time that 
SOEs were downsized, through an avoidance of massive unemployment and through 
the creation of new jobs in tandem with restructuring18 – viz. through ‘creative 
destruction’ (Stiglitz, 2002:183, 184).  
 
Furthermore, the pace, sequencing and scope of privatisation and regulation are highly 
significant in enabling a more orderly restructuring. A rapid privatisation, or the ‘shock 
therapy’ that radical market reformers such as the IMF favour, would likely carry 
political costs that would hinder further reforms in the absence of effective legal and 
institutional structures (Stiglitz, 1998:19, 22). Insufficient regard for how privatisation 
was achieved and paying too little attention to the policy’s social and distributional 
consequences have facilitated corruption and rampant inflation19 and contributed to 
decreases in income and increases in inequality in Russia (Stiglitz, 2002:144, 157, 169). 
The greater success of China in the transition towards a market economy can be further 
attributed to a more gradual approach before privatisation was introduced, which 
allowed for the establishment of new enterprises and job creation, and a restructuring of 
the existing structures. A more gradual approach to privatisation enables better 
sequencing of reform and the creation of the prerequisites for good privatisation 
(Stiglitz, 2002:162, 184). 
 
 
                                                 
17
    Such as banks that lend, legal systems that can enforce contracts and a process of bankruptcies. 
18
    Which involves the elimination of the old economy by creating a new one (Stiglitz, 2002:183). 
19
    Which wiped out the savings of many countries. 
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3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLES OF TNCs 
 
The term ‘TNCs’ refers to companies producing in more than one country and is not 
used in the study in the formal sense, as defined by Hirst and Thompson (1996:11).20 
The economic roles of mining TNCs and their relations with the governments of host 
countries are investigated using the arguments mainly of pro-TNC proponents (the neo-
classical theorists and Marxist neo-fundamentalists) and of TNC critics (the Global 
Reach and Marxist neo-imperialist theorists – the latter include the dependency 
theorists), according to the categorisation of Jenkins (1987:17). Notwithstanding the 
dissimilar views on the ultimate outcome of TNCs’ activities, the Marxist neo-
fundamentalists support the neo-classical perspective that TNCs play a progressive role, 
especially in developing host countries. This perspective contrasts with the stance of 
non-Marxist Global Reach theorists (derived from Hymer’s industrial organisation 
theory) and of Marxist neo-imperialist theorists that TNCs play a subversive role in 
these countries.  
 
Mining sector activities, which demand high technological and capital requirements and 
where the rent element21 is expected to collect major returns, require strong government 
bargaining skills to ensure that the greatest possible share of the rent element accrues to 
the host country (Chang, 1998:238). Nwoke defines mining rent as “the difference 
between the market price of a unit of mineral resource sold in the form of finished 
products and the total average costs incurred in discovering, producing, transporting, 
refining, and marketing the unit of that particular mineral resource. Total average costs 
are current costs, and a fair rate of return required by a private firm in the minerals 
industries” (Nwoke, 1984:42, cited in Ciccantell, Smith & Seidman, 2005:6, 7). Several 
theorists attribute the poor performance of especially African resource-rich economies 
to certain weaknesses in the governance of these countries, rather than to mining itself. 
This view suggests that the ‘resource curse’ argument promoted by some theorists, 
                                                 
20
    According to their definition, TNCs are considered as truly global entities serving global markets through global operations with 
internationalised management and their locational decisions are motivated largely by where returns are highest and most secured. 
Accordingly, TNCs would not be based in one predominant national location (as with multinational companies) but are truly 
footloose without specific national identification and they are able to operate effectively independent of parent companies and 
unconstrained by the politics of particular nation states. Since this is not necessarily the case with the foreign mining companies in 
Zambia, the more appropriate term for these companies is ‘multinational’ rather than ‘transnational companies’. 
21
    Nwoke (1984) broadens Marx’s concept of rent to the extraction of minerals in peripheral nations. 
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namely that resource-abundant countries display poor economic growth and 
development outcomes (see, for example, Sachs and Warner, 1997), needs not be 
inevitable. 
 
Accordingly, key considerations in the theoretical debate on TNCs in the mining sector 
entail an examination of the contributions of TNCs to capital and technology, which are 
significant requirements in the mining sector. The returns to the local economy from the 
activities of TNCs in the mining sector are then investigated. This is followed by an 
examination of the roles of the government in ensuring more favourable outcomes from 
the participation of TNCs in the host country, in particular its bargaining leverage to 
ensure that the greatest possible share of rent from mining accrues to the host country. 
 
3.2.1 Contribution of TNCs to capital and technology  
 
This section assesses the theoretical argument that TNCs supplement the capital and 
technology of developing countries that would otherwise be lacking. The supplement 
assumption (that foreign resources supplement domestic resources, without which local 
production would be limited) and the resource generation assumption (that TNCs 
generate additional resources to utilise previously unused resources) justify the 
existence of TNCs in host countries, according to neo-classical theorists (Jenkins, 
1987:19). In the conceptualisation of earlier neo-classical theorists, Direct Foreign 
Investment (DFI)22 increases the capital stock of host countries by way of capital flows 
that it facilitates between nations, encouraged through differential rates of return.  
 
More recent neo-classical proponents of the product cycle model (for example, Vernon, 
1979)  and of ‘internalisation’ (including Buckley & Casson, 1985)  ascribe the transfer 
of technology to the host country, by TNCs, as even more important than the transfer of 
capital, which because of external market imperfections, such technology transfers 
would otherwise not take place in developing host countries (Jenkins, 1987:20; 
Helleiner, 1989:1451). The imperative to sell a product at a competitive price, or at a 
                                                 
22
    DFI is defined by the IMF as ‘investment made to acquire a lasting interest in a foreign enterprise with the purpose of having an 
effective voice in its management.’ It includes all flows (direct or through affiliates) from the investor, as well as reinvestment 
earnings, net borrowing and equity capital (IMF 1985, cited in Helleiner, 1989:1445).  
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lower cost, when the product cycle is at a mature and therefore standardised stage,23 
enables developing countries to obtain technology at relatively favourable terms, 
through TNCs, according to the model (Vernon, 1979, cited in Buckley, 1985:8).  
 
Neo-fundamentalists share the neo-classical arguments that foreign capital complements 
rather than displaces indigenous capital through benefits such as technology and capital 
transfers; that TNCs supplement and generate additional resources; and that TNCs open 
the markets of developed countries for the developing countries (Warren,24 1980, cited 
in Jenkins, 1987:31 and 32). Emmanuel (1976) emphasised in particular the low-cost 
technological contributions of TNCs to host countries (cited in Jenkins, 1987:32). The 
market-seeking production activities of firms that the product cycle model emphasises 
nevertheless fail to explain resource-based, efficiency-seeking or strategic asset-
acquiring DFI (Dunning, 1993:71).  
 
However, according to the ‘real options view of investment’, an initial ‘wait and see’ 
attitude of investors may encourage investors to postpone their investments. The real 
options view is based on the assumption of irreversible investment costs (namely, the 
capital loss to the investor when disposing of investment goods in a second-hand 
market) and of the uncertainty of future pay-offs and of future output prices. The greater 
the uncertainty and the higher the value of the potential investment, the greater would 
be the likelihood that the firm would postpone its investment decision. Possible 
investments that foreign companies possess elsewhere would likely ease losses in 
returns that they might incur from the postponements (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, cited in 
Andersson, 2000:79). The ‘real options’ approach is highly relevant in the African 
context (Andersson, 2000:79).  
 
The real options approach is contrary to the neo-classical model of investment of 
Jorgenson (1963). Jorgenson’s model asserts that the firm chooses its capital stock so as 
to maximise the present value of the future cash flow, assumed to be known with 
                                                 
23
    The cost is also reduced because the labour-intensive stage of production that marks the mature stage is carried out in less 
developed countries where labour is cheap. 
24
    One of the main proponents of neo-fundamentalism. 
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certainty, and it also assumes that the firm can sell the excess capital without a loss. 
That is, the firm chooses its capital stock to equalise the marginal product of capital 
with the user cost of capital (cited in Andersson, 2000:79).  
 
Moreover, in the analysis of neo-imperialists, practices that drain the surpluses or 
resources from especially Third World host countries, inter alia by way of repatriating 
monopoly profits, are considered to contribute to ‘blocking the development25 and 
socialist transformation’26 and to the ‘development of underdevelopment’27 in host 
developing countries. Underdevelopment obstructs the capital accumulation that is 
essential for economic progress in host countries (Helleiner, 1989:1453; Jenkins, 
1987:28, 29). The introduction of risks and the negative repercussions of locally 
disintegrated and externally dependent economies that TNCs’ activities tend to 
generate, also promote underdevelopment, in the view of the dependency school 
(Helleiner, 1989:1454; Padayachee, 1995:164). The stagnation and decay of 
underdevelopment created by the participation of TNCs in developing countries would, 
in fact inhibit technical progress in the host country, according to Lenin (1917, cited in 
Jenkins, 1987:27, 28). These activities of TNCs contrast with the resource generation 
and supplement assumptions of neo-classical theorists that TNCs play a positive role in 
the development of host countries. 
 
Also, financing DFI by borrowing from local banks would make national gains in the 
supply of capital and foreign exchange unlikely. Additionally, if the resources are not 
invested within the host country, then the borrowing would effectively amount to a 
capital outflow (Helleiner, 1989:1455). Benefits of TNCs to the host countries depend 
on how much capital and foreign exchange is supplied and whether they merely 
substitute domestic inputs (Helleiner, 1989:1455). 
 
An over-reliance on TNCs may create distortions in the local social, political and 
economic environment that may deflect development of the host countries from a more 
                                                 
25
    Amin’s term. 
26
    According to the Monthly Review School (especially Baran, Sweezy, O’Connor and Magdoff). 
27
    Frank’s term. 
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desirable and balanced path, in the conceptualisation of dependency theorists. The 
distortions may include a highly unequal income distribution, a strengthening of 
domestic concentrations of economic and political power together with the stifling of 
national entrepreneurship, indigenous research and development (Helleiner, 
1989:1454). Furthermore, in the analysis of neo-imperialists, crucial decisions on 
production and on accumulation of TNCs follow the global interests of the parent 
company, which do not always suit the interests of local capital (Jenkins, 1987:29). 
 
3.2.2 Returns to the local economy from the activities of mining TNCs 
 
Exhaustible resources require adequate capturing of rent by the government and the 
reinvestment of the capital allowance component in alternative forms of capital assets, 
to promote national development and to maximise long-term revenue to compensate for 
depletion or their limited income and employment potential (Blignaut & Hassan, 
2002:89-101; Blignaut & Hassan, 2001, cited in Cawood et al., 2001:157). The 
alternative renewable forms of capital assets that revenue from non-renewable resources 
should be invested in include the creation of new wealth and forms of renewable capital, 
such as human, social and physical capital, which are central to achieving sustainable 
development beyond mining (Pedro, 2004:6). Accordingly, the main determinants of the 
returns to the local economy from the activities of TNCs in the copper mining sector in 
Zambia considered in the study are: (i) increases in government revenue, and the 
foreign currency earnings of Zambia; and (ii) the development of the local capacities, 
especially the suppliers and workers of the mines.  
 
(i) The roles of mining TNCs in increasing government revenue and foreign currency 
earnings 
 
An adequate fiscal take from mining is necessary to enable the government to meet 
requirements of capital generation for reinvestment in projects and in social capital 
(Macfarlane, cited in Cawood et al., 2001:220 and 221). Accordingly, the tax system of 
the mining sector provides a measure of the integration of this sector to the rest of the 
economy (Bova, 2009:2). A reduced ability of governments to tax mobile factors (partly 
as a result of tax competition) that lowers government revenue put pressure on 
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government expenditures in productive sectors28 that are vital for the economic 
development of countries (see, for example, Ebrill et al., 1999; IMF, 2005a; Glendy, 
2006, cited in Volkering, 2009:3).  
 
Rather than improving the revenue and resources of the government through 
supplementing foreign exchange earnings and the local savings of Third World host 
countries, TNCs drain the resources of these countries, in the conceptualisation of neo-
imperialists and Global Reach theorists. Transfer-pricing practices, through certain 
accounting procedures that are not always reflected in the tax returns of subsidiaries, 
would also facilitate the draining of surpluses and have negative redistributive 
implications for developing countries, according to Global Reach theorists. The 
problem of transfer-pricing relates to “the absence of market friction in transactions 
between controlled persons and the resulting need to verify prices in such transactions 
for income tax purposes and, if necessary, to adjust for that absence” (Rosenbloom, 
2005, cited in Bhat, 2009:1).  
 
(ii) Roles of mining TNCs in promoting local capacities 
 
In the case of non-renewable resources, it is necessary to develop not only mineral 
clusters but also lateral or down-stream businesses that have the potential to create 
employment and generate value-added rents and wealth, according to Pedro (2004:6). 
However, other theorists downplay the benefits of developing backward and forward 
linkages to mining, mainly because the capital-intensive nature of modern mining 
operations renders them heavily reliant on foreign capital, with poor local production 
linkages (Lewis, 1982; Auty, 1993, cited in Cawood et al., 2001:220, 221). These 
theorists consider fiscal linkages the strongest linkage between the mining sector and 
the national economy, rather than backward and forward linkages.  
 
Moreover, contrary to the claim of neo-classical and neo-fundamentalist theorists that 
TNCs supplement local resources, Global Reach theorists argue that certain practices of 
TNCs may contribute to the displacement or substitution of local capital and 
                                                 
28
    Such as infrastructure, education and healthcare. 
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entrepreneurship (Hirschman, 1969, cited in Jenkins, 1987:25). Such practices 
encompass restrictive business practices29 through clauses that tie various inputs to the 
technology suppliers, restricting exports to divide world markets (through TNCs acting 
collectively as cartels, or through collusions) and the packaged nature of DFI, which 
includes the import of capital and management (Jenkins, 1987:24, 25). Neo-imperialists 
share the view that TNCs substitute local capacities. De-nationalisation (that is, 
increasing foreign control of the local economy), the displacing and acquiring of 
profitable local capital and the moving of TNCs into new activities, while relegating 
local capital to the least profitable and most competitive sectors, also play a subversive 
role in the host country, in the analysis of these theorists. 
 
The practices of TNCs of substituting local capital reduce the local bourgeoisie to a 
‘comprador’ or dependent bourgeoisie position, incapable of playing their historic role 
of promoting capitalist development, according to neo-imperialists (Jenkins, 1987:29). 
In contrast, the Latin American dependency theorists discourage a close relationship 
between the local bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists, which they argue would not 
provide a basis for national development (Padayachee, 1995:164). The ‘dependency’ 
argument is not shared by neo-fundamentalists, who maintain that TNCs reduce, rather 
than cause dependence of host countries, by fortifying and diversifying host countries’ 
economies or by developing these countries’ productive forces (Jenkins, 1987:31).  
 
3.2.3 Roles of the government in promoting more beneficial outcomes from the 
participation of TNCs in the host country 
 
The roles of the government in promoting more beneficial outcomes from the 
participation of TNCs in the host country are examined by assessing government 
measures necessary for attracting TNCs and to guide their activities to more 
advantageous outcomes for the host country. The bargaining role of the government in 
directing the activities of TNCs towards more successful results is also explored.  
 
                                                 
29
    To preserve monopoly rent. 
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3.2.3.1 Government measures to attract TNCs 
 
The policy implications drawn from Rugman’s neo-classical risk-aversion hypothesis 
are that governments of developing countries should promote greater stability to attract 
TNCs and provide a favourable climate to attract investments by TNCs. The hypothesis 
considers TNCs as efficient entities and views the location of a firm’s investment as a 
function, in addition to the geographic distribution of its existing assets, also of the 
firm’s perception of uncertainties in potential host countries. Liberal trade policies and 
unrestricted trade and industrial policies are considered important for attracting DFI. 
Policies to attract TNCs should, though, not promote distortions (Rugman, cited in 
Jenkins, 1987:22; Dunning, 1993:173).  
 
However, the marginal increases in the share of DFI in developing countries in the 
1990s, regardless of extensive liberalisation policies, somewhat discredit the argument 
that liberal policies would attract well sought-after global TNCs (Chang, 1998:236). As 
long as restrictive government policies are not too excessive but are stable, with 
predictable changes, they do not represent a major factor influencing the locational 
decisions of especially larger TNCs and those with higher sunk costs30 that would likely 
accommodate these policies (Chang, 1998:237). The lowering of government taxes (or 
tax incentives, tax holidays and differentiated tax structures) proves less important than 
the general investment climate and policies affecting specific sectors in attracting DFI 
(Padayachee, 1995:166).  
 
Moreover, DFI would stimulate rapid economic growth only once a certain economic 
development threshold is attained, according to a study by Blomstom, Lepzig and 
Zeyan (cited in Padayachee, 1995:165). Rather than causing rapid industrialisation, DFI 
therefore seems to take place as a consequence of rapid industrialisation. Accordingly, 
the development of local capacities (which includes a stronger regulatory framework) 
and resources to enhance the general economic position of the host country and a stable 
political climate seem more important than liberal policies in attracting less footloose 
global TNCs (Chang, 1998). Section 3.3.1.2 elaborates on some factors that increased 
                                                 
30
    A cost that has been incurred and cannot be reversed (Investopedia, 2010). 
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the capacity of the governments in developmental states, which would also enhance the 
bargaining leverage of the government to ensure more successful outcomes for the host 
country from the activities of TNCs.  
 
3.2.3.2 Government measures to promote more advantageous outcomes for the host 
country 
 
A further policy prescription attributable to both earlier neo-classical theorists and 
‘internalisation theorists’ is that government regulation of TNCs’ activities, considered 
as always inefficient, needs to be removed or discouraged (Jenkins, 1987:22; 
Padayachee, 1995:164). However, liberal policies and the neo-classical appeal for the 
elimination of government interference in the economy may not necessarily have 
positive outcomes for the country. For instance, corporate objectives of TNCs to 
maximise profits over welfare might in fact have adverse consequences on the country 
and might sabotage trade and industrial policies of host countries’ governments (Panic, 
1998:264). Moreover, evidence exists that in cases where the state has played an active 
role, the local economy has benefited greatly from internationalisation (Evans, 1998). In 
particular, developmental theorists consider strong state involvement as necessary to 
effectively impact on decisions of TNCs (Jenkins, 1987:25, 26).  
 
Strong bargaining skills (elaborated upon in Section 3.2.3.3) and effective government 
measures are also necessary in the mining sector to ensure a greater capturing of the 
share of the benefits of the rent element for the host country from the activities of TNCs 
(Chang, 1998:238; UNECA, cited in Action Aid International, Christian Aid, Open 
Society Institute of Southern Africa, Third World Network Africa & Tax Justice 
Network Africa, 2009:x, 3). To reverse the ‘paradox of plenty’ and to obtain mineral 
wealth from mining revenue, necessary for development, the building of institutional 
capacities seems to be the most urgent challenge of minerals-dependent economies. 
Weak government institutions have been the root cause of Africa’s ‘resource curse’ 
(Action Aid International et al., 2009:viii, x; Bebbington, Hinojosa, Burneo & 
Warnaars, 2008:10). Good governance through effective institutions was fundamental in 
enabling Botswana with its rich natural resources to enjoy economic growth (Action 
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Aid International et al., 2009:3; Iimi, 2001:24).  
 
Measures to maximise long-term mineral revenue, enabled through an adequate 
capturing of rent by the government and reinvestment of its capital allowance 
components in alternative forms of capital assets, and to buffer short-term distortions of 
mineral price volatility are also necessary to limit the ‘resource curse’ (Lewis, 1982 and 
Auty, 1993, cited in Cawood et al., 2001:220 and 221). Better institutional capacities, 
which are lacking in many African mining economies, specifically require a reform of 
the laws, policies and institutions that govern financial payments made by mining 
corporations. The distribution of revenue from mineral rent is rarely a simple 
technocratic process but rather the result of complex political forces, requiring 
government policies that will ensure acceptable distributional balance among recipients 
of mineral rents (Cawood et al., 2001:153; Crowson, 1998, cited in Shen, 2001:11).  
 
The combined effect of taxation and spending represents an important avenue through 
which a more equitable distribution of income from mining becomes possible 
(Volkerink, 2009:3). However, the government has to balance its fiscal take from 
mining (to meet requirements of capital generation for reinvestment in projects and in 
social capital), with a firm’s willingness to invest (Macfarlane, cited in Cawood et al., 
2001:6; Otto, 2001:1). Too high taxes may prompt foreign investors to invest elsewhere. 
Conversely, if taxes are too low as is often the case with African countries competing 
for foreign mineral investment, the rent from mining dissipates almost exclusively to 
mining TNCs. These governments then needlessly forgo the collection of a fair share of 
mining rent (Action Aid International et al., 2009:vii, viii, x; Cawood et al., 2001:153; 
Otto, 2001:1).  
 
Stabilisation funds, aimed at reducing the impact of commodity price volatility on the 
economy, which would in turn improve greater predictability of the budget by 
stabilising spending patterns, may also achieve greater fiscal stability and discipline 
(Pedro, 2004:12; Luong & Weinthal, 2006:40). Again, strong state institutions, 
emphasising oversight, transparency and an independent judiciary, are necessary for 
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stabilisation funds to work, or else these funds could inadvertently reinforce the power 
and authoritarian tendencies in mineral-rich countries (Luong & Weinthal, 2006:40). 
Furthermore, studies suggest that in addition to better regulation, increased benefits can 
be achieved from DFI through greater transparency of foreign operations and by 
subjecting TNCs to competition from both local and other foreign firms (Padayachee, 
1995:166). 
 
Furthermore, the government should play a more proactive role in the selection process 
and in directing the activities of TNCs. In particular, rather than accepting footloose 
TNCs that are merely involved in cross-border linkages, the government should select 
DFI from global firms, which are likely to have significant positive spin-offs for the 
host countries. Global firms possess longer-term commitments and transfer skills and 
technology to the host country, which appears to have the strongest potential for 
indigenous development (Padayachee, 1995:173). Global firms are therefore important 
avenues for transferring expertise, finance and managerial assistance to local firms and 
for upgrading and consolidating technology and human resource capabilities of host 
countries (Gordon, 1994, cited in Padayachee, 1995:166).  
 
Moreover, industrial policies should aim to attract especially global TNCs that reinforce 
competitive advantages and that promote partnerships with host countries’ industrial 
and retail outlets, through vertical or backward and forward linkages, or through 
horizontal linkages. Such linkages would build local capacities, by improving human 
capital, manufacturing competitiveness and technological capabilities (Padayachee, 
1995:173). Horizontal linkages, involving partnerships of local industries with global 
TNCs’ research activities, will have positive local spillover or externality effects, 
including increased human capital development. These could potentially translate into 
dynamic comparative advantages for the host country (Padayachee, 1995:173). 
Especially vertical-linkages, where global TNCs outsource less core activities to 
producers of the host countries (to ensure that the capabilities of local suppliers match 
and integrate with the value chain of TNCs), promote employment opportunities, know-
how and appropriate resources (including technology) to local suppliers (Kozul-Wright, 
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1998:150, 152, 154).  
 
3.2.3.3 The role of bargaining of the government in affecting more successful outcomes 
from TNCs’ activities 
 
Host governments could influence the activities of TNCs in their countries, especially 
by way of bargaining, on account of the potential that exists for rent or quasi-rent, 
pertaining to oligopoly, and because of transfer-pricing practices and other market 
imperfections that characterise the activities of TNCs, according to Chang (1998:237). 
Employing the potentials of the country to attract and steer the activities of TNCs within 
targeted desired directions would also enable the government to enhance the economic 
welfare of their countries (Chang, 1998:237; Helleiner, 1989:1453, 1461). Neo-
fundamentalists also consider the international competition among TNCs important for 
increasing the bargaining power of developing countries.  
 
However, the assumptions of the bargaining paradigm that relationships among 
negotiating parties are established as a result of free choice and that the state acts in the 
interest of the members of its subjects do not always hold, especially in developing 
countries (Bruno Continni, 1968, cited in Lungu, 2008:3; Padayachee, 1995:164). The 
bargaining paradigm gives insufficient consideration to the potential for interest group 
divergences, which are influenced by political factors (especially captive powerful 
interests that determine the policy direction of the state) and by competition within the 
host country that may constrain bargaining. Forces outside the volition of the state may 
coerce the government to follow certain actions (Philips, 1976, cited in Helleiner, 
1989:1462; Padayachee, 1995:164; Lungu, 2008:4). 
 
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, certain approaches of the host government in the 
bargaining process would ensure more beneficial outcomes for the host country from 
the activities of TNCs and may be more important than a universal liberal policy.31 
Liberal policies would, in fact, reduce the manoeuvring power of the host country. A 
differentiated strategic approach that takes into account the contextual realities, the 
                                                 
31
    Encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank. 
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technological and other roles of the industry and the relative bargaining strengths of 
TNCs and governments to enable host countries to extract the maximum benefits 
possible from TNCs has proved more important than a universal liberal policy, 
according to Chang (1998:238).  
 
New domestic industries require a more liberal policy, while tougher localisation 
requirements, as well as other restrictions on TNCs are more appropriate when the 
technological capabilities of the local industry are well developed (Chang, 1998:238). 
The bargaining success of the host country is further determined by the information, 
political will, alliances, or competitiveness of the country in relation to other countries 
(and firms) and by domestic organisation (Helleiner, 1989:1461). The location and 
quality of minerals prove especially important in attracting TNCs in the mineral sector 
(Helleiner, 1989:1461). 
 
A corporatist role of the state that characterises developmental states, discussed in 
Section 3.3.1.2, denoting that the leadership role of the state is more important than its 
follower role, will also increase its bargaining leverage to deal more effectively with 
private foreign and internal economic interests. A corporatist role would enable the 
government to determine the role of TNCs’ capital, set terms that attract foreign capital 
(without conflicting with TNCs) and to serve the domestic economic development of 
the state (Leftwich, 1995:417). A leadership role necessitates a bolstering of the state’s 
capacity. 
 
Accordingly, in contrast to developing countries, the power of developmental states was 
first consolidated before foreign capital interests expanded, which augmented the 
bargaining leverage of governments in these countries (Leftwich, 1995:418). On the 
other hand, a host country’s bargaining leverage is particularly weak if, as is the case 
with mineral exploration activities, opportunities for profitable activities are doubtful 
(Helleiner, 1989:1463). Also, the bargaining strengths of host countries are weakest 
during periods before foreign firms have sunk inputs into the country, while the 
capacity of the TNCs to extract concessions from the host country will decline once it 
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has sunk its own inputs into the project (Helleiner, 1989:1463).  
 
3.3 A REVIEW OF PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLES OF THE STATE  
 
The roles of the state in the privatisation of SOEs and in influencing the activities of 
TNCs, assessed above, are subsets of the theoretical review of the roles of the state in 
the economy. The exposition of the roles of the state in the economy serves largely to 
put the pro-market, minimal government interventionist policies of the IMF and World 
Bank, instituted alongside the privatisation policies of the mines, into context. The 
discussion below examines first the theoretical perspectives on the roles of the 
government in the economy. This is followed by an examination of the theoretical 
arguments of the interests promoted through the state as well as by market-oriented 
policies. 
 
3.3.1 The roles of the government in the economy 
 
The various theoretical views on the roles of the government in the economy are 
evaluated below, followed by a brief consideration of measures considered necessary to 
enhance the capacity of the state in the economy. Main criteria that have accounted for 
the high capacity of developmental states that contributed to the exemplary growth and 
development of these countries are drawn upon in evaluating the capacity of the state.  
 
3.3.1.1 Theoretical perspectives on the roles of the government in the economy 
 
Besides recognition of a role for the government in promoting law and order and in 
establishing physical infrastructure, the neo-classical approach that favours pro-market 
or liberal polices demands a reduction in the role of the government in the economy or a 
de-politicisation of the economy. This approach permeates the SAPs32 and stabilisation 
policies33 of the IMF and the World Bank. Liberalisation involves the removal of 
government interference in financial and capital markets and the elimination of barriers 
to trade, enabling the free movement of goods, services, investment and capital flows 
between countries (Stiglitz, 2002:59).  
                                                 
32
    Involve policies of getting the prices right, by eliminating subsidies and protection, raising interest rates, lowering wages, 
devaluing the currency and privatisation (Fine and Stoneman, 1996:9). 
33
    Involve reduction of government and balance of payment deficits (Fine and Stoneman, 1996:9). 
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The neo-classical theorists’ criticisms of the state are thus not confined to government 
policies of import substitution and of financial repression but are levelled at the 
necessity of the state itself, considered as an irrational, corrupting force that prevents the 
rational management of the economy (cited in Chang, 1994:1, 8). Constraints on public 
action that limit government policies and generate internal political realignment also 
became more binding alongside foreign debt obligations and policy pressures of IMF 
and World Bank conditionalities (Shapiro and Taylor, 1990:876). The recommendation 
to de-politicise the economy, through diminishing the roles of those that can exercise 
political influence, will, more than market liberalisation, remain the most long-lasting 
legacy of the neo-liberal counter-revolution (Chang, 1994:8).  
 
Neo-classical theorists consider the ‘invisible hand’ of the competitive market as more 
effective than the government in reconciling the different desires of various individuals 
and the only viable path to development, which cannot be controlled by the state (cited 
in Chang, 1994:3). The premise that private agents have perfect foresight informed the 
neo-classical argument that the price mechanism, determined through markets, 
promotes robust growth and an effective allocation of resources. The price mechanism 
is also viewed as more capable than short- and long-term developmental goals of the 
government in achieving both short-term allocative efficiency and long-run dynamic 
efficiency (Williamson, 1990, cited in Stiglitz, 1998:1; Chang, 1994:3). 
 
Various counter-arguments against a minimalist non-interventionist role for the state 
takes specifically market failure as the point of departure. The market failure 
approaches describe a strong role for the government in complementing markets,34 in 
the context of imperfect information and incomplete markets, by way of correcting 
market failures, such as externalities and economies of scale and through the 
development of infant industries and public goods35 and in the building of 
                                                 
34
    That, singly, would not always yield efficient outcomes and socially acceptable distributions (a function that the Washington 
consensus fails to take into account). 
35
    Including maintaining law and order. 
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infrastructure36 (Fine & Stoneman, 1996:15; Stiglitz, 1998:24-25). Other theorists draw 
further upon recent endogenous growth theories or ‘new’ growth theories that 
emphasise increasing returns or expansionary spillovers through investment in 
education (cited in Amsden, 1997:469, 470; Fine & Stoneman, 1996:15).  
 
Stiglitz also envisages a crucial role for the government in the building of human capital 
and especially in the transfer of technology, both of which are key to development.37 In 
the absence of building these, the gap in public investment in human capital and in the 
transfer of technology (which has returns greater than research and development, when 
countries are not operating at the technological frontier), would unlikely be filled by the 
market. The state also has an important role in promoting fundamentals, such as 
economic policies, environmental protection and in the regulation of social protection 
and welfare (Stiglitz, 1998:5, 6, 25, 26, 32).  
 
Moreover, available evidence shows that the state-market dichotomy conceptualised by 
neo-classical theorists, as well as the notion of a balance between the state and the 
market, is misplaced in the African context. In fact, the provision of infrastructure, 
through state action, could extend the market. Evidence of public crowding-in for 
private and foreign investment is stronger than the contrary in these countries (Bangura 
& Gibbon, cited in Fine & Stoneman, 1996:19). The state nevertheless needs to 
withdraw once it completed its effective catalytic role, according to Stiglitz (1998:24, 
25). 
 
However, Amsden criticises the endogenous growth theory of expansionary spillovers 
through investment in education, arguing that in the absence of industrial policies to 
enable the absorption of school leavers, an unexpected brain drain and unemployment 
would preclude increasing returns through investment in education. Instead, Amsden 
shifts the focus to the need for establishing industrial policies (Amsden, 1997:469, 470). 
The market failure approach also omitted to take into account the capacity of the state to 
                                                 
36
    Such as education, health and roads.  
37
    Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) represents a policy through which the transfer of technology can be promoted (Stiglitz, 
1998:26). 
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identify and to implement policies to correct for market failures (Fine & Stoneman, 
1996:15).  
 
3.3.1.2 Measures enhancing the capacity of the state in the economy 
 
Instead of a wholesale reduction or a de-politicisation of the state, institutional change 
would lower the costs associated with state intervention. The political school, whose 
point of departure is the lack of political analysis of the ‘market failure approach’ and 
that seeks to identify the conditions under which the state is capable of being 
developmental, suggests an appropriate interventionist role for the government (Fine 
and Stoneman, 1996:15). A high capacity of the state, characteristic of developmental 
states, plays a fundamental role in promoting the hugely successful growth and 
development of the South East Asian ‘tigers’. 
 
A developmental state is defined as a state whose politics have concentrated sufficient 
power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the 
achievements of explicit developmental objectives, either by establishing and promoting 
the conditions for economic growth by organising it directly or a varying combination 
of both (Leftwich, 1995:401). Developmental states tend to have well distributed 
benefits, with high growth rates, measured by a high Human Development Index 
(HDI)38 (Leftwich, 1995:418). Three components characteristic of a developmental state 
that are relevant to the Zambian mining sector and which could aid analyses of the 
capacity of the Zambian state, include the promotion of economic bureaucracies that 
enjoy power and competence and are insulated; a corporatist role of the state over other 
economic interests; and effective industrial policies.39 
 
(i) Economic bureaucracies that enjoy power and competence and are insulated 
 
In the context of a world of limited mobility, a reform of the state and a better political 
management of the economy, together with institutional change, would be more suitable 
options for over-politicisation than the price mechanism through the market that neo-
                                                 
38
    Measures national income, life expectancies and education. 
39
    Other measures, not applicable to the study, considered necessary for a developmental state include the establishment of a 
developmental elite and an ability to control civic society. 
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classical theorists favour. These options would also be more effective than correct 
prices for achieving long-term developmental goals, in the view of Chang (1994:10-11). 
A long-term vision of the state that would improve the ‘entrepreneurial vision’ of the 
state was critical to the development of developmental states and of several developed 
countries. A long-term vision would best be achieved through effective institutions, 
which the government needs to build (Chang, 1994:13).  
 
The economic bureaucracies of developmental states, managed by institutions that 
organise the interaction between the state and the economy, act as core centres for 
strategic economic direction and co-ordination. In contrast to the generality of planning 
institutions of many developing countries, these core economic bureaucracies, on 
account of their relative autonomy in economic affairs,40 have real power, possess high 
technical competence and are insulated from shaping developmental policies (Leftwich, 
1995:412, 414). For example, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) of South Korea that 
was crucial in contributing to the economic success of South Korea, had significant 
scope to manoeuvre (Kim & Leipziger, 1993:29, 30).  
 
(ii) A state that has a corporatist role 
 
The bargaining leverage of the state with TNCs and the debate of the minimalist or 
interventionist role of the state in its relation with TNCs, discussed respectively in 
Sections 3.2.3.3 and 3.3.1.1, are subsets of the question regarding the capacity of the 
state. A corporatist role of the government over other economic interests (including 
those of TNCs and of the IMF and the World Bank) would contribute to more effective 
economic development that would promote the capacity of the state to deal effectively 
with private foreign and internal economic interests (Leftwich, 1995:415). 
Developmental states possess an adequate corporatist role to enable them to determine 
the roles of TNCs’ capital, set terms that attract foreign capital (without conflicting with 
the TNCs) and to serve the domestic economic development of the state (Leftwich, 
1995:417). This argument coincides with Chang’s view that the government should 
formulate its own ‘choice sets’ that would promote national interests, rather than 
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    Parliament does not have a great influence on the economy. 
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moving to a given optimal ‘choice set’ (Chang, 1994:13). Moreover, contrary to what is 
generally the case in developing countries, the corporatist role of the state also involves 
the consolidation of the power of developmental states before foreign capital interests 
are expanded (Leftwich, 1995:418).  
 
(iii) Effective industrial policies 
 
A consolidation of power that also increases the capacity of the state to attract TNCs 
could significantly be achieved through industrial policies that promote local capacities 
(Evans, 1998). In the absence of tariffs and quotas, competition from more established 
TNCs, enabled through unrestricted policies, would impede the development of national 
firms, while subsidies would promote the resources, expertise and efficiency of national 
firms closer to the level of TNCs (Panic, 1998:264). Accordingly, rather than getting 
prices ‘right’ determined through the market getting prices ‘wrong’ (for example, 
through tariffs, quotas and subsidies) created profitable investment opportunities that 
accounted significantly for South Korea’s growth (Amsden, 1989:14).  
 
Competent local capacities in South Korea were developed through the nurturing of 
local conglomerates and prompting them to become internationally competitive (Evans, 
1998; Amsden, 1997:469-470). Trade barriers and subsidies have promoted local 
industries in developmental states but require a degree of good government discipline, 
that is, ‘guarded capitalism’ (Amsden, 1989:14; Chang, 1993:151). However, it is 
important to first assess the costs of distortions (especially product distortions) 
associated with trade protection (Rodrik, 1992). 
 
3.3.2 Interests promoted through the state and market-oriented policies 
 
A political economy approach is pertinent in assessing the manner in which the 
surpluses of the economic sectors are redistributed with a change in ownership. A 
political economy approach takes cognisance not only of pure economic issues but also 
of political aspects, involving an inquiry into the nature of power and political 
behaviour in the development process and the competition for authority. The economic 
aspect in a political economic framework encompasses an examination of the allocation 
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and exchange of scarce resources, including political and social resources (Uphoff & 
Ilchman, 1972, cited in Low, 1991:4). The pivotal role of the state and the impact of 
economic, social, political (and even cultural) policies on the generation and 
redistribution of power are acknowledged in this approach (Low, 1991:4). 
 
The state is considered as an organisation controlled by interest groups, politicians and 
bureaucrats that use the state for their own self-interests, with socially undesirable 
outcomes, according to neo-classical models (Chang, 1994:2). Chang challenges the 
degree to which the self-interest assumptions pervade the political socialisation process, 
in light of the greater institutional constraints on self-seeking that the state faces over 
the market. Moreover, politicians’ consideration of themselves as guardians of public 
interests and other interests groups predispose them to serve public rather than personal 
objectives. In fact, some of the most successful economies in East Asia have emerged as 
a result of structural change, facilitated through high political participation (Chang, 
1994:9). 
 
Furthermore, class interests are not the prerogative of government ownership but are 
represented through both the state and the market (Fine & Stoneman, 1996:19). For 
instance, rather than being neutral, the pro-market forces and less government 
interventionist policies promoted by neo-classical proponents favour capital, while 
diminishing the influence of workers. Also, the idea of a ‘leaner, fitter state’, which 
effectively leaves economic decisions to the market, amounts to disguised intervention 
on behalf of capital (especially foreign capital), while government intervention on 
behalf of labour is withdrawn. Fine and Stoneman further maintain that privatisation 
represents not merely a withdrawal of the state in favour of the market but is a particular 
form of intervention, which, depending on its form in immediate implementation and 
subsequent regulation, favours some capitalists, whilst disadvantaging others. 
 
Moreover, the roles of the IMF and the World Bank, whose policies are fashioned 
according to neo-classical views, have been to create, preserve and promote capitalist 
relations in production and exchange. This was achieved by pressurising especially 
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smaller states, from the late 1980s and the 1990s, to liberalise and re-orient state 
intervention towards ‘creating an enabling environment for businesses. More recently, 
the roles of the World Bank and the IMF, which have shifted over the years, have 
largely been aimed toward ensuring the profitable functioning of a core of private 
capital, even if this requires concretionary policies. Such a practice contrasts with the 
more overtly interventionist Keynesian policies that were prevalent during the 
immediate post-colonial period. Concretionary policies undermine a more broadly 
based accumulation of capital (Fine & Stoneman, 1996:14, 23). 
 
Bond and Manyanya extend this argument further, claiming that in addition to SAPs 
and the stabilisation policies of the IMF that favour certain elite classes over 
marginalised groups (such as indigenous business and workers), state ruling parties may 
also resist radical change in social relations. Radical change is considered necessary for 
true transformation. For instance, governments’ increasing acceptance of the World 
Bank and IMF policies, together with corrupt government practices that do not benefit 
the masses, signify a realignment of the government away from the more marginalised, 
including workers and peasants, towards alliances with those that would assist them to 
remain in power. Accordingly, these theorists argue that the imperialist hold of the IMF 
and the World Bank together with government policies have dramatically changed the 
social relations in favour of capital, especially foreign capital and the government elite, 
over the workers, who are disadvantaged by neo-liberal policies (Bond & Manyanya, 
2002:62, 63, 71, 79).  
 
Fine and Stoneman (1996) recognise the significant influence that the IMF and the 
World Bank possess in building class structures but question the inevitability of certain 
outcomes of the policies of these bodies suggested by Bond and Manyanya’s 
conceptualisation. These theorists consider the view of the IMF and the World Bank as 
instruments of foreign capital and conduits of well-defined capital interests that simply 
impose neo-colonial imperatives as overly deterministic. A simplistic class-based 
classification, such as a clear distinction between indigenous and TNCs’ capital and 
capital and non-capital producers, is further viewed as insufficient. It also fails to take 
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into account the possibility that these classifications may vary over time and across and 
within countries and the heterogeneity within economic sectors that involve a portfolio 
of complex activities and interests (Fine & Stoneman, 1996:14).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. BACKGROUND OF THE ZAMBIAN MINING SECTOR 
 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the Zambian economy to provide context to 
the mining sector. Main policies of the Kaunda and the Chiluba governments that 
influenced the mining sector are then examined. The examination also explores the 
impact of policies of the IMF and the World Bank that were intermittently introduced 
from 1983 and were more rigorously adopted in the 1990s under the Chiluba 
government. Furthermore, the redistribution of the resources of the mining sector and 
the consequences on Zambia’s development and political economy under the different 
governments are considered. This is followed by an investigation of various economic 
indicators. 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY  
 
Substantial investments into the mining sector during the Federation years resulted in 
the Kaunda government inheriting at independence on 24 October 1964, a well-run, 
modern and technologically sophisticated mining sector infrastructure (MUZ, 1994:1). 
At independence, the copper mining sector contributed significantly to the Zambian 
economy. It accounted for 92% of total export earnings, 40% of GDP, 71% of 
government revenue and a third of employment in the direct productive sectors, 
amounting to about 50 000 workers (MUZ, 1994:1; Seidman, 1977:218). The high 
contribution of mining to the Zambian economy also reflects the poor economic status 
of the rest of the economy or the ‘Dutch disease’41 that the economy suffered at 
independence. 
 
In the short term, the high copper prices alongside the policies of the Kaunda 
government of reallocating surpluses and taxes from mining to develop the rest of the 
economy, promoted a more rapid growth of the Zambian economy than was the case 
under Federal rule (World Bank, 1984, cited in Rakner, 2001:530). The growth was 
especially evident in copper production, the employment levels of the mining and other 
                                                 
41
     Refers to the deindustrialisation of an economy as a result of the discovery of a natural resource. The term was coined after this 
outcome occurred in Holland with the exploitation of North Sea Oil, which raised the value of the Dutch currency, rendering exports 
uncompetitive and causing its industry to decline (The Free Dictionary, 2010). 
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sectors, the manufacturing sectors and in the provision of social services (Cherv, 
1989:126). Mining taxes were largely repatriated out of Zambia before independence 
under Federal rule (World Bank, 1984, cited in Rakner, 2001:530). The rapid growth of 
the Zambian economy, especially in the first decade of independence, shifted Zambia in 
1969 to a middle-income country, with one of the highest GDPs in Africa (Seidman, 
1977:218; World Bank, 1984, cited in Rakner, 2001:530; McGrath & Whiteside, 
1989:169; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:34; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7).42 
 
External factors, especially the collapse in the price of copper in 1974-75 after the first 
oil crisis in 1973 that culminated in the prolonged depression on the world market and 
considerably weakened Zambia’s terms of trade, interrupted the rapid growth and 
negatively affected the rest of the Zambian economy (Cherv, 1989:126-127; Leistner, 
1996:11.8; Rakner, 2001:530; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8). The contribution of copper 
earnings to total government revenue dropped sharply, from 34% in 1974 to 13% in 
1975, and remained at low levels for well over a decade (Burdette 1986:96, cited in 
Akwetey, 1994:53). In 1979, the second oil crisis and the resultant increases in interest 
rates alongside the slowing down of Zambia’s development forced the Kaunda 
government to borrow to maintain the provision of social services and to finance 
industrialisation (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8).  
 
Despite the economic crises, the mining sector continued to be treated as a ‘cash cow’43 
under Kaunda’s government, ‘milked’ without corresponding investment in machinery 
and prospecting ventures. Moreover, as had been the case before 1969, the mines 
suffered from low investment in exploration and drilling. Consequently, no new mines 
were opened after 1979 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8). The production of copper also 
dropped dramatically, from a peak of 747 500 tons in 1969 and a high of 694 600 tons 
in 1976 to merely 257 000 tons in 2000, largely owing to increased production costs in 
the existing mines.  
 
                                                 
42
    During this time, Zambia boasted a GDP higher than those of Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea, three times that of 
Kenya and twice that of Egypt. 
43
    Involving the redeployment of the resources of the mining sector to develop other sectors. 
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Accordingly, the drop in copper prices relative to the price of imports, alongside a 
continuation of the same consumption patterns created during the first decade after 
independence when the income from copper was high, greatly contributed towards the 
dramatic collapse of the Zambian economy between the 1970s and 1990s. Furthermore, 
the per capita income declined by 50% from 1974 to 1994, demoting Zambia to the 25th 
poorest country in the world in 1994 (Cherv, 1989:126; Leistner, 1996:11.8; Rakner, 
2001:530, 531; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8). In the context of foreign exchange shortages, 
the falling output of copper and trade deficits, Zambia became highly indebted from the 
1980s (Leistner, 1996:11.8; Rakner, 2001:531). The country’s high debt forced the 
Kaunda government to accept IMF and World Bank policies from 1983 that henceforth 
played an important role in directing economic development in Zambia. 
 
4.2 POLICIES OF THE KAUNDA AND CHILUBA GOVERNMENTS AND OF 
THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK  
 
Several policy changes that the Kaunda and the Chiluba governments introduced in the 
mining sector influenced the development of the mining sector and the political 
economy of Zambia in distinct ways. As is noted above, external actors, in particular the 
IMF and the World Bank, also shaped the economic and mining sector policies of 
Zambia from the 1980s and their policies became more entrenched from the 1990s 
during Chiluba’s government. The discussion below examines the mining policies of 
the Kaunda government and the policies of the IMF and the World Bank during 
Kaunda’s government and their impact on the mining sector. This is followed by an 
overview of the policies of the Chiluba government, which were largely determined by 
the IMF and the World Bank, and their impact on the mining sector.  
 
4.2.1 The mining policies of the Kaunda government 
 
The policies that the Kaunda government adopted that constituted significant milestones 
in directing the development of the mining sector were, in chronological order: the 
Accommodation Period; the nationalisation of the mines; the granting of management 
control to TNCs; state control over the management of the mines; increases in 
government shareholding in mining companies; the merger of Nchanga Consolidated 
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Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Copper Mines (RCM) to form the 
ZCCM and the NERP. These policies as well as those of the IMF and the World Bank 
that the Kaunda government adopted that also influenced mining policies in the 1980s 
are elaborated upon below. 
 
Accommodation Period (1964-69) 
 
During the Accommodation Period, the two foreign TNCs, Anglo American 
Corporation (AAC), operating in Zambia under Zambia Copper Investments Limited 
(ZCI) and the American Metal Climax (AMAX) that operated under the Roan Selection 
Trust (RST), were allowed to continue full ownership and control of the mines in 
Zambia. Moreover, the mining rights of these two private mining companies remained 
unaffected and continued to be held in perpetuity (Saasa, 1987:17, 26). However, 
despite the mining TNCs’ uninterrupted ownership and control over the mines, some 
interventionist policies were introduced during the Accommodation Period by way of 
the far greater reallocation of surpluses from mining nationally than was the case in the 
pre-independence period.  
 
A redirection of 13.5% of mineral royalties44 to the new government that the Mining 
Ordinance (Amendment) Act of 1964 facilitated, and the reforms via the Muligesh 
Declaration limiting remittances of mining companies to only half of their profits,45 
enabled the higher redistribution of mining surpluses into Zambia. Prior to 
independence, the mineral royalties accrued to the British South African Company 
(BSA). Before limitations were placed on remittances, the mining TNCs tended to 
distribute over 80% of their profits as dividends, instead of reinvesting these in Zambia, 
which contributed to Zambian operations being grossly undercapitalised (Saasa, 
1987:27). 
 
The Kaunda government used the same tax formula for the mining companies that the 
BSA employed for many decades before independence, based on the LME prices and 
on gross taxable profits rather than on net profit. However, the private mining 
                                                 
44
    Based on the LME – prices, per ton per month less £8. 
45
    While the other half had to be reinvested in Zambia. 
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companies objected to this formula of taxation under the Kaunda government.46 The 
royalty and export tax of mining companies, as a percentage of gross taxable profits, 
totalled about 49.2%, comprising of 23% in royalties47 and 26.2% in export tax (Turok, 
1989:26; Sardanis, 2003:230, 231). Income tax amounted to 37.5%, which, together 
with the royalty and export tax (based on a tax on production, rather than on profit) 
enabled the Zambian government to receive taxes worth about 73% of profits from 
mining companies. This was high by international standards. The high taxes had an 
adverse impact especially on smaller, less profitable mining companies (Saasa, 1987:26, 
37). 
 
Dissatisfaction with the linking of the royalty formula to the LME prices of copper48 and 
the tax on production rather than on profit, which private mining TNCs felt discouraged 
the development of high-cost low-grade mining, precipitated their demands for the 
replacement of the royalties and the export tax with a mineral tax. The mineral tax was 
to be based on net profit, rather than on LME prices (Sardanis, 2003:230; Saasa, 
1987:28). The motivation for rejecting exactly the same tax formula that they had 
accepted before independence was also rooted in the fact that AAC, as the major 
shareholder in the BSA and through the share of royalties that it received from the 
RST,49 had regained these taxes. This left the company largely unaffected by the amount 
it paid in royalties. During the Accommodation Period these taxes accrued to the 
Kaunda government (Sardanis, 2003:230).  
 
The nationalisation of the mines, instituted through the Matero Declaration (1969) 
 
The government decided to nationalise the mines shortly after its acquisition of majority 
shares in the manufacturing and importing sectors of the economy (Seidman, 1977:229). 
The Mulungushi reforms of 19 April 1968 initiated the process of nationalising the 
mines. The president declared in the Mulungushi reforms that all rights of ownership or 
partial ownership of minerals that had hitherto remained in the hands of the two private 
                                                 
46
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
47
    Or a rate per ton equal to 13.5% of the average LME quotation during the month less £8. 
48
    Which were erratic. 
49
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
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mining companies, AAC and AMAX, as well as their exclusive prospecting and mining 
licenses, must revert to the state.  
 
The nationalisation, instituted through the Matero Declaration of 11 August 1969, 
required an amendment of the constitution through a referendum and conferred 
government majority ownership over the mines (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7; Maambo, 
1998:4; Lungu & Silengo, 1997:13). The Mines Acquisition Act50 established the new 
order in the ownership structure of the mines. The Act conferred all rights of ownership 
of minerals to the state, granting the state the power to acquire a 51% share in any new 
mine and obliging the owners of the existing mines, the ZCI and RST, to offer the 
government 51% of their shares,51 in the form of ‘A’ class shares held by the newly-
created Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) (Lungu & Silengo, 
1997:9; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7; Maambo, 1998:4).  
 
The change led to the creation of a new corporate structure that lasted for 12 years until 
1982, when the two nationalised companies combined to form the ZCCM (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:7). The ZCI Holdings and RST became the minority shareholders, 
possessing 49% of ‘B’ class shares in these companies52 and were respectively renamed 
NCCM and RCM (Maambo, 1998:4). After 1982 the ZCCM conglomerate operated 
until the mines were privatised between 1997 and 2000 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7). 
 
The establishment of the 100% state-owned Mining Development Corporation 
(MINDECO) tasked with overseeing these bodies, together with the majority ownership 
that the government gained in the mining sector, granted the state greater influence over 
the copper mining industry (Saasa, 1987:38). The structure that the mining industry 
adopted from 1970 to 1982 is illustrated in Figure 4.1. However, during this time the 
government further relaxed the exchange controls in terms of dividends paid to non-
Zambians. Private mining TNCs also continued to retain management control and other 
rights in the mining sector. This aspect is elaborated upon below.  
                                                 
50
    The most significant feature of the Matero Declaration. 
51
    Interviews with John Lungu, 10 October 2003 and M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
52
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
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Figure 4.1: Structure of the mining industry between 1970 and 1982, after state 
majority ownership was introduced 
 
 
Source: MINDECO (cited in Saacha, 1987:39). 
 
The nationalisation policies introduced in Zambia between 1968 and 1972, rather than 
primarily because of a socialist predilection of the Kaunda government, were developed 
as a nationalistic and pragmatic response to the behaviour of private capital. The 
nationalisation policies involved the control and expansion of the parastatal sector over 
strategic parts of the economy, including the mining sector (Turok, 1989:47). After 
independence, the mining TNCs profited enormously, chiefly through excessive 
expatriation of profits gained during the boom that resulted in gross under-
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capitalisation, excessive local borrowing and a massive increase in foreign exchange 
expenditure on invisibles and on transfer pricing53 that were lost to the government 
(Lungu & Silengo, 1997:13; MUZ, 1994:3; Turok, 1989:42).  
 
The lack of new post-independence development in the mining sector by the private 
mining TNCs54 and the accrual of substantial mining rents to the foreign mining 
companies were important motivations behind the nationalisation of the mines in 
Zambia. However, the nationalisation of the mines should not be confused with 
nationalisation in the sense of a government takeover of 100% ownership without 
compensation. On the contrary, under the agreement the government acquired the 51% 
controlling shares of the mines in exchange for fairly generous compensation to the 
former owners, AAC and AMAX (Seidman, 1977:229).  
 
The compensation to the former mine owners that the government guaranteed for its 
acquisition of the 51% mining shares was in the form of ZIMCO bonds, at 6% interest 
and according to the book value of the mines. The payments were to be executed in 
semi-annual instalments over eight years to RST, at approximately K13.5 million per 
annum and to AAC at about K14.5 million per annum for 12 years, or an annual amount 
of about US$40 million to the mining companies, including interest to their parent 
companies, until 1978 (Seidman, 1977:229; Kaunda, 2002:18; Sardanis, 2003:238). The 
government was also to pay the companies a further US$21 million until 1982 
(Seidman, 1977:229). Special provisions in the agreements enabled an acceleration of 
these payments, whereby the government had to pay two-thirds of the dividends 
received from each group if the sum exceeded the fixed annual payments during periods 
of high copper prices (Sardanis, 2003:238). The total compensation that the government 
paid to the mining companies in the form of bonds for nationalising the Zambian mines 
amounted to US$262 million (Seidman, 1977:235).  
 
Since no statutory provisions existed to give the government explicit control over non-
statutory industries, outright nationalisation, which generally involves some legislative 
                                                 
53
    Whereby foreign investors manipulated production and revenue figures. 
54
    That these companies tended to blame on the royalty system. 
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statute or government decree, was not legally possible in Zambia during Kaunda’s 
rule.55 Rather than an outright nationalisation through an Act of Parliament, the Kaunda 
government elected to nationalise56 or to gain controlling interests in the mines in a 
more tentative way, through ‘derived control’ of companies by means of the Articles of 
Association of the relevant companies and through a referendum. The choice of these 
methods was calculated not to cause concern among foreign investors (Turok, 1989:46; 
Lungu & Silengo, 1997:13).  
 
Moreover, the government allowed TNCs to retain a substantial foreign minority 
interest in the parastatal companies. The parastatal companies were allowed a separate 
existence,57 enabling them to operate largely as conventional businesses, rather than 
government departments. These concessions further support the argument that the 
government took care to avoid alienating foreign interests in Zambia (Turok, 1989:47).  
 
To make the change in ownership rights more palatable, the Kaunda government 
granted the mining companies more favourable exchange controls and tax structures. 
The tax structures entailed more lenient post-nationalisation tax formulae for royalties 
and exports, through the Mineral Tax Act of 1970 that stemmed from the Matero 
Declaration (Seidman, 1977:232). These measures encompassed the new mineral tax 
formula, which replaced the royalties and the export tax (that, together with income 
taxes, were based on LME prices and on gross taxable profit58).  
 
The new formula was calculated on profits after deduction of capital expenditures on 
mining operations, enabling the mining companies to pay only 51% of their net profits 
in the form of the new tax. In addition, the exchange control regulations permitting 
mining companies to remit only 50% of their profits were eliminated. However, income 
tax still had to be paid on the balance of the profits and a kind of PAYE formula was 
also introduced for the collection of the mineral tax, to circumvent delays in revenue 
                                                 
55
    Even when the government possessed 100% shares in large companies the parastals had a legitimate and apparent permanent 
existence. 
56
    After clause 18 of the Constitution of Zambia was repealed. 
57
    That were not incorporated into the government departments. 
58
    That dominated the mining sector before Independence under private ownership of the mines and, for a short period, after 
Independence, before the mines were nationalised. 
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collection until audited accounts of the mining companies became available (Sardanis, 
2003:232, 238).  
 
To encourage further mining development, the taxation of the mining industry, 
comprising of a combination of the mineral tax and the existing income tax, was limited 
to a maximum of 73%. Several allowances also lessened somewhat the tax burden on 
more profitable mining companies (Sardanis, 2003:238; Seidman, 1977:232; Saasa, 
1987:37). Furthermore, new mines that achieved an average income of less than 12% of 
their average equity were provided with considerable tax refunds for up to three years. 
The new tax structures also encouraged investment specifically by way of not 
‘punishing’ low-grade ore and high-cost mining ventures and were favourable to 
marginal mines (Seidman, 1977:232; Saasa, 1987:37). After their initial resistance, the 
mining TNCs eventually accepted nationalisation, which was also based on a realisation 
that the 51% majority ownership of the government could be advantageous, since the 
state would be sharing 51% of the costs and that state involvement would ensure 
industrial harmony.59  
 
Granting private TNCs management controlling power (1970-1973)  
 
After the nationalisation of the mines, the effective management or controlling power 
remained firmly vested during 1970-73 with the two foreign minority shareholders, the 
AAC and the RST. The benefits that AAC and RST enjoyed (elaborated upon in 
Table A1, in Annexure) were principally through their considerable power of veto and 
through their sole and exclusive right to provide certain services at a high fee. The 
services encompassed the sales and marketing of minerals and metals (at a fee of 1.5% 
of the gross turnover, plus 2% of the profits), financial, commercial, technical and other 
services (at a consultancy fee of 0.75% of turnover and 2% of profit, after mineral tax 
but before income tax) and recruitment services (Saasa 1987:40; Sardanis, 2003:269). 
Furthermore, the mining TNCs enjoyed preferential treatment in exchange control 
regulations, permitting the automatic externalisation of non-taxable profits, dividends, 
management fees and income from the sales of the private mining companies.  
                                                 
59
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
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Additionally, the AAC and RST were protected against increases in several taxes, as 
long as their bonds were outstanding, and were allowed to write off all their expenditure 
in full in the year in which they were incurred. The mining TNCs were also paid a fixed 
minimum amount of ZIMCO bonds each year, irrespective of the profitability of the 
mines, and that had to be accelerated when profits were high. Moreover, the mining 
TNCs were protected against, among others, the government’s defaulting on its ZIMCO 
bonds and against cancelling their management and sales or marketing contracts. 
Accordingly, although they were the minority shareholders, AAC and RST gained 
considerable control, particularly through their management, consulting and marketing 
privileges in the mining industry. This enabled them to accumulate significant sums at 
the time (Saasa, 1987:40).  
 
However, rather than employing internal profits for investment – the Kaunda 
government’s intention behind the more favourable tax reforms during 1970-73 – the 
mining TNCs preferred to borrow from external sources for expansion programmes. A 
large proportion of the TNCs’ profits were allocated to dividends, instead of for 
reinvestment into the mining sector (Sardanis, 2003:268, 269; Saasa, 1987:40). Much of 
the savings and salaries of the expatriate community also left the country. The resources 
of Zambia were further externalised through the mining TNCs’ depositing abroad the 
huge compensation that they received for nationalising the mines during Kaunda’s 
government (Makgetla, 1994:119). 
 
The enormous reduction in government taxes under the TNCs’ management and 
government ownership was also significantly as a result of higher costs of mining 
TNCs, in addition to the fall in copper prices, tax reforms and the compensation the 
government had to pay the mining TNCs for nationalising the mines. The transfer- 
pricing practices60 of mining TNCs, enabling the externalisation of considerable mining 
                                                 
60
    The mining companies also over-invoiced their costs, partly by adding their high management fees (averaging about 
US$6-7 million per year, paid directly to the mining TNCs) as an operating cost that contributed to the sharp increase in the costs of 
mining companies to about 20% from 1971-72 and possibly by over-invoicing imports from their own suppliers to reduce their 
share of taxable profit. The reported increases in the costs of the mines managed by AAC, by almost as much as that of AMAX 
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profit out of Zambia, and high management costs greatly contributed to the elevated 
costs of the mining TNCs under private management of the mines from 1970-73 
(elaborated upon in Section 5.4.1.3 of Chapter 5). Government taxes fell from 
US$673 million in 1970 to US$65 million in 1972 (discussed in Section 4.4.20 below). 
The government was nevertheless still able to make decisions on the reallocation of a 
large share of the returns from mining for the development of other sectors of the 
economy. 
 
Accordingly, the increasing dominance of the state sector during Kaunda’s government 
was seemingly also a pragmatic response to the exploitation of Zambia’s resources by 
private foreign capital. Ex-president Kaunda cites the transfer of profits out of Zambia 
rather than investing them in the Zambian mines, as an important reason for transferring 
the management control of the mines to the state (Turok, 1989:47).  
 
Management control by the state (1973) and the introduction of Zambianisation policies 
 
The Kaunda government revoked the management contracts of private TNCs in 1973. 
Subsequently, Zambian managers were appointed for the first time to take over 
management control of the mines (Sardanis, 2003:269). The decision to revoke the 
management contracts of TNCs was firstly motivated by the private managers’ failure 
to reinvest a fair sum of their mining profits (much of which were transferred out of the 
country) in development projects in Zambia.61 Secondly, it was motivated by tendencies 
of mining TNCs to employ external loans, instead of their share of profits, for 
investment into mining operations in Zambia. These practices, in addition to the total 
‘investment income’ outflow and compensation payments, burdened Zambia’s balance 
of payments (Seidman, 1977:233, 234).62 
 
A third rationale was the decision to speed up Zambianisation policies in the mining 
industry,63 through the Mulungushi Reforms, involving the deliberate placing of 
                                                                                                                                               
despite being unaffected by the Mufulira disaster that augmented the cost of production of AMAX, serve as further evidence that 
AAC had probably over-invoiced their costs (Seidman, 1977:224, 233). 
61
    Also through transfer pricing practices, which reduced the annual government revenue, considerably. 
62
    As borrowed investment funds as well as the 7% to 9% interest had to be repaid. 
63
    Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, 11 October 2003. 
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educated and skilled Zambian technocrats into key management positions (Saasa, 
1987:40). Under private ownership and management of the mines no Zambians had 
occupied managerial positions64 before 1973. At the time, managers of the mining TNCs 
envisaged employing Zambians in general management positions only after 16 years.65 
A lack of the necessary managerial skills and experience for running big corporate 
companies (Zambia had only about a hundred graduates at independence) was another 
reason why Zambians generally occupied the lowest employment levels in the mining 
sector before 1973.66  
 
The Kaunda government paid additional compensation to AAC and AMAX for the 
consequent loss of income arising from the premature termination of their management 
contracts and of the marketing contracts of their parent companies.67 The payments, 
although not obligatory,68 were ostensibly to pave the way for the appointment of 
Zambian managers. The government also redeemed all outstanding ZIMCO bonds to 
these companies in 1973 (Kaunda, 2002:19, 21; Saasa 1987:40). The amount paid for 
the premature termination of their management and services contracts amounted to 
K33 million (22 million pounds sterling) to AAC and K22 million (14.2 million pounds 
sterling) to AMAX, or a total of US$90 million over a three-year period (Seidman, 
1977:235; Saasa 1987:40). The government was forced to take out a UK loan of 
US$150 million from the Euro-dollar market, at a floating rate of about 13%-15% 
interest,69 to enable these payments (Seidman, 1977:235). 
 
The timing of revoking the management power of the TNCs and the almost overnight 
redemption of the ZIMCO bonds to these companies to make way for the initial 
appointment of two black managing directors70 proved disadvantageous to the 
development of the mines in the short term, according to Sardanis (2003:269). Because 
                                                 
64
    Zambians were placed mostly in administrative and in personnel related positions and were excluded from occupying positions 
in critical areas, such as in cost accounting (interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003). 
65
    Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, 11 October 2003. 
66
    Interviews with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003; Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003 and Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
67
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
68
    A lack of skilled Zambian manpower and the need to maintain overseas markets, with whom the private mining TNCs had 
contact, however, also influenced the government’s decision to pay the private mining companies compensation for the termination 
of their management and marketing contracts (Seidman, 1977:229). 
69
    Then encouraged by high copper prices which, shortly thereafter, remained depressed for almost a decade. 
70
    The interviewee was one of the two Managing Directors (interview with Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003). 
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of the shortage of suitably qualified Zambians in the mining sector at the time, the 
government was obliged to re-hire most of the former expatriate managers to the 
positions that they had previously occupied, and this despite the fact that AAC and the 
RST had already received compensation for revoking their management contracts 
(Seidman, 1977:235-236). The redemption of the ZIMCO bonds also caused an added 
balance of payment and tax burden of about US$22 million a year (Kaunda, 2002:19; 
Seidman, 1977:235). Addressing the loopholes in the management contracts of the 
private mining companies might have been a better option for the Zambian economy 
than the government’s revoking of the management contracts of the private sector.  
 
Subsequent to paying AAC and AMAX for the premature termination of their 
management and marketing contracts, the NCCM and RCM became self-managing 
companies, with the choice of management resting directly with the government. 
Towards the end of 1973, following the cancellation of the marketing contracts with 
AAC and AMAX, the new Metal Marketing Corporation (MEMACO), a fully state-
owned company, took over the responsibility for marketing Zambia’s copper contracts. 
Despite its relative independence, the copper industry remained dependent on the TNCs 
for the provision of technical personnel, operational plans, research and development 
and for computer and management services (Saasa, 1987:40-41). 
 
Although Zambian employees in the mining sector initially lacked experience, which 
caused some inefficiencies at the start of the Zambianisation process, in the medium 
term they soon gained the necessary experience to operate the mining sector 
competently. This was achieved mainly through extensive training and scholarship 
programmes for tertiary studies,71 to selected pupils in the Copperbelt who were still at 
high school,72 and through staff development programmes.73 Zambianisation was further 
promoted by relieving or demoting expatriates from their positions.74 The 
Zambianisation policies enabled Zambian managers to participate very competently in 
nearly all aspects of mining, especially at the operational and the technical levels and in 
                                                 
71
    Also at foreign Universities in Britain and the USA. 
72
    Based on aptitude tests and Cambridge results (interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003). 
73
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; 
Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003 and Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003.  
74
    Interview with Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003. 
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the support services to the mining industry, until the mines were privatised (Kaunda, 
2002:25; Seidman, 1977:227).75  
 
The swift participation of a greater number of indigenous Zambians in the economy 
quickly promoted the emergence of a high-income Zambian elite.76, 77 Also, the largely 
merit-based selection of highly skilled and competent Zambian managers that replaced 
the expatriates after the expiry of their contracts at the copper mines, contributed to the 
Zambianisation process in the medium term not being disruptive to the operations of the 
mining sector.78 The education of Zambians and other benefits gained from the 
Zambianisation policies, together with reforms towards economic nationalisation, 
represent commendable successes of the Kaunda administration.79 The training 
programmes to promote Zambianisation in the mining sector, which continued under 
the Chiluba government, ceased under private ownership of the mines.80  
 
Government increases its shareholding in NCCM and RCM (1978-79) and the merger 
of RCM and NCCM to form the ZCCM (1982) 
 
From 1978 to 1979, the government increased its shares in NCCM to 60.026% and in 
RCM to 60.62%, as compensation for loans that these two companies owed to the 
government. This was followed in 1982 by the merger (intended to rationalise the 
mining sector) of NCCM and RCM81 that formed the ZCCM, a conglomerate of all the 
copper mining operations, which became the second largest copper mine in the world 
(Saasa, 1987:43; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 7). The main shareholder of the ZCCM was the 
government,82 possessing 60.3% of the shares. The minority private shareholders 
consisted of ZCI, the South African subsidiary of AAC, with 27.3% of the shares. The 
remaining 12.4% of the shares were owned by other international investors, including 
                                                 
75
    Interviews with Zion Simwanza, December 2003; Gilbert Temba, 13 October 2003; John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Andrew 
Sardanis, 19 October 2003, Simon Capper, 30 October 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003 and David Chilipamushi, 20 
October 2003. 
76
    Some obtained top political and civil service posts with high salaries and fringe benefits (Seidman, 1977:227).  
77
    Interviews with Jack Jones, 22 October 2003; Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003; Andrew Sardanis, 
19 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; John Lungu, 12 November 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; Francis 
Kaunda, 20 October 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; Willie Sweta, 30 
October 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003 and Gilbert Temba, 13 October 2003. 
78
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003; Fortune 
Kamusaki, 25 November 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; Simon Capper and Sipho 
Phiri, 30 October 2003; Gilbert Temba, 13 October 2003 and Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
79
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
80
    Interview with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
81
    Interview with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
82
    Including the Ministry of Mines. 
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the RST (ZPA, 2000b:15; Transparency International, 2002:18).83 Seven A-directors 
represented the government and five B-directors represented AAC on the board of the 
ZCCM. 
 
Although the ZCCM failed to declare dividends, AAC remained a minority shareholder 
and a board member of the ZCCM until its privatisation. Its continued stay was partly 
because of the business opportunities such an arrangement held for its other businesses, 
mainly those strongly linked to the ZCCM as backward-linked industries.84 However, by 
2002 Anglo had an exit policy in Zambia, reflected also in the sales of its subsidiaries in 
Zambia and of its shares in the Shell company in Zambia.85 
 
New Economic Reform Programme (NERP – 1987-88)  
 
The SAPs of the IMF and policies of the World Bank that the Kaunda government 
adopted for most of the 1980s and since the 1990s were punctuated by the NERP86 that 
the Kaunda government instituted from July 1987 to December 1988. The main theme 
of the NERP was ‘growth from own resources’. Chiefly, the policies of the NERP 
entailed the re-institution of greater controls in the Zambian economy, on a similar basis 
to those that were in place pre-1982, before the introduction of the IMF and World 
Bank policies (McGrath and Whiteside, 1989:179; Cherv, 1989:138; Simutanyi, 
1996:827). The NERP also differed in content from the IMF-supported programmes in 
the area of subsidies. The NERP reinstated the subsidies that the IMF policies withdrew. 
This was done because of their acute political significance, since their removal resulted 
in widespread popular unrest (Hanson & Hentz, 1999:486; McGrath & Whiteside, 
1989:172). 
 
Table A2 (in Annexure) elaborates on the controls that the Kaunda government 
instituted under the NERP. The main controls influencing the mining sector under the 
                                                 
83
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003 and 
Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
84
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
85
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
86
    As an Interim National Development Plan (INDP). 
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NERP encompassed the fixing of the interest rate at a lower rate87 and the suspension of 
the auctioning of the foreign exchange, through imposing greater controls over the 
foreign exchange market and by fixing the exchange rate of the kwacha.88 Additionally, 
the government placed a ceiling on the country’s debt service payment89 and suspended 
additional interest payments owed to the IMF and the World Bank. The government 
also reintroduced direct price controls through the Price and Incomes Commission 
(Cherv, 1989:138, 139; Akwetey, 1994:56; Lungu & Silengo, 1997:15; Simutanyi, 
1996:827; Hanson & Hentz, 1999:484; McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:172, 178).  
 
However, the government was forced to abandon the NERP in 1989, within only 
eighteen months of its adoption, mainly owing to the impact of the collective Western 
financial embargo that foreign donors instituted in September 198790 as punishment for 
reverting to greater government controls in the economy. The financial embargo starved 
the country of aid assistance.91 The spiralling economic crisis in 1988 and soaring debts 
brought the country’s projects to a standstill. Apart from casting doubt on the 
creditworthiness of Zambia, the collective financial embargo also undermined the 
chance of the NERP proving itself as a viable alternative to SAPs in Zambia (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:9; Loxley, 1990:10 & Bates & Collier, 1993:428, cited in Akwetey, 
1994:56; Simutanyi, 1996:827; Hanson & Hentz, 1999:484, 485; Cherv, 1989:134, 135, 
138; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987a, cited in McGrath & Whiteside, 
1989:180).  
 
Subsequently, the donors made future support conditional on compliance with donor 
priorities. Compliance to donor conditions was also a prerequisite for drawing on the 
                                                 
87
    Partly to assist indigenous firms that had been priced out of the market by the high interest rate policy of the IMF (Cherv, 
1989:139). 
88
    Through allocated foreign exchange control measures, via the Foreign Exchange Management Committee. 
89
    At 10% of net foreign exchange earnings but only after essential import requirements were met (estimated to cover only one 
sixth of the unrescheduled debts (McGrath and Whiteside, 1989:172, 179; Cherv, 1989:133, 138; Akwetey, 1994:56; Simutanyi, 
1996:827; Hanson & Hentz, 1999:484). 
90
    Including the USA’s Export-Import Bank and even Scandinavian donors, due to cross-conditionalities that the multilateral 
banks and donors imposed on Zambia. 
91
    East European, Chinese and Scandinavian aid agencies complained of the difficult working environment, given the cool 
political relations and the breakdown of complementary aid supported programmes, previously supported by other bilaterals and 
multilaterals (Hanson & Hentz, 1999:485). Access to the second tranche of the Standby facility granted to Zambia in March 1986, 
of SDR 230 million from the IMF and SDR 69 million from the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) was blocked. 
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Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).92 In June 1989, the Kaunda 
government was forced to renegotiate with the World Bank and the IMF for a shadow 
programme that entailed a fully-fledged SAP (discussed below) (Simutanyi, 1996:827; 
Cherv, 1989:138; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:9).  
 
The impact of the policies of the IMF and the World Bank on the development of the 
mining sector during Kaunda’s government 
 
Mining policies in Zambia were significantly influenced by the policies of the IMF and 
the World Bank from 1983, when Zambia embarked on its first systematic SAPs. From 
1983 to 1991, the policies of the Kaunda government oscillated between accepting and 
abandoning the policies of the IMF and the World Bank. The government tended to 
adopt only some of the prescribed measures, influenced largely by electoral-maximising 
motives.93 However, the suspension, delays and reduction of funds from the multilateral 
financial institutions94 that prompted the Kaunda government to adopt the NERP from 
mid-1987 to 1988 in the context of the country’s escalating debt problem,95 also 
sabotaged the government’s adherence to the SAPs (McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:179; 
World Bank, 1996:3; Lungu & Silengo, 1997:14, 15; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:5). The policies of the IMF and the World Bank that the Kaunda government 
adopted before and after the NERP are considered below.  
 
(i) Policies of the IMF and the World Bank before the NERP 
 
The massive debts of the country and the inability to fund government revenue from 
mining income forced the Kaunda government to accept its first conditional loan from 
the IMF in 1973/4 and to enter its first World Bank SAPs in 1983. The adoption of 
SAPs enabled the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to push the Zambian 
government into adopting economic liberalisation policies (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:9). 
Table A3 (in Annexure) lists the various measures that the IMF and the World Bank 
                                                 
92
    The broader targets established in the Policy Framework Paper (PFP) and Rights Accumulation Programme (RAP) agreements 
contrasted with the strict quarterly targets characteristic of the three standby agreements that Zambia signed in the 1980s (Hanson & 
Hentz, 1999:487).  
93
    Such as, to counter widespread riots on the Copperbelt, following the removal of food subsidies in 1986 and in 1991, which 
resulted in hikes in food prices. 
94
    That also contributed to the failure of Zambia’s auction system, introduced in 1985. 
95
    In 1986 arrears to the IMF alone were around $100 million, which blocked the way to a new Standby agreement (Cherv, 
1989:132). 
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imposed on the Zambian economy during Kaunda’s government, which broadly include 
various liberalisation, de-regulation, rehabilitation and rationalisation policies. 
However, the policies of the multilateral institutions and other aid donors, aimed at 
rehabilitating the state enterprise (or parastatal) sector in the 1980s, generally proved to 
be of limited success, also in the mining sector (Craig, 2002:2). In particular, the 
demand management measures and supply measures of the SAPs had a negative impact 
on the workers and on the development of the mining sector, which continued during 
Chiluba’s government.  
 
Demand-side measures that involved cuts in the government deficit (about 20% in 
1982), though seemed necessary, as continued high government expenditure was not 
sustainable in the context of the poor performance of the Zambian economy. Demand-
side measures in the mining sector included the closure of three mines, reductions in 
employment and a decline in investment in the productive sectors of the economy, 
through the virtual halt in new investments in public projects. Although government 
expenditure cuts were necessary to reduce the high government deficit, lower 
investments in productive sectors resulted in inadequate maintenance of equipment and 
machinery and shortages in operating materials. This had a highly unfavourable impact 
on the Zambian economy (Cherv, 1989:136).96 In the 1990s, the lack of reinvestment in 
the mining sector was considered the major reason for the poor performance of the 
ZCCM (according to research conducted by Kapika, Nyirenda & Mumba, 1996:8). 
Demand management programmes further contributed towards the considerable 
reduction of the labour force in the over-manned mining sector97 and to a deterioration 
of social services, in particular health and educational facilities, also of the mining 
community (Cherv, 1989:136). 
 
Moreover, the impact of the supply-side measures had a highly negative impact on the 
local support industries linked to the mining industry under government ownership of 
                                                 
96
    The allocation, from the government of only $290 million for the operations of the ZCCM in 1983, half of which went to 
service debts, was highly inadequate, since the ZCCM required at least $350 million in direct foreign exchange allocation in 1983 to 
sustain its operation and to pay for the essential debt service requirements it received (Cherv, 1989:128). 
97
    The drastic increase in Zambia’s foreign debt to $4 billion, by June 1984, of which $725 million was owed to the IMF and $350 
million to the World Bank and with arrears alone to the IMF being around $100 million in 1986, which blocked the way to a new 
Standby agreement, forced the Kaunda government to introduce a massive retrenchment programme (Cherv, 1989:132). 
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the mines (Cherv, 1989:138). In particular, the decontrol of interest rates prescribed in 
1985 led to a significant increase in interest rates. Moreover, the devaluation of the 
kwacha in 1983 and the currency’s depreciation that accompanied the auctioning of the 
exchange rate in 198598 had a deleterious impact on the local support industries to the 
mines. Figure 4.12 shows that immediately following the first auctioning of the 
exchange rate in late 1985, the kwacha fell from US$1=ZK2.23 to US$1=ZK5.01 and 
dropped further to US$1=ZK12.7 in 1986 (McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:172). 
 
The detrimental influence of the auctioning of the exchange rate and the consequent 
depreciation of the kwacha on the mining economy was largely owing to ensuing 
increases in the costs of imported inputs of Zambia’s highly import-dependent 
backward-linked industries to the mining sector (Cherv, 1989:133). The high import 
content of local backward-linked industries to the mines, of about 50% and more, was 
mainly due to a general absence of domestic substitutes for intermediate and capital-
intensive inputs. Accordingly, contrary to the argument of the IMF that the devaluation 
would encourage importers to switch to locally made input, the depreciation in the value 
of the kwacha in 1985 encouraged a vicious downward economic cycle.  
 
More specifically, difficulties in obtaining more expensive spare parts and mining 
inputs and equipment99 as a result of the high inflation following the devaluation and the 
depreciation of the kwacha especially in 1986 caused a drop in copper output. The 
consequent decline in foreign exchange earnings had a negative impact on employment, 
the balance of payments and government revenue that increased Zambia’s debt burden. 
This spurred a further decline and shortage in the country’s foreign exchange affecting 
an additional drop in the value of the kwacha (Cherv, 1989:128, 132, 136). Negative 
consequences as a result of the increases in the costs of mining inputs, in the context of 
the high import content of the local manufacturing sector, overrode the potential 
benefits of a weaker exchange rate for lowering local costs such as the costs of labour 
for the mining sector. 
 
                                                 
98
    Suspended from 24 January to 17 March 1987, but re-introduced again from 1995 under the Chiluba government. 
99
    Such as spare parts, fuel and transport. 
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Subsequent to announcing a unilateral declaration of national bankruptcy, the Kaunda 
government abandoned the IMF policies of 1985. The declaration was precipitated by 
the country’s enormous debt problem and declining foreign exchange, with virtually all 
of Zambia’s export earnings (reaching only about US$650 million in 1985) having to be 
used to pay its debts of about US$400 million to the IMF, about US$71 million to the 
World Bank and nearly all of the rest for paying various donor countries (Cherv, 
1989:134). Consequently, the government adopted its own government-devised 
strategy, the NERP, in 1987, discussed above (McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:178; 
Roberts, 1994, cited in Lungu & Silengo, 1997:15; Simutanyi, 1996:827; The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:5; Hanson & Hentz, 1999:484).  
 
(ii) IMF and World Bank policies adopted after the NERP – elaborated in the Policy 
Framework Paper (PFP), 1989-93  
 
After the NERP was abandoned, the Kaunda government was forced to adopt the 
market-oriented economic policies of the IMF, specified in the PFP covering the 1989 
to 1993 period, and to follow performance ‘benchmarks’, detailed in the Rights 
Accumulation Programme (RAP) (Simutanyi, 1996:827; Hanson & Hentz, 1999:487). 
The SAPs instituted during that period essentially involved a devaluation of the 
currency, a decontrol of prices and the cutting of food subsidies (Simutanyi, 1996:827; 
Akwetey, 1994:56; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:9). Initially, the Kaunda government stayed 
on track with these policies,100 but strayed from them in mid-1991.101 The IMF then 
again suspended financial disbursements to Zambia (Hanson & Hentz, 1999:487; 
Simutanyi, 1996:828, 834; World Bank, 1996:10).  
 
The depreciation of the kwacha, following the auctioning of the exchange rate, had a 
similar impact on the Zambian economy to what transpired in 1985-86, described 
above. The new pricing policy, aimed at encouraging greater movement of trade,102 was 
an additional supply-side measure to those introduced before the NERP. The new 
pricing policy entailed the elimination of the import licensing system, the cutting of the 
                                                 
100
    Despite widespread riots in June 1990 during which 27 people were killed and hundreds were injured and arrested following 
the 100% increases in the prices of high-grade maize meal. 
101
    Subsequent to the refusal of the IMF to allow for the postponement of a scheduled round of reduction of maize meal subsidies 
till after the first multi-party elections, in November 1991. 
102
    Especially the decontrol of consumer goods, apart from maize. 
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maximum tariff rate, the simplification of the tariff structure and the removal of 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports. Policies to encourage free trade in 1989 
during Kaunda’s government, in the context where the prices of consumer goods103 were 
decontrolled, had a similar but less severe influence on the mining sector to what 
transpired with the introduction of trade liberalisation during Chiluba’s government, 
discussed below.  
 
4.2.2 Overview of the policies of the Chiluba government and the impact on the 
mining sector 
 
In the beginning, the economic reform programme that the MMD government, which 
came into power in October-November 1991, negotiated and signed with the IMF did 
not differ significantly from those imposed on the Kaunda government in its first PFP. 
The first PFP in fact extended two years into MMD rule. However, the Chiluba 
government embraced all the measures in the stabilisation and adjustment package that 
the multilateral financial institutions advocated (Craig, 2002:2). It also executed the 
reform package more decisively and with greater commitment and coherence than the 
Kaunda government.104 Subsequently, the SAPs that the Chiluba government accepted 
encompassed more far-reaching changes than those imposed on the Kaunda 
government. 
 
The Chiluba government further distanced itself from its trade union support base and 
adopted foreign investor-friendly policies (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:4; 
World Bank, 2002b:28; Hanson & Hentz, 1999:487). This supports the argument of 
Bond and Manyanya (2002) that IMF and World Bank policies favour a realignment of 
government measures away from the workers. The Mwanawasa government adopted 
the neo-liberal policies and the privatisation of the state assets more cautiously than the 
Chiluba government had done.105 It also reintroduced national planning policies 
(through the Planning Department at the Ministry of Finance) that the Chiluba 
                                                 
103
    Apart from maize. 
104
    With the focus of the politics of adjustment in the Second Republic (1973-1991) being on whether to implement structural 
adjustment (Simutanyi, 1996:826). 
105
    Interview with Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003. 
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government had eliminated (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:5).106  
 
Table A4 (in Annexure) lists the various stabilisation and adjustment policies that the 
Chiluba government adopted. Broadly, these policies entailed a more extensive and 
comprehensive liberalisation programme of the exchange and interest rates and of trade, 
as well as of stabilisation and structural reforms107 such as the privatisation of state-led 
sectors (World Bank, 2002a:18, 2002b:27, 28; Simutanyi, 1996:829; Ministry of Mines 
and Mineral Development, 2003:2). By early 1993, all controls over prices, interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates and foreign currency allocations had been removed and 
subsidies eliminated (Craig, 2002:2). The acceptance of the RAP led to almost US$1 
billion in aid flowing into Zambia annually, during 1991-96 (Hanson & Hentz, 
1999:488).  
 
The effect of the Chiluba government’s liberalisation and industrial policies on the local 
support industries to the mining sector is considered below. This is followed by a brief 
contextualisation of the privatisation of the mines in Zambia. 
 
4.2.2.1 Impact of liberalisation policies and weak industrial policies of the Chiluba 
government on the support industries to the mining sector 
 
The liberalisation policies that the MMD government adopted, promoted by the IMF 
and the World Bank, considered below, include the liberalisation of the foreign 
exchange, interest rates and of trade policies.  
 
(i) The liberalisation of the foreign exchange and interest rate 
 
The Chiluba government’s more rigorous and extensive adoption of liberal policies of 
the foreign exchange (following the abolishment of the Exchange Control Act in 1994) 
and of the financial market had a similar but more severe effect on local support 
industries to the mines than what transpired with the auctioning of these markets under 
Kaunda’s government, from 1985 to 1986. In sum, the depreciation of the kwacha and 
                                                 
106
    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003. 
107
    Partly because consensus existed among the main groups on the necessity for structural adjustment (Simutanyi, 1996:826). 
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the high increases and volatility in the interest rate108 (that rendered lending inaccessible 
to many local entrepreneurs)109 that respectively accompanied the liberalisation of the 
exchange rate and of the financial markets, reduced the capacities of the local support 
industries to the mining sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:32; World Bank, 
2002a:14, 2002b:6). This is well reflected in the steep decline in the growth of 
manufacturing and in its contribution to GDP, illustrated in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. As 
was the case in the 1980s, their flawed structure prevented the local backward-linked 
industries to the mining sector from taking advantage of the potential incentive 
pertaining to the depreciation of the local currency, to procure locally.  
 
On the contrary, in the context of a poorly integrated local manufacturing sector, on an 
inter-industry level and of its high import content,110 the significant increases in inflation 
due to rises in the costs of imported intermediate inputs, following the depreciation of 
the local currency, undermined the development of many locally-based manufacturing 
companies. Accordingly, rather than encouraging local industrial development the 
impact of the high inflation following the depreciation of the local currency was 
subsequently expressed in a macro-economic meltdown. Greater linkages of Zambia’s 
industries that would have reduced their dependence on imports for intermediary goods 
should have been introduced before the liberalisation policies were implemented, for 
ensuring a more beneficial impact on local capacities from the depreciation of the local 
currency.  
 
(ii) Free trade policies 
 
The exposure of the Zambian economy to full-scale trade liberalisation policies before 
the mines were privatised and at a time when the local support industries to the mines 
were weak, encouraged the import of superior technology and lower priced, higher 
                                                 
108
    Caused by linking the determination of nominal interest rates for both the borrowing and the lending rates to the sale of 
Treasury Bills (TB) in the TB market, from March 1993, the devaluation of the kwacha and the rampant inflation rate, the result 
largely of the policy of monetary authorities under Chiluba’s rule to allow the kwacha to depreciate for a time with a periodic 
tightening of its monetary stance. 
109
    A low interest rate is one of the essential ingredients together with an explicit and coherent domestic investment strategy, 
strong financial institutions, capital and entrepreneurship, for ensuring more beneficial outcomes from trade liberalisation, according 
to Rodrik (1999:19). 
110
    Interview with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003. 
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quality and better packaged mining inputs111 from more competitive foreign companies. 
Especially inputs from South Africa and Zimbabwe112 flooded the Zambian market 
(Africa Analysis, 2002a:20; Africa Research Bulletin, 2001a:14627, 2002a:15037; The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:27, 48, 49; ZPA, 2000b:16).113 Before the 
liberalisation of trade, local industries enjoyed considerable benefits under the 
protectionist policies of the Kaunda government, though limited mainly to less capital-
intensive goods (World Bank, 2002b:29; SADC, 2000:346; Singogo, 2000:11, 12).114 
 
While the greater competitiveness that free trade policies introduced benefited the 
copper mines in Zambia, the associated reduction in the domestic demand for locally 
produced inputs to the mines had a highly negative influence on the local and locally-
based industries and suppliers to the mines.115 By the mid-1990s, over 60% of inputs for 
manufacturing, comprising mainly of capital goods,116 were imported.117 The free trade 
policies, alongside the decontrol in the price of consumer goods118 and the high costs of 
imported inputs in the manufacturing sector in Zambia, linked to the depreciation of the 
kwacha, further encouraged a switch from importing capital equipment to the trading of 
cheaper imported consumer goods. The switch led to a stagnation in the imports of 
capital goods, required as intermediary inputs to local industrial companies, which 
undermined the manufacturing sector, especially the backward-linked industries to the 
mining sector (Craig, 2001:2; World Bank, 2002b:28).  
 
A myriad of especially engineering support industries to the mining sector closed down 
as a consequence of trade liberalisation, contributing to the stagnation of Ndola, which 
before trade liberalisation had been a vibrant industrial city. The engineering companies 
linked to the mining sector that closed down included Gencore, Lusaka Engineering 
Industries, DHS Engineering, Lancore Engineering, African Explosives and the BP 
                                                 
111
    Interview with Fred Yamba, 25 November 2003. 
112
    Australian, UK and USA companies are also moving into the Zambian market. 
113
    Interview with Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 October 2003. 
114
    Since most capital-intensive technologies were imported despite import substitution policies (Leistner, 1996:11.13-11.14, 20; 
Makgetla, 1994:107, 109). 
115
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
116
    And 25% for consumption goods, such as food, beverages and tobacco. 
117
    The Dunlop plant in Zambia then imported about 90% of their inputs (Leistner, 1996:11.14). 
118
    Apart from maize. 
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lubricant plant.119 Various producers of tyres, namely Dunlop, Buffalo and Consolidated 
Tyre Services, that had previously supported the mining sector, also closed down in 
Zambia.120, 121  
 
(iii) Industrial policies of the Chiluba government 
 
Contrary to the protectionist policies of the Kaunda government,122 in addition to liberal 
policies the weaknesses in the industrial policies of the Chiluba government also 
adversely affected the local backward-linked industries to the mining sector. Table A7 
(in Annexure) lists and elaborates on the major factors prior123 and subsequent to the 
privatisation of the mines during MMD rule that undermined the capacities of local 
industries and suppliers to the mining sector. 
 
Main weaknesses in the industrial policies of the MMD government that negatively 
affected local suppliers included: (i) a failure to provide appropriate safety nets to 
protect local suppliers and manufacturers against the negative consequences of 
privatisation; (ii) a lack of active government participation to encourage the 
competitiveness of local companies, among others through adequate training, before 
trade liberalisation policies were introduced; (iii) the absence of greater government 
participation in the development of the manufacturing sector, through an effective 
industrial policy (to also develop backward and forward linkages to mining); (iv) 
increases in duties on raw materials over finished goods that encouraged local suppliers 
to switch from production to the trading of goods; and (v) the provision of extensive 
incentives, including lower taxes and concessions, to foreign investors not extended to 
local investors (effectively subsidising foreign investors).  
 
Additional factors that adversely influenced local industries were the lack of capital, the 
                                                 
119
    Interviews with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003; Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003; Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 
October 2003; Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003; Isaac Masonda, 11 November 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 25 
November 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; John Lungu, 12 November 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 
and Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
120
    While consolidating or relocating their plants mainly to South Africa and/or Zimbabwe. 
121
    Interviews with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003; Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 
2003 and John Kangwa, 21 November 2003.  
122
    Through import substitution and through the establishment of state-owned manufacturing companies that boosted the 
manufacturing capacity of Zambia. 
123
    Mainly from 1995 to 1999. 
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high production costs of locally-based manufacturing companies, the weak domestic 
market and the lack of an aggressive marketing campaign of local suppliers to the 
mines. Main factors accounting for the high costs of local production entailed: (i) the 
increases in the interest rates, following the introduction of a liberal financial market 
and the delays in the ZCCM paying its debt to local suppliers; (ii) cost-push inflation 
introduced onto the Zambian economy that augmented the price of imported mining 
inputs, subsequent to the depreciation of the kwacha; (iii) higher taxes imposed on local 
businesses over foreign businesses; (iv) the high costs of transportation, petroleum fuel 
and of electricity; (v) outdated equipment; and (vi) poorly maintained assets.  
 
The above discussion shows that the poor industrial policies of the Chiluba government, 
favouring liberal policies and foreign investor-friendly policies, had a highly 
detrimental impact on the local backward linkages to the mining sector. In the context 
of the weak local industries and the highly imperfect markets, Zambian industries could 
not compete with more competitive international companies, following the introduction 
of trade liberalisation policies before the mines were privatised. This precluded local 
industries from benefiting more from the improved performance of the mines under 
private ownership. The negative impact of the liberalisation policies and poor industrial 
policies on the Zambian economy are also reflected in Figure 4.5 that shows a huge 
decline in the contribution to the manufacturing sector to GDP from 37.2% in 1992, 
27.9% in 1993 to only 11.24% in 1994. Moreover, Figure 4.7 shows a considerable 
decline in manufacturing employment during the 1990s, dropping significantly by 
29 400 from 1991 to 1999, from 75 400 in 1991 to 46 000 in 1999, mainly as a result of 
the introduction of trade liberalisation policies in Zambia.124  
 
When a country moves from low productivity towards zero productivity, which was the 
case with the bankruptcies of many backward-linked companies to the mining sector, 
especially following the introduction of trade liberalisation policies in the 1990s, it 
reduces the benefits to the country (Stiglitz, 2002:59). Additionally, the lack of 
government assistance to local manufacturing companies during Chiluba’s rule, whilst 
                                                 
124
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
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encouraging foreign investors, is contrary to the policies of developmental states that 
encourage state-directed investments (Leftwich, 1995:410). Successful industrial 
policies, involving strong and effective government intervention, were crucial to the 
phenomenal development of developmental states, according to Amsden (1997:469, 
470).  
 
4.2.2.2 Privatisation policies of the mines in context 
 
A detailed exposition of the privatisation of the copper mining sector in Zambia is 
provided in Chapter 5. The discussion below merely contextualises the issues that 
informed the privatisation of the mining sector.  
 
Instead of negotiating from a strong bargaining position, crucial in the case of the 
mining sector to ensure that the greatest share of the rent element expected to collect 
major returns accrued to the government, the Chiluba government bargained from a 
weak position in the privatisation of the mines. This was especially the case with the 
privatisation of the final but more lucrative mines, viz. the KCM and the Mopani 
Copper Mines (MCM). The poor bargaining leverage of the Chiluba government prior 
to the decision to unbundle the mining sector, prevented the government from setting 
the terms for the privatisation of the ZCCM, selecting options for privatising the ZCCM 
and determining to whom and the form in which the ZCCM would be sold, and the 
terms of the sales. Various pressures that the mining sector faced that weakened the 
bargaining position of the government were paramount in precipitating the privatisation 
of especially the remaining mining assets.  
 
The principal factors that precipitated the privatisation of the final mines, elaborated 
upon in Table A6 (in Annexure), were, broadly: the poor economic position of the 
ZCCM and of the Zambian economy; pressure from suppliers and donors (who linked 
balance of payment funds to the privatisation of the mines); unfavourable external 
factors, namely socio-political instability if the ZCCM were to liquidate and the decline 
in the price of copper; and certain strategies of the TNCs. The poor economic position 
of the Zambian economy and of the ZCCM in the late 1990s immediately prior to the 
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privatisation of the final mines significantly reduced the bargaining leverage of the 
government. The poor economic performance of the country was mainly due to the 
huge losses of the ZCCM. The losses were largely as a result of the lack of 
recapitalisation of the mining company and the enormous increases in the debt of the 
government and loan obligations (partly due to the state’s assumption of the debt of 
various majority SOEs – including that of the ZCCM). The country’s declining foreign 
exchange and tax revenue, pressure from suppliers and shortages of supplies added to 
the economic difficulties that the ZCCM experienced at the time.  
 
The interaction of multiple factors and actors, in particular foreign actors such as the 
donors (including the World Bank and the IMF), foreign consultants and the potential 
foreign buyers of the mines, greatly influenced the options selected for privatising the 
mining industry, the form that it would take and its enforcement. Especially AAC, as a 
minority shareholder of the ZCCM and because of the pre-emptive rights it enjoyed, 
played a pivotal role in determining the options that the government adopted for 
privatising the ZCCM. Accordingly, contrary to developmental states where the 
government possesses a corporatist role in setting policies independent of international 
financial institutions, in the context of a weak state the Chiluba government largely 
accepted and followed the IMF and World Bank policies, also in the privatisation of the 
ZCCM. Such a position undermined a greater corporatist role for the state. The 
influences of privatisation policies and of the majority control of TNCs in mining 
companies on the Zambian economy are examined in detail respectively, in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
 
4.3 THE REDISTRIBUTION OF MINING RESOURCES AND THE IMPACT 
ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ZAMBIA 
 
The dissimilar policies of the Federation and the Kaunda and Chiluba governments had 
different consequences on the reallocation of the resources of mining on the Zambian 
economy, with different political-economic implications for the various stakeholders 
that are investigated below. The brief overview of the redistribution of the resources of 
the mining sector and the impact on the Zambian economy during the pre-independence 
  
84
period serves as a standard against which the redistribution of the mining resources 
under government ownership is evaluated.  
 
4.3.1 The pre-independence period 
 
During the Federation years in the 1950s until independence, the transfer of substantial 
tax revenue and foreign exchange resources from Zambia mainly for the development 
of the rest of the Federation, especially Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), 
proved detrimental to the development of Zambia. From 23 October 1953 to 
independence in 1964, about £97 million was repatriated out of Zambia, in lost taxes to 
Zambia. Much of the savings and salaries of the expatriate community also left Zambia 
before independence (Turok, 1989:28, 36). Furthermore, the externally oriented 
consumption policies of the short-term contract mining staff and of the inputs for the 
copper industry, such as oil, coal and other essential goods, which encouraged the 
importation of goods mainly from Southern Rhodesia, hindered the development of 
especially the backward-linked industries to the mining sector.  
 
Notwithstanding the well-developed modern and technologically sophisticated mining 
sector infrastructure that the Kaunda government inherited at independence, the failure 
under colonial rule to redistribute surpluses from mining for the development of the 
local economy contributed towards the stagnation of the rest of the Zambian economy. 
In particular, wage employment in Zambia remained at 270 000 throughout the pre-
independence period, and the private sector and the manufacturing base in Zambia were 
small and undeveloped. Manufacturing contributed only 7% to GDP at independence 
(Turok, 1989:28, 36, 39, 44; Cherv, 1989:127).  
 
During the Federation years, the redistribution of a portion of surpluses from mining 
(then the largest single industry in the Federation) to mining employees and managers, 
partly through the provision of social services such as schools and hospitals (owned by 
the mines) and of housing,125 were confined to the expatriate population. In contrast, the 
indigenous Zambians benefited very little from the copper mining industry (MUZ, 
                                                 
125
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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1994:1; Seidman, 1977:218).126 The health and educational infrastructure of the 
indigenous Zambians was poorly developed during the colonial years. At independence, 
less than 0.5% of the Zambian population had completed their primary education and 
Zambia had only 107 graduates (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7).  
 
4.3.2 The Kaunda era 
 
In contrast to the externally oriented mining policies and consumption patterns of the 
Federal government,127 favouring mainly the expatriate community and Southern 
Rhodesia, electoral-maximising motives during Kaunda’s government encouraged a 
much wider redistribution of the surpluses from copper mining to the Zambian 
economy. Under Kaunda’s government, mining revenue was also spent on non-core 
mining activities and non-mining sectors and businesses,128 enabled through the direct 
ownership and control of the government in mining parastatals since 1974 (Maambo, 
1998:Figs. 8, 9; MUZ, 1994:4). The non-core mining activities and non-mining sectors 
developed from surpluses of the mining companies included rural development, import 
substitution, the introduction of subsidies, export promotion, industrialisation and the 
development of infrastructure of Zambia, and the social service infrastructure of the 
mining community (MUZ, 1994:4; World Bank, 1996:8).129 In particular, surpluses 
from mining were used for extending the provision of a wide range of new services130 to 
the hitherto neglected African majority. 
 
Additionally, mining revenue was employed to encourage the growth of economic and 
social activities that were dependent on the miners’ income, such as industrial activities, 
the establishment of shops and the buying of land for farming131 to supply food to the 
                                                 
126
    Interview with Sipho Phiri and Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
127
    Namely, policies to externalise Zambia’s mining resources for the development of Southern Rhodesia, and practices that 
encouraged the repatriation of profits of mining TNCs out of Zambia. 
128
    Such as tourism, freight and forwarding, dry cleaning, public transportation (also air travel) companies and the operations of 
the mills, after they were nationalised, following huge increases in the prices of mealie meal and subsequent food riots in 1986 
(interviews with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; Zion Simwanza, December 2003; 
Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003 and M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003). 
129
   The deployment of resources from the mining sector to develop non-mining related activities was precipitated by a shortage of 
private investment (attributable mainly to unfavourable fiscal policies and rigid exchange control regulations) and the poor 
performance of the subsidised SOEs, which pervaded the Zambian economy (MUZ, 1994:4; World Bank, 1996:8, 2003b:135).  
130
    Especially social services. 
131
    That culminated into the establishment of one of the biggest farms in Zambia, the Mpongwe farming scheme, a highly 
successful operation at the time (interview with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003). 
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mining community (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8; World Bank, 2004a:11).132 Proceeds from 
copper production were further diverted to less productive sectors133 and for political 
purposes, such as running the affairs of the party and paying Zambia’s foreign debts.134 
The spending of mining revenue on non-mining related businesses and in particular on 
less productive sectors proved detrimental to the development of the mining companies, 
especially when revenue from mining became scarcer. These activities limited 
reinvestment in the mines that is so crucial to sustaining the mining sector. 
 
Especially in the first decade of independence, the reallocation of surpluses from mining 
during Kaunda’s government, much of which were repatriated out of the country before 
independence, to develop other sectors of the economy was central in promoting the 
notable development of the Zambian economy (Turok, 1989:41; Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:8). The wider redistribution of mining revenue for developing the social services 
and the manufacturing sector of Zambia under Kaunda’s government, from the pre-
independence period, which were instrumental in the notable development in these 
areas, are explored in greater detail below. 
 
4.3.2.1 The development of social services 
 
The philosophy of ‘Zambian humanism’, focusing on developing the potential of the 
indigenous population, motivated the decision to develop the social service provision of 
Zambians during Kaunda’s government. The Zambianisation policies, the five-year 
National Development Plans,135 the extension of the ‘cradle to grave’ welfare policy, 
(confined to the expatriate population under private ownership of the mines before 
independence) to the majority African population136 were the main government policies 
employed to promote ‘Zambian humanism’. The ‘cradle to grave’ welfare policy 
                                                 
132
    Interviews with Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003; Zion Simwanza, December 2003 and Fred M’muembe, 14 October 
2003. 
133
    Such as the buying of the Challenger Jet (interviews with Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003 and Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 
2003). 
134
    Interviews with Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003; Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003; 
Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003; Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; Andrew Sardanis, 19 
October 2003; Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; John Lungu, 12 November 2003 and Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003 
and M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
135
    Policies of the National Development Plans that promoted ‘Zambian humanism’ through directing the profits of the 
nationalised copper mines also to the building of hospitals, schools and universities and in the provision of subsidies to state-owned 
manufacturing companies and to consumers. 
136
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
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involved the employment of revenue from the mining sector to develop also the non-
core activities of the mines and to provide various incentives, such as social services 
and employment benefits to mining employees (Lungu & Silengo, 1997:12, 36; 
Seidman, 1977:224; World Bank, 1996:8). 
 
The employment of mining surpluses to extend social services to local Zambians as 
well, led to huge improvements in the provision of social services of the indigenous 
mining community. Policies of ‘Zambian humanism’, in particular the Zambianisation 
policies, further enabled the indigenous Zambians greater participation in the modern 
sector and were effective in redressing the highly uneven distribution of income and 
wealth that disadvantaged the locals. At independence, the social indicators of 
indigenous Zambians were among the lowest in the world (World Bank, 1996:8).  
 
In addition to taking care of their workers, revenue from mining was also employed to 
provide social services to the whole mining community.137 The social services provided 
to mineworkers and their families included the provision of free education for miners’ 
children (also at university level)138 and mineworkers were provided with subsidised 
housing, food, electricity, water and transport (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8). In 1971, 
current expenditures for education increased five-fold from the immediate pre-
independence period to US$83 million, over 12% of the budget (Seidman, 1977:224; 
MUZ, 1994:2). In 1986, the Copperbelt University (Zambia’s second university) was 
established.139 The development of the human capital of local Zambians through the 
state-sponsored training of Zambians, and crucial to the Zambianisation policy, proved 
a highly successful programme. However, it was severely eroded under private 
ownership of the mines (Lungu & Silengo, 1997:12, 21, 36; Seidman, 1977:224; SADC, 
2000:349).140  
 
Moreover, funds for health multiplied seven times in 1971 from 1963, to US$37 
                                                 
137
    Such as managing the environment, maintaining the roads, collecting refuse, as well as establishing cafeterias, bars and social 
clubs, including, Youth Development Schemes, women’s clubs and social casework agencies that supplied relevant services, under 
their competence, to the mining community in the mining townships. 
138
    Interviews with Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003 and Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003. 
139
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003 and Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003. 
140
    Interviews with Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003 and Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003. 
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million, representing over 5% of the budget (Seidman, 1977:224). Effective healthcare 
was provided for the mining community, with hospitals141 being established in all 
mining settlements,142 also at Nchanga and Konkola, where no government hospitals had 
previously existed. The mining companies further provided recreation clubs for 
employees (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:8).143  
 
Furthermore, electoral-maximising motives account for the much higher number of 
employees employed in the mining sector under state ownership during Kaunda’s 
government than under private ownership (refer to Figure 4.7).144 The high employment 
levels and the provision of social services, however, became unsustainable in later 
years. The unprecedented boom in the world copper prices and the increasing output of 
copper (which pushed the national product upwards to the exceptionally high annual 
rate of 12%) in the early 1970s then enabled the redistribution of surpluses from mining 
under Kaunda’s government. 
 
4.3.2.2 The development of the manufacturing sector 
 
Policies aimed at redistributing surpluses and taxes from mining to develop Zambia’s 
manufacturing sector (which was almost non-existent at independence), mainly the 
parastatal manufacturing sector, had a highly positive impact on the development of this 
sector. The development of the manufacturing sector also promoted a greater 
diversification of the economy than what was the case during the pre-independence 
period. Accordingly, under Kaunda’s government, the performance of the highly 
import-dependent manufacturing sector became strongly linked to that of the mining 
sector145 as the dominant contributor of Zambia’s foreign exchange (Turok, 1989:43; 
McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:172, 173; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7, 8).146 
 
The manufacturing sector was largely nurtured through industrial policies entailing the 
                                                 
141
    With competent medical personnel. 
142
    That resulted into the ZCCM having one or two hospitals at each of its operating divisions. 
143
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003 and Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003. 
144
    Interview with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003. 
145
    Such as textiles, food processing, tobacco and chemicals. 
146
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies147 that the Kaunda government 
introduced between 1965 and 1980 and the development of the parastatal sector. The 
parastatal sector was primarily built in the first decade of independence, from 1964-74, 
mainly from the revenue from mining. The state played a direct role in promoting both 
of these policies (Craig, 2002:1). The state also entered into joint ventures with foreign 
corporations to establish a range of new industries as part of the parastatal sector (Craig, 
2002:1; World Bank, 1996:9). 
 
The policy of the Kaunda government to take over control of most foreign-owned 
businesses, including large private companies,148 while leaving some economic space for 
Zambian entrepreneurs in small- and medium-sized concerns, led to the Zambian 
economy becoming a mixed-economy with a strong state sector from the 1970s (Turok, 
1989:44). The government established both the Industrial Development Corporation (of 
Zambia) (INDECO), the state holding company for manufacturing and the ZIMCO, the 
controlling or master holding company for parastatals, to expand the share of the state 
sector in productive activities (World Bank, 1996:9). By the mid-1970s, most of the 
main enterprises in the economy were under state ownership, held within a hierarchy of 
state holding companies, with ZIMCO at the top (Craig, 2002:2). 
 
The manufacturing sector grew phenomenally under the state-led industrialisation 
initiatives of the Kaunda government, sponsored from mining revenue, with ZIMCO 
becoming a formidable parastatal in the 1970s, ranking by turnover in 1980 in the first 
100 companies in the world outside the United States. In 1975, the assets of ZIMCO 
added up to ZK1 468 million and total government-controlled assets reached almost 
ZK2 000 million (ZIMCO, cited in Turok, 1989:44). About 75% of the total assets of 
ZIMCO, amounting to ZK713 million in 1971, were obtained from the copper mines. 
This underscores the pivotal role that the mining sector played in developing the 
manufacturing sector during Kaunda’s government (Turok, 1989:44). 
 
Moreover, INDECO, that became the main vehicle for state-led industrialisation, also of 
                                                 
147
    ISI policies benefited mainly the high-income bracket (Turok, 1989:41). 
148
    Such as insurance companies and building societies and industries. 
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backward linkages to the mining sector, rapidly established itself under the directive of 
Andrew Sardanis149 as a strong force in the economy. This was achieved through the 
state’s taking over responsibility for the management of its minority interests in 
associated companies and of those enterprises and corporations within which it held the 
majority shares. The assets of INDECO increased seven-fold; from 1965-67 and by 
1971 the total state-controlled assets amounted roughly to ZK1 009 million. 
Agreements established by INDECO with international foreign investors such as Japan, 
Italy, Britain, America and South Africa, led to the establishment of various enterprises, 
including backward linkages to the mining sector, such as an explosives factory, a tyre 
factory, cement works and other enterprises in Zambia150 (Turok, 1989:40). 
 
Accordingly, the manufacturing sector, which was almost non-existent at independence, 
grew rapidly in the first decade of Kaunda’s rule151 from only about 7% of Zambia’s 
GDP in 1964 to 12.1% in 1974152 and Zambia’s overall GDP increased by an average of 
6.1% per annum, amongst the highest in Africa (Cherv, 1989:126). Under Kaunda’s 
government, the manufacturing sector continued to grow, reaching 36% of Zambia’s 
GDP in 1990.153 Employment in manufacturing grew by 77% over the 1964-69 period, 
output grew by 192% in nominal terms or by 60% in real terms, from 1965 to 1970 and 
gross fixed capital formation grew by 472%, from 1964 to 1968 (Young, 1973, cited in 
Turok, 1989:43, 44). The phenomenal state-led manufacturing growth during Kaunda’s 
government, mainly from the revenue from mining, accentuates the powerful role that 
interventionist industrial policies could potentially play in promoting industrialisation.  
Additionally, the highly negative influence that trade liberalisation policies had on the 
Zambian-based backward-linked industries to mining in the 1990s further illustrates the 
importance of effective industrial policies of the government in promoting 
industrialisation in developing countries. 
 
However, despite the impressive growth in the manufacturing sector in comparison to 
                                                 
149
    Then Chief Executive of INDECO. 
150
    For example, a fertiliser factory, a sugar estate, a textile mill and hotels. 
151
    Interview with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003. 
152
    Using constant 1977 prices. 
153
    If 2000 constant prices are used. 
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that of the Federation years, most of the mining inputs, comprising largely of capital 
goods, were still imported. The poor integration of the mining sector to the local 
manufacturing sector, mainly owing to the confinement of most of the industries to the 
production of consumption rather than intermediate or capital goods, largely accounted 
for the high import content of the mining sector (Saasa, 1987:10). The failure of the 
mining sector to develop significant local backward and forward linkages and the high 
import content of almost 50% of most of the few existing local backward-linked 
industries to the mining industry154 during the pre-reform period, also reduced the 
impetus of the mining sector to evolve as an engine of growth for other sectors. Instead, 
the mining sector developed as an enclave surrounded by less developed sectors and a 
very backward agricultural sector that the Kaunda government tended to neglect (World 
Bank, 1996:9, 10; Saasa, 1987:11). By the mid-1970s, the manufacturing sector of 
Zambia was still a heavily protected state-led industrial sector. 
 
Furthermore, despite significant growth in the Zambian manufacturing sector during 
Kaunda’s government, the uncompetitive practices of the protected parastatal-
dominated manufacturing sector generated inefficient companies, with high consumer 
prices, low productivity and relatively poor quality of goods and services. The 
protection provided to the parastatal industries further disadvantaged private sector 
businesses. While the parastatal sectors performed well in the 1960s and 1970s, losses 
were subsequently experienced in many of these public enterprises, estimated at 
US$455 million from 1985 to 1989 (World Bank, 2002b:5). In the latter part of 
Kaunda’s rule, controls imposed on the foreign exchange allocations to suppliers, due to 
a scarcity of foreign exchange, further disadvantaged the Zambian suppliers to the 
mines. As a result of huge inefficiencies, many local support industries to the mining 
sector became bankrupt with the lifting of controls and with the full-scale introduction 
of trade liberalisation policies in the 1990s, discussed above in Section 4.2.2.1 (World 
Bank, 1996:9, 2002b:27). 
 
Accordingly, interventionist industrial policies, whilst necessary, are not sufficient in 
                                                 
154
    Such as machinery, electricity, water, foundries and metal products and distribution. 
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promoting the development of competitive local industries. In the absence of setting 
strict targets that local industries had to meet, which would have helped infant industries 
to grow up and become internationally competitive, protectionist policies promoted the 
emergence of several ‘lame ducks’ that drained Zambia of its resources and obstructed 
sustainable growth in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, the formidable development 
of South Korean industries was nurtured through interventionist policies, as well as 
through the setting of strict benchmarks that manufacturers had to meet to become 
internationally competitive,155 before the economy was opened to foreign companies 
(Evans, 1998; Padayachee, 1995:173). 
 
4.3.2.3 Political-economic implications of Kaunda’s mining policies 
 
Under government ownership of the mines during Kaunda’s government, the significant 
redistribution of revenue from mining for expanding and developing the social 
amenities of Zambia and for encouraging Zambianisation promoted the interests of the 
Zambian population. The policies that ensured that the mines were being managed 
mostly by Zambians, at chief executive, senior management and the technical levels156 
and that promoted the human capital development of local Zambians were highly 
favourable to Zambian mineworkers and managers.157 Expatriates were largely sidelined 
by Zambianisation policies. The building of local infrastructure from mining revenue 
also contributed considerably to national development.  
 
Additionally, industrial policies, through the protectionist policies that Kaunda’s 
government introduced that contributed considerably to the development of the local 
manufacturing sector, were favourable to local entrepreneurs. However, the emergence 
of several ‘lame ducks’, mainly owing to the failure of the government to increase the 
global competitiveness of local entrepreneurs alongside protectionist policies, 
constituted a drain on Zambia. The failure to establish more local backward and forward 
linkages to the mining sector and to lower the import content of manufacturers further 
                                                 
155
    A distinctive feature of Korea lies in the discipline the state exercised over private firms and represented an integral part of the 
vision of the Park government (Amsden, 1998:14). 
156
    Interview with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003. 
157
    Expatriates were, however, also employed in some technical positions. For instance, the Cost Accountant and the Chief 
Geologist at the ZCCM were expatriates (interviews with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003 and Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003). 
  
93
limited the development of local manufacturing industries. 
 
The omission to establish these measures also obstructed sustainable growth in the 
manufacturing sector. This was demonstrated in the collapse of many industries 
following the introduction of trade liberalisation policies. The redistributive activities of 
the Kaunda government, to fulfil political or electoral-maximising objectives, were also 
unsustainable in the context of the negative impact that the over-extension of the 
resources of the ZCCM and the associated increasing costs of production of the mines 
had on the performance of the ZCCM. 
 
4.3.3 The period of Chiluba’s government, during government ownership of the 
mines 
 
It has been noted in Section 4.2.2.1 above that the more extensive and comprehensive 
liberalisation programme of trade, of the exchange rates and of the financial markets 
that the Chiluba government adopted, as well as the poor industrial policies that it 
instituted in the 1990s, disadvantaged the local support businesses to the mining sector. 
In particular, the higher production costs of local suppliers, linked to the more rigorous 
re-introduction of supply measures from 1995 under the Chiluba administration (namely 
the auctioning of the interest and exchange rates), in the context of the high import 
content of the local industries, had an adverse impact on the local suppliers. The 
bankruptcies of many locally-based industries and the backward-linked industries to the 
mines as a result of the stricter adoption of trade liberalisation further disadvantaged the 
Zambian-based industries. Conversely, the liberal and foreign investor-friendly policies 
mainly benefited the mining TNCs that gained from cheaper, better quality imported 
inputs. Such policies also favoured foreign, especially South African backward-linked 
companies that increasingly supplied inputs to the Zambian mines. 
 
Consequent reductions in the output of locally-based industries and in the employment 
levels of Zambia also had a negative impact on the Zambian workers and the economy. 
Moreover, certain demand management programmes of the IMF and the World Bank in 
the 1990s and under private ownership of the mines required for improving the budget 
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deficit of the government, further disadvantaged the Zambian workers that were 
retrenched in 1990s. In addition, the demand management measures degraded the social 
services of the Zambian community. The political-economic consequences of the 
privatisation policies in the mining sector and of the majority control of TNCs over 
mining are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
In summary, in the longer run, in the absence of economic growth and greater 
reinvestment in the mining sector, the Kaunda government’s approach of employing the 
mining sector as the ‘cash cow’ of the economy contributed significantly from the 
1980s towards degrading the global competitiveness of the mining sector. It further 
undermined the performance of the mining sector, precluding a greater redistribution of 
resources from that sector. This suggests that economic growth is a prerequisite for 
sustainable redistribution. Without growth, the redistributive activities into 
unproductive sectors of the economy in fact undermined growth. 
 
4.4 ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
Several economic indicators are reviewed in this section in order to gain insight into the 
effects of different variables, such as changes in ownership, mining policies of the 
governments and the policies of the IMF and the World Bank, on the Zambian economy 
and in particular on the mining sector. The influence of diverse factors on the trends of 
various economic indicators is also exposed in the investigation. Furthermore, an 
examination of the trends provides evidence as to whether the data match theoretical 
arguments considered in this study. The position of Zambia’s copper mining sector in 
the international context is considered first. Several national economic indicators are 
then examined, followed by those more specific to the mining sector. 
 
4.4.1 Position of Zambia’s copper mining sector in the international context  
 
The role of the copper mining sector in Zambia in the international context is 
considered, briefly, in terms of its international cost and production competitiveness. 
 
 
  
95
4.4.1.1 International cost competitiveness of the copper mining sector  
 
In contrast to its competitors, including CODELCO (the majority state-owned copper 
company in Chile), the copper industry in Zambia that once set the pace for the world’s 
copper mining industry158 and was one of the world's lowest cost producers, became 
decidedly less cost competitive, especially in the 1990s. The steady increase in the cost 
of copper production in Zambia,159 beyond those of most of its global competitors, 
despite the Copperbelt having some of the largest copper and cobalt deposits in the 
world, rendered the profitability of the Zambian mines more vulnerable to the 
international slump in base metal prices. Base metal prices were particularly depressed 
in the late 1990s (World Bank, 2003b:135, 2004a:3; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:39). However, the mining industry started to lose its global market share as early 
as 1982, when the NCCM and the RCM merged to form the ZCCM (Kapika et al., 
1996:8). 
 
While the major producers of the world produced copper at a cost in 2003 of between 
US$0.30/lb and US$0.45/lb,160 with the most efficient mines producing at a cost of 
production below US$0.10/lb,161 the weighted average cost of copper production of 
Zambia was US$0.58/lb (World Bank, 2003b:135). This placed the country in 2003 in 
the 85th percentile in the world; a modest improvement over the status of the cost 
competitiveness of the ZCCM in 1995, just prior to the privatisation of the mines, when 
it reached the 95th percentile. The high costs of production of several mines in Zambia 
(including Konkola and Nkana, the country’s most prolific mines), of about 
US$1.17 per pound in early 2000 relegated these mines to amongst the highest-cost 
producers in the world (World Bank, 2002b:15, 2004a:48; ZPA, 2000c:34). 
 
These high production costs render Zambia’s copper mines highly uncompetitive 
globally (World Bank, 2003b:135). A persistent high cost of production, above that of 
                                                 
158
    Interview with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003. 
159
    In 1997, an estimate of over US$2 billion in capital expenditures were required to maintain copper production merely at 
existing levels (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 9). 
160
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
161
    According to a recent international study, comparing the cash costs of copper production per pound and which covered 95 
copper mines, accounting for 83% of the world’s production. 
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the average world market, alongside the trend of declining international copper prices,162 
would cause the copper industry in Zambia to become unsustainable, demonstrating the 
precarious position of the industry (World Bank, 2003b:135, 136, 2004a:48). The 
factors that contributed to the high costs of copper production are elaborated upon in 
Section 5.4.1.1 of Chapter 5.  
 
4.4.1.2 International production competitiveness of copper mining  
 
In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, Zambia was among the top global copper producers 
and the envy of CODELCO, boasting production levels of over 700 000 tons in 1969. 
At independence, Zambia supplied a tenth of the world's copper. However, while the 
output levels of its competitors, particularly Chile, continue to rise, the production 
levels of Zambia have dropped progressively, especially from the 1980s (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:40; Seidman, 1977:218). In 1996, CODELCO 
produced about 1 million tons of copper per annum, outstripping by far production at 
the ZCCM that then fell to 313 900 tons (Kapika et al., 1996:7). In 2003, the production 
levels of copper in Chile reached about 4 million tons, compared to 349 000 tons in 
Zambia, with CODELCO163 producing 1.67 million tons of copper, about 41% of 
Chile’s total copper output (CODELCO, 2003:54). 
 
4.4.2 Gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that the Zambian economy expanded rapidly in the first decade after 
independence, at an average rate of 6.1% from 1964 to 1974. The unprecedented growth 
rates that Zambia enjoyed in 1964 (12.9%) and in 1965 (29.4%) were largely 
attributable to the increasing copper prices. However, the growth rate fell rapidly to an 
average of 2.6% soon after, in the 1970 to 1974 period. The ten years of relative 
prosperity (1964-74) were followed by a decline from 1975 to 1980. The high growth 
rates in the first decade of independence contributed to Zambia’s per capita income 
being the highest in independent sub-Saharan Africa in 1970, at US$420 (World Bank, 
1984, cited in Rakner, 2001:530). 
 
                                                 
162
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
163
    Including its production at El Abra, which amounts to 111 058 tons. 
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The general declining trend in GDP in the latter part of the 1970s was mainly due to 
external shocks, principally the collapse of the world copper prices from the mid-1970s 
and the increases in the price of oil in 1973, forcing the government to resort to foreign 
borrowing to make up for the growing resource gap (Bank of Zambia, 2003:6; 
Nalwamba, 2002:20; Cherv, 1989:126, 128, 136; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:54). As a result, 
Zambia became highly indebted, with substantial debt service costs inhibiting the 
possibility of economic development in the 1980s. The SAPs of the IMF/World Bank 
that Zambia adopted from 1983 achieved little or no improvement in GDP growth. 
 
The brief respite in the economic decline in 1988, with the real GDP growth increasing 
to 6.3%, coincided with the severing of relations with the IFIs in 1987 and the adoption 
of the NERP from 1987 to 1988. The NERP largely entailed the resumption of greater 
government control over the Zambian economy (Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:29). 
The higher GDP growth during the NERP might also have been the result of the greater 
availability of government resources, enabled through the lowering of its debt services 
to the IMF and the World Bank to only 10% of net foreign exchange earnings and 
because of increases in copper prices that broadened its scope to stimulate the economy. 
However, since the growth enjoyed during the NERP was achieved at a cost of 
accumulating external debt service, it was unsustainable. Economic growth declined 
again and remained volatile following the restoration of relations with the IFIs in 
November 1989. 
 
In the 1990s, which were characterised by rigorous adjustments of the economy, growth 
in the real GDP was volatile. The GDP fell by an average of 1.15% annually in 
1990-95, relegating the Zambian economy to a position as one of the worst performers 
of African countries not at war, far below the sub-Saharan average of 2-4% (Leistner, 
1996:11.13; McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:169; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:34). Again, the collapse in the world copper price and the debt burden were 
largely to blame, compounded by the negative effects of drought164 and of flooding on 
the agricultural sector. 
                                                 
164
    Zambia experienced drought in 1991/1992, 1994-95 and in 1998 in the southern and western parts of the country; flooding also 
occurred in 1997 and 1998 in the northern parts of the country that damaged the crops. 
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Figure 4.2: Real GDP growth and average of GDP (at constant 1996 prices from 
1980 to 2006) 
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Sources: IMF Financial Statistics, World Bank World Tables, Central Statistical Office and Bank of 
Zambia (cited in Andersson, 2000:12); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c, 2008a:13). 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that from 1999 to 2007, Zambia experienced a notable sustained 
positive GDP growth, averaging 4.57% over this period, for the first time since the late 
1960s. The acceleration in the GDP in the early 2000s was partly due to early 
investments of private mining companies into the Zambian economy (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002:28). The increases in the real GDP after 2004, by 5.6% from 
2003 to 2007, were mainly as a result of the high global copper prices, which led to 
fresh investments and increased output in the mining sector (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007b:30, 2008b:18). Reductions in debt-servicing costs, through the Highly 
Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) initiative for which Zambia qualified in 2005 
and particularly because of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)165 that was 
extended to the country in 2006, were also highly significant in freeing up resources that 
could encourage economic growth (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:60; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:43). 
 
 
 
                                                 
165
    The MDRI reduced Zambia’s debt to less than 1/10th of the previous level. 
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4.4.3 Relationships of GDP, mining and manufacturing growth rates  
 
The lack of statistics of growth rates for the same base year as a continuous series 
makes comparisons of different periods problematic. Figure 4.3 shows that prior to the 
nationalisation of the mines in 1969 the growth rates in manufacturing did not follow 
those of mining, mirroring the influences of the practices of mining TNCs to buy input 
mainly from outside Zambia. Subsequently, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly in 
particular from 1970 to 1976. From 1972 to 1982 a positive linkage existed for the most 
part between mining and manufacturing, reflecting the influence of policies of the 
Kaunda government to develop the local manufacturing sector from mining surpluses. 
Thereafter, the positive relation broke down with the introduction of SAPs in 1983. The 
mining sector growth rates were more volatile compared to those of the manufacturing 
and the agricultural sectors until 1993. 
 
Notwithstanding that manufacturing growth was not consistent it experienced less 
negative growth than the mining sector before 1994. Moreover, despite the prolonged 
slump of mining growth for most of the 1980s manufacturing performed relatively well 
during this period, growing at varying rates. However, the decline in the growth rates of 
the manufacturing sector in 1985 was mainly because of high increases in the price of 
imported intermediates (that were unavailable in Zambia) that accompanied the 
auctioning of the exchange rate in 1985. This led to the erosion of many local industries. 
 
In the 1990s, the year 1994 was marked by a dramatic decline in manufacturing growth 
mainly because of the liberalisation of trade that culminated into the bankruptcies of 
many local industries, including backward-linked industries to the mining sector. The 
liberalisation policies were also highly significant in eroding the relationship between 
manufacturing and mining growth.166 In contrast, in 1994 the services sector started to 
rise considerably. In particular, the financial sector growth rate increased significantly 
to 113% in 1994 from 3.6% in 1993.167 The poor relation between mining and 
                                                 
166
    Growth rates in the mining and the manufacturing sectors, however, followed each other in 1992 and in 1996-97. 
167
    The tentative calculations based on comparisons of CPI for the base years 1977 and 1994 and the assumption that the 1994 
sectoral GDP figures from the CSO are in billions rather than million of kwachas were done to give estimates of 1994 figures in 
1977 million kwachas. The calculations provide a rough estimate of the percentage changes in the contribution of the different 
sectors to GDP from 1993 to 1994 according to the 1977 base year. 
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manufacturing in 1997 and 1998 was partly as a result of the long delays in the payment 
of local suppliers to the mines that slowed down manufacturing growth and because of 
an even greater shift towards the production of consumption rather than capital goods. 
 
Figure 4.3: GDP, mining and manufacturing growth rates* (rolling averages) 
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*The CSO calculated mining and manufacturing growth rates for 1966-70 at constant 1965 prices; 1971-76 at constant 1970 prices; 
1978-93 at constant 1977 prices and 1994-2007 at constant 1994 prices. The switch to different base years made calculations of the 
percentage change from 1976-77 and from 1993-94 not possible. However, the tentative calculations based on comparisons of CPI 
for the base years 1977 and 1994 and the assumption that the 1994 sectoral GDP figures from the CSO are in billions rather than 
millions of kwachas168 were done to give estimates of 1994 figures in 1977 million kwachas. The calculations provide a rough 
estimate of the percentage changes in the contribution of the different sectors to GDP from 1993-94 according to the 1977 base year. 
 
**2007 value is estimated. 
 
Sources: IMF Financial Statistics, World Bank World Tables, Central Statistical Office and Bank of 
Zambia (cited in Andersson, 2000:12); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c, 2008a:13); Central 
Statistical Office (2008).169 
 
In the early 2000s, under private ownership of all the mines, the linkage among 
manufacturing, mining and GDP growth rates was also weaker possibly owing to 
foreign goods and equipment displacing local manufacturing companies. Despite the 
poorer linkages manufacturing experienced relatively good growth, from 1.86% in 1998 
to 5.7% in 2002 to 7.6% in 2003. However, a closer examination reveals that the growth 
started from a low base and was mainly as a result of an increase in consumer goods, 
mostly in the food, beverage and tobacco sector that increased by 81% from 1994 to 
                                                 
168
    Most probably a typing error. 
169
    Statistics were sent on request. 
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2007. The food, beverage and tobacco sector rose from 59.3% of total manufacturing in 
2000 to 65.8% in 2007. Moreover, the textile and leather industry increased 
considerably from 1994 to 2004 but subsequently declined. 
 
The rather flat rise in the growth trend of manufacturing from the late 1990s and under 
private ownership of all the major copper mines reflects the decline in the diversity of 
the manufacturing sector. Moreover, notwithstanding the general increasing trend in the 
growth of the manufacturing sector under private ownership, the growth rate of 
manufacturing fell in 2004 to 4.7% from 7.6% in 2003 and in 2005 to 2.9% at the time 
of high copper prices. At the height of the copper price boom the growth in 
manufacturing increased to 5.8% in 2006. 
 
4.4.4 Sectoral contribution to GDP 
 
Contribution of mining to GDP 
Prior to the nationalisation of the mines mining’s contribution to GDP generally 
decreased from 1965 to 1968, partly because of the increasing contribution of 
manufacturing to the Zambian economy. Nonetheless, mining sustained a contribution 
of 30% or more of GDP (49.6% at independence in 1964 and 41% in 1965, compared to 
agriculture at 13.7% and manufacturing at 6.8% in 1965) until 1974. Subsequently, the 
shock attributable to the effects of the oil crisis and the decreases in the copper prices, 
the consequent drop in output and increases in the costs of production from 1974-79 
dragged the share of mining to GDP down to about 12% in 1978 and lower until the 
jump in mining’s contribution in 1994.  
 
The relatively low contributions of mining to GDP in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
were mainly due to the lower prices and output of copper, the limited foreign exchange 
that indirectly increased the costs of imported inputs and the subsequent shortage of 
spare parts for the mining and manufacturing sectors (Cherv, 1989:128; Bank of 
Zambia, 2003:6). The considerable growth in the manufacturing sector also accounted 
for the lower contribution of mining to GDP from 1975-89. Higher copper prices and 
the phenomenal fall in the agricultural and manufacturing sector were chiefly 
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responsible for the increases in the share of mining to GDP in 1994. In the late 1990s, 
the steep drop in the share of mining to GDP, from 16.7% in 1994 to 6.4% in 2000, was 
mainly due to the poor reinvestments into the mines from the mid-1990s, the drop in 
copper and cobalt prices, especially in 1996 and 1998, and the significant reduction in 
copper mining output (Bank of Zambia, 2003:6). 
 
Under private ownership of the mines the contribution of mining to GDP increased 
slightly, from the lowest level of 6.4% in 2000 to 7.7% in 2003. This was partly as a 
result of the impact of fresh investments from private mining TNCs and of increased 
output in the mining sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:34; Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:54; Bank of Zambia, 2003:6). The subsequent dramatic increase in the price of 
copper from 2004 to 2007 resulted in only a marginal increase in the contribution of 
mining to GDP, to 8.7% in 2006, which was still lower than the 1998 level, when 
mining’s contribution to GDP was 9%. The contribution of mining to GDP dropped in 
2007. 
 
Compared to the full range of all the sectors that make up the economy, the share of 
mining to GDP declined considerably from third to seventh position from 1999 to 2000, 
corresponding with the period when the privatisation of the last mines was being 
completed (Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:30). The contribution of the mining sector 
also dropped below those of agriculture and manufacturing since the late 1990s. It 
continued to decline under full private ownership of the mines. 
 
Manufacturing 
Figure 4.4 shows that the manufacturing sector contributed less to the Zambian 
economy than the agricultural and mining sectors until 1971. Thereafter, from 1972 
until 1992, its share increased significantly resulting in it overtaking the mining sector 
for the most part from 1977 until 1993. Manufacturing overtook the agricultural sector 
already in 1971 (except for 1976). The author also relied on statistics from the WDI to 
show growth trends of the manufacturing and agricultural sector (refer to Figure 4.5) to 
enable the cross referencing of data provided from the CSO. Although the figures from 
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the WDI and the CSO do not correspond exactly they display similar trends. The 
increases in the share of the manufacturing sector to GDP, from only 6.9% in 1965, 
according to the WDI figures170 (6.8%, CSO) to 37.1% in 1992 (30.4%, CSO), reflect 
the positive impact of the concerted industrial policies of the Kaunda government on the 
development of the manufacturing sector. 
 
However, subsequent to the introduction of strict SAPs during Chiluba’s government, 
the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP fell dramatically, from 27.9% in 
1993 (26.4%, CSO) to only 11.2% in 1994 (9.8, CSO). Thereafter, it remained at low 
levels, ranging from 11.2% in 1995 (10%, CSO), 13.4% in 1996 (9.9%, CSO) to 11.1% 
in 2006 (10.6%, CSO). The steep drop in the manufacturing sector’s contribution to 
GDP in 1994 was mainly attributable to the decline in the dominance of the parastatal 
sector, following the stricter implementation of more extensive liberalisation 
programmes during Chiluba’s government, which led to the bankruptcies of many 
locally-based firms in the 1990s (Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:30, 31). 
 
Under private ownership of the mines, the manufacturing contribution to GDP remained 
low (below agriculture but above mining), ranging from 11.4% in 2000 to 12% in 2003. 
These levels were lower than the 1998 level of 12.9%. At the height of the copper price 
boom in 2006 it declined to 11.1%.171 The manufacturing figures might even be lower, 
as the heavy weighting of food within the sub-sector, especially maize milling 
(officially classified as manufacturing), can distort the output figure of the 
manufacturing sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:15). 
 
The contribution of other sectors  
Growth in agriculture also experienced higher volatility than manufacturing but 
stagnated in the 1970s till the late 1980s when it reversed. Agriculture became more 
dominant than mining and manufacturing from 1993/1994. The share of agriculture to 
GDP was 21.8% in 2006 (13.6%, CSO). However, returns from agriculture are 
                                                 
170
    Based on 2000 constant prices. 
171
    The foreign investor friendly policies and other government policies that disadvantaged the domestic producers against foreign 
producers and the poor socio-economic infrastructure of Zambia, which augmented the transactional costs of local industries, 
account greatly for the poor performance of local producers (Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:30). 
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generally poor, with commercial farmers providing almost all the export earnings from 
the agricultural sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:15).  
 
Figure 4.4: Contribution of sectors to GDP 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f G
D
P 
(%
)
Agriculture, value add ed  (% o f GDP)
Manufacturing , value add ed  (% o f GDP)
Mining  and  q uarrying , value ad ded  (% o f GDP)
Tertiary secto r, value ad ded  (% o f GDP)
 
* % of mining to GDP (at constant prices) has been rebased from 1965-69 (using 1965 as the base year), 1970-76 (using 1970 as the 
base year), from 1977-2007 (using 1977 as the base year). 
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Figure 4.5: Contribution of agriculture and manufacturing to GDP 
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While mining and manufacturing declined for most of the 1990s the service sector172 
experienced significant growth. It became the dominant sector from the mid-1990s, as 
its share increased from 28% in 1991, 30.2% in 1993 to 43.8% in 1994. Figure 4.6 
shows the shift in the economy away from manufacturing towards a service nation. The 
significant change in the structure of the economy especially from 1994 was strongly 
linked to the introduction of strict SAPs (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:6, 
2008b:20; Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:30).  
 
Figure 4.6: Shifts in sectoral contributions to GDP in the Zambian economy 
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Sources: Central Statistical Office (2008).173 
 
The service sector continued to grow under private ownership of the mines to 57.5% in 
2007.174 Accordingly, it became an important driver of economic growth (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:28, 2008b:20). Since the official statistics for the 
service sector capture an unknown proportion of total activity they should be treated 
with caution (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:28). Figure 4.6 shows that the 
agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP also increased notably from 1991 to 2006. 
 
 
                                                 
172
    Made up of the electricity, gas and water; construction; restaurants, bars and hotels; transport, storage and communications; 
financial intermediaries and insurance; real estate sectors. 
173
    Author’s own calculations done from information sent by CSO on request. 
174
    The largest sub-sectors within the services sector in 2003 and in 2007 were the wholesale and retail sector followed by the real 
estate and business services. The financial intermediaries and insurance sub-sectors were the third most important sector in 2003 and 
ranked fifth in 2007 after the transport storage and communications sector (mainly because of increasing share of cell phone 
companies) and the government services. Growth would likely continue in the communications and tourism sectors. 
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4.4.5 Human Development Index and poverty levels of Zambia 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI175 – measuring the average progress of the human 
development of a country) of Zambia dropped below the average of sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1991 and remained below this level until 2007, when it was last recorded. While 
the HDI has increased progressively in almost all regions from the mid-1970s, it 
stagnated in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990. The stagnation was partly because of 
economic reversals and because of the catastrophic effects of HIV/AIDS on life 
expectancy (UNDP, 2007/2008).  
 
Also, the rise in Zambia’s HDI between 1980 and 1985 under Kaunda’s rule was 
reversed at an increasing rate, from 1987.176 Zambia, in fact, became the only country in 
East, Central and Southern Africa to experience a worsening in its HDI177 by 1997, from 
the 1975 level. Zambia’s HDI dropped by 5.4% between 1990 and 1997 and reached its 
lowest level in 2000, after which it increased only marginally (UNDP, 2001:35-36, 
2009). Between 1990 and 2007, Zambia's HDI fell by -0.17% annually from 0.495 to 
0.481, ranking it 164th out of 182 countries in 2007. In 2005, the HDI of Zambia was 
0.434 (UNDP, 2007/2008, 2009). 
 
Moreover, in 2005, Zambia’s Human Poverty Index (HPI-1), focusing on the most 
deprived in multiple dimensions of poverty, or the proportion of people below a 
threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as measured in the 
HDI,178 was 41.8. This ranked the country 96th among the 108 developing countries for 
which the index has been calculated (UNDP, 2007/2008). The introduction of 
excessively liberal policies under MMD rule, from the 1990s, especially in the real 
sectors of Zambia, alongside the removal of subsidies (an important requirement of 
SAPs) compounded the poverty levels of Zambia. 
 
                                                 
175
    Which represents a better measure of poverty than income. 
176
    The HDI, however, also dropped but at a lower average rate of 4.4% between 1985 and 1990, which corresponds to a time of 
IMF and World Bank involvement in Zambia (UNDP, 2001:35-36). 
177
    Account nevertheless needs to be taken of the fact that since life expectancy forms part of the HDI, the lower HDI is partly 
influenced by the higher incidence of AIDS in recent years in Zambia. 
178
    Living a long and healthy life, having access to education and a decent standard of living. 
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Official poverty figures179 show that poverty reached unprecedented levels in Zambia, 
rising from 69.7% in 1991 to 73% in 1998.180 The poverty levels are significantly higher 
if basic needs such as shelter, education, healthcare, lighting, clothing, footwear and 
transport are taken into account (Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:31). The negative 
trends in human development that accompany SAPs and neo-liberal policies, imposed 
by the World Bank and the IMF, suggest that additional measures are needed to 
minimise the erosion of human development in the process of reforming the economy 
through macro-economic stability (UNDP, 2001:39). 
 
4.4.6 Total employment and mining employment in Zambia 
 
Total employment grew faster than mining employment from 1979, indicating a 
diversification in sectors other than mining from this date. During 1985-91, total 
employment and mining employment were stable and were sustained at high levels, but 
began declining sharply between 1993 and 2003, with the decrease in mining 
employment being more significant. The mining sector’s share of total formal sector 
employment dropped from 22.2% in 1963 to 15.9% in 1984, 11.9% in 1990 and to 7.3% 
in 2000 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:3). The discussion below elaborates on the total and 
mining employment of Zambia.  
 
Total employment 
 
Total formal employment of Zambia increased steadily from independence in 1964 at 
268 700, to a peak of 546 000 in 1992 (Figure 4.7). Subsequently, about 80 000 formal 
sector jobs were lost from 1992 to 1998. The drop coincided with the institution of more 
rigorous SAPs, liberalisation and privatisation policies since the 1990s. 
 
At present, the overwhelming majority of the labour force of Zambia is employed in the 
informal sector,181 whose share of total employment has grown considerably from the 
                                                 
179
    Based on the percentage of the population below the established poverty line, determined through a food basket of minimal 
caloric requirements of a predominantly vegetarian list of food. 
180
    Poverty levels might even be higher than the official figures, possibly 98%, if non-vegetarian food and basic needs, such as 
shelter, education, healthcare, lighting, clothing, footwear and transport were included in the food basket (CSO, 1998, cited in 
Mwanawina & Mulungushi, 2002:31). 
181
    Dominated by women. 
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early 1990s (Tshoaedi, 2000:87; World Bank, 2002b:18). Formal sector employment182 
that accounted for merely 19.1% of the total labour force in 1990 dropped further to 
only 10.6% in 2000. Informal sector employment increased from 68.9% in 1990 to 
76.4% in 2000, and was 73.9% in 2005. Official unemployment levels were 12% in 
1990, which increased to 20% in 1993 and were 16% in 2005. However, unofficial 
sources cite much higher unemployment rates for Zambia under MMD rule. This is 
because many people regarded as employed in the informal sector in official figures, are 
considered as unemployed in unofficial sources. Accordingly, a staggering 3.39 million 
or 89.4% of workers were either unemployed or employed in the informal sector in 
2000 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007c; Central Statistical Office, 2006; World 
Bank, 2009; Regional Investor Survey, 2001:44; Catholic Secretariat, 2001:12; Ministry 
of Finance and National Planning, 2002b:74).183 
 
Most retrenchments (approximately 54 000) occurred in the 1990s before privatisation 
policies were introduced. The lower employment levels in the 1990s were mainly owing 
to the bankruptcies of several industries as a result of increased competition emanating 
from trade liberalisation and the removal of controls, rather than the privatisation 
process,184 according to the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA)185 (2000a:20; 
2000b:16). 
 
Mining sector employment 
 
Figure 4.7 shows that mining employment increased, especially in the 1960s and the 
1970s, from 57 130 in 1963 to a peak of 81 311 in 1975.186 Subsequent to the 
introduction of SAPs, mining employment fell considerably to only 64 500 in 1985, 
shifting it from first position over 1960-84 to third position between 1985 and 2006, 
                                                 
182
    The public sector, namely, the central and local government and the parastatals, is the largest formal sector employer in Zambia 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:21). 
183
    The figure was 81.3% in 1991. 
184
    The ZPA ascribes the loss in employment in the non-mining sector due to privatisation at only 6 000 out of a total of 60 000 
formal sector job losses between 1992 and 1996. Moreover, out of the 6 000 that were retrenched, 4 000 were on account of the 
collapse of the state trade sector prior to privatisation (ZPA, 2000a:20). 
185
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, Advisor of ZPA, 28 October 2003. 
186
    After agriculture, manufacturing was the second largest employer in the formal sector with an estimated workforce of 68 000 in 
1994. 
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after agricultural and manufacturing employment.187 Despite the considerable drop from 
the 1976 levels, mining employment was still relatively high in 1991 at 64 800.  
 
Figure 4.7: Total and sectoral employment in Zambia 
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Sources: Central Statistical Office, Quarterly Employment and Earnings Inquiry and the Monthly Digest 
of Statistics (2006); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2006:61). 
 
Subsequently, before the mines were even privatised, huge reductions took place in the 
mining sector workforce in the 1990s. About 19 600 employees lost their jobs at the 
ZCCM from 1992-97, with the workforce dropping to only 42 498 in 1997, when the 
first mines were privatised. The decline in the workforce before the mines were 
privatised was mainly as a result of the cost-cutting measures of the Chiluba 
government in the 1990s.188 These measures were rooted in fiscal pressure and the SAPs 
of the IMF and the World Bank, demanding significant reductions in government 
expenditure, including the streamlining of the workforce of the ZCCM.189 Demands 
from these bodies after 1993 that the government curb the expansion of government 
investments into enterprises in line for privatisation, beyond maintaining their physical 
                                                 
187
    Employment figures from the Association of Copper Mining Employers, though, show a less significant decline in employment 
levels in the 1980s, than those of the CSO. 
188
    Interviews with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003 and Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
189
    Interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003. 
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assets intact, also reduced employment opportunities in the mining sector in the 1990s 
(Andersson, 2000:75). 
 
Under private ownership of the mines, many permanent mineworkers further lost their 
jobs in the short term. This is mirrored in the steep fall in permanent employment from 
38 521 in 1999 to only 22 000 in 2000 and to its lowest level of about 19 000 in 2002. 
The permanent mining employees dropped in 2002 by 19 521 or 50.6% of the level 
reached in 1999 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:3, 21, 22; Van Buren, 2003:1151; World Bank, 
2002b:4, 18). This was mainly as a result of the tendencies of mining TNCs to 
increasingly shift workers into fixed-term employment and more important, into 
subcontracting work, through external contracts, elaborated upon in Chapter 5.190 The 
variations in the types of contracts offered under private ownership of the mines render 
it difficult to calculate the exact number of people working in the industry under 
different terms and conditions since the mines were privatised (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:22). If fixed-term and subcontracting employment are taken into account then the 
total mining employment amounted to 35 042 in 2000. 
 
The copper price boom in 2005 and 2006 contributed to the increases in the total 
permanent and non-permanent employment figures in the mines to 38 700 by 
September 2006, in the five firms that make up the biggest share of mining 
employment. The increases were, though, mainly in indirect employment, through 
contract and fixed-term employment, which together comprised then 46% of mining 
employment in 2006. Permanent employment levels increased only slightly to 21 000 in 
2006 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:22). Although copper mining is the main contributor to 
export earnings, it is no longer labour-intensive and dropped below agricultural and 
manufacturing employment already since 1985. Currently it accounts for a relatively 
small proportion of formal sector employment (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2008b:21). 
 
As far as the relations among employment in mining, agriculture and manufacturing are 
                                                 
190
    Interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003. 
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concerned, Figure 4.7 shows that from 1970 to 1984, except for the 1976 to 1979 
period, employment levels in all the sectors generally increased. Subsequent to the fall 
in mining employment from 1984 to 1985 the agricultural sector, which was in third 
position, overtook the mining and manufacturing sectors (apart from 2002) as the 
dominant employer from 1985 until 2003. Manufacturing employment remained 
reasonably stable from 1985 until 1991, and then dropped considerably together with 
mining employment from 1993 to 2001, coinciding with the time that excessive SAPs 
and liberalisation and privatisation policies were introduced in the Zambian economy. 
Manufacturing employment nevertheless remained above the levels in mining from 
1985 to 2002. 
 
4.4.7 Mining’s contribution to exports 
 
Copper mining contributed 96.5% to total mining output in 1987 and copper and 
cobalt191 (a by-product of copper) production still accounted for 90% of mining 
production in 2006, rendering copper mining highly representative of the mining 
industry in Zambia (Saasa, 1987:7; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:25, 34). 
Moreover, the mining sector is the most important contributor to the foreign exchange 
earnings of the Zambian economy,192 boasting for the most part over 90% of Zambia’s 
export earnings193 since independence (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:39; 
World Bank, 2002a:4; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 7). Mining exports contributed 99% to total 
exports in 1970 and copper and cobalt mining still accounted for 90.4% of Zambia's 
foreign exchange earnings in 1992.  
 
However, Figure 4.8 shows that from 1994 to 2002 a considerable decline took place in 
the share of copper and cobalt exports to total export earnings, from around 85.3% in 
1994 to its lowest level of only 59.3% in 2002. The progressive drop in the export 
earnings from copper during this time were largely attributable to the periodic slumps of 
the international copper price, the fall in production levels (in 2000 below a third of its 
peak) and to increased production costs, mainly owing to a lack of reinvestment in the 
                                                 
191
    That acquired importance only in the mid-1980s. 
192
    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003. 
193
    Interviews with Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 
2003. 
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mines (Catholic Secretariat, 2001:12; Van Buren, 2003:1151; Leistner, 1996:11.19; 
Akwetey, 1994:53). The major disruptions in mining activities that accompanied the 
privatisation process further accounted significantly for the decline in copper earnings 
(Committee on Economic Affairs, 2000:60 and 110). The increase in the production of 
cobalt in the 1990s, from 6.2% of export earnings in 1990 to 19.2% in 1998, cushioned 
the mining sector somewhat against a bigger drop in its contribution to exports.194  
 
Figure 4.8: The contribution of mining to total exports 
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c). 
 
From 2004, the share of copper and cobalt mining to total export earnings rose notably 
to 74.6% and increased further to an estimated 81.9% of goods exported in 2006, 
coinciding with surging international copper prices. Consequently, the mining sector 
grew by almost 50% in real terms from 2001 to 2005 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2007b:25, 34). While mining will continue to be a major economic activity in Zambia, 
its contribution to export revenue is however likely to remain below its pre-1991 levels.  
 
The fall in export earnings in the decade between 1992 and 2001 had a devastating 
impact on Zambia’s balance of payments, investments, exchange rates and the foreign 
exchange reserves. The poor balance of payments exacerbated the country’s 
                                                 
194
    The drop in the share of cobalt to export earnings in the early 2000s, under private ownership of the mines, from the 1998 level 
was mainly as result of the depletion of cobalt resources at KCM and the non-production at Roan Antelope Mining Corporation of 
Zambia (RAMCOZ) (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2002a:62). 
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indebtedness. Moreover, under private ownership of the mines an increase in export 
earnings did not necessarily translate into considerable benefits for Zambia, since most 
of the income was repatriated out of the country that also had a negative influence on 
the income debit of Zambia. The impact of the changes in the export earnings on these 
economic variables and of the repatriation of mining surpluses on the income debit of 
Zambia are examined below. 
 
4.4.8 Balance of payments 
 
The mining sector’s195 domination of Zambia’s foreign exchange renders the balance of 
payments position of the country highly dependent on the performance of mining. 
Accordingly, the same external factors that contribute to a decline in the performance of 
the mining sector have a negative impact on the trade balance of Zambia. These factors 
include a drop in the production and price of copper and, more recently, of cobalt, 
driven largely by the international demand for these metals and increases in the price of 
oil, a major input in mining (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:40, 2007b:41; 
World Bank, 1996:4; Cherv, 1989:129; Seidman, 1977:236).  
 
Throughout the 1960s, until 1974, Zambia experienced a balance of payments surplus, 
averaging 1.4% of GDP per annum, mainly owing to the high world copper prices. 
However, the surpluses declined consistently from 1974. The interaction of higher oil 
prices and the world economic recession that caused a drop in the price of copper, as 
well as increases in both visible and invisible imports, accounted for Zambia’s high 
balance of payments deficits from the mid-1970s (World Bank, 1996:4; Cherv, 
1989:129; Seidman, 1977:236). The balance of payments difficulties that Zambia 
experienced in the mid-1980s were mainly as a result of the widening gap between the 
debt servicing and payment capacity of the government and the dramatic rise in the 
costs of imports, following the auctioning of the exchange rate in 1985 (McGrath & 
Whiteside, 1989:180).  
 
Figure 4.9 shows that Zambia experienced trade deficits for most of the 1990s. The 
                                                 
195
    Especially copper and cobalt mining. 
  
114
trade deficits increased even more, in the short term, under private ownership of the 
major copper mines. The deficits were significantly influenced by the slower decline in 
imports,196 relative to the decrease in the share of exports to GDP197 or by the increases 
in imports that, for the most part, far outweighed exports. Zambia was, therefore, a net 
importer of goods and services at the time.  
 
The introduction of strict trade liberalisation in 1995 facilitated the huge imports of 
goods and services. The devaluation of the kwacha following the auctioning of the 
exchange rate in 1994, which dramatically increased the costs of foreign goods for the 
highly import-dependent economy and the declines in the production of copper also 
accounted greatly for the trade deficits in the 1990s. However, the country enjoyed trade 
surpluses in 1991 (at US$42 million), 1994 (at US$64 million) and in 1997 (at 
US$54 million), coinciding either with higher copper prices (1991 and 1994) or rising 
levels of copper production (1997) in Zambia (World Bank, 1996:4; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002:47, 2007b:41).  
 
Zambia experienced its highest trade deficits in the first few years under private 
ownership of the mines. The trade deficit peaked at US$341 million in 2001, the highest 
level on record, and was still high in 2003 at US$312 million. The increasing trade 
deficits that Zambia experienced under private ownership of the mines in the short term 
between 1998 and 2003, were mainly owing to the surge in imports,198 alongside the 
decline in exports. In 2003 imports, spurred on by greater investments in mining (which 
have a substantial import component) as a result of the higher copper prices, climbed to 
US$1 393 million, concurrently with declining exports (Africa Analysis, 2003b:20; 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2003:28; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2007b:41).  
 
A lower balance of payments support than what was pledged by multilateral donors, 
together with the sharp rise in global petroleum oil prices, a major component of the 
                                                 
196
    From 39% of GDP, between 1965 and 1974, to 34%, between 1990 and 1995. 
197
    From about 50% to about 31%, during the respective periods that contributed to the bankruptcy of many locally-based mining 
companies. 
198
    By 6% in 2000 and 28% (20.2% of GDP) in 2001. 
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import bill,199 hindered further improvements in the balance of payments position of 
Zambia at the start of the 2000s. Capital equipment, a major input component to the 
mines, and consumer goods account for most of the remainder of the import bill (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:23; Africa Research Bulletin, 2001b:14647). 
Substantial increases in food imports200 also contributed to the greater trade deficit in 
2002 (Government of Zambia, 2002: paragraph 19). The high trade deficit constituted a 
major macroeconomic challenge for the country (Africa Research Bulletin, 
2001b:14647; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:47). 
 
Figure 4.9: Imports, exports and trade balance 
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However, Zambia enjoyed trade surpluses from 2004-07. The trade surpluses increased 
dramatically from about US$35 million in 2005 to a peak of US$1 183 million in 2006, 
despite the rise in imports by an annual average of around 20% from 2003 to 2006 (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:41). Huge increases in copper exports,201 around 
four times the level recorded in 2002202 that outweighed surging imports, which led to a 
fall in the drag that net trade imposed on the GDP, accounted mainly for the higher 
trade surpluses (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:41, 2008b:15, 23). Total 
                                                 
199
    Owing to repeated supply disruptions from the Indeni refinery in Ndola that necessitated the import of refined petroleum 
products, rather than crude oil. 
200
    Mirrored in the 6.8% increase in merchandise imports during the second half of 2002. 
201
    To an estimated US$3.1 billion in 2006. 
202
    Due to the boom in the prices of copper and, to some extent, because of the benefits accruing from the greater investments in 
the copper mining sector. 
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exports in general increased in value to US$3.8 billion in 2006 (with growing domestic 
production), that is, by 73% from the 2005 level. Subsequently, in 2007, the trade 
surplus dropped to US$726 million, chiefly as a consequence of the significant rise in 
imports from 2006 to 2007 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007a:6).  
 
4.4.9 Income debit  
 
A study of the income debit, encompassing payments abroad,203 including the debt 
interest payments of the country, profits and dividends, plus all forms of employee 
compensation, provides a good indication of the outflows of revenue from Zambia due 
to the repatriation of profits and dividends from mining TNCs and of employee 
compensation. Before 2004, the external debt service or interest payments on external 
debt have been the main income debit component in Zambia. However, more recently, 
the huge debt relief granted to Zambia in 2005 and 2006 reduced the influence of debt 
service on the income debit of Zambia.  
 
Figure 4.10 shows that, except for the years 1988-89 and 2004-06 and to a lesser extent, 
1985 and 1991, the income debit of Zambia remained rather small, ranging from 
US$130 million in 1981 to US$354 million in 1986. The substantial increase in the 
income debit of Zambia to US$604 million in 1988 from the 1981-86 levels was 
possibly due to the accumulation of high debt servicing as a result of the NERP that the 
Kaunda government adopted. At the time the government limited its debt service 
payments owed to multilateral institutions. 
 
In spite of the dramatic improvements in the performance of the mining sector from 
2003 to 2006 and the increases in GDP, the income debit and income deficit of Zambia 
rose enormously during that time. The income debit increased to unprecedented levels 
in 2006, of US$1 075 million, for the period covering 1980 and 2006. The dramatic 
increase in the income debit was chiefly as a result of large repatriations of profits and 
shareholder dividends of foreign-owned mining companies and of remittances or 
compensation of foreign employees out of Zambia, under the foreign private ownership 
                                                 
203
    In respect of foreign-owned investments in the domestic economy.  
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of most of the companies in Zambia. This is to some extent supported by the fact that 
the external debt service or interest payments on external debt, previously the main 
income debit component of Zambia, declined enormously204 since 2005 and particularly 
in 2006, from US$729 million in 2003 to only US$174 million in 2006 (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008a:7, 2008b:24). Accordingly, a huge component of gains from 
the increased GDP did not benefit the Zambian economy, as large sums of mining 
profits were repatriated out of the country specifically at the time the mining sector 
gained significantly from the high copper prices. 
 
Figure 4.10: Real GDP, income debit and income balance (deficit) 
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c). 
 
4.4.10 Inward direct investment (net direct investment flows) and capital 
investment 
 
Figure 4.11 shows that the inward direct investment (or the net direct investment flows 
of capital by non-residents into the country) into Zambia was highly unstable, especially 
from 1989 to 2006. The inward direct investment flows were low from 1980-88. There 
was a net outflow of direct investment in 1981. The investment flows were relatively 
high in 1990 and in 1997-98 and increased considerably from 2003-06.  
 
The substantial increases in the inward direct investment flows in 1990 to 
US$203 million from US$93 million in 1988 were possibly encouraged by the market-
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    Principally as a result of the enormous debt-reduction and debt forgiveness that Zambia secured with creditors. 
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oriented policies that the Kaunda government adopted, specified in the PFP covering the 
1989-93 period. However, from 1991 to 1995 the inward direct investment of the 
private sector dropped sharply to only US$34 million in 1991 and remained at low 
levels till 1995. The annual average net flow of direct investment from 1991-95 was 
only US$50.8 million, compared to the average of US$133.7 million in the late 1980s, 
during 1987-90. The low foreign investment during 1991-95 coincided with the 
uncertainty created during the 1991 elections and the transformation period before the 
privatisation of the non-mining economy and of the mines. Moreover, several foreign 
companies relocated from Zambia, following huge inflows of cheaper foreign inputs 
into the country as a result of trade liberalisation policies (discussed in Section 4.2.2.1 
above).  
 
Figure 4.11: Inward direct investment and capital investment 
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Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c); Chamber of Mines, 2006 (cited in Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:77). 
 
The higher levels of net direct investment in 1997 to US$207 million and in 1998 at 
US$198 million from US$67 million in 1995 reflect the impact of the ambitious 
privatisation programme, in particular the sale of Zambia Sugar in 1998 to Tate and 
Lyle and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) for US$70 million 
(Ndulo, 1999, cited in Andersson, 2000:77). However, despite the privatisation of the 
mines that started in 1997 and was completed in 2000, the net direct investment levels 
declined sharply between 1999 and 2001, from levels obtained in 1998, dropping to 
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US$72 million in 2001. These levels were also low in 2002. 
 
The low net direct investment, in the short term, from 2000-2002, under private 
ownership of all the major copper mines, possibly reflects an initial wait-and-see 
attitude of private investors. This coincides with the ‘real options view of investment’. 
This view is based on the assumption of irreversible investment costs (namely, the 
capital loss to the investor when disposing of investment goods in a second-hand 
market), and on the uncertainty of future pay-offs and of future output prices that 
encourage investors to postpone their investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, cited in 
Andersson, 2000:79). The larger the uncertainty and the higher the value of the potential 
investment, the greater would be the likelihood that the firm would postpone the 
investment decision (Andersson, 2000:79). Possible investments that foreign companies 
possess elsewhere would likely lessen losses in returns that they might incur from the 
postponements. These arguments are also considered in Section 6.1.2 of Chapter 6. 
 
However, the subsequent sharp rise in the net direct investment between 2003 and 2006 
under private ownership of the mines was largely thanks to the dramatic increases in the 
prices of copper at the time that encouraged higher investments in the mining sector. 
The net investment flows reached their highest level in 2005 at US$380 million, for the 
period covering 1980 to 2006. The investment levels rose further from US$82 million in 
2002 to US$364 million in 2004. However, these levels dropped slightly to 
US$350 million in 2006.  
 
Figure 4.11 shows that capital investment also proved rather unstable in the short term 
under private ownership of the mines. The considerable volatility reflects the significant 
influence of the price of copper on capital investment under private ownership and 
possibly a reluctance of mining TNCs in the short run not to respect their investment 
obligations. The capital investment dropped enormously in 1998 to only about 
US$8 million, from about US$116 million in 1997. Subsequently, it increased steadily 
until 2000, reaching about US$252 million, but declined again from 2001-2003 to 
around US$112 million in 2003. In the years of high copper prices capital investment 
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increased steeply from 2004 to 2005, reaching about US$352 million in 2005. 
 
4.4.11 Exchange rates  
 
The significant contribution of the mining sector to Zambia’s foreign exchange and the 
vulnerability of copper mining to external factors render the kwacha highly susceptible 
to the performance of mining and indirectly to the influences also of external factors. 
The external factors that influence the exchange rate encompass the world demand for 
copper products, the prices of copper and the performance of the US dollar.205 
Moreover, aid and debt forgiveness were becoming increasingly important in supporting 
Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings that indirectly influence the exchange rate.  
 
Internal factors that affect the local exchange rate include increases in the imports of 
mining inputs and a rise in the costs of the production of copper (Nalwamba, 2002:5). 
Additionally, under private ownership of the mines and in the absence of greater exports 
in other sectors, the ability of private mining companies206 to remit profits from mining 
sales out of Zambia could also affect significant reductions in the foreign exchange 
levels. This would, in turn, cause a depreciation of the kwacha. Rather than encouraging 
local entrepreneurship, the poor capacities of local industries precluded them from 
taking advantage of incentives that a depreciation holds for building local 
entrepreneurship, discussed above. 
 
In the 1980s, the introduction of the auctioning of the foreign exchange system in 1985 
resulted in a depreciation of the kwacha. Before this, the stringent allocation system 
under the controlled foreign exchange regime, the Foreign Exchange Mechanism 
Allocation System (FEMAC) contained significant declines in the value of the kwacha. 
The kwacha fell from US$1=ZK0.8 in 1980 to US$1=ZK21.7 in 1989 (Maambo, 
1998:Figs. 7, 8). The control that the NERP reintroduced in the foreign exchange 
market from 1987-88 accounted for the brief increase in the value of the kwacha in 
1987 to US$1=ZK8 from US$1=ZK12.7 in 1986. Severe shortages of foreign exchange, 
largely due to the IMF and the World Bank and other bilateral bodies failing to provide 
                                                 
205
    The currency in which the price of copper and cobalt is quoted. 
206
    Because of the lack of exchange controls. 
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funding to Zambia, as retribution for the government’s introduction of the NERP 
policies in 1987-88, led to the fall in the kwacha after the NERP during Kaunda’s 
government. 
 
Figure 4.12 shows that a more dramatic depreciation in the value of the kwacha took 
place against both the US dollar and the rand, the currencies employed by Zambia’s 
main trading partners during the 1990s since the beginning of Chiluba’s rule, and 
especially under private ownership of the mines. The decline in the kwacha was much 
more pronounced against the US dollar. The enormous depreciation and volatility of the 
kwacha against the US dollar and the rand from 1994207 coincided with the auctioning of 
the exchange rate that opened the economy to external shocks.208  
 
Figure 4.12: Kwacha exchange rate with US dollar and rand (represented as a log 
graph) 
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Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c, 2008a:13); Bank of Zambia (2000).  
 
Within less than a decade, from the beginning of Chiluba’s rule in the early 1990s till 
1999, the kwacha declined, sharply, from US$1=ZK88.97 in 1991 to US$1=ZK2 632.2 
                                                 
207
    Despite occasional efforts by the BoZ to support the exchange rate. While the BoZ has no formal powers to set the exchange 
rate, it periodically intervenes in the market, through currency purchases and the manipulation of statutory reserve ratios, to 
influence the value of the kwacha. Moreover, while intervention by the central bank might smooth out short-term fluctuations, this 
would postpone rather than avert a sharp depreciation (which was historically the case), especially as foreign exchange reserves are 
expected to increase slowly, to around only three months of import cover (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007a:6, 2007b:28). 
208
    A fully liberalised or market-determined exchange rate commenced in 1994 (following the opening of the Open Central 
License in February 1990, the floating of the kwacha in October 1992 and the inter-bank foreign exchange system in December 
1993). Trade in foreign exchange was further liberalised in July 2003, through the elimination of the requirement of clearance, also 
of major foreign-exchange transactions, through the BoZ's dealing window (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b, 2007c:44; 
World Bank, 2002a:14). 
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in 1999, representing a depreciation in the nominal exchange rate of 2 858%. The 
kwacha depreciated against the rand from R1=ZK30 in 1991 to R1=ZK549.7 in 2000. 
The considerable depreciation of the kwacha against the US dollar in the late 1990s was 
mainly owing to the withholding of balance of payment support and the significant 
reductions in export earnings, because of a weaker performance of the mines and the 
decline in the price of copper in 1998, following the East Asian crisis of 1997 (SADC, 
2000:340). 
 
Under private ownership of all the copper mines, increased investments and higher 
inflows of balance of payments support from donors did not result in an improvement in 
the value of the kwacha against the US dollar until 2004. On the contrary, the kwacha 
depreciated dramatically against the US dollar to US$1=ZK4 157.8 in 2000 from the 
1999 level of US$1=ZK2 632.2 and plunged to its lowest level in 2004, at 
US$1=ZK4 771.3, amounting to a decline of 81% from 1999 to 2004. The kwacha also 
displayed high volatility, against both the rand and the US dollar exchange rates, 
especially from 1999 to 2004.  
 
Subsequent to the huge savings as a result of the debt relief and other donor support209 
granted to Zambia, the strong copper exports following unprecedented high prices and a 
growing investor confidence,210 the kwacha appreciated in 2005 to US$1=ZK3 508.9 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007a:5, 2007b:44; Africa Confidential, 2006:4). 
Policies that the central bank and the Commerce, Trade and Industry Ministry 
introduced in 2003,211 limiting services from being quoted in foreign currencies, also 
contributed to some stability in the kwacha in recent years (Bank of Zambia, cited in 
Africa Research Bulletin, 2003c:15633). The depreciation of the kwacha in 2006 to 
US$1=ZK4 406.6 was largely as a result of political uncertainty212 and reductions in 
emerging-market premiums, owing to continued interest rate hikes in the major global 
economies that encouraged wide global emerging-market sell-offs (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:44).  
                                                 
209
    Consequent to the government’s successfully implementing the majority of IMF-advocated reforms. 
210
    Reflected in higher inflows of Zambia's two main sources of foreign exchange. 
211
    To stop goods (including equipment). 
212
    That plagued Zambia in 2006. 
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4.4.12 Foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold)  
 
Figure 4.13 shows that the foreign exchange reserves increased slowly from 1986 until 
1994. Thereafter, the reserves showed a general declining trend until 1999, when they 
reached their lowest level for the period covering 1980-2007. Subsequently, the foreign 
exchange reserves exhibited an upward trend and their growth accelerated during 
2003-07. However, in the short term, under private ownership of all the copper mines, 
the foreign exchange reserves were volatile during 2000-03.  
 
Donor assistance and foreign exchange generated from copper exports are the major 
variables affecting the level of foreign reserves in Zambia (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007b:44). Increases in donor support largely boosted the foreign exchange levels 
in 1985 during Kaunda’s government, to US$200.1 million, from US$54.5 million in 
1983 and augmented Zambia’s foreign exchange in 1990 to US$193.1 million. Trade 
surpluses, alongside donors’ contributions and debt relief, also contributed markedly to 
the considerable rise of Zambia’s foreign exchange revenue in 1994. 
 
Figure 4.13: Foreign exchange reserves 
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Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c, 2008a:13). 
 
The plummeting of the foreign exchange levels in the late 1990s to US$69.4 million in 
1998 and to their lowest level in 1999 at US$45.4 million, was mainly owing to the 
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prolonged aid freeze from donors in the latter part of the 1990s.213 These measures 
followed Zambia’s failure to meet certain IMF/World Bank benchmarks, including the 
privatisation of the ZCCM (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:44). The poor 
performance of the mining sector also contributed to the low exchange rates in the late 
1990s. 
 
The short-term volatility in the foreign exchange reserves between 2000 and 2003 under 
private ownership was possibly due to policies entitling private mining companies to 
repatriate 100% of their net profits from the sales of copper out of Zambia214 and to the 
tendency of TNCs to withhold foreign currencies from the BoZ. These policies also 
limited higher foreign exchange reserves from mining under TNCs’ ownership of the 
mines. Improvements in the trade deficit in 2002 underpinned the recovery of the 
foreign exchange in that year. 
 
The reserves declined dramatically to only US$247.7 million in 2003 from the 2002 
level of US$535.1 million (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001c:14687; Van Buren, 
2003:1151). The worsening of the trade deficit in both 2001 and 2003 contributed to the 
decreases in the foreign exchange reserves in those years (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007c). The decline in external programme assistance in 2001 was also 
responsible for the reduction of Zambia’s foreign exchange reserves in that year (PRSP, 
2002:10; Van Buren, 2003:1156).  
 
The increase in the foreign exchange reserves of Zambia to a more sustainable level in 
more recent years, from US$248 million in 2003 to US$1 090 million in 2007, were 
partly as a result of its improved balance of payments. The more favourable balance of 
payments were to some extent influenced by the surge in copper exports, following high 
copper prices, and various aid or balance of payments support extended to Zambia,215 
rather than because of the privatisation of the mines. More crucially though, the huge 
foreign debt forgiveness that Zambia enjoyed through its HIPC status and of even 
                                                 
213
    Forcing the government to draw down its reserves to meet debt-service payments and other obligations. 
214
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
215
    The debt forgiveness reduced the interest payments of Zambia from US$144 million in 1999 to US$89 million in 2000 (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:50). 
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greater significance, the MDRI, accounted for the significant increases in the foreign 
exchange levels from 2004 to 2007.  
 
Accordingly, in addition to strong copper exports, inflows of aid assisted considerably 
in the build-up of the foreign reserves of Zambia at the BoZ,216 especially in more recent 
years, as a large portion of the net surpluses from mining is repatriated out of the 
country (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:5). Despite the significant increase in 
the foreign exchange reserves to their highest level in the period covering 1980-2007, at 
US$1 090 million in 2007, the BoZ could nevertheless still cover only 2.7 months of 
imports (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007a:3, 2007b:43, 44).  
 
4.4.13 Debt of Zambia 
 
The surplus on the current account that Zambia enjoyed in 1974 was turned into an 
external debt of about US$1.7 billion in 1975 that increased enormously to 
US$6.6 billion in 1989, of which US$1 billion was comprised of overdue interest 
payments (Cherv, 1989:127; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007c). Zambia's foreign 
debt rose further to almost US$6.9 billion in 1990, demoting the country to one of the 
most indebted in sub-Saharan Africa. Only Sudan rivalled Zambia among Africa's 
problem debtors in 1989 (World Bank, 1996:3; Cherv, 1989:127; Leistner, 1996:11.18, 
11.19; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007c).  
 
Despite several debt relief initiatives from donors since 1991 immediately following 
MMD rule (such as debt cancellations, other debt relief and aid), which lowered the 
external debt of Zambia, the decreases in debt remained small and were unsustainable 
until 2005. For instance, the declines in Zambia's debt in 1994217 (mainly owing to 
donors’ contributing US$3.2 billion to the country and because Zambia's creditors at the 
time wrote off US$1.3 billion of the country’s debt)218 and in 2000 to US$5.7 billion 
were met in both instances by subsequent increases in Zambia’s external debt (Leistner, 
1996:11.18, 19; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007c). From Figure 4.14 it is noted 
                                                 
216
    The BoZ would, though, intervene in the market to mop up excess liquidity (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:5). 
217
    That represents 184.5% of GDP and 549.9% of exports. 
218
    Totalling US$3.5 billion from 1992-94. 
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that Zambia’s debt increased to US$7 billion during 1995-96,219 ranking it then amongst 
the most indebted countries in the world (Leistner, 1996:11.19; Burnell, 1995:688; The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007c).220 Also, the country’s debt peaked at 
US$7.3 billion in 2004, despite the approval of the three-year SDR220 million 
(US$320 million) poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF221), in June 2004 (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007c). 
 
Figure 4.14: External debt of Zambia 
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Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c, 2008b:18). 
 
The high aid statistics of Zambia222 were not unique amongst low-income countries. 
What distinguished Zambia, however, was its huge debt service burden, with the 
interest payments on external debt then constituting the main income account debit.223 
The debt service of Zambia was US$70 million in 1998, US$l44 million in 1999 and 
US$89 million 2000.224 The debt service still constituted more than 37% of the 
country’s foreign currency reserves in 2000 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:60; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002:13, 50; Regional Investor Survey, 2001:37). 
 
The debt stock of Zambia dropped significantly only from 2005, when the IMF and the 
                                                 
219
    Equivalent to 170% of gross domestic product. 
220
    In 1993, external debt equalled 232% of GNP and no less than 638% of total exports, while debt service absorbed 32.8% of 
export earnings (down from 51.1 per cent in 1991). 
221
    The main goal of Zambia's three-year PRGF with the IMF, due to run until September 2007, was to improve fiscal discipline 
and management, while other priorities under the PRGF were to improve governance, develop the business environment for the 
private sector and to complete the privatisation programme (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007a:2). 
222
    Constituting 63% of the share of its GNI in 1995 but dropping to 21% in 2004. 
223
    Principal repayments appear as a current transfer debit. 
224
    There was a corresponding over 4% reduction in the 2001 income account deficit to US$168 million from its 2000 level (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:50, 2007c). 
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World Bank formally endorsed a US$3.9 billion debt-relief package for Zambia,225 
under the HIPC initiative, in April 2005. The debt stock decreased sharply from 
US$7.1 billion (before Zambia received the HIPC partial debt relief package) to 
US$4.5 billion, immediately after the partial debt forgiveness it gained from the HIPC 
debt relief package226 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:60; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2007b:43, 26, 2007c).  
 
Better still, under the MDRI227 that the World Bank and the IMF announced in 2006, 
those sub-Saharan African countries that had already reached the HIPC Completion 
Point won a massive additional write-off. The write-off entailed the IMF, the 
International Development Association of the World Bank and the African 
Development Fund (AfDF) cancelling 100% of their debt claims on Zambia. The debt 
cancellation under the MDRI,228 reduced Zambia's external public debt stock to 
US$502 million in July 2006, according to government estimates less than a tenth of its 
previous level (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:6; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:43-44, 
2008a:10, 2008b:24). The huge external debt forgiveness granted to Zambia, especially 
under the MDRI in 2006 enabled the government to build up its foreign-exchange 
reserves and to bridge the persistent substantial deficit on the current account that left a 
significant financing gap (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:10, 11, 2008b:24).  
 
However, Zambia immediately started building up its loans again, resulting in a rise in 
its external debt from US$2 325 million at the end of 2006 to US$2 596 million in 
2007,229 mainly to finance the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP),230 running 
from 2006 to 2010 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:61; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
                                                 
225
    Subsequent to Zambia’s fulfilling almost all of the 15 key reforms and objectives set by the IMF to qualify for debt cancellation 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:43). 
226
    The debt, though, increased again and was already at the end of 2005 US$5.7 billion. 
227
    Born out of an acknowledgement that the HIPC scheme had failed to have the desired impact on the debt burden of many poor 
countries. 
228
    Involving the IMF’s writing off around US$577 million, the AfDF about US$245 million and the World Bank about 
US$1.88 billion. 
229
    That would cover just over half of the expected financing gap (equivalent of about US$1.5 billion) between projected costs, 
amounting to K65.2 trillion and projected domestic resources, estimated at K49.9 trillion, over a five-year period. Most of this 
funding should come from normal expenditure and funds previously budgeted for debt servicing but released by the MDRI deal 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007:61). 
230
    The borrowing to finance the FNDP would culminate in a 66% hike in aid from both domestic and external sources, from an 
average of US$550 million per year, from 2004-2006, to an average of at least US$800 million for the five years of the FNDP 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007:61). 
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2007a:2). Zambia’s foreign public debt doubled to US$l billion by 10 June 2008 from 
the 2006 level. This is nevertheless still less than a seventh of its external debt in 2004. 
In 2007, the domestic debt of Zambia constituted 19.9% of GDP, compared to 129% of 
real GDP in 2000 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:4, 10, 11, 2008b:24; 
Regional Investor Survey, 2001:37).  
 
4.4.14 Inflation  
 
The study uses the changes in consumer prices as an indicator of the inflation rate in 
Zambia, as data on changes in producer prices of Zambia are not readily available and 
consumer prices constitute the main variable affecting the inflation rate in Zambia. The 
terms ‘inflation rate’ and ‘changes in consumer prices’ are therefore used 
interchangeably in the study. A huge discrepancy exists between the official and 
unofficial inflation rates in Zambia, especially in the early 1990s. A high inflation rate 
harms local business profitability in particular and negatively affects the welfare of the 
nation, rendering it difficult for Zambians to afford basic goods.231  
 
Figure 4.15 shows that the gradual increases in the inflation level, from 3.1% in 1964 to 
20% in 1984, were followed by a considerable rise and a higher volatility in inflation 
from the late 1980s and especially in the early 1990s until 1993. Inflation that averaged 
44% from 1985 to 1987 increased to 55% in 1988, subsequent to the abandoning of the 
economic reform programme in 1987 (World Bank, 1996:13; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:31). The high increase in inflation in 1991, at 98.5%232 was 
largely as a result of the Kaunda government printing more money to meet the 100% 
increase in the salaries of civil service employees and to pay for the election 
campaign,233 following the IMF’s suspension of all financial disbursements to Zambia 
(Simutanyi, 1996:828). 
 
                                                 
231
    On the other hand, most international companies in the export sectors of Zambia that benefit from higher dollar and rand rates 
over the kwacha, are less affected by the increases in the consumer price index. These companies tend to act against the effects of 
inflation by hedging against the depreciation of the kwacha, partly, by keeping most of their income in dollars and rands.  
232
    The unofficial inflation rate was purported to be 400% (Van Buren, 2003: 1155). 
233
    While government spending in productive activities (like construction, building the capacities of local companies and 
agriculture) or development projects would promote economic growth (even though it would contribute to some increases in 
inflation), the injection of government borrowings mainly in unproductive, consumption orientated sectors, such as for salaries, 
wages and for recurring departmental charges, would crowd out the private sector (interview with Fred Yamba, 25 November 2003). 
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Figure 4.15: Percentage change in consumer prices  
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Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007c, 2008b:18); Bank of Zambia (2000). 
 
At the beginning of MMD rule, the inflation level increased even further to 165.7% in 
1992 and peaked at 183.3% in 1993. Subsequently, it dropped sharply to 54.6% in 1994. 
The inflation level has stabilised since 1998, when it reached 24.5% and ranged 
between 26% (in 2000) and 18% (in 2004) in the 1999-2004 period. In 2006 inflation 
declined considerably to 9%.  
 
The main factors that accounted for the high inflation in Zambia, especially at the start 
of MMD rule, were the loose monetary policy, which historically allowed the value of 
the kwacha to fall and that in turn encouraged inflation and rising import costs, 
especially of fuel; a weak exchange rate;234 lax fiscal policy; and inconsistent food 
supplies (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:35; ZPA, 2000a:16). One of these 
conditions is sufficient to stoke inflationary pressures (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:35, 2007b:31, 2008b:22).235 The demand management programme that SAPs 
promote largely accounted for the decline in inflation after 1993 under MMD rule. The 
stronger currency influenced the drop in inflation to 9% in 2006, in addition to a 
combination of prudent fiscal policy and a bumper maize crop (The Economist 
                                                 
234
    Firmer monetary control demanded from SAPs since 1994 and policies aimed at encouraging greater exchange rate stability 
possibly also promoted the decline in inflation from 1994 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001e:15009; IMF, cited in Van Buren, 
2003:1155-1156). 
235
    The consistency of food supplies is largely determined by the success of the maize harvest. 
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Intelligence Unit, 2007b:31, 2008b:22).  
 
4.4.15 Budget deficit  
 
Figure 4.16 shows that Zambia experienced a higher budget deficit during Kaunda’s 
government than under the MMD government, mainly because of the greater 
government expenditure linked to Kaunda’s humanist policies. The stricter adoption of 
SAPs of the Chiluba government, in comparison with the Kaunda government, which 
limited government expenditure, curbed somewhat the budget deficit of the MMD 
government. In the period covering 1980-2007, the highest increase in the budget deficit 
in 1991 at 45.1% of GDP from 8.7% in 1990 was principally due to the excessive 
spending of the Kaunda government on its election campaign and because of the 100% 
increases in the salaries of civil service employees, to promote electoral-maximising 
motives.  
 
Figure 4.16: Budget balance (as % of GDP) 
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While the budget deficit was generally lower during the MMD government, who also 
enjoyed a brief budget surplus of 1.5% in 1992, the deficit nevertheless displayed an 
increasing trend from 1993 to 2003. The budget deficit from 1994 to 2004 averaged 
around 5.5% of GDP. Government spending on recurrent charges, such as wages and 
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salaries and loss-making parastatals, rather than on capital projects (that would have had 
more positive outcomes on Zambia’s development), affected the budget of the country 
in a negative fashion. The increases in the budget deficit from 1994 to 2003 were also 
mainly as a result of donors failing to disburse the amount of aid they had pledged, 
according to the MMD government (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:28).  
 
However, since 2004, the budgetary performance has been more favourable, with the 
fiscal deficit dropping to only 1.7% of GDP in 2004, down from 6.6% in 2003, owing to 
the improved fiscal management, focused on enabling Zambia to qualify for the new 
PRGF (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:28, 2008b:17). The budget deficit also 
improved considerably in 2007 to only 0.3% of GDP, from 2.9% in 2006. The 
significant increases in the budget of the Finance Ministry to US$3.2 billion by the end 
of 2005 were spurred mainly by the copper boom and the enormous decline in the debt 
of Zambia. In turn, this enabled the government to potentially finance 71% of the 2006 
budget of Zambia from local resources (Africa Confidential, 2006:4). 
 
4.4.16 Copper prices 
 
The price of copper shows high volatility (refer to Figure 4.17) and declined in the last 
three decades by an average annual rate of about 3.4%. The Zambian economy’s 
enormous dependence on copper renders its performance highly vulnerable to the price 
of copper and, by extension, to the demand for the commodity by major industrialised 
consumers, since international demand and supply factors largely determine the price of 
copper. The performance of the Zambian economy is therefore highly sensitive to the 
strength and duration of world recovery, especially of the USA (that consumes more 
than one quarter of the world’s minerals) and more recently of China, that has replaced 
the USA as the world’s largest consumer of copper (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2007b:42; Africa Research Bulletin, 2003d:15677; Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, 2002b:74, 75; The Post, 2003a:4).  
 
Accordingly, the two major world recessions, viz. 1973-75 and 1979-82, depressed the 
demand for and the price of copper in 1975 and 1982. The general low copper prices in 
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the 1980s were also attributable to the flooding of the world market for copper, as a 
result of the policies of the IMF that encouraged the copper-producing developing 
countries to increase their copper exports – a policy that proved harmful to Zambia’s 
economy (Cherv, 1989:136; Seidman, 1977:236).  
 
The plummeting of the price of copper by 44% from mid-1997 until 2002 was mainly 
attributable to the 1997-98 Asian crisis,236 the subsequent contagious ripple effects that 
precipitated the Russian and Brazilian financial crises, and the 11 September attacks in 
the USA in 2001 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001d:14976; Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, 1999:47, 2001:74; Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 
2002b:74, 75, 2003:28; ZCCM, 1999:7). The doubling of Western commercial stocks 
over the 1997-98 period to 1.2 million tons further depressed the price of copper in the 
late 1990s (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2002b:75). The copper price 
declined from US102.5 cents/lb in 1997 to US71.1 cents/lb in 1999. 
 
Figure 4.17: Copper prices* 
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*Exclude outlier in 2006, when copper prices peaked at 305.6 US cents/lb. 
 
Sources: Adapted from IMF Financial Statistics, World Bank World Tables, Central Statistical Office and 
Bank of Zambia (cited in Andersson, 2000:13); The Economist Intelligence Unit (1989-90:37, 1995-
96:34, 1999-2000:24, 2001:33, 2006:41, 2007b:35). 
 
However, after decades of a general decline (except for the brief respite in 1994/1995 
when the price of copper was significantly higher than the long-term trend) the global 
                                                 
236
    That accounted for the poor economic performance of Japan and South East Asia. 
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price of copper rose to unprecedented levels between 2004 and 2006. The copper price 
increased from US80.3 cents/lb in 2003 to US305.6 cents/lb in 2006 (World Bank, 
2004a:48). The major catalysts for the increases in the price of copper from 2003 to 
2005 were the tight supply of copper-producing countries and high global demand 
(especially by China), riding on strong world economic growth, as the world economy 
was coming out of a recession, which benefited the commodities market.237 Threats of 
industrial action and speculative pressure further contributed to the higher copper prices 
in 2006 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:1, 2; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007a:4, 30, 
2008a:6).  
 
Nonetheless, the long-term trend in copper prices, expected to move cyclically in 
tandem with world economic demand, is likely to remain negative. This is partly 
because structurally, the copper mining industry is subject to a significant degree of 
product substitution,238 which will depress demand and consequently the price of copper 
(World Bank, 2004a:48). In the absence of a greater diversification of the Zambian 
economy, such a trend would impact negatively on the country’s livelihood. 
Government policies aimed at diversification therefore appear necessary to relieve the 
economy of its huge dependence on the highly volatile copper prices that create a lot of 
uncertainty, and to eliminate the ‘Dutch disease’ that afflicts Zambia. 
 
4.4.17 Copper production  
 
The copper production levels are considered in some detail below, to illuminate the 
factors that account for the trends in copper production, discussed in Section of 5.4.1.1 
of Chapter 5. In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, Zambia was among the top global 
copper producers. It is noted from Figure 4.18 that broadly, the copper output declined 
more significantly in the 1980s than in the 1970s. The decline accelerated in the 1990s. 
Production levels increased again, albeit slowly, in the short term under private 
ownership of the mines. 
 
More specifically, in the 1960s copper production increased dramatically to 
                                                 
237
    Interview with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
238
    Especially by fibre optics. 
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680 000 tons in 1965 from 350 000 tons in 1955. Zambia’s copper production levels 
peaked in 1969 at 747 500 tons, accounting then for 12% of international production 
(Van Buren, 2003:1152; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:34). The opening of 
new ore sources239 largely accounted for the phenomenal growth of copper production in 
Zambia from the late 1950s until 1969 and for its continued high levels in the mid-
1970s (Maambo, 1998:5; The Economist, 2002b:1). The significant decline in the 
production of copper from its peak in 1969 to 534 600 tons in 1971 was mainly 
attributable to over a million tons of mud and water from the surface engulfing a large 
part of the underground workings of the Mufulira Mines240 (Maambo, 1998:5). 
 
Despite subsequent declines in the production of copper from levels attained in 1969, 
the production levels remained high until 1976, when it still reached about 
700 000 tons. A combination of factors, viz. a depressed copper price from late 1974 to 
mid-1978, the hike in the oil price, the effects of political turmoil in Southern Africa 
that spilled over into Zambia and the higher turnover of the expatriate personnel 
contributed to the poorer performance of the mining sector from 1977-79. Limited 
foreign exchange and the scarcity of spare parts further precluded better performance in 
the latter part of the 1970s (Roan Consolidated Mines Limited, 1980:4). 
 
In the 1980s, production levels declined considerably from 607 200 tons in 1980 to 
448 400 tons in 1989. The lower production levels in the 1980s were caused by: delays 
in promised foreign exchange from donors from 1983 to 1986; the closure of high-cost 
and less profitable mines in 1987241 and of the Luanshya smelter and the Ndola copper 
refinery; shortfalls in foreign exchange; and higher costs242 of mining (World Bank, 
1989:49; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 8). During the late 1980s, the costs profile of the ZCCM 
escalated from the lower to the upper decile of the world's producers (Maambo, 
1998:Fig. 8). The high costs at the time were mainly owing to the significant 
depreciations of the kwacha in 1987, subsequent to the auctioning of the foreign 
                                                 
239
    Namely, the Nchanga Open Pit and Konkola in 1957, the Chibuluma mine in 1963, the Chambishi Open Pit in 1965 and the 
Kalengwa mine in 1969. 
240
    Which cost the lives of 69 miners in September 1970. 
241
    Namely Chambishi, Konkola No.3 Shaft and Kansanshi. 
242
    Beyond those of most global competitors. 
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exchange rate in 1986 that, in the absence of local substitutes, increased the price of 
mining inputs. The more expensive methods of mining required for deeper level mining 
and the poorer average grade linked to deeper copper ores further contributed to the 
high increases in the costs of mining input from 1985 to 1987 (Cherv, 1989:127; 
Maambo, 1998:Fig. 7).243 
 
The acceleration of the decline in the average copper production in the 1990s during 
Chiluba’s rule was at a rate of about 5.1% p.a., compared to the 3.5% long-term decline 
(World Bank, 2002b:9, 2003b:134, 2004a:48). The levels of copper production dropped 
in the 1990s (except for the brief increases in 1992 and in 1993) from 448 400 tons in 
1989 to 382 000 tons in 1991, to only 260 000 tons in 1999. The general decline in the 
production of copper in the 1990s, despite the higher copper prices in 1994 was 
predominantly due to high production costs.  
 
The increases in production costs in the Copperbelt region244 in the 1990s were again 
mainly as a result of the depreciation of the kwacha and the high costs associated with 
deeper level mining and the lower grade of copper, together with geological factors245 
and increased seismic activities (ZCCM, 1996, cited in Lungu & Silengo, 1997:26; 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2002b:75; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 1). 
Underinvestment in the mines, significantly the outcome of pressure from the IMF and 
the World Bank that the government limited its investments in the mines that were 
earmarked for privatisation246 further increased production costs (Andersson, 2000:75). 
Shortages of low matte grade concentrates at the Mufulira smelter and of acid and low 
acid soluble copper in tailings, which resulted in many unscheduled shutdowns, added 
to the drop in production levels in the late 1990s (ZCCM, 1999:11).  
 
In 2000 when all the mines were transferred to private ownership, copper production 
                                                 
243
    Shortages of largely imported spare parts in the mining and in the metallurgical processing plants, linked to the lower 
accessibility of foreign exchange to Zambians, following the depreciation of the kwacha, contributed to the importing of machinery 
into Zambia dropping to only 4.6% in 1986 (from 13.4% in 1984) of a declining total foreign exchange base. This resulted in a 
deferring of mining projects that would have replaced declining reserves (Africa Now, 1987:31; Maambo, 1998:Figs. 7, 8). 
244
    By about 50%, with the increasing replacement of high grade minerals bornite and charcocite by low grade mineral 
chalcopyrite, as the mines deepened. 
245
    Such as the reduced strike lengths, thickness and shallow dip of ore bodies that rendered the caving method inappropriate. 
246
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, December 2003. 
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dropped to only 257 000 tons,247 its lowest level since the late 1950s (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002:40, 2007b:34; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 
2000:60; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:19). The decline was largely attributed to delays in the 
arrival of spare parts and equipment; the state of dilapidation of the mines; industrial 
and labour unrest (also in 1999); and the drop in copper production248 at Roan Antelope 
Mining Corporation of Zambia (RAMCOZ) (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, 2000:60; Lungu, 2001:15; Mining Journal 17/11, cited in Africa 
Research Bulletin, 2000b:14593). Disruption in acid supply at KCM in the first quarter 
of 2001, as well as increased water levels in the mines and the placement of RAMCOZ 
under receivership contributed to the rather low copper production levels in 2001 
(Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2003:22; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:41).  
 
Production levels indicate an increasing trend under private ownership of the mines 
from 2001. The increase has become more significant, from 2004-2007. The higher 
copper production in 2002 to 337 700 tons, despite the withdrawal of Anglo American 
from KCM in 2002, was mainly due to the recapitalisation of the mining sector and the 
boost in the production of copper at Bwana Mkubwa (Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, 2002c:62; Pretoria News, 2004:21; Regional Investor Survey, 2001:38; Africa 
Analysis, 2001:12; Africa Mining Intelligence, 2002b:1).249  
 
Copper production in Zambia almost doubled to 497 100 tons in 2006, from 
257 000 tons in 2000. The value of metal exports rose from US$506 million in 2001, to 
over US$1 billion in 2005 and to US$2.7 billion in 2006 (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007b:19, 25, 30, 34; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:1, 19; Africa Confidential, 2006:5, 
2007:10). Nevertheless, these levels remained lower than those attained in the 1960s 
and early 1980s under Kaunda’s government.  
 
                                                 
247
    With KCM then producing only 136 000 tons of copper in the nine months of its operations. 
248
    From 3 000 tons to 1 000 tons a month. 
249
    Production at Bwana Mkubwa increased from 2 500 tons per annum to about 30 000 tons in 2002, assisted by the increasing 
ores that First Quantum acquired from the Lonshi copper mine in Congo-Kinshasa, that are processed at Bwana Mkubwa, whose ore 
reserves in Zambia were almost exhausted in 2001 (interview with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003). 
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Figure 4.18: Copper and cobalt production 
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Sources: Adapted from IMF Financial Statistics, World Bank World Tables, Central Statistical Office and 
Bank of Zambia (cited in Andersson, 2000:13); The Economist Intelligence Unit (1989-90:37; 1990-
91:27; 1995-96:21, 34; 1999-2000:24; 2000:46; 2003:47, 63; 2006:65; 2007b:35; 2008b:19); Van 
Buren (2003:1152). 
 
Record high international copper prices between late 2004 and 2006, the massive 
rehabilitation works undertaken in 2004, in particular at KCM and at MCM, and higher 
investments in expanding production and mining sector growth250 spurred the significant 
rebound in copper production levels in more recent years. However, extensive floods, 
industrial action, insufficient capacity for processing concentrates in Zambia, shortages 
of fuel and the 10-day closure of the KCM leaching facility251 contributed somewhat 
towards the unexpectedly lower levels of copper production in 2007, at 521 984 tons 
(Bantubonse, cited in Africa Mining Intelligence, 2006b:2; The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007b:30).  
 
4.4.18 Volume and price of copper  
 
Figures 4.19 and 4.20 show that in the 1970s and the 1980s, under Kaunda’s 
government, a correlation existed for the most part in the responsiveness of the supply 
of copper to price (or the supply elasticity of copper). Accordingly, price significantly 
determined copper output. The high responsiveness is reflected in the sharp increases 
and decreases in the volume of copper within short periods following fluctuations in the 
price of copper under Kaunda’s government, compared to the 1990s under Chiluba’s 
                                                 
250
    The latter of which increased by almost 50%, in real terms, from 2001 to 2005. 
251
    To address the pollution problems that the mine experienced. 
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government.  
 
Figure 4.19: Changes in volume and price of copper 
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Bank of Zambia (cited in Andersson, 2000:13); The Economist Intelligence Unit (1989-90:37; 1990-
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Figure 4.20: Changes in volume and price of copper (rolling averages) 
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Instances during Kaunda’s government when the volume of copper did not respond to 
falling copper prices (in 1982 and 1989) possibly reflected, among other, policies of the 
Kaunda government to at times cushion production levels under state ownership to 
prevent massive changes in employment. On the other hand, it is noted from 
Section 4.4.17 that the oil crisis, the spill-over effects of the political turmoil in southern 
Africa and constraints in foreign exchange largely accounted for the poorer response of 
the mining sector to increases in the copper price in the latter part of the 1970s (Roan 
Consolidated Mines Limited, 1980:4). Moreover, the higher production costs and lower 
grade of ore and the closure of several mines in 1987 contributed to the lower copper 
production levels in 1988, despite increases in the price of copper. Clear conclusions of 
asymmetric responses in production to increases and to decreases in copper prices could 
not be drawn within the confines of the study. 
 
In the 1990s, under Chiluba’s government, two notable trends marked the relation 
between changes in the volume of copper output and those of relative copper prices. 
The trends were likely significantly influenced by strict SAPs and liberalisation policies 
that were introduced and by the uncertainty as to the fate of mining (after the mid-
1990s) before the change to private ownership of the mines. Firstly, the supply elasticity 
of copper was much less elastic than under Kaunda’s government, indicating that the 
volume of copper was not strongly driven by price during this period. On the contrary, 
from 1994-97 the changes in the volume of copper output and in the price of copper 
moved in opposite directions with output falling in 1994 despite the increases in the 
price of copper in 1994-95. Secondly, the plunges in copper production lasted longer in 
the 1990s.  
 
The resistance in the output response to the changes in the price of copper from the mid-
1990s was considerably influenced by the lack of resources and policies of the IMF and 
the World Bank discouraging investment in the mines earmarked for privatisation. In 
addition, the increasing costs of production in the 1990s obstructed higher production 
levels, restricting greater gains for Zambia from higher copper prices. The long time it 
took to finalise the privatisation of all the major copper mines, in the absence of 
  
140
adequate reinvestment of the mines, also proved disruptive to growth in copper 
production. However, in 1998 and 1999, when some of the mines were already 
privatised, the supply elasticity increased. 
 
Under private ownership of all the mines from 2000 a stronger positive correlation 
existed in the changes in the volume of copper output and the price of copper from 
2003-06 compared to under Kaunda’s government and much more so than in the 1990s. 
This demonstrates a greater short-term responsiveness of the private owners to price 
changes. The negative relation from 2000-02, namely a rise in growth in the volume of 
output when copper prices declined was likely as a consequence of the initial positive 
impact of higher investments into the mines under private ownership. However, the 
greater responsiveness in the volume of output to price under private ownership from 
2003-06 corresponded to the period of unprecedented high copper prices confounding 
definitive conclusions as to the role of ownership on the elasticity of supply. Moreover, 
the longer-term responses of copper output to copper prices under private ownership did 
not as yet play out since the mines were fully privatised only in 2000. 
 
On the flipside, production decisions of mining companies in Zambia had an 
insignificant impact on the international copper price in the 1990s and in the 2000s, as 
Zambia’s copper output contribution to the international stockpile was small during 
these times. The output level of Zambia’s copper to the total world production was only 
4.6% in 1990 and it declined even further to a mere 1.94% in 2000. At the height of the 
copper price boom in 2007, Zambia contributed only 3.37% to the international 
stockpile, compared to 12.58% in 1969 (The World Copper Factbook, 2009). 
 
4.4.19 Productivity of workers in the mining sector 
 
Figure 4.21 shows that the productivity of the mineworkers was on average higher in 
the 1970s than the 1980s. The average labour productivity in the 1990s also exceeded 
that of the 1980s but displayed considerable volatility. A more significant increase in 
the productivity of the mineworkers took place under private ownership of the mines. 
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More specifically, the peak in labour productivity in the mining sector in 1978, at 
10 tons/worker, was primarily as a result of the considerable decline in the excess 
numbers of mineworkers (employment of mineworkers was reduced from 75 974 in 
1977 to 62 650 in 1978), alongside relatively high production levels. However, the 
sizable drop in copper production and an increase in mining employment account for 
the lower productivity of workers in 1970 to 7.3 tons/worker, from 9.9 tons/worker in 
1969. In the early 1980s, the significant fall in the productivity of the workforce in 
mining to only 6.4 tons/worker in 1984 was principally due to the considerable rise in 
employment levels in the mines (from 60 730 in 1979 to 81 982 in 1984) amidst 
declining copper production levels. The notable reductions in the excess workforce 
contributed largely to the subsequent higher labour productivity of 7.2 tons/worker in 
1985.  
 
Figure 4.21: Productivity of workers in the mining sector 
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The rise in the average labour productivity in the 1990s, over that of the 1980s, was 
chiefly as a result of the huge reductions in the excess mining sector labour force that 
led to a more efficient use of the existing labour force. However, the lowest worker 
productivity levels between 1969 and 2007, of only 5.9 tons/worker, occurred in 1991 
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and in 1995. Higher increases in labour productivity in the 1990s were curtailed mostly 
by the large drop in copper production levels. In addition to lower production levels the 
reductions in the labour productivity of the mining sector in 1995 were also as a result 
of the uncertainty created by the impending privatisation of the ZCCM and the breaking 
down of corporate governance,252 demonstrated in the Cobalt Report (Kapika et al., 
1996:4).  
 
The higher productivity levels of permanent workers in 2000 under private ownership 
of all the major copper mines, from 6.8 tons/worker in 1999 to 7.3 tons/worker in 2000, 
were mostly because of the more efficient use of an even lower number of the 
permanent workforce than in the 1990s, since production levels in fact dropped to their 
lowest levels in 2000. From 2002, higher copper production levels also accounted for 
the increase in the productivity levels of mineworkers. In 2002 productivity levels of the 
mines reached 9.1 tons/worker. 
 
4.4.20 Government revenue from mining 
 
Under private ownership and control of the mines during most of the 1960s, the high 
contribution of mining to government revenue in 1965 at 71% and in 1966 at 64% was 
mainly due to the boom in international copper prices and to the enormous taxes 
imposed on mining companies. The taxes amounted to about 73% of their profit.253 
Subsequently, government revenue from mining declined dramatically to only 13% in 
1975 and to zero from 1977-79 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:7). 
 
However, despite the decline in the share of mining to government revenue to 58% in 
1970 government revenue increased from US$365 million in 1966 to US$673 million in 
1970 under government ownership but private sector management of the mines. The 
high copper production levels and the boom in world copper prices then accounted for 
the high government revenue (Seidman, 1977:224). The subsequent sharp decline in the 
contribution of mining to government revenue in the 1971-72 period, to only about 
US$65 million in 1972, when the mines were under government majority ownership but 
                                                 
252
    Interview with Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003. 
253
    Principally because taxation was based on production, rather than on profit. 
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still under private management, was chiefly owing to the drop in international copper 
prices. The rise in the costs of production,254 the amendment in the legislation in 1969 
that reduced the effective tax rate of the mining sector from 73% to 28% of profit,255 as 
well as the fall in production,256 further reduced government revenue in 1971/72 
(McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:169; Seidman, 1977:224, 232, 233). 
 
In the early 1980s, the negligible contribution of mining to government revenue, under 
the ZCCM, was mainly owing to losses that the mining sector experienced from 1982 to 
1983 (Saasa, 1987:7; EDI, cited in the World Bank, 1989:19). The two subsequent tax 
regime changes within the 1980s significantly influenced government revenue from 
mining. The first change from a tax on profit to a mineral export tax, determined 
through the value of metal produced, applicable from 1983 to 1987, led to an increase in 
government revenue during these years. The percentage of the mineral export tax 
increased progressively257 from 4% in April 1983 to 8% in August the same year and 
further to 10% from 1985-86 and to 13% in 1987 (ZCCM, 1983:10).  
 
The higher mineral export tax contributed to the increase in government tax revenue 
from only US$5 million in 1982 to US$140 million in 1986, despite the decline in total 
revenue of the ZCCM from US$930 million in 1982 to US$680 million in 1986 
(Maambo, 1998:8). The more favourable tax regime granted to the ZCCM after 1987, 
following the elimination of the mineral export tax on 1 January 1988,258 together with 
the recovery in the copper price in late 1986, reduced government revenue but enabled 
the ZCCM to enjoy profits in subsequent years (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 8; ZCCM, 1988:4; 
Africa Now, 1987:31).  
                                                 
254
    Reportedly by about 20%. The higher costs were mainly attributable to (i) higher management fees, averaging about US$6-7 
million per year, paid directly to the companies but which were added as an operating cost; (ii) companies over-invoicing imports 
from their own suppliers, which lowered the annual government revenue by about US$72 million; (iii) the huge compensation 
payments that the government made to the mining companies; (iv) the concession allowing companies, after deducting less than 
30% for taxes, to repatriate a major share of their profits; (v) the practice of private mining companies to largely borrow abroad, for 
investment purposes, at 7% to 9% interest, instead of reinvesting their share of profits and (vi) the declining ore grades, requiring 
more expensive capital equipment to extract copper (Seidman, 1977:233, 234). 
255
    Mainly through the replacement of the existing royalty and export taxes, which were based on the production of copper and 
sales, by a single mineral tax that was linked to a percentage of gross taxable profit, the policy exempting mining companies from 
paying taxes if losses occurred, and permitting companies to write off 100% of all investments in the year they were made, for tax 
purposes (which cost the government an estimated US$70 million in tax revenues in 1971 and 1972). 
256
    Caused, primarily, by the cave-in at the AMAX-managed Mufulira mines. 
257
    With the consent of the IMF and the World Bank. 
258
    Saving the ZCCM approximately US$75 million in costs, per annum. 
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Figure 4.22 shows that taxes from mining were also considerable in the early 1990s, 
reaching about US$236.7 million in the 1990-91 financial year and US$194.6 million in 
the 1991-92 financial year. The higher mining revenue coincided with the introduction 
of the mineral export levy in 1990, which progressively increased the levy at copper 
prices over US$1.00/lb. Any revenues earned from prices over US$1.20/lb went to the 
government (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 8).  
 
Figure 4.22: Government revenue from mining  
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Sources: Chamber of Mines, Unpublished presentation provided by Chairman of the Chamber to the IMF 
Visiting Mission to Zambia (cited in Fraser & Lungu, 2007:77); ZRA (2010);259 ZCCM (1992:2, 1993:22, 
1994:9, 1996:19). 
 
Subsequently, a significant drop in mining taxes took place. Losses that the ZCCM 
experienced in the 1993-94 financial year accounted for the fall in mining tax in that 
financial year to US$2.6 million. The abolishing in April 1994 of the mineral export 
levy that was replaced with a royalty on base metals tax (at a rate of 3%), the removal of 
exchange controls and reductions in taxation on both profits and imports influenced the 
downward trend in taxes from mining from 1994 to 1999 (ZCCM, 1994:7; Maambo, 
1998:Fig. 9). Total mining tax was US$38.84 million in 1995. Net losses260 that the 
ZCCM experienced from 1996 to 2000 also considerably influenced the additional 
                                                 
259
    Information sent on request. 
260
    Amounting to about US$144 million in the 1996-1997 financial year (ZCCM, 1997:22). 
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decline in taxes from mining in the latter part of the 1990s. 
 
Figures 4.22 and 4.23 show that in the short term under full private ownership of the 
mines, government revenue from mining taxes (excluding PAYE from mineworkers but 
including withholding tax, royalty tax and company tax) declined even further to 
negligible levels until 2004, from the low level of 1999 of US$5.2 million. The 
concessions granted to mining TNCs largely accounted for the poor mining taxes in the 
short term under private ownership of the mines. The contribution of mining taxes to 
total government revenue was still relatively low in 2005, at US$10.07 million, despite 
high increases in the price of copper. Subsequently, mining taxes rose to 
US$49.68 million in 2006 and to US$174.29 million in 2007. 
 
Figure 4.23: Mining taxes and total government revenue 
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Figure 4.24 illustrates that within the mining sector, the taxes from mining employees, 
through PAYE, were the main contributor to government revenue under private 
ownership of the mines. The contribution by way of company tax, withholding tax and 
mineral royalties remained meagre until 2004. From 2000 to 2004, the government 
gained less than US$1.75 million in mineral royalties from mining TNCs, compared to 
US$7.44 million in 1998. At the height of the copper price boom, mineral royalties 
                                                 
261
    Information sent on request. 
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increased to US$9 million in 2005 and to US$17.6 million in 2007. Withholding tax 
was insignificant, ranging from zero to below US$0.78 million, even during the copper 
price boom.  
 
Figure 4.24: Different taxes paid by mining companies  
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Under private ownership mining company tax was almost non-existent at below 
US$0.7 million until 2005, compared to US$8.62 million in 1995 before the mines were 
privatised. The government started gaining notable mining company tax only from 
2006, at US$36.34 million that subsequently increased to US$156.73 million in 2007. 
The higher company taxes in 2006 and 2007 corresponded with the boom in the price of 
copper. Nonetheless, these values, at the height of the copper price boom, were still 
considerably lower than mining tax revenue in the early 1990s, especially since these 
figures are based on nominal rather than real figures. 
                                                 
262
    Information sent on request. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. THE PRIVATISATION OF THE MINING SECTOR AND THE 
IMPACT OF CHANGING OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE ON THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY 
 
This chapter addresses the research questions as to: (i) the privatisation approach of the 
government in the mining sector and the development consequences for Zambia; (ii) the 
changing objectives and management structure under different ownership and the 
impact on growth and the socio-economic development of the Zambian economy; and 
(iii) the political-economic implications of the privatisation and private ownership of the 
mines and the impact on development. 
 
The privatisation process of the mining sector is first considered, followed by an 
assessment of the regulatory and institutional capacities of the Zambian government in 
the privatisation of the ZCCM. The role of the privatisation of the ZCCM in improving 
public finances is then investigated. Subsequently, the changing ownerships and 
management structure and their impact on mining performance and on the socio-
economic development of Zambia are examined. The political-economic implications of 
the privatisation and the private ownership of the mines and the impact on development 
are then explored.  
 
5.1 THE PRIVATISATION OF THE MINING SECTOR 
 
This section investigates the privatisation process of the ZCCM and key influences. The 
main stages in the privatisation of the ZCCM are then reviewed. Further, the bidding 
process of the Kafue Consortium and of Anglo American and factors influencing the 
timing of the final assets of the ZCCM are evaluated. This is followed by a brief outline 
of the main transactions in the privatisation of the ZCCM. 
  
5.1.1 The privatisation process and key influences 
 
As described in earlier chapters, Zambia’s international debt and the corresponding 
influences of the World Bank and the IMF diminished the leverage of the Chiluba 
government to determine whether it wanted to privatise the mines. Rather, the focus of 
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the Chiluba government was shifted towards ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ the copper mines 
of Zambia were to be privatised. The donors, in turn, in a bid to push the privatisation 
agenda, bought the MMD an extended political honeymoon, by increasing aid to the 
Chiluba government in the first few years of its rule. The increases in aid were designed 
to cushion Zambians against possible difficult social and political consequences likely 
to arise from the massive and rapid structural changes to the economy. The budget 
became more than 40% donor-dependent during this time (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:9).  
 
Despite the weak position of the Zambian government, political interference in the 
process of privatisation strongly marked the privatisation of the ZCCM. The 
institutional framework established for privatisations, in general, was amended in the 
case of ZCCM, elaborated upon in Section 5.2, to enable greater political influences in 
the privatisation process. The options considered in the privatisation of the ZCCM and 
the decision-making processes are now considered. 
 
Options 
 
The Chiluba government considered three options between 1992 and 1996 for 
implementing the privatisation of the ZCCM that are briefly outlined below. The 
influence of the unbundled option that was eventually adopted in the privatisation 
process of the ZCCM is evaluated in greater detail. 
 
Option 1: A single TNC or a consortium of TNCs acquiring a controlling interest in the 
ZCCM 
 
This option was rejected as the government feared that the likely control of Anglo 
American over the ZCCM under this option would have subjected the copper industry 
of Zambia to the corporate interests of Anglo American. The government was 
particularly apprehensive that a possible preoccupation of Anglo American with its 
South African interests and with longer-run projects would likely have encouraged the 
company to neglect and delay large-scale rehabilitation and the development of the new 
mines and the mining industry in Zambia (Craig, 2001:393, 394). While this option was 
rejected, Anglo American continued to exert considerable influence in the process of 
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privatising the mining sector until its departure in 2002. 
 
Option 2: Private ownership and independent operation of the ZCCM 
 
The private and independent option263 would have entailed the refinancing of and a 
decrease in government shares in the ZCCM, to convert it into an independent private 
sector company. Such a privatisation strategy would have circumvented problems 
associated with dismantling the company and would have prevented the ceding of 
control to foreign ownership (Craig, 2001:395). The achievement of this option was 
unlikely, in light of:  
• The improbability that the government would have been able to raise the required 
finance for the future development of the ZCCM and to establish it as an 
independent private sector company. 
• The losses that the company experienced in the 1990s, from 1995 to 1999,264 and of 
the declining production levels of the ZCCM (refer to Table A6, in Annexure). 
• The extensive rehabilitation of the ZCCM that was required to restore investor 
confidence and with the poor likelihood that the existing management possessed the 
necessary skills to do so.  
• The possibility that Anglo American would have exercised its pre-emptive rights to 
prevent the government from selling over 10% of its shares in the ZCCM to the 
Zambian public and/or to foreign investors (Craig, 2001:396). 
 
Option 3: Unbundling and sale of components of the ZCCM 
 
The option of unbundling the ZCCM, first recommended in June 1994, in the Kienbaum 
Development Services Report, would have enabled each investor to enjoy majority 
interest in the ‘unbundled’ sections of the ZCCM. However, the ZCCM was to retain a 
role in technical support and services. This option had to overcome the opposition of 
Anglo American, as minority shareholder and on account of the pre-emptive rights it 
enjoyed in the ZCCM (entailing also an effective right to veto the sales of the major 
assets of the company once the government’s shares fell below 50%) and through its 
                                                 
263
    Partly inspired by the successful privatisation of the Ashanti Goldfields Company of Ghana. 
264
    The ZCCM also experienced losses in the 1993-1994 financial year. 
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representation on the ZCCM Board of Directors (Craig, 2001:391; Afronet, Citizens for 
a Better Environment and RAID, 2001:34). The unbundled option was eventually 
selected as the preferred option for the privatisation of the ZCCM. 
 
The decision-making process 
 
The options and process to be followed in the privatisation of the ZCCM were mainly 
determined through the deliberations in the reports of advisors to the Zambian 
government and through the positions of different interests, including the World Bank, 
Anglo American and the ZCCM management. The ZCCM managers largely acted in the 
interests of the Zambian government. Two sets of advisors, Kienbaum and Rothschild 
and Clifford Chance, set out the privatisation of the ZCCM in their reports that are 
discussed separately below. 
 
(i) The Kienbaum Report 
 
The Kienbaum Report of June 1994 was prepared by Kienbaum Development Services, 
German advisors, and was funded by the World Bank. The report recommended a rapid 
privatisation and a division of the assets of the ZCCM into six bundles. The report also 
recommended imposing a series of commitments on the buyers to ensure continuity in 
the provisions of social services to the mining communities, which would have been 
more favourable to the Zambian mining community. Incentives discouraging private 
companies from rapidly withdrawing from the provision of water, sanitation, health, 
education and recreational services would have promoted continuity in the provision of 
social services (ZCCM-IH, 2001:1; Transparency International, 2002:18, 19). 
 
However, Anglo American vigorously opposed the recommendation for unbundling. 
Reasons that Anglo American cited for its opposition entailed firstly, likely increases in 
costs owing to a duplication of functions by the different mining companies in their 
endeavours to become self-sufficient in their mining operations. Secondly, it reckoned 
that a separation of the blending process would be disruptive to normal mining 
operations, with each mine being forced to become dependent on other mining units for 
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concentrating, smelting and refining activities (Kaunda, 2002:182).265 Moreover, selling 
the ZCCM as a single unit would also have served Anglo American's strategy to enter 
Zambia's mining industry from a position of strength (Kaunda, 2002:182). 
 
Ultimately, a combination of reasons led to the Zambian government rejecting the 
report. These reasons included: Anglo American’s opposition to the unbundling of the 
ZCCM; the failure of the report to provide an implementation plan for the unbundling 
strategy; and an apprehension that a likely collapse of weaker divisions that might have 
proven difficult to sell through an unbundling process would result in mass 
redundancies (Kaunda, 2002:31, 32; ZCCM-IH, 2001:1). Allegations that the advisors 
had leaked information to potential buyers further fuelled the government’s opposition 
to the Kienbaum Report.266 The Kienbaum consultants were subsequently replaced by 
the UK-based financial and legal advisors, NM Rothschild and Sons (Merchant 
Bankers) and Clifford Chance267 respectively, to continue further studies on the 
privatisation of the ZCCM (Craig, 2001:395). 
 
(ii) The Rothschild Report 
 
Two years after the government’s rejection of the Kienbaum Report, in June 1996, the 
Rothschild Report came up with similar recommendations in that it also proposed an 
unbundling of the ZCCM, although it recommended eight separate business packages 
instead of six. However, the Rothschild Report differed in several other respects to the 
Kienbaum Report. First, it had a much weaker emphasis on the commitments of the 
private buyers to the continuity in the provisions of social services to the mining 
communities and on incentives to discourage private companies from rapidly 
withdrawing from the provision of water, sanitation, health, education and recreational 
services. Second, lower government shares, through the Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines-Investments Holdings (ZCCM-IH) that represented the government in the 
different mining companies, ranging from 10% to 21% (refer to Table A5, in 
                                                 
265
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
266
    Interview with Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003. 
267
    The World Bank sponsored the Kienbaum as well as the Rothschild and Clifford Chance advisors to the government in the 
privatisation of ZCCM (interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003; Transparency International, 2002:18, World Bank, 
2002a:4, Kaunda, 2002:27, 32; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 10). 
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Annexure), reduced the share of profits retained in Zambia (Transparency International, 
2002:1, 2, 18, 19; ZPA, 2000b:15, 2000c:34; Muchimba, 1998:5; ZCCM-IH, 2001:1).  
 
Again, Anglo American possessed strong leverage in being able to influence the 
recommendations of the Rothschild Report, as these had to be broadly acceptable to 
ZCI268 Directors (Craig, 2001:395). Only after Anglo American accepted the unbundling 
process proposed in the Rothschild Report did the Chiluba government, who previously 
rejected the proposal for unbundling the ZCCM,269 accept a similar though more 
comprehensive proposal for unbundling.270 An opportunity to acquire and develop the 
lucrative Konkola Deep271 from the rest of the ZCCM that the government, through lack 
of funds, was forced to give up, led to Anglo American subsequently waiving its pre-
emptive rights and accepting the unbundling strategy for the ZCCM (Craig, 2001:399). 
 
In order to make the unbundled option that the Rothschild Report proposed even more 
palatable for Anglo American, it obtained a 5-year management contract of 
SmelterCo272 at the close of its transaction, to facilitate its processing activities in an 
unbundled ZCCM. SmelterCo, together with the Nkana smelter and refinery, was 
critical to the operations of KCM, as the largest producer of copper in Zambia.273 
Furthermore, Anglo American, through KCM, enjoyed an additional three-year 
exclusive option to purchase SmelterCo’s assets,274 with a right to refuse bids received 
in the remaining two years (ZPA, 2000c:39; ZCCM-IH, 2001:3). The exclusive option 
granted to Anglo American was also deemed necessary to enable the company to 
evaluate the viability of an alternative long-term metal processing route, through 
biometallurgical processing technology, within the three years (ZPA, 2000c:39; World 
Bank, 2003b:133; ZCCM-IH, 2001:1; Kaunda, 2002:96).  
 
                                                 
268
    Anglo American’s subsidiary that had a minority ownership of the mines.  
269
    Put forward in the Kienbaum Report. 
270
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
271
    Described by ex-ZCCM Chief Executive, Francis Kaunda, as “the jewel of ZCCM’s crown without which the rest of ZCCM is 
a dead duck.” 
272
   Chilean experts rehabilitated SmelterCo during the two years that it was under Anglo American’s management control, with a 
£50 million grant from the UK government (ZCI made conditional a requirement for a grant on the closing of their deal that led to 
the smelter then being operated at profitable levels (interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003 and Stuart Cruickshank, 28 
October 2003).  
273
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
274
    MCM enjoyed a second option on SmelterCo's assets (ZCCM-IH, 2001:3). 
  
153
While Anglo American came to support the unbundling option, due to advantages it 
held for the company, the Chiluba government’s shift towards unbundling was further 
influenced by a new understanding that this option would play an important role in 
maximising investment, bringing in expertise and reducing risk. A single investor would 
probably not have been able to invest the estimated US$3 billion that was required for 
rehabilitating the mine. A diversity of ownership would also have enabled the 
participation of varied expertise in the mining industry (Kaunda, 2002:31, 32; Craig, 
2002:364). It was also understood that an unbundled ZCCM would minimise the 
political and economic risks to Zambia, as it would prevent any single company, or 
consortium, from gaining monopoly control over the industry and an influence over the 
national economy (ZCCM-IH, 2001:1; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 10; Craig, 2002:364; 
Kaunda, 2002:31, 32). 
 
5.1.2 Main stages in the privatisation of the ZCCM 
 
The privatisation of the ZCCM was to take place in two stages. This was to enable the 
company to deal with the huge debt that the ZCCM had accumulated, the social service 
provisions that formed part of the company's administrative policy and the disposal of 
non-core assets of the ZCCM, such as houses, hospitals and schools (Transparency 
International, 2002:1).  
 
Stage one involved the sale of substantial majority interests in the ZCCM's mining, 
treatment and power distribution operations, offered in separate packages to private 
investors, with the ZCCM maintaining minority interests. Instead of the scheduled 
period of 1997, the first stage of the Rothschild and the Clifford Chance 
recommendations were completed only in March 2000,275 following the transferral of all 
productive assets of the ZCCM to private ownership. The residual holdings of the 
ZCCM were converted into an investment company under the name of the ZCCM 
Investment Holdings plc (ZCCM-IH) on 21 June 2000 (Craig, 2001:390, 407). Stage 
two entails the government selling some, or all, of its residual shareholding in the 
ZCCM to the local and foreign public and to financial institutions (Kaunda, 2002:38; 
                                                 
275
    The finalisation of the terms agreed to in January 1999 until March 2000 was delayed by the stipulation that Anglo American 
includes at least, one other mining company within the consortium (Craig, 2001:406). 
  
154
Craig, 2001:397; ZPA, 2000c:34; Muchimba, 1998:5). No timetable was set for stage 
two of the privatisation of the ZCCM and it had not been addressed by 2009 (ZCCM, 
2000:9). 
 
5.1.3 The bidding process of the Kafue Consortium and of Anglo American and 
factors influencing the timing of the privatisation of ZCCM’s final assets 
 
The relative merits of the Kafue Consortium and Anglo American bids and the effects 
of the delay in the privatisation of the mines are major areas of contention between 
different parties, such as the World Bank, the Zambian Privatisation Agency (ZPA) and 
the Privatisation Negotiating Team. The Privatisation Negotiating Team was the body 
the government established to commence negotiations in the privatisation of the ZCCM. 
The timing of the sales of the final and most lucrative assets of the ZCCM was closely 
related to the bargaining over bids received. Especially the bargaining process of the 
Kafue Consortium, the ultimate rejection of the bids received from the Kafue 
Consortium and various demands from, in particular, Anglo American that certain 
conditions be met before the sales of the ‘Aco’ package were finalised, determined the 
timing of the sales.  
 
The discussion below first examines the bids of the Kafue Consortium and of the Anglo 
American Consortium, followed by an evaluation of arguments by some that the delay 
in the privatisation process enabled Anglo American to substantially lower its bid below 
that of the Kafue Consortium bid. 
 
Kafue Consortium and the Anglo American bids 
 
The bid of the Kafue Consortium for package ‘A’ of the ZCCM proposed in 
September/October 1997 was, in fact, accepted by the government.276 The bid package, 
comprising of Nkana/Nchanga (A), Chambishi Acid and Cobalt Plants (G) and the 
Chingola Refractory Ores (L), amounted to about US$370 million. This matched 
closely the valuation of US$399 million that the Negotiating Team calculated for the 
assets of that package. However, subsequently, the Kafue Consortium made further 
                                                 
276
    The offer that was officially announced on 7 November 1997. 
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major downward revisions in 1998, which departed significantly from the agreed 
commercial terms that had formed the basis for finalising the transaction documents of 
the September/October 1997 offer. The revision led to the Negotiating Team 
terminating the exclusive negotiations of the Kafue Consortium (Kaunda, 2002:65, 66).  
 
As is illustrated in Table 5.1, the downward revision in the 10 March 1998 bid from the 
September/October 1997 offer included the demand for more concessions. The 
concessions entailed tax waivers below what the Negotiating Team was offering and an 
inclusion of additional assets that were not in the original package. These assets were 
the Ndola Lime Company (NLC), the Dar-es-Salaam Port facility, the Nampundwe 
Mine, the bulk transport fleet and the parts manufacturing facility (Transparency 
International, 2002:22; Kaunda, 2002:66). Moreover, the timing of the 10 March 1998 
bid appears to have been deliberate to coincide with the week before the Consultative 
Group meeting in Paris on aid to Zambia, in which the privatisation of the ZCCM was 
to feature as a major conditionality (Kaunda, 2002:66).  
 
In a revision released on 31 March/April 1998, the Kafue Consortium further reduced 
the bid value in a number of areas over the October 1997 bid. Moreover, the claim of 
the Kafue Consortium that they were to invest US$1 billion in the mines, in their 
revised offer of June 1997, is also misleading. Calculations performed by Rothschild 
show that the value of the retained interest of the ZCCM amounted to merely 
US$90 million over a period of 10 years and that the discounted value of debts to be 
assumed was only US$42 million. Accordingly, the investment commitment of the 
Kafue Consortium bid was then brought to US$200 million and the total investment of 
the revised June 1997 bid to US$492 million; far short of US$1 billion (Kaunda, 
2002:62). The Negotiating Team rejected the revision of the Kafue Consortium bid and 
after a delay of a further two years it reached an agreement with Anglo American in the 
privatisation of the final assets.  
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Table 5.1: Comparison of bids made by the Kafue Consortium  
 
October 1997  
(accepted by the 
government) 
10 March 1998  31 March/April 1998 
 
• Cash consideration 
US$150 million 
• Debt assumption 
US$75 million 
• Committed 
investment US$400 
million 
• Cobalt price 
participation benefits 
to the ZCCM of 
US$75 million  
• The ZCCM retained 
interest of 12% 
(valued at US$70 
million) 
• Less demanding tax 
adjustments 
 
The October 1997 bid 
amounted to US$370 
million, while the 
ZCCM valuation of the 
package was US$399 
million 
• Cash consideration of US$200 
million, broken down to US$50 
million on closure, with three 
additional tranches of up to US$50 
million each, payable at the end of 
the second, third and fourth years. 
The tranches were tied to the average 
copper price on the LME that was to 
commence at closure 
• Debt assumption US$35 million on 
closure, with a further US$40 million 
after 5 years, provided that the 
average LME copper price over the 
five-year period was 95 cents/pound 
or ‘high’ 
• The ZCCM retained an interest of 
12% (but free carry was eliminated) 
• Demanded the inclusion of the NLC 
Limited, Nampundwe Mine, the Dar-
es-Salaam port facility, the bulk 
transport fleet and the parts 
manufacturing facility in the package 
• Cash consideration US$105 
million, provided that a percentage 
of the amount was placed in a 
retention account, pending the 
resolution of cash adjustments not 
previously discussed 
• Among the items for cash 
adjustment was a demand for 300 
houses, in addition to the 
institutional houses attached to the 
mining assets in the package; or it 
was to deduct US$150 000 from 
the cash consideration, for each 
house they should have received  
• Debt assumption US$35 million to 
be undertaken after 5 years, 
provided that the LME price of 
copper did not fall below 
95 cents/pound 
• Committed investment expenditure 
US$400 million 
• The ZCCM carried interest was 
reduced to 6%, all payable 
 
Sources:Kaunda (2002:65-67); Bull (cited in Profit Magazine, 1998:127). 
 
Several pressures that impinged on the Zambian government, especially after the 
collapse of the Kafue Consortium bid, elaborated in Table A6 (in Annexure), the 
absence of rival bidders to Anglo American for the Nchanga and Konkola mines,277 and 
the low copper prices weakened the government’s bargaining leverage during the 
privatisation of the final assets of the ZCCM. Donor pressure included making the 
release of US$530 million of balance of payment support, pledged in May 1998, 
conditional on the completion of the ZCCM’s privatisation (Craig, 2001:405). The poor 
health of the economy, described also in Chapter 4, together with the weak performance 
of the ZCCM further lowered the bargaining leverage of the government immediately 
before the mines were privatised. Additionally, inside knowledge of the poor economic 
position of the ZCCM that Anglo American was privy to, mainly owing to its position 
as shareholder, strengthened the bargaining power of Anglo American (Craig, 
                                                 
277
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003 and Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
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2001:406).  
 
These pressures encouraged the downward bid of Anglo American and forced the 
government to accept more flexible and lenient privatisation policies with the company 
than it had hoped for (Craig, 2001:403, 404, 408). The more lenient policies 
encompassed a compromise on certain government objectives, such as an acceptance of 
a lower sale price and increased foreign ownership. Most importantly, Anglo American 
was able to extract additional concessions from the Zambian government over those 
received by other mining companies (Craig, 2001:408).278  
 
The terms of the sale concluded with Anglo American under ZCI279 were as follows:  
• Cash payment of US$90 million (comprising of an immediate cash payment of 
US$30 million and of US$60 million, payable in six instalments, starting from 
1 January 2006)280 
• Committed investment for existing operations of US$208 million 
• Investment to develop Konkola Deep of US$523 million 
• Retained interest for the ZCCM, 20% of equity (5% free:15% carried)  
Sources: Africa Research Bulletin (2000a:14302); Craig (2001:406); Kaunda (2002:89); ZCCM 
(2000:8); ZPA (2000:38). 
 
Evaluation 
 
Insight of the negotiation process in the privatisation of ZCCM reveals the challenges a 
developing country face in the privatisation of SOEs and the influence of different 
interests, including major multinational mining houses and foreign donors in the 
privatisation process. In the mining sector case study the decision of the Zambian 
Negotiating Team to reject the offer of the Kafue Consortium for the most lucrative 
assets of the ZCCM was widely criticised by the World Bank and experts in the ZPA. 
These criticisms are based firstly on the argument that the terms of the Kafue 
Consortium bid were superior to those subsequently agreed to with Anglo American 
                                                 
278
    Interview with Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003. 
279
    The ZCI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Anglo American plc, listed on the London Stock Exchange. Anglo American plc in 
turn comprises the merger of Minorco S.A. and Anglo American Corporation and Konkola Copper Mines plc and was established to 
take over the responsibilities of the acquired assets (ZPA, 2000c:150). 
280
    Interview with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003. 
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that the government, because of various sustained pressures, was forced to accept. 
Secondly, these experts argue that the two-year delay in the completion of the 
privatisation process, following the rejection of the Kafue bid, undermined the potential 
for the recovery of the mining industry. This was mainly due to the deterioration of 
plant and machinery and because the government was unable to cash in during a period 
when the copper price was relatively high (Craig, 2002:366). 
 
These arguments are evaluated first, through comparing the Kafue Consortium bid and 
the Anglo American bids and second, through assessing the effects of the delay in the 
privatisation of the ZCCM, including its impact on the degradation of the assets of the 
ZCCM. Third, the policy conclusion of experts at the ZPA and the World Bank that a 
quick privatisation was to be preferred is evaluated. 
 
1. Assessment of the Kafue Consortium bid and the Anglo American bid 
 
The Kafue Consortium comprised of: 
1. Anglovaal Mining Limited (AVMIN), specialists in deep-level mining, from 
South Africa; 
2. Noranda Mining and Exploration Inc, specialists in smelting and refining, from 
Canada; 
3. Phelps Dodge,281 specialists in open cast mining from the USA; and 
4. the CDC, based in the UK, major development financiers throughout the 
Commonwealth that up to then had contributed much to the success of Zambia's 
privatisation programme (Bull, cited in Profit Magazine, 1998:126; Kaunda, 
2002:58).  
 
The four entities, Anglovaal, CDC, Noranda and Phelps Dodge that previously had pre-
qualified individually for the fixed assets of the ZCCM, subsequently formed one 
consortium at the pre-qualification stage. The broad-based nature of the Kafue 
Consortium comprising of highly reputable companies with varied expertise and 
                                                 
281
    That was in 1996 the only bidder for the Nchanga and Nkana mines. These mines comprised about 60% of Zambia’s copper 
production. 
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business cultures282 held significant advantages for Zambia. The formation of the 
consortium raised its capacity to mobilise huge sums of capital to inject into the 
Zambian mines (Kaunda, 2002:58, 59).  
 
The broad-based ownership of the Kafue Consortium would further have hedged the 
country against a possible disastrous impact that a withdrawal under sole ownership 
might have held for the Zambian economy. This is because a withdrawal by one of the 
members might not always have been followed by other members.283 A diversification 
of ownership away from Anglo American, whose shareholders on the London Stock 
Exchange then opted for a strategy away from Africa, represented a further advantage 
that a Kafue Consortium takeover of these assets would have held for Zambia.284 
However, the decision to form a consortium and to submit a single bid was probably 
based less on consolidating resources than on a strategy to reduce competition and to 
secure assets below market value (Kaunda, 2002:58, 59). 
 
On the other hand, Anglo American formed a consortium with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) arm of the World Bank and the CDC, to bid for and to operate the 
assets of the ZCCM it acquired under KCM. Anglo American was the major 
shareholder, owning 65% shares in KCM, through ZCI. The IFC and the CDC each 
possessed a 7.5% share in KCM (Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, 2000:48, 
49, 114).  
 
A direct comparison of the Kafue bid with the Anglo American bid in the calculations 
of the World Bank is flawed. This is because it fails to take into account the different 
composition of the assets on which the Kafue Consortium and those on which Anglo 
American based their bids and the fact that circumstances had changed. The package on 
which Anglo American based its bid was smaller than those of the Kafue Consortium 
(Craig, 2002:366; Kaunda, 2002:80). Furthermore, while it appears that the cash 
payment and level of committed investment that Anglo American proposed fell far short 
                                                 
282
    Interviews with Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003 and Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003. 
283
    Interview with Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003. 
284
    Interview with Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003. 
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of the Kafue Consortium’s offer that was rejected the year before by the government, a 
close examination shows otherwise. 
 
Estimations, calculated by piecing together information provided in the range of sales 
agreements that matched the bigger package on which the Kafue Consortium based its 
bids, show very similar values between the Anglo American and the Kafue Consortium 
bids in terms of proposed investment (cited in Craig, 2002:366-367).285 Accordingly, 
despite being unable to attain more for the Nchanga and Nkana assets than the 
government had hoped, investment commitments of the Kafue Consortium amount to 
about the same level as the total for the variety of commitments made by Anglo 
American, AVMIN, First Quantum and Glencore for the same assets (Craig, 2002:366-
367). The investment commitments of the Kafue Consortium were US$400 million, 
over five years. 
 
The head of the Negotiating Team, Francis Kaunda, defends their decision to accept the 
Anglo American bid, arguing that the Kafue Consortium offer of October 1997 was not 
substantially superior to the Anglo American offer, despite the drop in metal prices, 
illustrated in Table 5.2 (Kaunda, 2002:84).286 It was also comparable to the independent 
valuation of assets conducted by Arthur Andersen and Mineral Resources Development 
International (MRDI) in October 1997 of US$399 million, based on discounted cash 
flows for the bigger package. The bigger package comprised of the Nchanga and Nkana 
Divisions, Chambishi Acid and Cobalt plants and Nampundwe Mine (Kaunda, 2002:84, 
85).287  
 
The similar value that the government obtained for the mines to those that the Kafue 
Consortium offered challenges to some extent the arguments of the World Bank and 
experts at the ZPA that the delay in the privatisation of the mines adversely affected the 
eventual price that the government received for the assets of the ZCCM. It further 
discredits the argument that the Kafue Consortium negotiations were far superior to 
                                                 
285
    Which is most relevant to the future prospects of the industry. 
286
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003 and Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003. 
287
    When the realised consideration for the Chambishi Cobalt and Acid Plants (sold to AVMIN) are taken into account. 
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those of Anglo American (World Bank, 2003b:133; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2008b:17). In addition, as the Kafue Consortium would have acquired assets accounting 
for an even greater share of the current production than that of KCM, the Zambian 
government would likely have been more vulnerable had the Kafue Consortium 
experienced problems similar to those of Anglo American (Craig, 2002:367). 
 
Table 5.2: Different offers of Aco’s assets by the Kafue Consortium and ZCI 
 
Components of bid Kafue ZCI 
Cash at close US$131 million (101million if 
houses were excluded) 
US$72 million 
Cobalt price participation No value US$44 million 
The ZCCM retained 
interest 
US$64 million US$138 million 
Subtotal US$195 million US$304 million 
 
 
 
The ZCCM's participation was 
contribution to the Konkola 
Division assets for a minority 
shareholding in the new company 
The ZCI-led Konkola Deep 
Mining Project (KDMP) 
consortium was to provide the 
required capital for developing 
the KDMP, estimated at US$720 
million 
Debt assumption US$35 million No debt, since most of the debts 
were already paid by the ZCCM 
Unconditional investment US$400 million spread over 5 
years 
US$300 million spread over 3 
years 
 
Source: Kaunda (2002:84).  
 
2. Impact of the delay in the privatisation of the ZCCM 
 
The second argument of the World Bank and experts at the ZPA is that the two-year 
delay in the privatisation of the major operations undermined the potential for recovery 
of the mining industry. The deterioration of plant and machinery and because the 
government was unable to cash in on periods when the copper price was relatively high, 
while the ZCCM continued to build up debt during the delay, undermined the potential 
for recovery (see, for example, World Bank, 2002b:7, 16). However, the delay was not 
merely owing to the government’s actions and was to some extent necessary.  
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Various demands from, in particular, Anglo American, that certain conditions be met 
before the sales of the ‘Aco’ package were finalised and because of administrative and 
legal issues that the government had to address with prospective buyers of the mines 
also significantly influenced the delay.288 The high leverage that Anglo American 
possessed in influencing the conclusion for the sales of the mines underscores the poor 
bargaining capacity of the government in determining the privatisation process 
(Kaunda, 2002:32, 33). In addition to the differences in the bids, the required 
administrative processes, and the bargaining power of Anglo American, another reason 
for the delay was the consideration of the government to first float 10% of government 
shares in the ZCCM to the public. It was deemed that this might smooth over negative 
public perceptions linked to the many job losses as a result of the privatisation process 
(Kaunda, 2002:32, 33).  
 
Some have also alleged that the delays during the Kafue Consortium negotiations for 
the remaining major assets of the ZCCM289 were also deliberately orchestrated to 
prolong the timeframe to obtain large salaries for those involved in the sale of the 
mines. The delay also facilitated the stripping of more cobalt and copper assets, through 
corrupt transactions with buyers at the time, possibly also by the ZCCM managers, who 
faced an uncertain future (ZAM, cited in Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, 
2000:51).290 
 
The argument that the delay promoted the considerable physical deterioration of the 
mining and processing assets of the ZCCM and that it adversely affected production has 
merit. This is because an earlier inflow of investment would have improved the 
resilience of the ZCCM to a downturn in the copper price, which would to some degree 
have lessened the decline in the value of the mines.291 A more timely inflow of 
investment would further have promoted an earlier reduction in the costs of production 
                                                 
288
    These include the raising of finance to settle debts to trade creditors; to pay retrenchments; to fund capital expenditure of the 
managed assets; to address the issues of the future provision of social services that was part of the responsibility of the ZCCM; to 
work out the modalities of asset disposal; financing environmental clean-up obligations for potential third party claims; and to keep 
the ZCCM operational during the privatisation process (Kaunda, 2002:94 and Transparency International, 2002:26). 
289
    The Nchanga and Nkana major mining assets. 
290
    Interviews with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003 and Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
291
    Interview with Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003. 
  
163
of the ZCCM (Craig, 2002:366). Also, when the delay advances the timeframe for 
corrupt practices,292 which would have a very negative impact on the economy, then 
privatisation has to be done swiftly, according to the Resident Representative of the 
World Bank.293  
 
However, the large-scale corruption294 and the deterioration of mining assets were also 
due to a wider framework than the delay in privatisation. The absence of effective 
institutions and enforcement mechanisms to curb corruption at the time the ZCCM was 
privatised also facilitated corrupt practices. The policy of the IMF and the World Bank 
that barred the government from reinvesting into the mines tranched for privatisation 
and to withhold donor balance of payment support until the ZCCM was privatised, was 
also greatly responsible for the consequent lack of reinvestment into the mines. The lack 
of reinvestment contributed, most significantly, to the degradation of the assets of the 
ZCCM, which, in turn, propounded the poor economic performance of the ZCCM.  
 
Irrespective of the delay, reinvestment into the mines and more effective and strong 
institutions before privatisation policies were implemented, would have limited the 
degradation of the assets of the ZCCM, the subsequent losses the company incurred and 
the corruption, which allegedly transpired during the privatisation of the ZCCM. These 
measures would also have enabled a smoother privatisation of the mining sector. In the 
absence of reinvestment into the mining sector and of effective institutions, the delays 
merely propounded but did not initiate the corruption and the degrading of the mining 
assets. Instead of barring reinvestment into the mines earmarked for privatisation, 
investment of new equipment into the mines before privatisation that would likely have 
contributed towards a better performance of the ZCCM could merely have been 
factored into the price of the mines.295 A slower pace of privatisation, to allow for 
appropriate institutional building and of enforcement measures to facilitate a smoother 
privatisation process and for a less severe impact of privatisation on mineworkers, the 
Zambian community and on the economy, might, in fact, have been more beneficial.  
                                                 
292
    Interviews with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003 and Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
293
    Interview with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003. 
294
    Interview with Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
295
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, 1 December 2003. 
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Furthermore, the argument that the drop in copper prices played a significant role in 
lowering the Anglo American bid is exaggerated. This is because the decline in the 
price of copper was most severe from the beginning of 1997 to early in 1998, 
corresponding with the period of the Kafue Consortium’s negotiations, and which 
continued on a downward trend for another year. However, the level reached in 2001 
was not much lower than those of early 1999 (Craig, 2002:367).  
 
As such, any agreement that would have been reached with the Kafue Consortium 
might have run into problems similar to those experienced by Anglo American (Craig, 
2002:367). Moreover, the price of copper is independent of delays and while it 
incidentally declined during the delays, an increase in the price could also have been 
possible, in which case the delay would have had a positive impact on the sale price of 
the mines. The argument of the World Bank that the possibility of price declines would 
lower the asset value of the resource sector cannot, therefore, be a precept for a quick 
privatisation. 
 
The blame that the World Bank and some experts at the ZPA place on the delay in the 
privatisation of the ZCCM and the policy prescription for a swift privatisation of state 
assets to circumvent uncertainties that might arise from delays in the privatisation 
process is therefore misplaced. Rather than the delay per se, which might not 
necessarily have yielded a negative impact on Zambia’s development under different 
contextual realities, other factors influencing the mining sector during the delay were 
responsible for its poor performance. Opportunistic practices were, in fact, encouraged 
by the rushed processes, predominantly due to pressure from the IMF, the World Bank 
and other donors.296  
 
Instead of the rapid privatisation that neo-classical theorists favour, the pace, 
sequencing and scope of privatisation seem important for a more orderly restructuring. 
Effective legal and institutional structures are crucial for promoting successful 
                                                 
296
    Interviews with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
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privatisation. A too rapid privatisation or ‘shock therapy’ that radical market reformers 
favour would also likely carry political costs that would hinder further reforms (Stiglitz, 
1998:19, 22).  
 
A gradual approach enables better designs and sequencing of reform and the creation of 
requisites for good privatisation; including the creation of more effective institutions. A 
gradual approach would also provide the privatisation with greater legitimacy that 
would likely ensure more successful outcomes from the privatisation process (Stiglitz, 
1998:19, 22; 2002:162, 182, 183-184). The speed of privatisation needs to be balanced 
against clear long-term legal rules and against a transfer process that is considered as 
legitimate by the population (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:44). The weak legislative processes 
in Zambia (elaborated on in Section 6.5.1.6 of Chapter 6) also facilitated, by 2002, the 
exit from the mining sector of three of the seven major private mining companies that 
took over ownership of the mines, discussed below.  
 
5.1.4 Main transactions in the privatisation of the ZCCM 
 
Table A5 (in Annexure) provides a summary of the principal terms of sales of the 
various companies for the different assets of the ZCCM and the main transactions 
involved in the privatisation of the ZCCM. Kansanshi, the first asset of the ZCCM, was 
privatised in January 1997 and the remaining major assets of the ZCCM, sold to KCM 
and MCM, were only finalised on 31 March 2000. Several material changes took place 
in the control and ownership of the main copper mining assets in Zambia since the 
privatisation transactions were completed. This is because shares and shareholding 
companies change hands rapidly and the ownership structures of all the companies are 
still fairly fluid (Craig, 2002:368). Figure 5.1 shows the different assets held first by the 
different private companies, then under government majority ownership and again 
under private ownership, in chronological order. 
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Figure 5.1: Shifting ownership patterns for large-scale copper mining assets in Zambia from colonialism to 2007 
Bwana 
Mkubwa 
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Luanshya, Mulyashi 
Chambishi Metals 
Anglovaal (South 
Africa) 
Chambishi smelter 
Nkana slag dumps 
Chambishi Mines 
plc 
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Co.-Africa (China) 
Chambishi Mines 
Zambia 
Consolidated Copper 
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AAC/ZCI (US) 
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Chibuluma 
Mines plc 
Metorex (South 
Africa) 
Kalulushi 
Mopani Copper 
Mines (MCM) 
Glencore, 73.1%, 
First Quantum, 
16.9% (both 
Canada), 
ZCCM-IH, 10%, 
Nkana, Mufulira 
Konkola Copper 
Mines (KCM) 
AAC/ZCI (US) 
65% 
IFC, 7.5% 
CDC, 7.5% 
ZCCM-IH, 20% 
Konkola Copper 
Mines 
Vedanta, 51% 
(UK/India) 
ZCCM-IH, 49% 
Nchanga, Konkola, 
Chingola, 
Nampundwe, 
Chililabombwe 
Luanshya Mines 
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J and W/Enya 
(Switzerland) 
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Metals 
J and W/Enya 
(Switzerland) 
Key: 
     Mines under government ownership 
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Luanshya, 
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Source: Adapted from Fraser & Lungu (2007:14). 
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The mining TNCs that exited from Zambia were first Binani that owned majority 
interests in RAMCOZ at the Luanshya/Baluba mines (that was put under receivership in 
November 2000), followed by AVMIN, the majority owner of Chambishi Metals. The 
departure of Binani led to the Luanshya/Baluba mines lying idle for three years, before 
they were acquired, in 2004, by J and W, a subsidiary of the Swiss company, Enya, that 
also took over the mines owned by AVMIN (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:13). Moreover, 
Anglo American pulled out from KCM in 2002, after operating KCM for almost two 
years (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:35). Subsequently, Vedanta Resources 
took over KCM in 2004. 
 
5.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPACITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE PRIVATISATION OF THE 
ZCCM 
 
Various theoretical arguments, discussed in Chapter 3, favour the establishment of a 
robust legal and institutional framework before privatisation is introduced to ensure 
more favourable outcomes for the country from privatisation and under private 
ownership. Broadly, a robust legal and institutional framework is essential mainly to 
curb possible pitfalls, such as corruption and negative influences that might arise during 
the privatisation of SOEs and under private ownership. Kenneth Arrow’s 
groundbreaking work on the dynamics of why and when market economies work and 
how economies change regards the creation of institutional infrastructure, together with 
competition, as more important than privatisation itself for a market economy (Stiglitz, 
2002:182).  
 
The assessment of the regulatory and institutional capacities of the government in the 
privatisation of the ZCCM encompasses an investigation of the supporting institutions 
and the legal framework established for the privatisation of the ZCCM. Secondly, 
weaknesses in the legal and the institutional framework evident in the privatisation of 
the ZCCM are examined. 
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5.2.1 Supporting institutions and legal framework for the privatisation of the 
ZCCM  
 
The Privatisation Act of 1992 sets out the legal framework for the privatisation of 
SOEs. This Act authorised the creation of the ZPA as the most important supporting 
statutory body provided with the mandate to undertake all the privatisations in 
Zambia.297 The ZPA is an independent body with a 12-member board. Nine of these 
members (including the Vice Chairman) are non-government nominees from the 
professional institutions and stakeholders they represent (as required by legislation) and 
only three are government representatives. The private bodies represented on the board 
of the ZPA are the trade unions, the Churches of Zambia, the Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry, the Banks Association of Zambia, the Zambian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, the Law Association of Zambia, employers, farmers and the Dean of the 
Business School at the University of the Copperbelt (Afronet et al., 2001:11, 12).298 
 
The ZPA reports to Parliament via the National Assembly. Information from the ZPA is 
conveyed to the Cabinet through the Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry who in 
turn reports to the National Assembly.299 The ZPA is generally observed to have well-
functioning procedures and governance structures (Craig, 2002:5; Transparency 
International, 2002:7, 9; Momba, 1998/1999:8).  
 
Section 32 (1) of the Privatisation Act makes a clear distinction between the role of the 
government and that of the ZPA. This section legally empowers the ZPA as the sole 
body in charge of all sales transactions, the closure of each sale and in conducting the 
privatisation process, including the planning, managing, implementing and the 
controlling of divestiture of SOEs. These were to be free of political interference 
(Committee of Public Investment, cited in Afronet et al., 2001:15; Transparency 
International, 2002:8, 13).  
 
The Privatisation Act also empowers the ZPA board and not the President to appoint an 
                                                 
297
    Interviews with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003 and M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
298
    Although the President has to agree to each of the appointees selected by the independent bodies (Craig, 2002:5, 6; 
Transparency International, 2002:9 and interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003). 
299
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
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independent body in instances where additional technical expertise is required. This was 
the case with the privatisation of the non-mining assets of Zambia (ZPA, 2003:2, 5; 
Transparency International, 2002:14, 17).300 The Act confines the role of the 
government mainly to an advisory position to the ZPA and the government was also to 
determine the overall direction and timing of privatisation (World Bank, 2002b:15; 
ZPA, 2003:4, 6). 
 
The government undertook a comprehensive review of the laws, regulations and 
administrative measures affecting the mining industry. The review culminated in the 
enactment of the Mining Policy and the Mines and Minerals Act in July 1995 that, 
together with the provision of incentives to attract and promote private investments in 
the mining sector, were favourable to private sector investment (Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development, 1995:58; Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development, 
2003:2). Further legislation to support the privatisation process includes the Investment 
Act, the Employment Act, the Companies Act and the Securities Act (Transparency 
International, 2002:7). 
 
5.2.2 Weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework in the privatisation of 
the ZCCM  
 
The ZPA had undertaken several privatisations of non-mining interests before that of 
the ZCCM. However, during the privatisation of the mining sector the Chiluba 
government introduced substantial changes to the procedures for the privatisation of the 
ZCCM.301 These changes allowed for the introduction of political interests into the 
privatisation process and promoted irregularities and non-transparency in the 
management of the proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM. Regulatory measures to 
protect the interests of the mineworkers and the mining community against the impact 
of privatisation were also inadequate. These changes are now examined in greater 
detail. 
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    Interviews with Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 October 2003;  Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Stuart Cruickshank, 28 
October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003 and David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003. 
301
    Interviews with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003 and Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
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The introduction of political interests 
 
The introduction of political interests in the privatisation of the ZCCM was largely 
achieved through the Chiluba government setting up a parallel body to the ZPA, the 
Privatisation Negotiating Team, to lead the privatisation process and to complete the 
rest of the privatisations of the ZCCM.302 Francis Kaunda, former Chairman and CEO of 
the ZCCM assumed chairmanship of the Negotiating Team that comprised also of 
various Zambian experts, including several senior employees of the ZCCM, who 
possessed considerable knowledge of the mining industry (World Bank, 2002b:15). The 
Negotiating Team, whose creation the World Bank sanctioned, effectively subverted 
and usurped the roles of the ZPA (Afronet et al., 2001:11, 12).  
 
The politicisation of the Negotiating Team included its having to report to the 
Committee of seven Ministers (chaired by the Ministry of Mines and Mineral 
Development) to make recommendations for approval, before further approval was 
sought from the ZPA board and the ZCCM board of Directors. The approval of these 
bodies was necessary to legalise the privatisation decisions.303 The inclusion of several 
senior employees of the ZCCM within the Negotiating Team to negotiate the sales of 
the ZCCM, many of whom were opposed to the privatisation of the ZCCM,304 
introduced further vested interests in the privatisation of the ZCCM (Afronet et al., 
2001:11, 12; Committee of Economic Affairs and Labour, 2000:26, 37, 110; World 
Bank, 2002b:15, 22).  
 
A lessening of civil society participation in the privatisation process, from mid-1998, 
through the exclusion of several civil society board members305 from the ZPA board 
further facilitated the introduction of political influence in the privatisation of the 
ZCCM.306 The limit on the participation of the local society enabled the privatisation of 
the ZCCM to be steered to a particular agenda and reduced transparency in the 
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    Interviews with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003 and Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
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    Interviews with Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003; Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Zion 
Simwanza, December 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003; Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 
2003 and Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
305
    Namely, the Law Association of Zambia, the Banks Association of Zambia, the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
and the Churches of Zambia. 
306
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
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privatisation of the mining assets (Afronet et al., 2001:11, 12). Corruption is likely to 
grow with the lowering of civil society participation, as their participation is an 
important element in curbing corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1997:44-45). 
 
Greater government influence might to some extent have been desirable in the 
privatisation of the mining sector for ensuring that the greatest share of the rent element 
from mining accrues to the country and in light of its strategic importance to the 
Zambian economy. However,  the political influence introduced in the privatisation of 
the ZCCM, without effective checks and balances, increased the discretionary power of 
the Chiluba government. The higher discretionary power of the Chiluba government led 
to many decisions related to privatisation such as tender procedures and the distribution 
of resources, being made at State House. This, alongside weakened institutions, 
promoted alleged corruption by senior officials during Chiluba’s government.307  
 
Rose-Ackerman (1997:39) cautions against the involvement of top government officials 
in the allocation of large contracts, as the fewer restraints these officials enjoy would 
likely lead to massive-scale corruption. The secrecy that clouded some of the 
negotiations between the Negotiating Team and the bidders of the mines in the 
privatisation process further obscured accountability. This fuelled speculation that 
corruption, or the siphoning off of public funds, allegedly by top government officials, 
also played a part during the privatisation of the mining sector (Transparency 
International, 2002:i, 1). 
 
Despite claims that a chain of approval was sought for bids that the Negotiating Team 
recommended, before actual negotiations commenced with the recommended buyer, the 
Committee of Ministers that reported to the President effectively selected the bidders 
and conducted the bidding process (Kaunda, 2002:40).308 The various levels of 
agreements from the ZPA to approve the commencement of negotiations with bidders 
and for the sale of all privatised units in Zambia that the Privatisation Act necessitates 
were, at times, obtained only after negotiations were completed and presented as a fait 
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    Interviews with Zion Simwanza, December 2003 and M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
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accompli.309 The boards of the ZCCM and the ZPA were also merely informed of the 
decisions that the Committee of Ministers already made (Transparency International, 
2002:12; ZPA, 2003:2, 4). The ZPA was expected to rubber-stamp decisions already 
taken by the Committee of Ministers and the Negotiating Team, sometimes setting the 
Negotiating Team at odds with the ZPA (ZPA, 2003:2, 4, 6).310  
 
A weakness within Section 9 (3) of the Privatisation Act itself, which provides for the 
calling of meetings of the board without the necessary 14 days’ notice, in matters 
deemed urgent, and the stipulation that only five members form a quorum, also assisted 
in promoting political interests in the privatisation of the mines. This is because, 
provided that all three Lusaka-based government members were present, these 
provisions enabled the government to automatically end up with a majority if a meeting 
was called at short notice. This was the case with the first sale of the Luanshya/Baluba 
mine (Transparency International, 2002:13). Moreover, since three members of the 
Negotiating Team, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury at the Ministry 
of Finance and National Planning and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry, were also sitting on the board of the ZPA, once 
government approval was granted, the approval of the ZPA became inevitable.311 
 
The most prominent example of political interference and possible corrupt practices in 
the bidding process were allegedly the Negotiating Team’s selection of Binani, a copper 
trader and smelting company with no track record in deep level mining, over First 
Quantum to acquire the assets of the Luanshya/Baluba mine.312 The Luanshya/Baluba 
mine is a deep level mine that is difficult to operate on account of its complicated 
geology (Africa Mining Intelligence, 2001c:2). The ZPA was excluded from the 
opening of negotiations with Binani in the Luanshya/Baluba bid and the Negotiating 
Team refused to comply with the advice of the ZPA to turn down the Binani bid (ZPA, 
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    Interviews with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 October 
2003 and M.Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
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    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003; Simon Capper, 30 October 2003 
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    Interview with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
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    Interviews with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003; Sipho Phiri and Simon Capper, 30 October 2003; Stuart Cruickshank, 28 
October 2003; John Kangwa, 21 November 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003 and Alick 
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2003:2, 6).313 Ultimately, Binani was wound up in 2000 and the bid was subsequently 
awarded to J and W, instead of to AVMIN, under the Mwanawasa government, also 
amidst allegations of political influence (Africa Analysis, 2003a:16).  
 
However, arguments in favour of Binani were their commitments to retain the total 
workforce at Luanshya/Baluba and to make further investments. Moreover, the 
Financial and Legal Advisors, Rothschild and Clifford Chance, also participated in the 
selection of the Binani Group for acquiring the Luanshya mine.314 It has further been 
claimed that the ZPA was never forced to rubber-stamp bids that it did not favour.315 
However, the point is rather that under the Chiluba government the whole process was 
politicised to a much greater extent, enabled through the weak institutions and the fast 
pace of privatisation pushed for by the World Bank. 
 
Institutional and policy changes that promoted irregularities and non-transparency in 
the management of the proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM 
 
In addition to the introduction of political influence in the privatisation of the mining 
sector, the proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM were managed in an irregular and non-
transparent way. These were at odds with the structures that the ZPA established to 
promote transparency and accountability that featured strongly in the privatisation of 
non-mining SOEs. Transparency and accountability in the privatisation of non-mining 
assets were mainly achieved through effective communication with the public and also 
through progress reports that had to be gazetted. 
 
The irregular and non-transparent ways the proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM were 
managed arose as a result of:  
• The failure of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development that was in 
charge of receiving and depositing the proceeds of privatisation from the ZPA into 
the Privatisation Revenue Account (PRA) at the Central Bank to follow proper 
accounting procedures. 
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    Based on an argument that ZPA could not change decisions made by the Committee of Ministers (interview with Stuart 
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    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
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• Discrepancies in the keeping of proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM’s assets 
between accounts of senior officials of the ZPA and those of the ZCCM board.316 The 
discrepancies were partly owing to a practice of the Negotiating Team to, at times, 
deposit the proceeds317 into a ZCCM account,318 ostensibly to be used in the 
operations of the company and for meeting the company’s expenses, rather than into 
the PRA, despite its being a requirement of the Privatisation Act.  
• The failure of the Negotiating Team to publish in the government gazette details of 
the original values of the mining enterprises and of the completed sales and spending 
figures (which hindered objective assessment as to whether a fair price was obtained 
for the mines) and to provide a complete list of all the assets of the ZCCM.319 Besides 
the inability of the Negotiating Team, the ZCCM and the Ministry of Mines and 
Mineral Development to verify the price, they were also unable to verify to whom 
some of these assets were sold and the payment terms.320  
• A lack of public communication in the privatisation of the ZCCM as to why certain 
decisions were taken, why Zambia’s privatisation took place and as to the processes 
and the results of privatisation, which is required in the structures of the ZPA. The 
omission contributed significantly to a less transparent privatisation of the ZCCM, 
according to a review that the World Bank conducted. 
• The non-disclosures of the amount of money that went into the PRA account321 and 
of withdrawals from deposits322 in the PRA account and of the purposes for which 
these were to be used, making accounting difficult and leading to significant 
discrepancies in the proceeds obtained from the privatisation of the ZCCM. A 
shortfall of ZK3 963 822 387 and US$16 824 579 was expatriated from the amount 
remitted to the PRA. Structures within the ZPA subject each of the sales transactions 
to the approval of both the Attorney General and the Minister of Finance.  
• The failure to publish the public flotation of the remaining shares of the Zambian 
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319
    Despite the Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour requesting these from the Negotiating Team, the ZCCM and the 
Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development. 
320
    Including where it was paid. 
321
    This practice, however, happened already at the end of 1995, before the privatisation of ZCCM’s assets. 
322
    Which are listed in the ZPA Progress Report. 
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government,323 making it difficult to verify whether the money generated was 
deposited in the PRA, as is required by the Privatisation Act.  
• The transferring of a number of non-core assets to Trusts and disposing of some by 
‘deed of gift’, which are not provided for in the Act. 
• The Negotiating Team’s selling especially the non-core mining assets and the 
ZCCM’s overseas assets, without the prior authorisation of the ZPA board, and 
which, under the ‘rules for the implementation and approval of the terms of sale’, 
require the Attorney General’s review of the sale agreements and the signature of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
• The employment of confidentiality clauses in the privatisation of the ZCCM,324 
which obscured transparency and impeded detection of possible corrupt practices.  
Sources: Afronet et al. (2001:14, 15); Committee of Economic Affairs and Labour (2000:15, 38, 76, 77, 
112, 113); Craig (2002:6); Transparency International (2002:5, 13, 14, 15); World Bank (2002b:21); 
ZPA (2002:5) and interviews with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; 
Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003; Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003 and Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 
2003. 
 
Together, these weaknesses in the management of the proceeds from the sales of the 
ZCCM promoted corruption, allegedly committed by senior government officials, at a 
great cost to the Zambian economy (World Bank, 2002b:15, 21, 30; Transparency 
International, 2002:i, 1, 7). It is alleged that ex-President Chiluba misappropriated about 
R1 billion, according to a petition calling for his arrest, and a civil prosecution in a 
British court in May 2007 found Chiluba guilty of defrauding Zambia of 
US$46 million, via a UK bank account (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:10; 
The Star, 2002b:4). The alleged large-scale corruption corroborates to some extent 
Rose-Ackerman’s (1997:39) argument that when top government officials are involved 
in the allocation of contracts, massive scale corruption with far-reaching consequences 
is likely to take place. It also supports the argument of Stiglitz that when effective legal 
infrastructure to ensure good governance is absent, asset stripping by insiders and the 
local government is likely to take place (Stiglitz, 2002:144, 155, 157, 158).  
 
                                                 
323
    Which can generate significant amounts. 
324
    Based on the argument that rules governing shares traded on both the London and New York Stock Exchange prohibit the 
release of development agreements or documents to outside institutions. 
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Predictably, the head of the Negotiating Team, Francis Kaunda, contests the allegations 
of corruption during the privatisation of the ZCCM. He argues that the involvement of 
many parties, namely the board members of the ZCCM, the B-Directors (represented by 
shareholders) and the ZPA, required to approve the sales transactions of the mines, 
reduced the chances of corruption.325 Francis Kaunda further claims that it was only 
where individual decisions were made or when too many discretionary powers were 
provided to certain government officials (possibly the top government officials) that 
detection of corrupt practices became difficult and that corruption proved likely.326 
However, the argument that the participation of various bodies in the privatisation of the 
ZCCM lowered the chances of corruption was somewhat discredited by the fact that the 
various levels of agreements to approve commencement of negotiations with bidders 
were not always sought in the privatisation of the ZCCM, as discussed above. The ZPA 
was essentially expected to rubber-stamp decisions already taken by the Negotiating 
Team and the Committee of Ministers. 
 
Measures to curb corruption in the privatisation process should have been established 
before the privatisation process commenced, rather than after the corruption took place. 
For instance, the Task Force to investigate corrupt practices, including the tracking 
down of illegally sold government assets, was established after large-scale corruption 
had already transpired, also in the mining sector, during the privatisation process.327 
Furthermore, the independence of the Task Force was compromised because it was 
commissioned by the Mwanawasa government, a measure that probably excluded that 
government from the investigation.328 
 
Weaknesses in the regulatory framework to protect the interests of the mineworkers 
and the mining community against the impact of privatisation  
 
Several legislative and institutional weaknesses existed in the protection of workers 
against adverse consequences arising from the privatisation of the mines. 
 
                                                 
325
    Interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
326
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003 and Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
327
    Interview with Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003. 
328
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
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• The absence of alternative employment 
 
The Chiluba government failed to create new employment to absorb the many Zambian 
mineworkers that lost their jobs through privatisation and through trade liberalisation 
(Stiglitz, 2002:183-184).329 This is in contrast to China where new jobs were created in 
tandem with privatisation, which prevented massive unemployment and accounted for 
the rather successful privatisation of the SOEs in that country. Approximately 29 200 
mineworkers lost their jobs in Zambia from 1994 to 2000. About 3 500 mineworkers 
were retrenched from 1994 to 1996 and most mineworkers, 25 700, lost their jobs from 
1996, a year before the first mines were privatised, until 2000 when the last mines were 
privatised.  
 
Land was provided for agricultural farming through the Kanakatapa Resettlement 
Scheme as a social cushioning measure to some retrenched workers.330 However, most 
retrenchees in Zambia went into subsistence farming, mainly on land owned by the 
copper mines.331 Measures to relocate retrenched workers from the ZCCM to 
agricultural land where they could enjoy title deeds to participate in the agricultural 
sector seem necessary. 
 
• Inadequate social security safety nets 
 
The social security system in Zambia was highly inadequate in taking care of the many 
retrenched employees (ZPA, 2000b:16).332 This contrasts with the social safety nets in 
the form of social programmes provided to retrenched workers in countries of the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to soften the 
negative impact of trade liberalisation. The social safety nets extended to the retrenched 
workers in these countries included unemployment compensation, insurance, pension, 
family benefits and adjustment assistance (Rodrik, 1997:23-25).  
 
An effective social security safety net programme and government policies to reduce 
the negative socio-economic effects of the privatisation of the ZCCM on the Zambian 
                                                 
329
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
330
    Interview with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003. 
331
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
332
    Interview with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
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nation,333 which was to be sponsored from part of the proceeds of privatisation, never 
materialised. The omission was partly attributable to insufficient net capital obtained 
from the proceeds of privatisation.334 Inefficiencies at the division of the ZPA dealing 
with the social impact of privatisation335 and the tight budget constraints of the 
government, which contributed towards thousands of former workers of the ZCCM not 
being paid their pensions by 2007, also contributed to the inadequate social security nets 
provided to mineworkers (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:3).  
 
Furthermore, the attachment of other assets that workers gained during the privatisation 
process to their retrenchment and pension packages significantly reduced these 
packages of mineworkers. Houses sold to workers, personal to holder vehicles and loans 
were attached to their retrenchment packages and the value of the houses were also 
subtracted from their pensions during the privatisation of the ZCCM. Accordingly, the 
safety nets provided to those left unemployed were absent or highly inadequate to assist 
workers and communities that depended on the mines to sustain themselves 
economically and to cope with the financial difficulties that arose as a result of the 
privatisation of the ZCCM (Lungu, 2001:6; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:30, 51).  
 
The inadequate safety nets provided to workers had severe adverse repercussions on the 
mining community and greatly contributed to increased poverty levels in Zambia, 
discussed in Section 4.4.5 of Chapter 4 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:5; Lungu, 2001:16, 17; 
Gostner, 1997:60). The failure to protect those negatively affected by the privatisation 
process stands in stark contrast to measures that Poland introduced to lessen the impact 
of privatisation on the broader society. These measures encompassed benefits to the 
unemployed and adjustments to pensions and salaries in line with inflation, which 
significantly accounted for Poland’s market economy functioning better than those of 
other East European countries (Stiglitz, 2002:181, 262).  
 
The failure of the government to create alternative employment to accommodate 
                                                 
333
    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 
November 2003; Jack Jones, 22 October 2003; John Kangwa, 21 November 2003 and Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003. 
334
    Interviews with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003 and Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
335
    Interview with Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003. 
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workers left unemployed and to introduce effective social safety nets to unemployed 
mineworkers constituted major weaknesses in the protection of mineworkers during the 
privatisation process of the mines. Omissions in government policies that affect workers 
adversely under private ownership of the mines by TNCs are discussed in 
Section 6.5.1.4 of Chapter 6. Inadequate monitoring and poor enforcement of 
regulations during the privatisation of the mines and of the operations of mining TNCs 
further facilitated corruption and reduced more favourable results from the privatisation 
of the mining sector for the Zambian nation.  
 
Summary 
 
From the above discussion it is noted that the institutional and policy changes that the 
Chiluba government introduced in the privatisation of the mining sector, from those 
established during the privatisation of the non-mining assets, precluded a more 
successful privatisation of the mines in Zambia. These included: (i) the introduction of 
political interests into the privatisation process; (ii) irregularities and non-transparency 
in the ways in which the proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM were managed; and (iii) 
insufficient protection of mineworkers (Transparency International, 2002:17). Poor 
enforcement also limited the success of the privatisation of the ZCCM.  
 
The alterations in the procedures failed to match the elaborate legal and administrative 
framework and the procedures and controls that the ZPA followed during the 
privatisation of non-mining assets to ensure accountability and transparency and to 
control corruption and mismanagement in the privatisation process (Transparency 
International, 2002:17). Indeed, the political influence and increases in the discretionary 
power of the Chiluba government that the changes introduced in the privatisation of the 
mining sector compromised the independent functioning of the ZPA. These undermined 
and weakened institution building.  
 
Instead of promoting positive outcomes for the Zambian economy, an over-rapid 
privatisation, the ‘shock therapy’ favoured by radical market reformers,336 without 
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    Such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
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effective legal and institutional structures in place, and with insufficient regard for the 
policy’s social and distributional consequences, facilitated the poor outcomes from 
privatisation. The poor governance and irregular and non-transparent ways in which the 
proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM were managed and an inadequate protection of 
the interests of mineworkers as a result of these omissions facilitated corruption and 
limited the redistribution of benefits of the privatisation process. Accordingly, the 
manner in which the privatisation process of the ZCCM proceeded and an ineffective 
enforcement of existing legal measures for the privatisation of SOEs, had a highly 
negative impact on the Zambian economy. A more gradual privatisation process would 
have allowed for the establishment of clear long-term legal rules that would have 
facilitated the building of effective institutions, required for more successful 
privatisation and beneficial outcomes (Stiglitz, 1998:19, 22, 2002:182, 183-184; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999:44). 
 
5.3 THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATISATION OF THE ZCCM IN IMPROVING 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
 
The pro-privatisation argument that the privatisation of state assets would have a 
positive impact in improving public finance would be assessed in the mining sector in 
Zambia by investigating whether the sale of the mines improved government revenue 
and reduced the debt of the Zambian government.  
 
5.3.1 Revenue from the sales of the mines 
 
The poor bargaining leverage of the government, mainly because of the weak 
performance of the ZCCM and of the Zambian economy at the time the mines were 
privatised, largely accounts for the poor sale price the government was able to obtain for 
the mines. Of the gross total value of privatisation transactions in 2002 of 
US$425 million, gross mining sector proceeds accounted for US$338.8 million 
(79.71%), according to ZPA estimates. However, while the net balance in the Revenue 
Account/Fund from the privatisation of non-mining assets reached only about 
US$570 000 on 11 November 2002, with most of the funds in the Revenue Account 
being used to cover the ZPA and other expenses, no net proceeds remained from the 
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sales of the mines to be transferred to the PRA.  
 
Available information on received proceeds and on the use of funds shows that the 
gross receipts from the privatisation of the ZCCM, together with other available funds, 
were insufficient to cover the liabilities of the ZCCM  (World Bank, 2002b:22).337 
Because the privatisation of the ZCCM involved asset sales rather than share equity 
sales,338 the proceeds from the sale of the mines belonged to the ZCCM, and most of 
these proceeds were used to cover the company’s obligations to various creditors 
(World Bank, 2002b:22). Accordingly, none of the proceeds from the sales of the assets 
of the ZCCM benefited the national budget.339  
 
The sales agreement that permitted purchasers to pay only a small part of the total cash 
consideration, with the rest constituting deferred/conditional future payments, also 
significantly lowered the revenue received from the sales of the mines (refer to Table 
A5 in Annexure) (Transparency International, 2002:2; ZPA, 2003:2). This practice 
contravened the Privatisation Act, which stipulates that deferred conditional payment be 
made available only for Management Buy Outs (MBOs) and the purchase of shares by 
Zambian nationals. For example, at close, the government received only US$3 million 
in cash of the total US$28 million agreed upon for the Kansanshi Mine, while 
US$10 million was payable after completing a pre-feasibility stage and the remaining 
US$15 million after a feasibility study. Similarly, in the case of the Konkola Division, 
US$30 million was received in cash at the close of the Anglo American deal, while 
US$60 million was to be paid in six equal instalments, starting from year six after the 
closure of the deal (Transparency International, 2002:2).  
 
Moreover, the possibility of deferring payments would disadvantage Zambia if the 
company exits before paying its deferred cash obligations. This was the case with Anglo 
American, which left in 2002 after only 18 months of operations at KCM, enabling the 
Zambian government to obtain only US$30 million from the sale of KCM to the Anglo 
                                                 
337
    Which should be reflected in the cash flows and accounts of ZCCM. 
338
    In which case proceeds from the privatisation would have belonged to shareholders. 
339
    The government may wish to confirm this through an audit (World Bank, 2002b:22). 
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American consortium (ZPA, 2003:2). Section 6.3.1 of Chapter 6 shows that the 
extensive concessions granted to mining TNCs further reduced tax revenue from mining 
under private TNCs’ ownership of the mines.  
 
However, capital investments from mining companies were expected to have more 
lasting benefits over immediate cash from the sales of the mines, according to the ZPA 
(2002:6). This argument though is flawed as the failure of foreign mining companies to 
respect their pledged investment obligations, discussed in Section 6.1 of Chapter 6, 
severely limited this benefit. Unless the investment is made compulsory, to be agreed 
before the sales of the SOEs, cash payments take precedence over pledged investments, 
according to Pennings (2008:484, 489). However, if the proceeds in cash payments are 
not carefully monitored, as was the case with the ZCCM, corrupt practices may also 
reduce the benefits of cash payments.  
 
The World Bank blames the poor financial returns that the government gained from the 
sales of the mining assets on the weak financial state of the ZCCM and its arrears to 
creditors and utilities. These problems lowered the bargaining leverage of the 
government to demand more for the mines (World Bank, 2002b:23). However, this 
argument fails to take into account that the degradation of the assets of the ZCCM 
occurred to a large extent because of policies of the World Bank and the IMF, which 
barred the government from investing in mines earmarked for privatisation and not 
necessarily because of state ownership per se.  
 
It is also likely that corrupt practices, allegedly by top government officials under 
Chiluba’s government, during the privatisation of the ZCCM significantly lowered 
revenue from the privatisation of the mining sector. It is alleged that public money and 
proceeds from the privatisation of the mines were siphoned off into private offshore 
accounts (Afronet et al., 2001:14). The above discussion shows that deficiencies in 
Zambia’s regulatory and institutional framework facilitated possible corruption by 
government officials during the privatisation process.  
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The fact that the Zambian economy did not gain any net revenue from the sales of the 
mines contradicts the neo-classical argument that the privatisation of SOEs would 
increase government revenue from the sales of the assets (World Bank, 2002b:22). It is 
more in line with findings of empirical studies in sub-Saharan countries that 
government budgets received only a fraction of the share of privatisation and have at 
times been wiped out (Buchs, 2003:11). While it is difficult to ascertain what the net 
income flow would have been under state ownership of the mines, the success of 
privatisation is certainly limited when a lower sale price is obtained compared to the net 
income flow that would have been created if the enterprise remained in the public sector 
(Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2000a:221).  
 
Furthermore, the large-scale corruption that allegedly took place during the privatisation 
of the mines, within a liberal economy, supports Stiglitz’s view that when privatisation 
occurs with capital market liberalisation,340 rather than enhancing efficiency, growth and 
re-investment in the country, the incentive for corporate theft and asset-stripping by 
insiders increases. Moreover, growth may in fact be depressed (Stiglitz, 2002:144, 155, 
158). The determination of a direct causal relationship between capital market 
liberalisation and corruption is, however, outside the scope of this study. The 
allegations that money from the proceeds from the sales of the mines was transferred 
‘offshore’ is further in line with Stiglitz’s argument that resources might leave the 
country, as winners of the privatisation process are likely to transfer money to safe 
havens. This is especially the case when deep depressions contribute to low returns, or 
when large-scale corruption was involved in the privatisation process (Stiglitz, 
2002:144, 157, 158).  
 
5.3.2 The role of the privatisation of the mines in improving public finances  
 
In the short term, the neo-classical argument that the sales of SOEs would improve 
public finances was not borne out in practice in the Zambian mining sector. On the 
contrary, rather than reducing its liabilities, the government’s assumption of the ZCCM 
debt of approximately US$770 million, at the completion of the privatisation of its core 
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    Especially when an effective legal infrastructure to ensure good governance is absent. 
  
184
assets, as part of the consideration of Zambia’s HIPC condition, increased Zambia’s 
external debt.341 The increase was contrary to one of the intentions of the privatisation 
programme to transfer most of the external loan portfolio of the ZCCM that stood at 
US$436 million in May 1998, to the new owners (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 7; Transparency 
International, 2002:6). The government’s assumption of the debt of the ZCCM imposed 
an enormous cost burden on the national budget (Transparency International, 2002:6).342 
Moreover, payment of many of the retrenchment packages and pensions of 
mineworkers by the government added to Zambia’s debt (UNDP, 2001:23; Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:10). 
 
More recently, Zambia’s external debt was in fact reduced, but not through privatisation 
and private ownership of the mines. Instead, the Zambian debt was reduced, principally, 
from the HIPC status343 for which it qualified in 2005. Additionally, more importantly, 
because of the MDRI that multilateral institutions extended to Zambia in 2006, a major 
part of Zambia’s debt was written off,344 after it achieved certain macro-economic, 
social and governance targets (Transparency International, 2002:6).345  
 
The above discussion shows that gains in revenue from the sales of the mines were 
obliterated and the privatisation of the mines did not improve the debt of Zambia. The 
main reasons for these were: (i) the poor state of the ZCCM; (ii) the concomitantly 
lower selling price; (iii) certain concessions granted to mining companies to defer their 
cash considerations, in spite of these being in contravention of the Privatisation Act; 
(iv) possible corruption by government officials; and (v) the government’s assumption 
of various liabilities of the ZCCM. Tax concessions also notably reduced government 
revenue under private ownership of the mines (discussed in Section 6.3.1 of Chapter 6). 
In the short term, a failure of mining TNCs to respect pledged investments also reduced 
advantages for Zambia under private ownership of the mines.  
                                                 
341
    Interviews with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003, Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003 and Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 
2003. 
342
    Interview with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003. 
343
    Interviews with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003 and Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 
2003. 
344
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
345
    Such as using the savings from debt cancellation for anti-poverty programmes through Poverty Reduction Strategy Projects 
(interview with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003). 
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These outcomes support the arguments of several theorists that increases in government 
revenue from privatisation would significantly depend on the sale price, adequate taxes, 
concessions and on the auction designs (Penning, 2008:489; Buchs, 2003:12, 13; World 
Bank, cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 2006:20, 21). However, rather than being due to 
privatisation as such, the poor gains in government revenue from the sales of the mines 
seem to be largely attributable to inadequate consideration given to the manner in which 
the privatisation proceeded and as a result of ineffective institutions. These omissions 
also facilitated corruption.  
 
5.4 CHANGING OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND THE 
IMPACT ON MINING PERFORMANCE AND ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT OF ZAMBIA 
 
The discussion in this section addresses the research question whether different 
objectives, organisational capacities and control and monitoring of managers of SOEs 
over private companies account for better performance of private companies, as is 
argued by neo-classical theorists. This is followed by an examination of the socio-
economic effects of various cost-cutting and profit-maximising measures.  
 
5.4.1 Objectives, organisational capacities, monitoring and control of managers 
 
The roles of different objectives, organisational capacities of mining companies and 
monitoring and control of managers under changing ownership in influencing company 
performance are now considered. The examination of these issues under government 
ownership of the mines is confined mainly to the Kaunda government, as the 
uncertainty linked to the long transition from the decision to privatise the mines (which 
commenced shortly into Chiluba’s government) to its implementation, weakened 
incentives and the monitoring of manager behaviour. 
 
5.4.1.1 Impact of different objectives on performance 
 
The investigation of the influences of different objectives under changing ownership on 
company performance tests the argument of public interest theorists that dissimilar 
objectives of managers under private and state ownership impact differently on the 
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performance of the company. However, a determination of performance is not easy 
because of the problem of the counterfactual pre- and post-privatisation, the challenge 
in selecting appropriate variables to assess performance and the difficulty in isolating 
the influence of ownership on performance. Moreover, a profit-based determination of 
performance is complex, mainly because of difficulties in obtaining the relevant 
statistics largely because of the reticence of private companies to provide information 
on their profits. Accordingly, instead of an exact quantitative cost-benefit profit-based 
calculation of performance, the overall performance of mining companies in the study is 
considered more broadly, by way of the productivity of mineworkers, a lowering in the 
cost of production or x-efficiency and the production levels of copper.  
 
Productivity of workers 
 
Under majority government ownership of the mines during Kaunda’s government, 
higher employment levels that the electoral-maximising motives of the government 
encouraged, in the absence of improved copper production, reduced labour productivity. 
Rather than focussing on increasing productivity the Kaunda government greatly 
prioritised the demands of the mineworkers as a dominant political interest group.346 
Figure 4.21 of Chapter 4 shows that in the early 1980s the excessive employment of 
workers in the mining sector lowered labour productivity from 9 tons/worker in 1980 
and 7.6 tons/worker in 1981 that dropped further in 1991 to 5.9 tons/worker. The 
decline in labour productivity contributed considerably towards the higher cost of 
production of the ZCCM over those of its international competitors. Higher 
employment levels were therefore not sustainable, especially at times of low copper 
prices and when the mines performed poorly.  
 
However, in the 1990s during Chiluba’s government the more effective usage of the 
reduced labour force (by 11 000 workers from 1992 to 1994), mainly due to 
rationalisation policies introduced from 1992, in accordance with the SAPs augmented 
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    For instance, despite continued production at some of the mines being achieved at losses, largely to appease the Mineworkers’ 
Union of Zambia, the Kaunda government opted not to close unprofitable mines between 1976 and 1983 to reduce costs (interview 
with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003). It also reversed wage restraints of mineworkers in 1975 and it adopted less stringent 
IMF conditionalities. Furthermore, the 10% wage ceiling measure became possible only with the inclusion of four trade unions to 
the ZIMCO board in 1983 (World Bank, 1989:27, 33, 43). 
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the productivity of workers in the mining sector to 7.5 tons/worker in 1993. The 
uncertainty created from the impending privatisation of the mines though contributed to 
the poor productivity levels in 1995. 
 
It is further noted from Figure 4.7 and from the discussion in Section 4.4.19 of 
Chapter 4 that under private ownership of the mines, profit-maximising motives of the 
shareholders and cost-reduction measures encouraged private managers to reduce even 
further the number of mineworkers employed. Alongside rising production levels, the 
additional lowering of the labour force contributed to a notable increase in labour 
productivity under private ownership of the mines. Labour productivity reached 
8.9 tons/worker in 2004. 
 
X-efficiency or reductions in the costs of production of the mining sector 
 
Stronger profit-maximisation motives of private companies and a greater focus on the 
core business encouraged the private mining companies to pursue greater x-efficiency in 
the mining sector than was the case under government ownership of the mines. 
Conversely, under government majority ownership, surpluses from mining were 
diverted away from the core mining sector activities for the development of other 
sectors to pursue electoral-maximising347 or political interests and multiple objectives. It 
is noted in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 that the surpluses were redistributed mainly to 
develop the manufacturing sector, for social development and for debt service payments 
of the country.348 The policies of the Kaunda government to redistribute surpluses from 
mining for enhancing national, infrastructural and the socio-economic development of 
Zambians greatly improved the social welfare349 and the human capital development of 
Zambians.350 These policies also promoted the development of the parastatal sector.351  
 
However, the deployment of limited mining revenue352 for developing non-mining 
sectors, for paying the country’s foreign debt and for political purposes, without a 
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    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
348
    Interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
349
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003 and Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003. 
350
    Interviews with Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003 and Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003. 
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    Especially the manufacturing sector. 
352
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
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corresponding adequate reinvestment into the mines until they were privatised, was not 
sustainable. On the contrary, these policies considerably increased the production costs 
of copper mining in Zambia above those of its global competitors. The redistributive 
practices, while neglecting to sufficiently reinvest in the mines, also proved detrimental 
to the productive capacity of the core mining sector that had a negative impact on the 
performance of the copper mining companies under government ownership, especially 
at times of low copper prices (Kaunda, 2002:180; World Bank, 2003b:135; Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning, 2002b:74).353  
 
A directing of profits to adequately recapitalise and modernise the machinery and 
technology of ZCCM,354 to extend the life of the mines, to develop deep-level mining 
and to explore for low-cost deposits would have enhanced the longer-term efficiency 
and sustainability of mining in Zambia. Such measures would also have counteracted 
the declining ore grades. The Zambian government further failed since the 1980s to 
invest in research and development activities in the mining sector to promote more 
efficient ways of mining copper, to lower their production costs and to increase 
production levels (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:39; World Bank, 2003b:135, 
2004a:18; Leistner, 1996:11.12; Kapika et al., 1996:7; Maambo, 1998:Fig. 9).  
 
In contrast, high investments that CODELCO undertook in the mining sector in Chile in 
the 1970s and its research and development activities largely accounted for that country 
being able to subsequently overtake Zambia in both efficiency and in the production of 
copper.355 The costs of production of copper in Zambia rank amongst the highest in the 
world since the mid-1990s (World Bank, 2003b:135, 2004a:18). The negative impact 
that the redistribution of limited mining revenue into especially the non-productive 
sectors had in increasing the cost of production and in undermining the core mining 
sectors supports the neo-classical argument that electoral-maximising objectives curtail 
improvements in the performance of SOEs. However, as noted above, the failure to 
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    That had become unreliable and inefficient (interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003). 
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    Interviews with Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003 and Kasote Singogo, 16 October 2003. 
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invest in the ZCCM during the 1990s, while significantly owing to multiple objectives 
of the government, was also greatly influenced by demands from multilateral 
institutions that barred investment into the mines that were earmarked for privatisation 
during Chiluba’s government. 
 
On the contrary, greater profit-maximising motives of private mining companies under 
their ownership of the mines improved x-efficiency or reductions in the unit costs of 
production for a given output of copper at most of the mines in Zambia, compared to the 
pre-privatisation period (World Bank, 2002a:8; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:39). In particular, a smaller mining operator, Bwana Mkubwa,356 enjoyed a 
production cost of US$0.35/lb for copper and of only US$0.18/lb for acid production 
(after acid credits)357 in 2001, which made it the most efficient and lowest-cost producer 
in Zambia. Its low cost of production enabled the company to enjoy operating profits of 
US$2.64 million at the end of the 2001 financial year, despite the price of copper having 
reached a virtual all-time low in November 2001 of US$0.59/lb (World Bank, 
2003b:132; Africa Mining Intelligence, 2002c:1). The average cost of production of 
KCM under the ownership of Anglo American, from end-March 2000 until December 
2001, also declined by 20% to 30% per pound of copper (from 100 cents to between 70 
and 80 cents per pound of copper).358  
 
However, despite the improvements in x-efficiency achieved under private ownership of 
the mines, the average cost of copper production of Zambia’s mining sector, at 
100 cents per pound of copper in 2000, compared to the world price of 84 cents per 
pound of copper, then still ranked among the highest in the world. The continuing high 
production costs render Zambia’s mines globally uncompetitive (The Economist, 
2002b:1). Moreover, in the short term, before 2004, the cost-reduction measures of the 
private mining companies were insufficient to push most of these companies into 
profitable positions.  
 
                                                 
356
    Which focuses on the processing of tailings through a leaching process. 
357
    Bwana Mkubwa sold the excess quantities of acid to other copper producers in the market (World Bank, 2003b:132). 
358
    Interview with Lori Hanschar, 18 December 2001. 
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Irrespective of ownership, a multiplicity of factors such as external factors (mainly the 
price of copper and cobalt), indirect costs and geo-political factors also played a 
significant role in influencing the x-efficiency and performance of the mining 
companies. The impact of these factors on performance prevents a more precise 
determination of the influence of changes in ownership on x-efficiency. Indirect costs 
that lower the global cost competitiveness of Zambia’s copper mining sector include 
higher extraction costs associated with deeper level mining, compared to the open-cast 
mining359 that predominates global copper production360 and the decline in the average 
copper ore grades linked to deep-level mines. The greenfield mines in the northwest of 
Zambia (in particular, the Lumwana Copper Mines) that will be developed as open-pit 
mines promise to be cheaper to operate. They are likely to be on par with the Chilean 
mines,361 which cost 40% less than most of the mines in Zambia, partly owing to the 
predominance of open-cast mining in that country (Africa Analysis, 2002b:16; Africa 
Confidential, 2002:2; Cherv, 1989:127; World Bank, 2003b:135).  
 
The prohibitive costs of transportation to and from the market and the supply links of 
Zambia362 due to the country being landlocked, and the high electricity and fuel costs are 
further indirect costs that have considerably increased the costs of production of the 
Zambian mining sector (Africa Analysis, 2002b:16). The impact of the high transport 
costs on the performance of the mining sector is exacerbated by the fact that most of the 
plant and machinery inputs required by the mines have to be imported. The high 
transport costs have also increased the costs of inputs of the highly import-dependent 
backward-linked industries to the mining sector. 
 
Geo-political factors mainly encompassed the effects of political instability in the sub-
region, especially in the 1970s and the 1980s. The subsequent higher transportation 
                                                 
359
    Describes a form of mining in which the mineral is dug from the surface instead of from deep under the ground. It contrasts 
with deeper level mining (referring to mining at depths in excess of 900 meters) requiring tunnelling into the earth (Science-
dictionary.com, 2010; Answer.com, 2010a, 2010b). Asides from rare cases, relative costs (with the exception of quarrying) are 
significantly less for surface mining, while underground costs are higher. Typically, underground mining costs exceed surface 
mining costs by a margin of three to four to one (Hartman, 1992:36). 
360
    Interviews with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Francis Kaunda, 20 October 
2003. 
361
    Interview with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
362
    Interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
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costs also raised the cost of operations of the Zambian mines and of their backward-
linked industries, under government ownership. The closure of Zambia’s route links to 
the south363 that were used to transport its copper greatly raised the shipping costs of 
imported inputs364 under government ownership of the mines (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002:4; Seidman, 1977:234, 235). The diversion of shipments from 
the former Rhodesia, following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), cost 
the government over US$150 million (Seidman, 1977:234).  
 
Costs were further increased due to the poorly functioning road link to the port of Dar-
es-Salaam that Zambia was forced to use as an entry port to the sea and because of the 
difficulties that this port and the railway experienced in trying to cope with the 
increasing volume of goods.365 Subsequently, the longer distance366 through the Tanzania 
Zambia Railway (TAZARA)367 opened in 1976,368 to transport copper and oil as a 
separate route for Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam369 further raised the cost of production (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:4; Maambo, 1998:4; McGrath & Whiteside, 
1989:169; Van Buren, 2003:1154). Moreover, the sourcing away from South Africa 
after 1986 in the bid to isolate South Africa’s apartheid regime, added another US$60-
65 million per annum to the operating costs of the mining sector (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 8; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:5). 
 
Under private ownership of the mines, the factors that obstructed greater x-efficiency 
from being achieved at some mining companies, in addition to the price of copper and 
indirect costs, included the high toll charges for the processing of ores, owing to 
Mopani’s near-monopoly control over smelting and concentrating activities. Added to 
                                                 
363
    In particular, the limited access to the Rhodesian rail network and other transport links to the south (reopened only in October 
1978), in response to sanctions against the former Rhodesia, after the UDI, on 11 November 1965, as well as the closure of the 
Benguela railway line in 1975 (after Portugal withdrew from its former colony), following the civil conflict in Angola that rendered 
Zambia’s link to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola inaccessible (Van Buren, 2003:1154; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:4, 5; Maambo, 1998:4). 
364
    As mining companies began to airlift heavy machinery and equipment from South Africa. 
365
    Insufficient traction power, an unsatisfactory safety record, landslides, derailments, severe delays, pilferage and poor 
management hindered the achievement of greater efficiency of the TAZARA railway (McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:180, 181; Van 
Buren, 2003:1154). TAZARA incurred losses for the Zambian government in its first eight years of operation but reached a 
profitable position in June 1983, although it did not consistently achieve profits until 1988 (Van Buren, 2003:1154). 
366
    Compared to the southern routes.  
367
    A 1 860 km single-line track, subsequently built by the Chinese. 
368
    That handled 85% of Zambian exports by 1987, of which 90% was copper. Imports, though, continued to come mainly through 
South Africa (McGrath & Whiteside, 1989:181). 
369
    Nevertheless, an improvement to the existing infrastructure. 
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this were the high costs of obtaining finance that compounded the liquidity problems of 
mining TNCs. The high costs of corporate skills and unforeseen accidents also 
increased the costs of some of the private mining companies. Factors internal to the 
operations of private mining companies, such as operational problems and poor 
decision-making, further limited the achievement of greater x-efficiency at some private 
mining companies. Notwithstanding that the high cost of rehabilitating the mines 
increased the production cost of the mining sector under private ownership, the extent 
of its influence in the short term is questionable. This is because in the short term, 
capital investment under private ownership was not much higher than in 1991 under 
government ownership during Kaunda’s government (refer to Figure 4.11 of Chapter 4 
and the discussion bin Section 6.1.2 of Chapter 6). 
 
Accordingly, declining profit in the mining sector in Zambia cannot be definitively 
attributed to state ownership as other factors also influenced the mining sector 
adversely. This conclusion is supported by the application of the ROCIPI research 
programme to the Zambian parastatals, which shows that the failure of parastatals in 
Zambia reflected not the simple character of ownership but rather the complex 
interaction between national policy, economic realities and management intent, 
according to Makgetla (1994:123). The strong impact of factors additional to ownership 
on the poor economic performance of the ZCCM, from the 1980s onward and especially 
in the 1990s, also vindicates the argument of Cook and Kirkpatrick (2004:211) that a 
complex of other factors besides ownership also influenced efficiency. 
 
The influence of different ownership on copper production 
 
The production levels of copper and factors influencing these are examined below to 
test the argument that privatisation would result in lower output levels, since the 
government no longer subsidises firms to maintain output levels also at inefficiently 
high levels, according to Boycho et al. (1993, cited in Boubakri et al., 1999:20). The 
testing of public interest theory that output increases under government ownership, due 
to economic welfare-maximising objectives of the government (by maximising the 
output level of the firm at a socially optimal level, within a given cost structure) that has 
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relevance in the utility sectors has limitations in the resource sector. This is because the 
price of copper is determined on the international market and the consumers of copper 
are almost exclusively foreign. Moreover, the impact of other factors apart from 
ownership on copper production obscures discernible trends in the relationship between 
ownership and production levels of copper. The discussion on the influence of different 
ownership on copper production is therefore tentative, meriting more in-depth research 
outside the scope of the study.  
 
Notwithstanding the impact of various additional factors on the output levels of copper, 
ownership still seems to play some role, although a rather complex one, in influencing 
production levels. Figure 4.18 shows that during Kaunda’s rule, the production levels of 
copper increased considerably in the 1960s, reaching a peak of 747 500 tons in 1969 
when the government took over majority ownership of the mines, from 680 000 tons in 
1965. The production levels continued to be high in the 1970s as well. High copper 
prices were mostly responsible for the large increases in production levels in the 1960s. 
Under state ownership of the mines, electoral-maximising motives such as the decision 
to continue production at some loss-making mines, largely to appease the mineworkers, 
also promoted higher production levels. Figure 4.19 shows that the Kaunda government 
likely cushioned production levels in 1982 and in 1989.  
 
However, these high production levels were not sustainable under government 
ownership of the mines. A significant decline took place in copper production levels 
especially from the 1980s,370 following the adoption of IMF/World Bank policies from 
1983-87 and again from 1989-91, with an increasing decline taking place in the 1990s 
under Chiluba’s government (World Bank, 2002b:9, 2003b:134). The contraction of 
copper production in Zambia was particularly severe in the latter part of the 1990s and 
in 2000 under private ownership of the mines. Subsequently, production levels 
increased again under private ownership of the mines. 
 
Certain omissions under government ownership of the mines that diminished the role of 
                                                 
370
    Despite the growth of copper production at a rate of 7.6% p.a. from 1985-90. 
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mining as a long-term source of revenue undermined the sustainability of high 
production levels. These included insufficient regard for improving the performance of 
the mining sector and for saving a portion of their returns. The savings of some of the 
returns would have lowered to some extent the negative consequences of low copper 
prices on the performance of the mining sector. Furthermore, in particular during 
Chiluba’s government in the 1990s, the lack of resources that limited reinvestment in 
the mining sector and the increasing costs of production obstructed higher production 
levels. The lack of adequate resources for reinvestment also largely accounted for the 
weaker response in output to higher copper prices during Chiluba’s government, 
compared to under Kaunda’s government and under private ownership of the mines 
during the boom (Figure 4.19 and 4.20), elaborated upon in Section 4.4.18 of Chapter 4.  
 
While the government would for political reasons be less inclined under government 
ownership to significantly reduce production levels, to protect the workforce, under 
private ownership of the mines, certain x-efficiency and profit-maximising objectives of 
companies might, at times, constrain higher production. The private sector’s preference 
for profit-maximisation over higher employment levels would also likely result into 
production levels becoming more responsive to declines in copper prices under private 
ownership of the mines. For instance, in the short run, the temporary closures of the 
mines371 that were more dominant under private ownership and the withdrawal of some 
mining TNCs372 from Zambia to cut costs or promote profit-maximising motives 
considerably influenced reductions in the production levels of copper in 2000.  
 
The production of copper reached its lowest levels since the 1950s under private 
ownership of the mines at the end of 2000, at 257 000 tons (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2002:40; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2000:60; Pretoria 
News, 2004:21). The low copper prices in the late 1990s and in the 2000s though also 
influenced the poor production levels at the time. However, after the dip in the copper 
price in 2000, copper output increased from 298 000 tons in 2001 to 409 500 tons in 
2004 and to 497 169 tons in 2006. 
                                                 
371
    Such as the temporary halting of production at the Chibuluma mines, in September 2001 and the closure of the Nkana smelter. 
372
    As was the case with Anglo American. 
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The record high international copper prices from 2004 to 2006, together with higher 
investments or rehabilitation of the mines, undertaken in 2004 significantly influenced 
the notable increases in copper output in Zambia during these years (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:4, 30; 2008b:19, 25, 30, 34; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:1, 19). 
Also, although the production figures in 2004 and 2005 were higher than those achieved 
just prior to the privatisation of the ZCCM these levels were not unusually high in the 
history of copper mining in Zambia (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:19). Copper production 
levels at 445 600 tons in 2005 were only slightly above the 421 500 tons attained in 
1990, and were lower than the 1989 level of 448 400 tons. 
 
Nonetheless, the greater resources of private mining TNCs, in particular their much 
needed capital and technology contributions into the mines373 (elaborated upon in 
Section 6.1.2 of Chapter 6 and Table A9 in Annexure) might increase production levels. 
The higher capital and technology stock would also promote greater sustainability of the 
mining sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:7). On the flipside, Section 6.1.2 
of Chapter 6 assesses briefly the likelihood that improved company performance under 
private ownership may also raise the necessary revenue to enable greater technological 
investment in the mines.  
 
As is observed above, production levels of copper were also significantly influenced by 
factors other than ownership, in particular the price of copper and cobalt. Moreover, the 
high costs of Zambia’s copper industry, beyond those of most global competitors, 
together with decades of underinvestment and an ageing infrastructure, render the 
prospects of Zambia’s copper industry highly dependent upon the future price of copper 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:30, 34). The near closure of depleted mines 
such as the Nchanga open pit at the end of its life cycle and the increasing substitution 
of copper by fibre optics that is taking place in recent years would also lower production 
levels of copper, independent of ownership. 
 
                                                 
373
    That would enable mining TNCs in the longer term to open new mines, to recapitalise and to expand existing mining entities 
that would make deeper mining possible, and improve company performance. 
  
196
Further factors irrespective of ownership that affected copper production levels, 
extracted from Section 4.4.17 of Chapter 4, were:  
• The opening of new sources  
• Increased costs caused by poorer quality ores and more expensive methods of 
mining associated with deeper-level mining from the mid-1980s  
• The lack of capital for reinvesting in the mines (also the case with some mining 
TNCs), which was especially severe in the 1980s and the 1990s  
• Delays and difficulties experienced in obtaining imported spare parts or inputs374  
• Flooding problems in the mines375  
• Power shortages  
• The inaccessibility and inefficiency of the infrastructure supporting the mining 
sector 
• Accidents 
• A high silica content in the ores, in late-1996  
• Labour unrest (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:6, 7, 2008b:19).  
 
The influences of various factors also other than ownership on output, the positive 
impact of the unprecedented boom in the copper price376 and the short span within 
which the private companies operate the mines precluded definitive conclusions as to 
the impact of private ownership on production levels377 within the confines of the study. 
The determination of output performance based on the short-term performance 
improvements may therefore suffer from a demonstration effect, providing a misleading 
indication of performance under private ownership of the mines. It is though noted 
above that at times of weak copper prices and poor performance the possible closures of 
mines, more likely under private ownership than under state ownership, owing to the 
electoral maximising motives of the state that do not favour closures, would likely 
suppress rather than promote production levels. 
                                                 
374
    Especially the shortages of heavy fuel oil (HFO) and of low matte grade concentrates and of acid, under both private and 
government ownership of the mines, mainly in the 1990s, which resulted in unscheduled shutdowns, particularly at the Mufulira 
smelters in 1999. 
375
    The Zambian mines are some of the wettest in the world. 
376
    Eliciting a high supply elasticity in the volume of copper output. 
377
    And on the supply elasticity of copper (or the responsiveness of the volume of output to price). 
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In summary, the above discussion shows that private mining companies were more 
successful in achieving greater productivity of workers and x-efficiency than was the 
case under government ownership of the mines. While the redistribution of mining 
surpluses to develop other sectors, for electoral-maximising motives, under government 
ownership promoted greater development of the Zambian economy, these activities 
were unsustainable at times of low copper prices and had a negative impact on growth 
in the mining sector. Moreover, these objectives of the government curtailed greater 
reductions in the costs of production or x-efficiency. However, the influences also of 
factors independent of ownership on mining performance, confounded a clear 
determination of the extent of the influence of multiple and electoral-maximising 
objectives of the government in reducing mining performance. Not only the reductions 
in labour costs that the private companies mostly tended to target but all the factors that 
impinged on the performance of the mining sector required to be addressed for 
achieving greater x-efficiency and better performance in the mining sector.  
 
Furthermore, it can be concluded from the above discussion that in instances of high 
copper prices, the electoral-maximising motives of the state to maintain high 
employment levels of mineworkers favoured higher production levels during Kaunda’s 
government. At times the government cushioned higher production levels even when 
the price of copper dropped. However, the government was unable to sustain such high 
production levels in the longer run, especially when the copper prices fell and when it 
lacked adequate capital.  
 
Inadequate measures to increase the growth of mining companies through higher 
productivity, greater x-efficiency and reinvestment into the mining sector and to 
encourage the savings of a portion of mining surpluses, undermined the sustainability of 
higher production levels under government ownership. Growth and savings are 
therefore crucial for enabling the government to better manage the influences of other 
negative factors on the mining sector and for promoting greater sustainability of high 
production levels of mining, in the long term. Meaningful conclusions also cannot be 
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drawn as to the relation between private ownership and production levels mainly 
because of the highly significant influence of the copper price boom in improving 
production levels and due to the short time that mining TNCs operate in Zambia. 
 
5.4.1.2 Organisational weaknesses 
 
The argument that greater organisational weaknesses also promote poor performance of 
SOEs is considered in the context of the more bureaucratic decision-making under 
government ownership, the political influence of the government in the operations of 
the mining companies and of the Zambianisation policies that the government adopted 
under government ownership of the mines.  
 
• Bureaucratic decision-making 
 
A bureaucratic decision-making approach and the lack of autonomy necessitating 
referral to a committee for each decision made at the ZCCM,378 lowered productivity 
and efficiency under government ownership of the mines.379 Poor collaboration and 
diverse and the often competing views of the Finance Ministry380 and the National 
Commission for Development Planning (NCDP)381 further stifled quick decision-
making. Government interference, especially in aspects of marketing, sales, production, 
and finances and in the production targets of the ZCCM, decided at the corporate Head 
Office, also limited management autonomy.382 In contrast, the greater autonomy of 
managers under private ownership led to swifter, more efficient decision-making. The 
bureaucratic decision-making under state ownership of the mines supports the pro-
privatisation theorists’ argument that SOEs lack management autonomy, contributing to 
greater organisational weaknesses in SOEs.  
 
• Political influence in the operations of mining companies 
 
Political influences motivated by electoral-maximising objectives that took precedence 
over profit-maximising motives in the operations of the mining sector under 
                                                 
378
    Interview with Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003. 
379
    Interview with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003.  
380
    Responsible for the current budget and the government’s cash positions. 
381
    Whose mandate was to manage the capital budget and the body was concerned with promoting planned targets, financed 
largely by overseas and external borrowing. 
382
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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government ownership and management have also hindered profit-based performance. 
Political influence however was deemed necessary on account of the strategic 
importance of the mining sector. The government was able to promote political interests 
in the mining sector through the dual position of the Chairman and Chief Executive of 
the copper mines, a political appointee,383, 384 and his role as Chairman of the company’s 
board. The political agendas under government majority ownership of the mines limited  
the influence of the private sector. The more than two-thirds government control of the 
board of the copper mining company385 further increased the influence of the 
government over that of the private sector members on the board.  
 
• The influence of Zambianisation policies 
 
Furthermore, in the short term weaknesses in the Zambianisation policies (that the 
government introduced) also lowered productivity. The Zambianisation policies 
favoured indigenous Zambians over expatriates, while mining TNCs generally tend to 
employ expatriates over locals in management positions under private ownership 
(elaborated upon in Section 6.3.3.2 of Chapter 6). Expatriate employment levels in the 
copper industry declined from 16% in 1964 to 10% in 1971 and to 3.5% in 1983.  
 
In the initial stages, the Zambianisation policies contributed to inefficiencies in the 
mining sector due to reduced know-how as the inexperienced indigenous Zambian 
labour force replaced the experienced expatriate staff, which increased production 
costs.386 In the absence of an educated and trained Zambian workforce, expatriate skills 
were crucial. Moreover, skilled jobs became fragmented with less clear-cut 
responsibilities under government ownership (Economic Development Institute of the 
World Bank, 1989:19; English, cited in Wohlmuth and Messner, 1996:429). However, 
the ‘fragmentation’ was also because of expatriates deliberately creating alternative 
vacancies for Zambians in order to retain their own positions. The Zambianisation 
policies also affected a rise in the supervisory positions from 1 598 in 1982 to 2 268 in 
                                                 
383
    Interviews with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 
2003; Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003 and Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
384
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003. 
385
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
386
    Interview with Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
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1993, increasing the superior/subordinate ratio from 1:35 in 1982 to an all-time high of 
1:16 in 1993 (Kapika et al., 1996:3).  
 
However, it is erroneous to blame Zambianisation policies for the inefficiencies that 
occurred at a later stage. As is noted in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4, rather than 
contributing to a decline in productivity over the medium to long term, the extremely 
effective training provided to indigenous Zambians to speed up the Zambianisation 
policies promoted high competency of Zambian managers. These training policies were 
also responsible for the commendable and successful development of a highly skilled 
labour force, especially in the mining sector. The training enabled a merit-based 
selection of Zambian managers387 at the operational level, taking into account their 
competence, skills, qualifications, and mining experience.388 The extension to Zambians 
of benefits which had been reserved for expatriate personnel before the state’s takeover 
of the mines (refer to Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4) and the greater economic control that 
Zambian employees gained in mining as a result of Zambianisation policies, served as 
an important means to improve performance of Zambian managers under government 
ownership.389  
 
5.4.1.3 The monitoring and control of managers 
 
Property rights theorists, who place greater emphasis on the principal-agent relationship 
than on ownership, consider better incentives provided to private management as an 
important incentive for improving company performance. The importance of incentives 
in improving company performance has led several theorists to conclude that adequate 
incentives to managers would improve company performance irrespective of ownership. 
The takeover constraint is considered as a further important mechanism to encourage 
managers to pursue profit-maximising motives, according to pro-privatisation 
proponents. The discussion below examines whether better incentives were provided to 
                                                 
387
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; John Lungu, 12 November 2003; 
Andrew Sardanis, 12 November 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and 
Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003. 
388
    Those that benefited from scholarship programmes were employed mainly at the operating levels, rather than at the executive 
decision-making levels (interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003). 
389
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Wilphred Katoto, 12 
November 2003 and Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003. 
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managers under private ownership of the mines, the influences of better incentives 
through private management of the mines while under government ownership between 
1970 and 1973, and the role of the possibility to takeover a company under private 
ownership in promoting improved company performance. 
 
Under government ownership and management control of the mines, much like under 
private ownership and management, the board of the company (made up of both the 
government and the private sector, comprising of the Anglo American directors and/or 
other minority shareholders),390 monitored and controlled managers. However, the high 
priority placed on promoting political interests and electoral-optimising objectives in 
the government-dominated board redirected the managers’ objectives away from greater 
profit-maximising. Moreover, the government’s reluctance to replace managers who did 
not make a profit further promoted inefficiencies.391 Poor incentives to managers in the 
late 1980s, reflected in reductions in real wages of senior officials to 51% of the 1967 
levels, also served as a disincentive for attracting more skilled employees (Economic 
Development Institute of the World Bank, 1989:16, 18, 19).  
 
In contrast, vastly superior incentives were provided to managers under private 
ownership, which pro-privatisation proponents argue encourage them to pursue the 
profit-maximising objectives of their principals, namely their shareholders. The 
incentives provided to private managers include better social benefits and salaries that 
are predominantly dollar-based,392 monetary share options393 and bonus schemes394 (also 
based on performance appraisals,395 whereby managers receive a certain percentage of 
the profit over a target rate in their area of operation). A contractual managerial 
employment approach at Mopani (for a two-year duration) and at Bwana Mkubwa (on 
an open-ended basis), adjusted annually depending on the performance of managers, 
                                                 
390
    Interviews with Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003 and Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 
October 2003. 
391
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, December 2003. 
392
    At Mopani (interview with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003). 
393
    At First Quantum (interview with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003). 
394
    At AVMIN (managers, however, failed to enjoy this benefit since the company was largely making losses). 
395
    At Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC). Performance appraisal incentives in the form of cash bonuses provided to both 
managers and workers at CEC are established through managers together with all the workers in their division both setting and 
trying to achieve certain targets set by the companies and themselves, which encouraged teamwork (interview with Gary Loop, 29 
October 2003).  
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represents a further incentive to encourage improved manager performance.396  
 
Under private ownership of the mines, the listed companies seemingly boast superior 
measures for monitoring and controlling manager behaviour over non-listed companies. 
Alongside normal internal controls through their board of directors, listed companies 
are also subject to international standards of controls also through their foreign 
shareholders. In addition to the requirement of sound finances and profitability, the 
international controls subject these companies to audits and the scrutiny of bankers, who 
demand good social and environmental policies before extending loans to companies.397 
The company code of conduct, the disciplinary code and various other firm-specific 
measures, determined through the board of the company, impose further controls on 
manager behaviour. 
 
On the other hand, between 1970 and 1973 private management by expatriate managers 
under minority TNCs’ shareholding (then 49%) and 51% government ownership of the 
copper mines in Zambia did not represent an important incentive for improving 
company performance. On the contrary, certain strategies of the expatriate managers 
undermined greater improvements in the performance of the local mining companies. 
The stronger motivation of expatriate managers to improve the income of the 
shareholders of the mining TNCs over those of the local mining companies reduced 
gains for Zambia from mining surpluses and dampened better performance of the 
Zambian mines between 1970 and 1973 (refer to Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4).  
 
The higher income for parent companies of mining TNCs was orchestrated firstly 
through strategies of managers to manipulate the profits of the mining companies, 
predominantly through transfer-pricing policies and by way of inflated service fees 
(management, consulting and marketing privileges) that the parent companies enjoyed. 
The exclusive rights granted to the parent companies in the provision of these services 
enabled the high fees that artificially increased the cost of local production. Secondly, 
the mining TNCs repatriated a large portion of their share of profits to their parent 
                                                 
396
    Interviews with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003 and Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003. 
397
    Interview with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003. 
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companies (which supplemented their income) or as dividends to their foreign 
shareholders instead of using it for reinvestment in the mining sector. The dampening of 
the growth in performance of the copper mines as a result of these practices contrasts 
with the successes of corporatisation and commercialisation in improving company 
performance in New Zealand and Poland. 
 
The lack of appropriate government policies and oversight to provide for the 
development needs of the country, especially in respect of allowing mining companies 
to repatriate profits out of Zambia and in curbing transfer-pricing policies, also assisted 
the externalisation of profits from mining. The preferential treatment granted to mining 
TNCs to automatically externalise non-taxable profits, dividends, management fees and 
income from the sales of copper, facilitated the repatriation of profits (Sardanis, 
2003:268, 269; Saasa, 1987:40; Turok, 1989:47). Accordingly, private management per 
se is not a sufficient condition for better company performance and may, in fact, 
contribute to further declines in performance, through transfer-pricing practices. Better 
company performance under foreign private management of the mines also required 
effective government control to curb against both transfer pricing practices and the 
extent of the externalisation of mining profits out of Zambia. 
 
Moreover, contrary to the argument of neo-classical theorists that the possibility of a 
takeover acts as an effective constraint against poor performance of private companies, 
the takeover constraint did not represent an effective deterrent against poor performance 
in the newly privatised mining sector. For example, despite the superior incentives and 
controls of managers of private companies, RAMCOZ performed poorly (discussed in 
Section 6.1.3 of Chapter 6). However, it could be argued that the alleged corrupt 
relation that RAMCOZ had with the Chiluba government afforded the company leeway 
for engaging in these activities, without effective retribution.398 
 
Furthermore, the poor performance of RAMCOZ under private ownership did not, as is 
argued by pro-privatisation proponents, result in a smooth takeover but imposed a huge 
                                                 
398
    Interview with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003. 
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cost on the Zambian economy. This was mainly due to the delays and difficulties that 
the government experienced in getting new private sector interests to take over 
Luanshya/Baluba.399 The finalising of the deal with J and W in the acquisition of both 
RAMCOZ and Chambishi Metals plc for an undisclosed sum was slow, with J and W 
taking over control of Chambishi Metals only in 2004, despite having signed a 
memorandum of understanding on 9 April 2003 (Africa Analysis, 2003c:3; Africa 
Mining Intelligence, 2003c:2, 2003d:1; Africa Research Bulletin, 2003b:15600). Also, 
Vedanta took over KCM only two years after the departure of Anglo American from 
Zambia in 2002. The delay in the private sector takeover of especially RAMCOZ had 
far-reaching adverse social consequences, discussed in Section 6.1.3 of Chapter 6 
(CCDJP, 2002a:4; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:40).  
 
The failure to achieve a smooth and quick takeover indicates a weakness in the neo-
classical argument that a takeover constraint acts as an effective deterrent or a discipline 
against poor management performance under private ownership. Rather, the case of 
RAMCOZ supports the view of Cook and Kirkpatrick (2000a:210-211) that the 
takeover constraint does not act as an effective deterrent against poor manager 
performance. It also vindicates the argument that the takeover constraint is ineffective in 
developing countries (partly because of uncompetitive capital markets in these 
countries), according to Vickers and Yarrow (1988:24). 
 
5.4.2 Socio-economic effects of cost-cutting or profit-maximisation objectives of 
private companies 
 
In the absence of a greater redistribution of benefits from improved performance of 
mining companies, several cost-cutting (or x-efficiency) and profit-maximising 
measures that the private mining companies adopted, whilst enhancing company 
performance, had adverse socio-economic development consequences for Zambia. The 
following discussion examines the socio-economic and development consequences of 
the dominant cost-reduction and profit-maximisation objectives of private mining 
companies.  
                                                 
399
    Interview with Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003. 
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The main methods by which mining TNCs reduced their production costs were through: 
(i) concessions; (ii) reductions in the labour force and a lowering of their conditions of 
employment; (iii) shifting some responsibilities for the payments of retrenchment and 
pension packages, as well as for the provision of social services and for the treatment of 
some pollution, onto the government; (iv) temporary closures and withdrawals of 
mining companies; (v) supporting foreign suppliers over local suppliers; and (vi) a 
depreciation of the kwacha. Each method is now discussed in greater detail. 
 
• Concessions 
 
The concessions granted to private mining TNCs (elaborated upon in Section 6.2.2 of 
Chapter 6), greatly reduced the production costs of the mining TNCs. However, the 
concessions had a highly negative impact on government tax revenue and subsequently 
on the development of Zambia (Section 6.3.1 of Chapter 6). The concessions amounted 
to a government’s subsidisation of the private mining TNCs.  
 
• Reductions in the labour force and a lowering of conditions of employment 
 
In addition to the concessions, the layoffs of many mineworkers, including highly 
skilled employees,400 to improve worker productivity and reduce the total expenditure of 
their wage bills401 represented a further main strategy that private mining companies 
employed to reduce their production costs (World Bank, 2002b:19; ZPA, 2002:3).402 
However, it is noted from Section 4.4.6 of Chapter 4 that the significant numbers of 
retrenchments in the mining sector were already instituted under government ownership 
during Chiluba’s rule, in the transition period that led towards the privatisation of the 
mines. Figure 4.7 of Chapter 4 shows that about 14 400 mining employees lost their 
jobs at the ZCCM between 1992403 and 1996 before the mines were even privatised 
(from 62 100 to 47 700). However, these retrenchments were spurred largely by fiscal 
pressure that SAPs imposed on the government to cut government expenditure at the 
                                                 
400
    Interview with Norman Mbazima, 18 December 2001. 
401
    Interview with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003. 
402
    Interviews with Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; Jack Jones, 22 October 2003 and Silane 
Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
403
    Sources other than the CSO, though, show less significant increases in the employment levels in the early 1980s and a lesser 
decline in mining employment from 1993. 
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ZCCM404 and partly in preparation for the privatisation of the mines (Catholic 
Secretariat, 2001:17; ZPA, 2002:3).  
 
In the light of the poor and highly volatile copper prices in the late 1990s, these 
adjustments to reduce labour might have been necessary to improve the poor 
performance of the copper companies. A weighing of the real adjustments required to 
optimise the performance of the mining companies and of false efficiencies (a topic 
outside the scope of this study), would provide a more accurate portrayal as to whether 
these adjustments benefited or imposed a higher cost on the country as a whole. In the 
case of false efficiencies, the overall and social costs to the economy as a result of the 
huge job losses would beyond a certain threshold outweigh the benefits of improved 
company performance to the Zambian economy.  
 
At the commencement of the privatisation of the mines, a further 8 540 mining 
employees lost their jobs between 1996 and 1998 under a government-World Bank 
programme that the private companies made conditional on the sale of the mines, and 
another 639 employees lost their jobs in 1999 (Afronet et al., 2001:18, 34; ZPA, 
2000b:16; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:21). Moreover, from 1998 to 2002 a staggering 
20 160 mineworkers lost their jobs under private ownership, with permanent 
employment in the mining sector falling respectively from 39 160 to only 19 000. By 
September 2006, at the peak of the high copper prices, permanent employment in the 
mines rose only slightly to 21 000, still lower than the 2000 figure of 22 000 and much 
lower than the permanent employment level of 38 521 workers in 1999. Accordingly, 
the expectation that the private mining companies would substantially increase 
permanent employment opportunities for workers is unlikely to materialise, since much 
of the retrenchments occurred precisely as a result of mining TNCs downsizing their 
operations.405  
 
Increases in the employment of foreign contractors for much of the work previously 
                                                 
404
    Interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
405
    Interview with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
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done by the mining companies themselves,406 the shifting of many workers onto rolling, 
fixed-term contracts407 and an increasing casualisation of the workforce further lowered 
the labour costs of private mining companies. In 2006, the total mining sector labour 
force consisted mainly of external contract workers (41%), fixed-term workers (5%) 
and casual workers (1%). In 2006, permanent employment made up only 53% of the 
total mining sector labour force in Zambia (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:22, 24). 
 
The rise in the total employment levels in the mining companies in more recent years 
was mainly attributable to the phenomenal increases in employment in external contract 
firms. In 2006, the mining companies indirectly employed about 16 000 workers via 
contracting firms (that increased from 2 628 in 2000 to 11 536 in 2004) and at least 
1 900 workers on either fixed-term contracts, varying in duration from one to 5 years, or 
as seasonal/casual labour (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:22, 49). While just over half of the 
workforce of most of the major mining companies consists of permanent workers, Non-
Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA) and Bwana Mkubwa employed more contract 
workers than permanent workers in 2006.  
 
Of the 1 019 employees directly employed by NFCA in 2006, only 232 workers made 
up the permanent workforce; 687 employees were employed on a fixed-term basis and a 
further 100 workers were employed as casual workers. Accordingly, the permanent 
workforce comprised of only 29.7% of the employees directly employed at NFCA and 
made up only 10.5% of the total workforce of 2 200 workers directly and indirectly 
employed at NFCA. The two Chinese subcontracting firms that indirectly performed 
extensive work for NFCA employed 1 093 workers in 2006 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:49). 
Also, in 2003, Bwana Mkubwa employed between 300 and 400 subcontracted workers 
on site, while the permanent workforce consisted of only about 200 Zambians.408 The 
contract firms in the mining sector continue to make extensive use of fixed-term 
contracts, hiring many ex-miners to do the same jobs at the same site where they had 
                                                 
406
    Interview with Agnes Bwalya, 9 November 2003. 
407
    Interview with David Chilipamushi, 17 December 2001. 
408
    During that time, an additional 200 to 250 Zambians were employed on a subcontracting basis to haul ore from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (interview with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003). 
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previously worked, but on non-permanent contracts (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:22).409  
 
Whereas permanent workers are entitled to pensions and union representation and enjoy 
wages above poverty levels,410 external contract workers and fixed-term workers 
continue to experience substantially less beneficial terms and conditions of work. 
However, the wages of permanent workers have also not increased in line with the 
improved performance of the mining sector. The wages of permanent workers at NFCA 
were the lowest of all the mining houses in Zambia.411 To date, the full-time contract 
workers are also exposed to less favourable conditions of employment than their 
counterparts in the mining houses (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:48).412 
 
Most significantly, in 2006 the wages of non-permanent workers were in some instances 
just 10% of those offered to permanent workers, for the same work at the same mine. 
Moreover, they are still not entitled to pension benefits (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:22, 23, 
45, 48, 49; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:21).413 The non-permanent workers 
are further deprived of the benefits such as union representation and access to medical 
insurance or free treatment for their dependants and other fringe benefits, including 
patient cover and housing,414 which most permanent workers enjoy (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:3, 20, 22, 23, 53). Additionally, mining companies neglected to take responsibility 
for the conditions of work of workers in subcontracting companies (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:25).  
 
Limitations placed on the unionisation of workers415 and the ability of the mining 
companies to dismiss non-unionised workers without paying them severance 
                                                 
409
    For instance, in 2006, the permanent workforce at Mpelembe Drilling comprised of around 600-800 workers, while over 1 000 
employees were employed on fixed short-term contracts (MUZ, cited in Fraser & Lungu, 2007:23). 
410
    Established by the Basic Needs Basket (BNB). The figure is derived from the cost of basic food items and non-food items, such 
as charcoal and soap, and the costs of housing, water, electricity, education, health and transport to work, for an average Zambian 
family of six (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:23). 
411
    Earning just above the costs of the Basic Food Basket (BFB), a figure that covers food items alone. 
412
    In particular at BGRIMM Explosives, Sino-Metals and a number of other contractors that NFCA employ in the 'Chambishi 
Investment Zone. 
413
    The wages of many casual or contract workers that are directly employed at NFCA comprised of merely 10% of the Basic 
Need Basket in 2006, significantly below the legal minimum wage (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:49). 
414
    However, they are given a housing allowance (Fraser & Lungu, 2007: 22). 
415
    Achieved mainly through the massive reduction in the permanent workforce in mining and by degrading the power of unions 
representing the mineworkers, through the practice of these companies to dismiss the 'shadow committee' of employees (required to 
be formed for union recognition), which forces the MUZ, once they have identified a shadow committee, to organise clandestinely. 
  
209
allowances, and difficulties experienced in organising collective action416 have further 
lowered the conditions of employment of workers. These limitations also diminished 
the power of the unions to demand better working conditions for mineworkers (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:24, 25, 26, 52). Also, cost-reduction objectives of private mining 
companies that encourage the employment of temporary or casual workers in the 
underground mines, especially at NFCA, have degraded safety considerations (that were 
pivotal under government ownership).  
 
Poorer safety considerations possibly account, alongside the failure of the formal 
regulatory bodies to implement safer working conditions, for the increases in 
accidents417 at some of the mining companies under private ownership (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:49).418 Moreover, under private ownership the huge unemployment of 
mineworkers and a lowering of their conditions of work to reduce costs eroded job 
security and created, for the first time, a category of 'working poor' amongst 
mineworkers and compounded increases in poverty levels (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:3, 
10).  
 
• Shifting responsibilities of retrenchment and pension packages onto the government 
 
The cost-reduction strategy of some private mining companies of shifting the 
responsibility for the retrenchment and pension packages of the mineworkers onto the 
government, as a pre-condition before finalising the sales of the mines, was at a huge 
cost to the national economy (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:21, 22). This was especially the 
case in the context of the high external debt of the Zambian government. The 
government paid the retrenchment packages of those workers that were retrenched 
before the mines were privatised largely through a World Bank loan, taken out 
                                                 
416
    Owing to the non-obligatory nature of the right to recognise trade unions, difficulties experienced in organising workers 
employed in subcontracting firms and cumbersome requirements before a strike can occur. These requirements include an 
agreement by both parties on the next course of action; a 10 day waiting period subsequent to the unions securing a 2/3 majority 
from the workers before workers are allowed to strike; and the possibility that the Minister could stop the strike during this time, 
through the courts, if deemed against the interests of the public. 
417
   In 2005, 78 fatalities occurred as a result of mining accidents that were largely attributable to the explosion at the BGRIMM 
plant that killed 52 Zambian workers, the single biggest disaster in the history of Zambian mining (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:24, 26, 
28). 
418
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, December 2003. 
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specifically for this purpose.419, 420 All the retrenched workers had received their 
retrenchment packages by the end of 2003.421  
 
However, mainly as a result of the tight budget constraints of the government, 
thousands of former workers of the ZCCM had not been paid their pensions by 2006 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007:3). Furthermore, the policy of the mining companies of 
subtracting personal and holder vehicles and loans and the costs of houses previously 
owned by the ZCCM but sold to their former employees, from their retrenchment 
packages and the deduction of the houses from their pension packages as well greatly 
reduced the retrenchment and pension packages of former employees (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:30, 51). In addition, some mining companies, such as Metorex, paid only part of 
the pensions of their workers, calculated from the time they took over their respective 
mines, while the government had to pay the rest (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:5, 31). 
Moreover, delays by mining companies that privatised earlier, such as RAMCOZ and 
NFCA, in paying the retrenchment and pension packages of laid-off workers,422 brought 
about severe financial difficulties for the affected former employees of the ZCCM 
(Lungu, 2001:6).  
 
Accordingly, the safety nets provided to those left unemployed were absent or highly 
inadequate in dealing with the difficulties that the mining community faced subsequent 
to the liberalisation of the economy and the privatisation of the ZCCM. Moreover, 
transferring the obligation for the payment of some of the retrenchment packages and of 
the pensions of those mineworkers that were retrenched to the government contributed 
considerably to the zero net gains of the Zambian government from the proceeds from 
the privatisation of the mines (UNDP, 2001:33). On the contrary, these practices, 
together with measures forcing the government to treat the pollution of some mining 
companies, exacerbated the debt of the Zambian government. 
 
                                                 
419
    Interviews with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003 and Danny Kalyalya, 31 
October 2003. 
420
    The World Bank also provided a loan to address environmental issues in the mining sector (interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 
October 2003). 
421
    BoZ, questionnaire, 3 December 2003. 
422
    AVMIN paid the severance packages of workers immediately after takeover. 
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• Reducing responsibilities in the provision of social services 
 
Under private ownership, profit-maximising motives encouraged the mining companies 
to focus on their core activities and to refuse taking over the responsibility for non-core 
activities such as the control and provision of social amenities that the ZCCM 
previously provided.423 These measures considerably degraded the provision of these 
services to the mining community.424 A failure to specify all the services that were 
provided by the ZCCM in the development agreements and to transfer the responsibility 
for these services to the private companies also contributed significantly to the lack of 
social responsibility of the mining companies (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:16, 17). 
 
Higher healthcare fees and a decline in their standards under private ownership of the 
mines, and the closure of a number of the mine hospitals and clinics previously 
managed by the mines, reduced access to healthcare for the wider mining community, 
including the retrenched ZCCM mineworkers and their families. Before the 
privatisation of the mines, the mining community enjoyed easy access to these facilities. 
Under private ownership of the mines, these services were transferred to the 
government sector425 or to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that lacked the 
budgets necessary for adequately maintaining many of these services (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:40, 50).426 The most significant deterioration of health services was brought about 
by the dramatic collapse in preventative services, following the closing down of the 
public health departments by many of the successor mining companies (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:41).427 
 
Passing the responsibility for the upkeep of mining townships (that before privatisation 
was 75% funded by the ZCCM) from the mining companies to the ill-resourced local 
                                                 
423
    Anglo American refused to take over some of the schools and hospitals previously run by the ZCCM and Metorex disposed of 
the school it took over when the company performed poorly. 
424
    Interviews with Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003 and Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
425
    Via the District Health Management Boards (DHMBs).  
426
    For instance, all three clinics in Kalulushi Township that the Chibuluma Mines handed over to DHMBs were forced to close 
down (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:40). 
427
    On the other hand, except for NFCA that denies healthcare to all dependants of mineworkers, access to curative healthcare for 
permanent pensioned workers and their dependants in the ZCCM successor companies remained unchanged and, in most cases, is 
guaranteed in the development agreements (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:40, 50). However, while all workers that retired on medical 
grounds were given free medical support for life under government ownership of the ZCCM, under private ownership, those retired 
from the company would receive free access merely for 5 years and those made redundant were to receive 50% of their medical care 
only for one year (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:40). 
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municipal authorities, further degraded social services in Zambia. The private company 
now running the system is struggling to collect user fees leading to frequent suspensions 
in the provision of these services (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:36, 51). The introduction of 
user fees for the use of social amenities, subsequent to the separation of social and 
commercial amenities of the ZCCM during the privatisation process, alongside the 
removal of the subsidies that accompanied the economic stabilisation measures, also 
eroded the household income of the mining community. The mining community 
enjoyed these amenities free of charge before the ZCCM was privatised.428  
 
The degrading of social services, alongside the huge retrenchments of mineworkers 
under private ownership of the mines, have added significantly to the huge reductions in 
Zambia’s HDI and the enormous increases in poverty levels, despite the recovery of the 
mining industry, in more recent years. Section 4.4.5 of Chapter 4 shows that poverty 
levels increased from about 69.7% in 1991 under the Kaunda government to 73% in 
1998 during the privatisation of the mines and when some of the mines were already 
under private ownership. These levels are even higher in rural areas (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008a:8). The high poverty levels under private ownership of the 
mines are also mirrored in the fall in Zambia's HDI by 0.17% annually between 1990 
and 2007 from 0.495 to 0.481 (UNDP, 2009). However, Zambia’s HDI dropped to its 
lowest level in 2000, after which it increased only marginally, despite the boom in 
copper prices from 2004 to 2006. 
 
• Shifting responsibilities for the treatment of pollution to the government  
 
The cost-reduction measure under private ownership that involved shifting some of the 
responsibilities for the treatment of mining pollution to the government (or to NGOs, 
who often lack adequate resources to competently address these), increased the cost 
burden of the Zambian government. It also contributed towards higher pollution levels 
from mining (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:33). The higher pollution levels are further 
significantly attributable to the ineffective policing of transgressions of pollution levels 
by the ECZ, despite its possessing the right to prosecute management or directors in 
                                                 
428
    Interview with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
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their individual capacity, if upon investigation they have been found negligent in 
limiting or preventing pollution (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:37, 38).  
 
• Temporary closures and withdrawals  
 
Withdrawals of private mining companies from mining operations in Zambia to reduce 
losses or to maximise profits might potentially have a devastating impact on the 
development of the Zambian economy, manifesting the risks involved in the 
development of the host country when strategic assets are owned by foreign private 
companies (Africa Confidential, 2006:4). Additionally, the placement of RAMCOZ 
under receivership led to the unemployment of many miners and was at a huge cost to 
the government (elaborated upon in Section 6.1.3 of Chapter 6). Profit-maximisation 
measures that prompted some of the companies to suspend their operations also had a 
negative impact on employment and on production.  
 
Metorex for example moved forward the development of the Chibuluma South mine 
and put on hold open-cast mining429 and the processing of copper at their concentrator, 
in the latter part of 2001430 and suspended its operations in March 2002 (Regulatory 
News Service, 2001; Times of Zambia, 2002, cited in Craig, 2002:365, 368).431 Anglo 
American also deferred the development of Konkola Deep to cut its losses, before it 
withdrew from Zambia (Mining Journal, 2001, cited in Craig, 2002:365). 
Notwithstanding that the suspension of operations in the mines and the withdrawals 
from non-profitable operations prevalent under private ownership of the mines, might 
have been economically justified to reduce losses, such measures had an adverse impact 
on investment commitments of mining TNCs and on the development of Zambia. 
 
The policy of some mining TNCs of reducing their shares in loss-making companies 
had a less negative impact on Zambia’s economy than the closures of some of the mines 
and the withdrawal by a few mining TNCs. First Quantum addressed its poor 
performance at Mopani by reducing its interests in loss-making operations at the 
                                                 
429
    To curb losses that the company experienced and following the lack of financial support. 
430
    Interview with Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003. 
431
    Until a substantial material improvement in the price of copper was to occur. 
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company, in 2003 from 44% to 16.9% (Table A5 in Annexure) while consolidating its 
capital into more profitable mining projects, such as its operations at Bwana Mkubwa, 
in which it had full ownership. Bwana Mkubwa enjoyed a profit of US$2.6 million in 
2001 (World Bank, 2003b:132; Africa Mining Intelligence, 2002c:1; Regulatory News 
Service, 2001, cited in Craig, 2002:365). The low costs of production at Bwana 
Mkubwa were largely attributable to the low extraction costs of copper at the rich 
Lonshi mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that was processed in Zambia 
(World Bank, 2003b:132). However, Bwana Mkubwa that had a short lifespan was 
recently obliged to shut down its copper processing plant, causing the retrenchment of 
365 workers (Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2009). 
 
• Support foreign suppliers 
 
A reduction in the cost of production in the mines under private ownership was 
probably also achieved through mining companies’ increasingly supporting foreign 
suppliers, claimed to be more price-competitive than Zambian suppliers (elaborated 
upon in Section 6.3.3.1 of Chapter 6). The practice of supporting foreign suppliers 
encouraged the de-industrialisation of the local industry, which has undermined the 
development of Zambia and is contrary to what was the case in developmental states. 
Under government ownership, the procurement and sales procedures of the ZCCM, 
designed to promote linkages to the local economy, albeit at a relatively small scale, 
increased the market for local suppliers to the mines and supported the few existing 
Zambian industries that supplied inputs to the mines (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:2, 10). 
However, higher procurement from local suppliers under government ownership was 
limited by the fact that the mining sector inputs comprised mainly of capital and 
intermediate goods that were largely absent in Zambia and were predominantly 
imported. 
 
• Depreciation of the kwacha 
 
The general decline in the value of the kwacha, which mining TNCs are able to 
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manipulate through their effective control over Zambia’s foreign exchange,432 has 
contributed to a drop in the production cost of private mining companies, when local 
expenditure takes place in US cents per pound terms and is largely tax-deductible as 
well (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 9). While the alleged manipulation of the foreign exchange by 
foreign private mining companies to bring about a depreciation of the kwacha, would 
benefit the foreign private sector interests, a huge devaluation of the kwacha has a 
particularly harmful impact on the Zambian suppliers. This is mainly on account of 
consequent hikes in the prices of the highly import-dependent inputs of the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
In summary, it is noted above that in the short-term several cost-cutting measures by the 
private TNCs imposed social and welfare costs on the Zambian economy and 
contributed to increases in poverty levels under private ownership.433 The concessions 
granted to TNCs led to losses in government revenue. Accordingly, an evaluation of 
company performance exclusively on x-efficiency objectives provides only a partial 
picture.  
 
A more balanced evaluation of the roles of private ownership of enterprises requires a 
weighing of the benefits of improved x-efficiency against the socio-economic costs of 
cost-cutting or profit-maximising measures on the Zambian society. The poor socio-
economic impact of x-efficiency objectives on Zambia corresponds with the argument 
of Fine and Stoneman (1996:23) that an exclusive focus on x-efficiency objectives may 
even perpetuate unequal development, largely favouring foreign TNCs, legitimised in a 
market context. Greater redistribution of benefits from better performance of private 
mining companies especially through higher taxes, foreign currency earnings and the 
development of local capacities (also through higher employment) is necessary to 
promote development (elaborated in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6). Government measures, 
including negotiation with the private sector and a stronger implementation of 
                                                 
432
    Copper and cobalt contributed about 87.1% of Zambia’s foreign exchange in 1993 that dropped to about 65.7% in 2000, at the 
time when all the mines were privatised (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:39). 
433
    In addition to among others HIV/AIDS, low economic growth and unsustainable debt servicing (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2002:28). 
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regulations to ensure that greater benefits accrue to the Zambian nation under private 
ownership of the mines, are also crucial. 
 
5.5 POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRIVATISATION 
AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE MINES AND THE IMPACT ON 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The manner in which the privatisation of the mining sector proceeded had a highly 
unfavourable outcome on the political economy of most Zambians. Section 5.2.2 shows 
that several weaknesses in the institutional and regulatory framework and in the policies 
of the MMD government influencing the privatisation process facilitated corruption 
during the privatisation of the ZCCM. The major beneficiaries of the alleged corrupt 
and untransparent practices during the privatisation process were possibly the senior 
government officials who were said to be involved in the corruption of the mining 
sector immediately before the mines were privatised. The alleged corrupt practices 
likely deprived the Zambian economy of significant revenue that it otherwise would 
have been able to obtain from the privatisation of SOEs.  
 
On the other hand, the failure to institute policies and laws that would have ensured 
more favourable outcomes for Zambians during the privatisation process and under 
private ownership of the mines, affected especially the mineworkers, the local suppliers 
and the Zambian economy in a negative fashion. In particular, omissions in the 
legislative and institutional measures to provide adequate social security and other 
safety nets to Zambian mineworkers that would have lessened the adverse consequences 
of privatisation, had a deleterious impact on the mineworkers during the privatisation 
process. The extensive retrenchment programme introduced in the mining sector 
immediately prior to the privatisation as demanded by the IMF and the World Bank, had 
a highly negative impact on the mineworkers and the mining community. Similarly to 
what was also the case with the privatisation of SOEs in Russia, the poorly executed 
privatisation contributed to decreases in income and increases in inequality (Stiglitz, 
1998:19, 22, 2002:144, 157, 169). 
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Moreover, the above discussion shows that changes in ownership structure that 
introduced different manager objectives under government and private ownership 
altered the allocation of gains that brought about changes in the political-economic 
landscape of Zambia. It is noted from Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 that the electoral-
maximising motives pertaining to state ownership, mainly during Kaunda’s 
government, favoured the redistribution of gains from the extraction of the copper 
resources for the development of especially the Zambian mineworkers and of other non-
mining sectors. These included increases in employment, significant development of the 
manufacturing sectors, improvements in the provision of social facilities to Zambians 
and Zambianisation policies. However, excessive spending of mining revenue, in the 
absence of a corresponding saving of a portion of mining revenue (to assist in 
cushioning the economy against the impact of lower copper prices) and of measures to 
improve the company’s productive capacity (through capital and technology 
reinvestments), rendered these policies unsustainable. The over-extension of the 
revenue of the ZCCM into non-core mining sectors also hindered profit maximisation or 
better performance and contributed to the losses that the ZCCM experienced.  
 
Conversely, Section 5.4.2 shows that certain cost-cutting and profit-maximising 
measures under the private ownership of the mines, would likely encourage improved 
company performance in the longer term, which would benefit mining TNCs. However, 
void of reviving the national economy, partly through redistributive measures, the 
practice of the private mining companies to allocate the returns from the extraction of 
copper resources mainly to themselves and their predominantly foreign shareholders, as 
discussed in Section 5.4.2, would not necessarily manifest in greater development for 
Zambia. This would especially be the case in the context where much of the profits are 
repatriated out of Zambia.  
 
On the contrary, the subsidisation by the government of several activities of the mining 
companies, together with the high costs the mining TNCs imposed on the government 
greatly lowered government revenue. It is noted above that the transferring of costs 
occurred through the TNCs passing the responsibility for the provision of social 
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services, the treatment of some of the pollution from mining and for the payments of 
part of the retrenchment and pension packages to the government. Additionally, the 
reduced accessibility of social services,434 previously provided free of charge to the 
mining community by the ZCCM under government ownership,435 eroded the welfare of 
the Zambian mineworkers and the mining community under private ownership of the 
mines. 
 
Moreover, counter to the pro-worker policies of Kaunda’s government under 
government ownership of the mines,436 it is noted in Section 5.4.2 that several cost-
reduction measures under private ownership of the mines had severe negative socio-
economic ramifications in respect of the mineworkers and the mining community.437 
The social and welfare costs to the Zambian economy were mainly due to huge 
unemployment as a result of retrenchments, the substitution of local capacities with 
foreign capacities, the temporary closures of mining companies that are more frequent 
under private ownership and the withdrawals of some mining companies from Zambia. 
The eroding of the conditions of employment of workers and delays in paying out the 
retrenchment and pension packages of workers and significant reduction of these 
packages further affected workers adversely.  
 
However, in the absence of growth through better performance of the mining 
companies, and of greater reinvestment into the more productive activities, such as the 
core mining sector, rather than mostly into the more unproductive sectors of the 
economy, the redistributive policies of the Kaunda government were rendered 
unsustainable. In addition, the de-industrialisation that the substitution of local suppliers 
by foreign suppliers encouraged and the decline in the value of the kwacha benefited the 
mining companies. However, these have a negative effect on the Zambian economy, in 
particular, the local suppliers and manufacturing base.  
 
Besides some cost-reduction strategies of private mining companies, the poor capacity 
                                                 
434
    Linked to the transfer of the responsibility for the provision of social services to the ill-resourced government. 
435
    Especially in education and basic health-care services (interview with Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003).  
436
    Encouraged by its electoral-maximising motives. 
437
    Interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003. 
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of the government also facilitated certain practices of private mining companies that had 
highly adverse consequences on local capacities and on the development of the country. 
The various deficiencies in government policies, institutions and laws governing the 
privatisation (elaborated upon in Section 5.2.2 above) and the activities of the private 
sector (refer to Section 6.5 of Chapter 6) have favoured the mining TNCs and the 
foreign backward-linked suppliers to the mining sector. The introduction of 
liberalisation policies before the mines were privatised further advantaged foreign 
suppliers. These weaknesses in government institutions and laws proved unsupportive 
to the local suppliers to the mining sector.  
 
These political-economic outcomes of the privatisation and of profit-maximisation 
objectives and cost-cutting measures of private TNCs of the mining sector concur 
somewhat with Fine and Stoneman’s (1996:19) argument that privatisation represents 
not merely a withdrawal of the state in favour of the market. Rather, it is a particular 
form of intervention which, depending on its form in immediate implementation and 
subsequent regulation, favours some capitalists, while disadvantaging others. The 
‘leaner’ structures, generally promoted under private ownership and under market 
control, favour capital profitability, which is often foreign-based rather than 
domestically-based and discriminates against labour (Fine & Stoneman, 1996:23). 
Moreover, the limited growth and benefits for the mineworkers, local suppliers and the 
Zambian economy from the privatisation policies of the mines and under private 
ownership of the mines suggest that various qualifications are necessary to ensure more 
beneficial outcomes for Zambians from privatisation.  
 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that electoral-maximising objectives of 
the government and certain state redistributive objectives could yield higher 
development outcomes, as was the case under Kaunda’s government. However, when 
mining revenue became scarcer in the 1980s, the over-extension and the redistribution 
of mining resources into non-productive sectors at the expense of the core productive 
sectors of the economy became unsustainable. These policies then had an adverse 
impact on the performance of the mining sector and increased the debt burden of 
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Zambia that fed a further downward spiral of growth. The unsustainability of 
redistributive measures indicates that growth is also necessary for sustainable 
redistribution. However, not all states would necessarily pursue redistributive 
objectives.  
 
For instance, the adoption of extensive privatisation and liberalisation policies during 
Chiluba’s government greatly reduced the capacity of the government to influence 
decision-making in the mining sector. The lower government capacity, alongside the 
strict SAPs that the IMF and the World Bank imposed on the Chiluba government that 
limited government expenditure, and the corruption that allegedly prevailed under 
Chiluba’s government, hindered greater redistribution of gains from the privatisation 
and the private ownership of the mines. In contrast, the nationalisation of the mines and 
political interests introduced into the mining sector under Kaunda’s government 
enhanced the state’s capacity to influence decisions in the sector. 
 
On the other hand, improved x-efficiency of private mining companies would likely 
augment growth in Zambia’s mining companies. However, several of the profit-
maximising and cost-cutting measures of mining TNCs would not necessarily translate 
into higher development for Zambia. In the absence of a greater and more equitable 
redistribution of mining surpluses these measures, together with certain weaknesses in 
government institutions and laws regulating the privatisation and the private ownership 
of the mines, exacerbated inequalities in Zambia and undermined Zambian capacities. 
These outcomes blocked rather than promote development in Zambia, partly reflected in 
steep increases in the poverty levels in Zambia, following the privatisation and the 
private ownership of the mines.  
 
Accordingly, development is a function not only of the performance of the mining 
companies but also of adequate redistribution of returns from mining resources to 
improve equity. In addition to growth in the company, development also requires inter 
alia, improvements in production levels, government revenue, permanent employment 
levels, human capital development, the development of local suppliers, as well as 
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reductions in poverty levels. Sustainable and more equitable development needs a 
correct balance between growth and the redistribution of an appropriate proportion of 
surpluses from the mining companies to the Zambian economy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. THE ROLES OF TNCs IN THE MINING SECTOR OF ZAMBIA 
WITHIN A WEAK STATE 
 
This chapter addresses the research question as to the impact of the activities of mining 
TNCs on the development of the mining sector and the Zambian economy. Key 
components of the investigation are the investment and capital inputs from mining 
TNCs, the returns to the Zambian economy from the extraction of minerals and the role 
of the government in influencing the activities of mining TNCs. 
 
The roles of TNCs in the mining sector in Zambia, within a weak state, are assessed 
first by examining their contribution in exploiting the unused resources of the copper 
mining sector and in supplementing the technology and capital of Zambia. Second, the 
main consequences of the dominant bargaining position of the mining TNCs over the 
government on the Zambian economy are considered. Third, the returns to the Zambian 
economy from the extraction of copper are investigated. Fourth, the factors that 
influenced the decisions of Anglo American and AVMIN to depart from Zambia are 
explored. This is followed by an assessment of the political economic implications of: 
(i) the regulatory and institutional capacities of the government in controlling the 
activities of mining TNCs; and (ii) the activities of TNCs in the mining sector. 
 
6.1 THE ROLES OF TNCs IN EXPLOITING UNUSED MINING RESOURCES 
AND IN SUPPLEMENTING ZAMBIA’s TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL  
 
This section reviews the roles of mining TNCs in exploiting the mineral resources of 
Zambia and in supplementing the technology and capital of the mining sector in 
Zambia. The activities of Binani in the mining sector are then assessed as a case study 
to further evaluate the role of TNCs in supplementing the resources of Zambia. The 
findings would test the validity of arguments of neo-classical and neo-fundamentalist 
theorists that TNCs generate and supplement the resources of host countries and the 
contrasting views of neo-imperialists and Global Reach theorists that certain activities 
of TNCs subvert the development of these countries. 
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6.1.1 The roles of TNCs in exploiting mining resources 
 
The mining TNCs invested significant capital into the mining sector compared to 
immediately before the mines were privatised. The crippling financial constraints that 
the government sustained were largely responsible for the lack of investments from the 
mid 1990s under government ownership of the mines. Investments in prospecting and 
exploration activities that peaked at US$5.2 billion in 1997, the re-opening of unused 
mines and the opening of new mines, enabled greater exploitation of Zambia’s mining 
resources. Subsequently, exploration activities declined by almost 58% in 2001 below 
the peak exploration spending of 1997 to about US$2.9 billion, and by almost 15% from 
its 2000 level (Maambo, 1998:Fig. 13; Africa Research Bulletin, 2001d:14978). Table 
A8 (in Annexure), lists some of the exploration and prospecting activities of various 
mining TNCs in Zambia, including TNCs that did not acquire ownership of any mines. 
 
The financial investments of the mining TNCs, in the late 1990s, enabled the re-opening 
of Chambishi Non-Ferrous Metals, the Chibuluma mines, Kansanshi and Bwana 
Mkubwa that were closed in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lungu, 2001:16; Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:48). Financial investments at Chambishi Non-Ferrous Metals to refurbish 
and upgrade the equipment and infrastructure of the mines and the concentrator 
extended the life of the mine since the company commenced the production of copper in 
2003 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:48; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:36). 
Furthermore, J and W planned to spend over US$200 million to develop the Muliashi 
mine438 that was abandoned in the 1990s and to upgrade operations at the Baluba copper 
mine (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:36).  
 
Major new mining developments that hold significant potential for considerably 
expanding the mining resource base of Zambia include the exploiting of the largely 
untapped, lucratively resourced Lumwana Copper Mines,439 developed by Equinox 
Resources,440 and the KDMP that contains the largest copper resource in the Copperbelt 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:35). The KDMP is being developed by 
                                                 
438
    Benny Steinmetz Global Resource Group, a renowned diamond trader, is in partnership with J and W in Muliashi and their joint 
venture is named ENYA (Africa Mining Intelligence, 2006a:3). 
439
    That was expected to start producing 165 000 tons of copper per annum, from 2008. 
440
    A Canadian-listed mining company.  
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Vedanta Resources (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:35; Africa Mining 
Intelligence, 2002d:4). Furthermore, the expansion of Kansanshi under the majority 
ownership of First Quantum,441 at a development cost of US$290 million,442 would raise 
the lifespan of the mines to 30-40 years (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:36; 
Martin Creamers Weekly Online, 2003a). Both the unused mines that were re-opened 
and the new mining developments would increase mining production.443 
 
6.1.2 The roles of TNCs in supplementing technology and capital 
 
The mining TNCs also increased the technology and capital stock of the copper mines 
in Zambia from the immediate pre-privatisation levels. These investments are expected 
to have a highly positive impact on the development of the mining sector. Immediately 
prior to the privatisation of the mines in the late 1990s, insufficient reinvestment into 
the mines mainly due to lack of resources was the single most important reason for the 
poor performance of the mining sector under government ownership.444  
 
Key considerations in the assessment of the contributions of mining TNCs to the 
technology and capital of the host country are (i) the size of investments; (ii) factors 
influencing the investment levels; (iii) the origins of the capital; (iv) the ability of the 
government to achieve similar investment levels under government ownership of the 
mines; and (v) the impact of greater efficiency of TNCs445 in promoting higher 
investments in the mines than under government ownership. 
 
(i) Size of investments 
 
With the exception of Binani, the mining TNCs played a pivotal role in transferring 
additional technology inputs and capital stock into the mining sector of Zambia. Tables 
A5 and A9 (in Annexure) respectively list the technology and capital inputs that the 
                                                 
441
    First Quantum also owns the Bwana Mkubwa Mines, the MCM (in partnership with Glencore), the Lonshi copper mine, as well 
as the Chambishi smelter (not the same smelter as the one that the Chinese Non-Metal Ferrous Company is establishing, also in 
Chambishi), where it processes large deposits of copper and cobalt from the Lonshi Mines, located in neighbouring Congo-Kinshasa 
(Africa Confidential, 2006:4). 
442
    The incapacity of the design output to accommodate the production at the Kansanshi Mine from the first phase, commissioned 
in early 2005, led to the expansion of the mine, with the prospect also of finding gold (Africa Confidential, 2006:4). 
443
    Production of copper at Kansanshi was expected to increase from 127 000 tons in 2006 to 165 000 tons in 2008. 
444
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 17 December 2001; Danny Kalyalya, 14 December 2001; Alick Lungu, 20 December, 
2001; Norman Mbazima, 18 December 2001; Willie Sweta, 15 December 2001. 
445
    Owing to their expertise, technology and private sector investment. 
  
225
major mining companies pledged for the existing mines in Zambia and some of the 
most significant technological and capital inputs that TNCs actually invested in the 
Zambian mining sector. These inputs reinvigorated the mining industry and contributed 
to the rise in copper production levels (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:1, 19). Foreign 
investment in the mining sector for refurbishing the plants and for the purchase of 
spares and machinery is estimated at nearly US$4 billion446 from 2000 to 2007 (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:19, 35; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:19). The rise in real 
gross fixed capital formation to an estimated 19% of GDP in 2006 and to around 25% in 
2007 from only 13.5% in 1990 and 11% in 1994, primarily reflected the new 
investments in the mining sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:35, 2007b:26, 
2008b:15).  
 
However, despite substantial capital that the TNCs ploughed in the mines, in the short 
term these investments were generally less than they had pledged in the development 
agreements and took place mainly during the boom from 2005-2007 (Transparency 
International, 2002:6). For instance, the total of US$590 million that the three largest 
mining companies invested by 2000, fell short of the approximately US$822 million 
expected in committed investments from privatised mining companies that were 
required to re-engineer, recapitalise and to modernise existing operations (World Bank, 
2002b:17; ZPA, 2000b:15). Moreover, the mining TNCs failed to contribute the 
US$1 billion by 2000 that was expected as contingent investment, mainly for the 
implementation of greenfield projects and for expansions during the first ten years 
(ZPA, 2000b:15).  
 
The Chamber of Mines’ own figures show that the investment of the ZCCM in the 
copper mines, in the last seven years before the mines were privatised, 1990-1996, of 
around US$125 million a year, was not significantly lower than the average investment 
levels of around US$135 million a year achieved in the first seven years, from 1997-
2003, under private ownership (refer to Figure 4.11 of Chapter 4) (Fraser & Lungu, 
                                                 
446
    The MUZ provides a much lower investment estimate of US$1.4 billion, from 1998 to 2006, against that of The Economist 
Intelligence Unit. The significant investment that occurred in 2006-07, mainly due to high copper prices, would perhaps augment 
this figure somewhat, albeit less than The Economist Intelligence Unit suggests. 
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2007:20). In fact, if the effect of inflation on the US dollar is taken into account, the 
investment levels from 1997-2003 declined in real terms from the average investment 
levels between 1990 and 1996, under government ownership.  
 
(ii) Factors influencing investment levels  
 
Notwithstanding that the mining TNCs introduced major investments in sums that were 
unavailable to the ZCCM, it is unclear whether the higher investments in mining and 
the opening of the new mines came about solely as a result of private TNCs’ ownership 
of the mines. A closer examination of the investment trends shows that significant 
investments from the mining TNCs only began in 2004, at the start of the international 
copper price boom and increased especially in 2006, when copper prices peaked at 
unprecedented levels.447 This indicates that the dramatic increases in the price of copper 
were highly significant in influencing the investment levels in mining. 
 
A major contributing factor for the lower investment levels in the mining sector than 
were pledged was likely the practice of TNCs of delaying investment in the short term 
to enable them to first gauge whether the venture merited greater investments. As is 
noted in Section 4.4.10 of Chapter 4, this supports the ‘real options view of investment’, 
based on the assumption of irreversible investment costs, the uncertainty of future pay-
offs and of future output prices that encourages investors to postpone their 
investments448 (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, cited in Andersson, 2000:79). It further confirms 
the observation of Andersson (2000:79) that the real options approach is highly relevant 
in the African context. Conversely, the delay in investments of mining companies 
contradicts the neo-classical model of investment of Jorgenson (1963), which states that 
the firm chooses its capital stock so as to maximise the present value of the future cash 
flow, assumed to be known with certainty. This theory assumes that the firm can sell the 
excess capital without a loss; that is, the firm chooses their capital stock to equalise the 
marginal product of capital with the user cost of capital (cited in Andersson, 2000:79). 
                                                 
447
    In the period 2000-2003, the average copper price on the LME varied from US$1 558 per ton to US$1 815 per ton, which 
doubled over the next two years to US$3 684 per ton (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:20). 
448
    The greater the uncertainty and the higher the value of the potential investment, the greater would be the likelihood that the 
firm would postpone the investment decision (Andersson, 2000:79). Possible investments that foreign companies possess elsewhere 
would likely mitigate losses in returns that they might incur from the postponements. 
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The bid design, allowing for pledged investments rather than specific investments, that 
enable TNCs to delay their investment commitments, also precluded higher investment 
from mining TNCs. It further facilitated Anglo American’s departure from Zambia 
before honouring all its investment obligations. Additionally, a dependence on existing 
mining operations to fund greenfield projects contributed considerably to the lower 
capital and technology investments received from some mining TNCs.449 This practice 
further undermined the development of new mines in instances when the existing mines 
under-performed. For instance, the failure of Metorex to obtain the expected cash flows 
from production at Chibuluma West that were planned to fund capital expenditure at 
Chibuluma South,450 led to the temporary suspension of operations at the Chibuluma 
South mine451 in September 2001 (Regulatory News Service, 2001; Times of Zambia, 
2002, cited in Craig, 2002:365, 368; Chibuluma Mines plc, 2003:3; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002:42; Engineering and Mining Journal, 1998:14).  
 
Moreover, the losses that KCM experienced for most of the time prevented it from 
funding new projects. Furthermore, these losses alongside the company’s inability to 
raise US$313 million of limited recourse finance, accounted significantly for the failure 
of the Anglo American consortium to respect their investment pledges. These pledges 
included an investment of US$208 million in capital expenditure (capex); the turning 
around of the old Konkola and Nchanga mines within three years of their operation; and 
an investment of a further US$523 million in the greenfield project, the KDMP452 (refer 
to Table A5, in Appendix) (Mining Journal, 2001, cited in Craig, 2002:365; Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development, 2000:62; Engineering and Mining Journal, 
2000b:11, 16). Various weaknesses in government policies, discussed in Section 6.5.1, 
further account for the lower investment levels of mining TNCs in Zambia in the short 
                                                 
449
    Interview with Jack Jones, 22 October 2003. 
450
    Which has an approximate life of 14 years. 
451
    Until the price of copper improved, or until additional funding was sourced. An agreement reached with the IDC, of South 
Africa, to provide equity-based funding for the Chibuluma South underground project in 2003 solved the funding problem that 
Metorex experienced at the time (Chibuluma Mines plc, 2003:3). 
452
    The Konkola Deep, one of the biggest copper ore bodies in the world, was ZCCM’s main greenfield development project near 
the operational Konkola mine, with an estimated reserve of between 400 and 500 million tons, at 3.8% copper, and a productive 
capacity of over 200 000 tons/year and substantial tonnages of cobalt. However, the mine, which is one of the wettest in the world, 
required US$1billion in fresh investment by 2002 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:40; Kaunda, 2002:81, 186). 
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term.  
 
(iii) The origins of capital 
 
The origins of the capital from TNCs, namely local or international, also significantly 
influenced the benefits to the host country from the participation of TNCs. It has been 
shown above that the failure of several mining TNCs to bring in adequate funds raised 
outside Zambia (in the expectation that the mines would largely finance themselves), 
limited the capital contributions that potentially pertain to mining TNCs. Moreover, the 
reliance of mining TNCs on existing mining operations that they owned in Zambia for 
funding new projects diminished the potential benefits of capital and technology 
transfers at a low cost to the host country that neo-classical theorists and neo-
fundamentalists attribute to TNCs. Additionally, the borrowings of Binani from the 
Zambian state-owned bank453 and much of which were not paid back (discussed in 
Section 6.1.3) represented a drain on Zambia’s resources. 
 
(iv) The ability of the government to achieve high investment levels 
 
Notwithstanding that the TNCs invested less than what they had pledged, the capital 
and technology stock of Zambia improved under TNCs’ ownership of the mines. In the 
1990s, the high debt of the country and the poor performance of the ZCCM left the 
government with insufficient resources required to adequately reinvest in the mines. 
The tendency of the government to divert revenue from the mining sector (as the cash 
cow of the Zambian economy) for fulfilling multiple objectives and electoral-
maximising motives, has also reduced the resources available for reinvestment in the 
mines. This was especially the case in the latter part of Kaunda’s government, discussed 
in Section 5.4.1.1 of Chapter 5.  
 
The constraints that demand management programmes of the SAPs placed on 
government spending in the 1990s limited to some extent the redistributive leverage of 
the Chiluba administration. Rather, the lack of resources, linked mainly to the poor 
performance of the mining sector in the 1990s under government ownership, the historic 
                                                 
453
   To pay, among other things, the retrenchment packages of the workers at RAMCOZ. 
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low copper prices and the prolonged economic downturn, contributed more significantly 
to the low investment levels in the 1990s (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:19; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:27). Furthermore, insufficient reinvestment into the mining 
sector, especially in the 1990s, was not necessarily only because of government 
ownership. In particular, IMF and World Bank policies barring greater government 
investment into the mines that were earmarked for privatisation from 1996 were also 
greatly responsible for the large reductions in investments in the mines in the 1990s 
under government ownership. In turn, the inadequate investment into the mines 
reinforced the cycle of poor performance and lower revenue from mining available for 
reinvestment in the mines.  
 
Moreover, the large-scale technological investment in the tailings leach plant454 
established in 1974 in fact occurred under government ownership and management 
control of the mines.455 The plant was the largest of its kind in the world, and at the time 
placed Zambia at the forefront of the development of the solvent extraction process. 
However, these developments coincided with a time when resources were more readily 
available (Maambo, 1998:5). At times of low government revenue the state was unable 
to adequately recapitalise the mines. This underscores the important role that TNCs 
could play in building the technology of host countries that face significant financial 
constraints. 
 
(v) Impact of greater efficiency of TNCs in promoting higher investments in the mines 
 
Presumably, higher efficiency achieved under private ownership of the mines by TNCs, 
and their greater expertise and access to technology would raise revenue from the 
mining sector that could also be used for reinvestment in the mines. However, 
difficulties in obtaining information on the performance of private mining TNCs and the 
relative short term that the mines are under TNCs’ ownership render it not possible 
within the scope of the study to definitively determine a correlation between company 
performance under private TNCs’ ownership of the mines and investment levels.  
 
                                                 
454
    Interview with Norman Mbazima, 18 December 2001. 
455
    Whereby low-grade material could be leached and the resultant low tenor liquors upgraded. 
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Nonetheless, better performance under private ownership of the mines might not 
necessarily be expressed in higher investment levels. For instance, the ‘wait and see’ 
attitude of mining TNCs, discussed above, likely limited higher investment in the short 
term. However, in the medium term, the general better performance of the mining 
sector, mainly owing to the high increase in the copper price, did result in a significant 
rise in the technological and capital investments in the mining sector.  
 
Benefits of higher investments by mining TNCs would further diminish if a large 
portion of the rent element from mining is repatriated out of Zambia under private 
ownership of the mines by TNCs. Investment therefore also needs to be assessed against 
the repatriation of mining profits out of Zambia, to determine whether the activities of 
TNCs amount to a net inflow of resources. However, difficulties in detecting transfer 
pricing policies of mining companies and because of the unavailability of reliable data, 
render such an investigation outside the scope of the study.  
 
Accordingly, the level of investment seems less a function of ownership than of 
resources available for investment and of other factors that impinge on performance. 
However, in the context of the poor performance of the mining sector and the Zambian 
economy and a highly indebted government, the role of TNCs as significant potential 
conduits of capital and technology for developing countries was pivotal in augmenting 
sorely needed investments for the mining sector in Zambia. The poor bargaining 
leverage of the government compared to the mining TNCs in Zambia and certain 
weaknesses in the institutional, regulatory and implementation capacity of the 
government to enforce investment commitments of TNCs, elaborated upon in 
Section 6.5.1, also limit the extent of the technological and capital transfers from TNCs 
to the mining sector.  
 
6.1.3 Activities of Binani: a case study  
 
Measures that Binani undertook to limit its losses and their impact on the economy are 
examined below to further investigate the argument that TNCs are significant conduits 
of capital and technological investment. In particular, the investigation focuses on 
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Binani’s failure to repay bank loans and pay suppliers, workers and statutory bodies,456 
and its stripping of the mining assets from Zambia. This is followed by a consideration 
of the government’s assumption of the role of the receiver of RAMCOZ and the 
consequences on the economy.  
 
(i) Liabilities to the banks 
 
Binani failed to pay back its liability of K13.7 billion to the Zambian state-owned bank, 
the Zambian National Commercial Bank (ZANACO), obtained at government 
instruction457 and to pay the retrenchment packages of workers. This contributed to 
ZANACO incurring a loss totalling at least US$150 million in non-performing loans in 
the latter part of Chiluba's presidency. The loss was significantly to blame458 for the 
subsequent financial difficulties that the bank experienced (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2002:44; Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, 2000:54, 61, 62, 112).459 
The financial difficulties of ZANACO forced the government to issue bonds worth 
K250 billion to recapitalise the bank, to cover the liabilities to the bank of both Binani 
and Zambia National Oil Company (ZNOC) and the contingent liabilities of legal action 
by some ex-employees of ZANACO (Government of Zambia, 2002:paragraph 22). The 
poor performance of ZANACO during this time also led to the IMF’s demand that the 
bank privatise about 49% of its shares.460  
 
The failure of Binani to pay back loans borrowed from local banks supports the 
arguments of Helleiner (1989:1455) that when DFI is largely achieved through 
borrowing from a local bank, national gains in the supply of capital and foreign 
exchange would be unlikely. Moreover, if the capital that TNCs borrowed from the 
local banks is not effectively invested within the host country, which was the case with 
Binani, net gains in the supply of capital and foreign exchange from TNCs would be 
unlikely and the borrowing amounts to a capital outflow (Helleiner, 1989:1455). 
Furthermore, the risks that the activities of Binani introduced to the viability of 
                                                 
456
    Interviews with Zion Simwanza, December 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
457
    The Chiluba government’s acceptance of RAMCOZ’s high debt levels reflects gross negligence on the part of government in 
the protection of public funds. 
458
    Together with the liabilities of the ZNOC. 
459
    Interview with Ladslous Mwansa, 13 December 2001. 
460
    Interview with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003. 
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ZANACO, also affirm the neo-imperialists and the Radical Dependence School’s 
argument that TNCs introduce risks to the host country (Helleiner, 1989:1454; 
Padayachee, 1995:164).  
 
(ii) Liabilities to suppliers 
 
The massive debts of Binani to suppliers, in particular the debt of US$20 million to the 
Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC) and its debt to the Zambian Railways,461 and 
delays of up to six months in paying its suppliers, considerably degraded the earnings of 
the suppliers.462 The debts were detrimental to local suppliers and to the development of 
Zambia’s backward-linked industries. This was especially in light of the dramatic 
depreciation of the kwacha, by 194% from 1997 to 2000, an average inflation rate of 
about 25.4% from 1997 to 2000 and of the high bank interest rate charges, ranging from 
46.7% to 31.8% on short-term borrowing from 1997 to 1998 (Africa Mining 
Intelligence, 2003a:2; Engineering and Mining Journal, 2000c:26; Catholic Secretariat, 
2001:13). 463 State assurances and guarantees forced the government to pay the liabilities 
of Binani owed to CEC. 
 
(iii) Failure to fulfil commitments to workers 
 
Several policies of Binani also affected workers adversely. These encompassed the 
failure of Binani to fulfil its commitments to retain the full labour force of about 7 000 
that it inherited, to apply the normal retirement benefits to those who wanted to retire, 
and to pay the termination and retrenchment benefits464 of many workers during the 
receivership of RAMCOZ. The company further delayed paying salaries of workers 
(Lungu, 2001:15). The government decided to take over, among several other 
liabilities,465 the responsibility for paying both the terminal benefits of the employees 
that RAMCOZ failed to honour and the remuneration of the employees of the 
                                                 
461
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003.  
462
    These difficulties include several of its suppliers being unable to pay VAT that the ZRA requires within a month following 
their submissions (interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003). 
463
    Interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003. 
464
    An excess staff of 2 000 workers was initially retrenched on the advice of an industrial engineering review, which concluded 
that a workforce of only 3 965 employees were required for rational operations at Luanshya/Baluba (Kaunda, 2002:55, 56, 180). A 
further 1 000 workers were laid off after the initial retrenchment (interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003). A technical 
assessment of the pre-bid studies, which deemed this commitment unrealistic, also assessed that about 3 000 retrenchments would 
be required (World Bank, 2002b:21). ZCCM also found that operations at Luanshya/Baluba mines could not sustain the level of 
employment (ZPA, 2003:2). 
465
    Interview with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003. 
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company.466  
 
The remuneration of employees was partly achieved from an unauthorised payment of 
about US$5 million from the HIPC fund, in 2002, which the government had to 
reimburse (World Bank, 2002b:7, 16, 20, 23). Between 2000 and 2002, also during 
receivership, the mineworkers of the Luanshya/Baluba mines were not paid their 
termination and retrenchment benefits (World Bank, 2002b:20). The dramatic increases 
in unemployment levels, owing to the high retrenchments of workers and the closure of 
some suppliers in the region, partly as a result of Binani delaying or absconding from 
paying local suppliers for services rendered, had a particularly harmful impact on the 
economic life of Luanshya (World Bank, 2002a:11; Catholic Secretariat, 2001:14; 
CCJDP, 2002b:10; Lungu, 2001:6).  
 
(iv) Failure to pay statutory bodies 
 
The failure of Binani to pay back its debt commitments to statutory bodies and its 
omission to timeously remit the workers’ contributions to the Mukuba Pension Scheme 
were a further significant cost to the country. It also contributed to a collapse of the 
social services in the area, leading to labour unrest. The statutory bodies that Binani did 
not pay included the ZNFP, Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), ZCCM, 
ZRA and the Luanshya Municipal Council (GRZ, cited in Committee on Economic 
Affairs and Labour, 2000:54, 61, 62, 112; Catholic Secretariat, 2001:13; Africa Mining 
Intelligence, 2003a:2; Transparency International, 2002:1, 23, 24).  
 
(v) Asset stripping 
 
Rather than supplementing the technology and capital of Zambia, Binani also stripped 
the productive assets of RAMCOZ and repatriated the money received from the assets 
out of the country. This was achieved by way of dismantling and selling the machinery 
and equipment of the smelter at Luanshya that were transferred out of Zambia, 
ostensibly for servicing, but that were not returned (World Bank, 2002b:13; Catholic 
                                                 
466
    Interview with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003. 
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Secretariat, 2001:14).467 The subsequent further dismantling of the remaining parts of 
the smelter by the receiver, to enable it to pay the liabilities of Binani, led to the 
complete eradication of the smelter at Luanshya.468 RAMCOZ-Ndola Precious Metals 
also collapsed at the beginning of 1999, owing to the problems that the Binani Group, 
its holding company, experienced (World Bank, 2002b:13).  
 
(vi) RAMCOZ under receivership 
 
The government’s assumption of the role of the receiver of RAMCOZ,469 through its 
position as the major creditor or debenture holder of ZANACO, also imposed very high 
liabilities on the government. Inadequate and inappropriate government measures to 
effectively deal with the prolonged receivership and the liquidation of RAMCOZ 
(mostly because of difficulties experienced in finding an appropriate investor)470 under 
care and maintenance were also at great expense to the government.471 In particular, the 
high electricity bill, mainly owing to pumping activities to prevent the flooding of the 
mines472 contributed significantly to the huge costs that the government incurred under 
receivership.  
 
Additionally, a failure of the government to adequately de-water the Luanshya 
underground mine (that possessed good copper ore grades) under care and 
maintenance473 resulted in the mines being flooded. The mines were still flooded at the 
end of 2006, reducing investor interest in the Luanshya mines.474 This led to the new 
owners of the Luanshya Copper Mine (LCM475), upon determining that the Luanshya 
underground copper mines would be unprofitable, seeking permission from the 
government to close the Luanshya mine (Africa Mining Intelligence, 2006b:2).476  The 
                                                 
467
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003 and Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
468
    Which would force the new owner, J and W Holdings, to smelt its concentrates at the smelter in Kitwe (interview with John 
Lungu, 12 November 2003). 
469
    Interviews with Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003 and Zion Simwanza, December 
2003. 
470
    Interviews with Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003 and Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003. 
471
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
472
    Interview with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003. 
473
    Interviews with Gilbert Temba, 13 October 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
474
    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
475
    An affiliate of the J and W group that was awarded the mines after RAMCOZ left. 
476
    Subsequently, the Zambian government also cancelled the exploration license rights of Puku Minerals (a wholly-owned 
affiliate of Weatherly International plc) to re-open the Luanshya underground copper mine. The cancellation of the licence of Puku 
minerals, subsequent to the government already having awarded it the exploration permit and after Weatherly had already raised 
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Baluba section, the most profitable part of the Luanshya mine, was not affected by the 
flooding.477  
 
Delays in paying suppliers to the mines during the receivership and the liquidation 
process of RAMCOZ478 also had an adverse influence on the suppliers of the mines.479 
The delay in particular jeopardised the activities of ZESCO, the power company of 
Zambia, whose liquidity problems were eventually resolved through various debt swop 
arrangements between itself and the government.480 Moreover, mining companies that 
previously obtained acid (an important and one of the most expensive input 
requirements of mining companies) from the Baluba Mines, owned by RAMCOZ, were 
forced to import additional acid from Zimbabwe and South Africa.481  
 
Under receivership, the government also paid both the salaries of the residual 
employees at RAMCOZ,482 and the terminal benefit of 4 000 workers that had to be 
retrenched, with the mine being placed under receivership (World Bank, 2002b:20; 
CCJDP, 2002b:11). At the end of 2003, the government raised US$35 million to cover 
the terminal benefits and salary arrears of these employees (Times of Zambia, 2003:1). 
The delay in the payment of accumulated or terminal benefits and other liabilities to 
workers as unsecured creditors483 had a highly negative impact on their well-being 
(World Bank, 2002b:14, 16; Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, in Catholic 
Secretariat, 2001:13; CCJDP, 2002b:10, 11).  
 
It is noted from the above discussion that the borrowing activities of Binani from the 
national bank, ZANACO and the failure to pay its liabilities to the bank, suppliers, 
workers and statutory bodies in Zambia, for which the Zambian government had largely 
                                                                                                                                               
US$7 million for the development of the project and US$10 million for drilling work and a feasibility study, prompted the company 
to take legal action against the government (Africa Mining Intelligence, 2006b:2). 
477
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
478
    Interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003. 
479
    On account of the receiver, ZANACO, first recovering money owed to itself before considering money that RAMCOZ owed to 
local suppliers.  
480
    Interview with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003. 
481
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 14 December 2001; Norman Mbazima, 18 December 2001 and Willie Sweta, 15 December 
2001. 
482
    Since many workers that were not retrenched were still entitled to salaries, despite operations being halted for several months at 
the Luanshya/Baluba mines (interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003; and 
David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003). 
483
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
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assumed responsibility, and the asset-stripping activities of Binani at RAMCOZ were a 
great cost to the Zambian nation. The government’s subsequent assumption of the role 
of receiver of RAMCOZ was also at a substantial loss to the state coffers. These 
practices of Binani in Zambia contradict the neo-classical and neo-fundamentalists’ 
view that TNCs generate resources and supplement the technology and capital of the 
host country. Rather, the activities of Binani support the argument of neo-imperialists 
and Global Reach theorists that TNCs subvert development and promote the 
‘underdevelopment’ of host countries, partly by draining the resources of the host 
country.  
 
However, not all the mining TNCs in Zambia followed Binani’s rather parasitic 
example as most made considerable investments in Zambia (noted above, in Sections 
6.1.1 and 6.1.2). The greater exploitation of Zambia’s resources and the technological 
and capital inputs of virtually all of the mining TNCs into the Zambian mines support 
the supplement and resource generation assumptions that neo-classical theorists484 and 
neo-fundamentalists485 ascribe to TNCs. Furthermore, the poor bargaining leverage of 
the government also abetted many of the negative actions of Binani.  
 
The government’s inability to force Binani to pay its liabilities in Zambia and the 
instruction of the Chiluba government that the national bank grants loans to Binani 
proved grossly negligent. Moreover, as is observed above, the decision of the 
government to assume the liabilities of Binani was at a great expense to the Zambian 
economy. An alleged corrupt relationship that the Chiluba government had with Binani 
probably also encouraged some of the actions of the mining company.  
 
6.2 MAIN CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOMINANT BARGAINING POSITION 
OF MINING TNCs OVER THE GOVERNMENT 
 
As is noted in Chapter 3, a strong bargaining position of the government is necessary to 
ensure that the greatest possible share of the rent element from mining accrues to the 
government, which is crucial to maximise gains in economies dominated by an 
                                                 
484
    Vernon (1979, cited in Buckley, 1985:8). 
485
    Warren (1980, cited in Jenkins, 1987:19, 31 and 32). 
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exhaustible resource (Chang, 1998:238). The argument of proponents of bargaining that 
governments possess great influence in extracting favourable gains from the activities of 
TNCs in their countries, through bargaining with TNCs, are gauged against an unequal 
bargaining relationship in which TNCs enjoy a dominant role over the government.  
 
The poor bargaining leverage of the Zambian government was mainly owing to: donor 
pressure; various trade agreements that curtailed industrial policies of the government; 
Zambia’s poor economic position, especially its foreign exchange problems; practices 
of TNCs to co-ordinate and to consolidate their power; some corrupt practices; and 
weaknesses in the capacities of the state. In contrast, the various pressures that the 
Zambian government faced increased the leverage of the TNCs, especially of Anglo 
American,486 over that of the government during the privatisation of the final assets of 
the ZCCM. Table A6 (in Annexure) lists in detail the various factors that reduced the 
bargaining leverage of the Zambian government. 
 
The consequences of the dominant bargaining relation of the mining TNCs over the 
government are investigated below by examining the outcomes of the collaboration of 
some TNCs through the Kafue Consortium in the bidding process in the privatisation of 
the mines. This is followed by an investigation of concessions granted to the privatised 
mining TNCs.  
 
6.2.1 The Kafue Consortium: a case study of the behaviour of TNCs collaborating 
for a dominant bargaining position in the bidding process  
 
The operations of the Kafue consortium during the bidding process for the final assets 
of the ZCCM represent an appropriate case study of the behaviour of TNCs in a 
dominant bargaining position with the government in the privatisation of SOEs. The 
formation of the Kafue Consortium in 1997-98, comprising of companies that pre-
qualified before as single entities in the bid for the ‘Aco’ package,487 likely represented a 
deliberate strategy to increase the consortium’s bargaining power over that of the 
                                                 
486
    That possesses considerable bargaining leverage, through its experience in negotiating deals to maximise their gains and to 
protect themselves. 
487
    The final and most lucrative assets of the ZCCM, encompassing the Nkana and the Nchanga Divisions and the Chambishi Acid 
and Cobalt Plants. 
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Zambian government and to reduce competition during the bidding process 
(Transparency International, 2002:22). Alongside a weak government, the reduced 
competition enabled the Kafue Consortium, as the only entity to bid for the ‘Aco’ 
package, to undervalue the assets of the ZCCM it was to gain during the negotiations.  
 
The discounted cash flow method that was adopted that the ZPA and the foreign 
advisors favoured for calculating the value of the mines, largely based on the price the 
buyer is prepared to pay through competitive bidding, encouraged the buyers to 
undervalue the mines. The discounted cash flow method factored in its calculations of 
the value of the mines the investment inputs from the bidder to improve the existing 
assets, the price of copper and the time it would take for investors to recoup their 
investments.488 Accordingly, the profit-generating potential of the business (based on 
existing market conditions) largely determined the price in the discounted cash flow 
method,489 favouring the buyers at the expense of the sellers, according to Kaunda 
(2002:168, 169). This differed from an asset-based value of the mines, whereby the 
market value of the assets of the ZCCM was to serve as a guide in setting the price for 
the mines.490 The ZPA and foreign advisors felt that an asset-based value of the mines 
had a limited bearing on the actual value of the enterprise,491 since the assets might not 
always bring in an income for the buyer (ZPA, 2003:6; Kaunda, 2002:169). 
 
The undervaluing of the assets of the ZCCM by the Kafue Consortium was orchestrated 
by putting little value on the underground mines,492 placing no value on some assets they 
were to acquire493 and by overvaluing their expenditure. The considerable sums that the 
individual members of the Kafue Consortium, subsequent to its dissolution, bid for 
some of the assets on which the Consortium had placed no value, serve as evidence that 
the mining assets were undervalued. The Kafue Consortium reduced the valuation of the 
‘Aco’ package by excluding some assets from the valuation.  
 
                                                 
488
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
489
    Interviews with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003 and Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003. 
490
    The replacement cost of the assets and the ore in the ground based on the then current value of finished copper. 
491
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
492
    Interview with Gilbert Temba, 13 October 2003. 
493
    Interview with Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
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The assets that were excluded were the Nchanga and Nkana package, the Chingola 
Refractory Ores (CROs),494 Chibuluma South, for which no plan was provided, Nkana 
Synclinorium,495 which was earmarked for later development496 and the Nkana slag 
stockpiles,497 despite the group having possessed the technology to treat the material at 
these mines. The resources on which the Kafue Consortium placed no value amounted 
to 429 million tons. Furthermore, the projected life of 10 years that the Kafue 
Consortium estimated for Nkana and the CROs was too conservative (Kaunda, 
2002:62).  
 
Additionally, the Nkana slag dumps, on which the Kafue Consortium put no value but 
wanted to include in the package that it envisaged to operate only in the 12th year was 
later sold to a former partner of the consortium, AVMIN, for US$50 million. AVMIN 
invested in modern smelting and leaching facilities at the plant almost from the outset. 
Moreover, the Chibuluma Mines that the Consortium wanted to include in the package 
for strategic reasons498 were subsequently sold to Metorex for US$17.5 million. Also, 
the proposal of Metorex to immediately develop Chibuluma South, to phase in with the 
closure of Chibuluma West,499 curtailed the excessive retrenchments of workers that 
would have accompanied the closure of Chibuluma West that the Kafue Consortium 
envisaged. A failure to develop Chibuluma South, with a lifespan of approximately 
14 years, following the closure of Chibuluma West, would likely have turned the nearby 
Kalulushi town into a ghost town (Kaunda, 2002:62, 71, 72, 183).  
 
Furthermore, by excluding from their calculations the considerable reductions in 
redundancy payments subsequent to the inclusion of houses sold to workers in their 
redundancy packages, the Kafue Consortium overstated in its valuation both the 
discounted rate at 20%500 and the redundancy costs at US$30 million. Tax concessions 
                                                 
494
    That involved minimal costs because it is a surface mine. 
495
    That contained about 221 million tons at 2.23% copper and 0.10% cobalt. 
496
    After 10 years. 
497
    That contained about 20 million tons at 1.10% copper and 0.72% cobalt and because these are on the surface, they are less 
costly to process. 
498
    With AVMIN claiming to have exploration licenses both north and south of Chibuluma South. The demand for the inclusion of 
Chibuluma Mines in package “A” was tantamount to land grabbing, according to Metorex (Kaunda, 2002:74). 
499
    That was then expected to run out in about 4 years. 
500
    Since the normal rate was between 10% and 15%. 
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that the Kafue Consortium sought were also more than those approved for the other 
mines. These entailed reductions of mineral royalty tax to 1%, withholding tax from 
10% to 0% and of the import declaration fee from 5% to 0% (Kaunda, 2002:62, 63, 71, 
72, 75, 76, 183). 
 
Moreover, an alleged practice of Rothschild, the foreign advisors to the government, 
who assisted in valuing some of the packages,501 of undervaluing the assets of the mines 
and divulging these values to the buyers,502 possibly also increased the bargaining 
leverage of the Consortium over the Zambian government in the bidding process. The 
‘Kafue Consortium walkout’ in London was in fact allegedly precipitated by the 
difference in the value that the foreign advisors divulged to the buyers and the higher 
value that Francis Kaunda proposed for the mines.503 Evidence from the feasibility study 
of the buyers of the Chibuluma Mines that stocks worth about US$435 000 were 
excluded in the advisors’ valuations of these mines504 to some extent supports the claim 
that the advisors were inclined to underestimate the mining assets of Zambia.  
 
However, TNCs would not always behave in the opportunistic fashion that marked the 
behaviour of the Kafue Consortium during the negotiating process. Furthermore, a 
discounted cash flow method of evaluating the value of assets, over an asset-based 
valuation, does not inherently favour the buyer. Rather, the poor economic position of 
the country that weakened the leverage of the government for demanding more for the 
mining assets and its poor capacity for also valuing the mines independently of the 
advisors and of the buyers and to assert higher prices for the mines, encouraged the 
mining TNCs to shift bids in their favour. The poor leverage of the government was 
therefore considerably to blame for its failure in obtaining a fair market value for the 
mines at the time.  
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    Interview with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
502
    Interview with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
503
    Interview with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
504
    Interview with Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003. 
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6.2.2 Advantages through concessions 
 
Within a weak state, the mining TNCs, in particular Anglo American505 and Mopani, 
were able to gain extensive additional concessions from the government for their 
operations at KCM and MCM respectively, in comparison to those granted to other 
mining TNCs that privatised earlier.506 In turn, the government imposed very few 
obligations on the mining TNCs.507 These additional concessions were also granted to 
the new buyers, viz. Vedanta Resources that took over majority ownership of KCM in 
2004 and to J and W Holdings. J and W Holdings acquired both the Luanshya/Baluba 
mine, previously owned by Binani before it was placed under receivership, and 
Chambishi Metals that it took over from AVMIN.  
 
The new buyers made the additional concessions conditional on concluding the sales of 
the mines.508 Seemingly, the concessions were more the result of the poor bargaining 
leverage of the Zambian government, especially during the privatisation of the final 
assets of the ZCCM that made it vulnerable to the demands of these companies, rather 
than due to an independent government assessment of the merits of the concessions. 
The concessions continued during periods of high international prices (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:36).  
 
The different concessions granted to the mining companies that were not extended to 
local businesses and the additional concessions granted to KCM and to MCM are 
elaborated upon in Table 6.1 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:55, 62, 63, 65). To date, the 
companies continue to enjoy most of the concessions. The different types of 
concessions granted to the mining TNCs encompass concessions on company taxes, 
Value-Added Tax (VAT), royalties, customs duties and on other input tariffs. Certain 
concessions, more specific to some of the mining companies, were also granted to the 
various companies, especially to KCM (World Bank, 2002b:17; Regional Investor 
                                                 
505
    Afforded largely through its knowledge of the dire economic position of the ZCCM and of foreign donor pressure imposed on 
the Zambian government to finalise the privatisation of the ZCCM, on account of its position as a board member and a minority 
owner of the ZCCM (interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003). 
506
    Interviews with Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003; Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003; 24 November 2003; Silane 
Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Andrew Sardanis, 19 
October 2003 and Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003. 
507
    Interview with Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
508
    Interview with Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003 and Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003. 
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Survey, 2001:42).  
 
The main company tax concessions applicable to all the mining TNCs entailed the 
pegging of mining company tax at 25%, compared to 35% for manufacturing companies 
(and alongside personal income tax or PAYE, of 37.5%, for many formal-sector 
workers).509 Furthermore, the mining companies are allowed to deduct 100% of their 
fixed assets and capital expenditure from their accounting profit in the year in which it 
occurred, as tax allowance. The interest paid on loans and on taxes is also still tax-
deductible for the mining TNCs.  
 
Both the stability period and the carry-forward losses were applicable for 15 years and 
were broadened for KCM and MCM to 20 years, entitling them to subtract the losses 
made in year one of operations from the taxable profits in subsequent years (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:11, 15, 17). Moreover, KCM and MCM are still exempted from paying 
withholding tax on interest, dividends, royalties and management fees paid to 
shareholders and affiliates. The level of withholding tax for other mining companies is 
still 10%, except where double taxation agreements applied, in which case no 
withholding tax is payable (Kaunda, 2002:83; Transparency International, 2002:6).  
 
Secondly, the mining companies are exempted from having to pay the 17.5% VAT, 
until the companies start making a profit. Thirdly, the mineral royalty tax of earlier 
privatised companies was reduced to 2% of gross turnover of the revenue of minerals 
produced in the mining sector, despite the Mines and Minerals Act suggesting a mineral 
royalty of 3% for companies that hold large-scale mining licences. KCM and MCM 
enjoyed an additional reduction in mineral royalty tax to only 0.6%. Mineral royalty tax 
was reduced even further to only 0.5% for a new investor, Equinox, that came on board 
after the ZCCM was privatised, for developing the undeveloped Lumwana mine (Fraser 
& Lungu, 2007:11, 15; Africa Confidential, 2006:4).  
 
Fourthly, the concessions on customs and other duties that the mining companies enjoy 
                                                 
509
    More recently, though, personal income tax levels were reduced so as to provide relief to workers (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007b:29). 
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entail exemptions on import tax levied on machinery and equipment for five years if 
destined to be employed in the operations and in the exploration activities of the mining 
sector. The concessions on customs and other duties were also extended to other 
contracting firms that import machinery for the development of mining (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:11, 15, 17; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:9, 29). While other 
mining companies paid duties of up to 20% on consumables and spares, the aggregate 
rate of the concessions on import duties and tariffs of KCM and MCM was not to 
exceed 15% of the value of imported items for five years (Kaunda, 2002:83; 
Transparency International, 2002:6). Also, Equinox has been shielded for ten years 
from having to pay import duties on its operations at Lumwana (Kaunda, 2002:83; 
Africa Confidential, 2006:4). 
 
Other tariff reductions entail a 5% reduction in the electricity levy of the earlier 
privatised mining TNCs to 10%. KCM and MCM are exempted from paying excise 
duties on the consumption of electricity and pay an additional reduced electricity tariff 
rate of 2.7 cents per kilowatt-hour for 15 years, instead of 3.3 cents per kilowatt-hour 
that applies to other mining companies. Until its departure from KCM, Anglo American 
also enjoyed significantly reduced tariffs on lime and oil inputs to the mines. 
 
In addition to concessions on corporate taxes, VAT, royalties, duties and on electricity 
tariffs, the mining companies are also shielded from certain national laws. These 
include protection against several laws covering environmental pollution and from 
having to take over most of the liabilities of the ZCCM, such as pensions owed from the 
ZCCM to their employees (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:2; Africa Confidential, 2007:10). The 
mining companies are further allowed to externalise all their funds, proceeds, profits 
and dividends.  
 
Furthermore, Anglo American demanded the retrenchment of many workers at the 
mines it was to take over and shifted the responsibility for the payment and the 
settlements of the redundancy packages of the laid-off employees onto the Zambian 
government. The government paid the redundancy packages through a US$65 million 
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loan from the World Bank (Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour, 2001:70, 340; 
Africa Research Bulletin, 2000a:14302; Lungu, 2001:15). The state was also to bear the 
costs of the retrenchment packages of the employees that J and W retrenched before 
taking over RAMCOZ (the company intended to employ only 1 000 workers). 
Furthermore, J and W was allowed to close the Luanshya mine, since it planned to 
operate only the Baluba mine.510  
 
Table 6.1: Concessions granted to privatised mining companies in Zambia  
 
Concessions enjoyed by privatised mining 
companies  
Additional concessions granted to KCM and 
MCM 
Corporate tax concessions 
• A company tax of 25%, instead of 35% that is 
charged for non-mining companies and 30% 
for companies listed on the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange (LuSE) 
• The stability period is valid for 15 years 
• Carry-forward losses are valid for 15 years, as 
a tax concession. Non-mining companies are 
entitled to carry forward losses for only 10 
years 
• Interests paid on loans are tax deductible 
• Tax allowance that includes 100% deductions 
of fixed assets and on capital expenditure from 
the accounting profit of mining companies that 
is not applicable to  non-mining companies 
Corporate tax concessions 
• Similar to that for earlier privatised mining 
companies, company tax was levelled at 25%  
• The stability period was increased to 20 years 
(compared to 15 years for the earlier privatised 
mines) 
• The carry-forward period for tax losses 
increased to 20 years 
• KCM and MCM were exempted from paying 
withholding tax on interests, dividends, 
royalties and management fees paid to 
shareholders and affiliates. For other 
companies, the existing level of withholding 
tax was 10%, except where double taxation 
agreements applied, in which case no 
withholding tax was payable 
VAT  
• Full exemption on VAT of 17.5%. The 
suspension of VAT on imported mining 
equipment and that would be applicable until 
these companies make a profit. This also 
applies to new mining investors that had not, 
as yet, started production by mid-2008, 
namely, the Muliashi copper mine, owned by 
J and W Investments, and the Chambishi 
smelter, owned by China's NFCA 
 
Mineral royalty concessions 
• Royalty tax is reduced to 2%, which is often 
deferred 
Mineral royalty concessions  
• Mineral royalty tax was reduced to 0.6% for 
KCM and MCM. Equinox enjoys a further 
reduction in mineral royalty tax to 0.5% 
                                                 
510
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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Concessions enjoyed by privatised mining 
companies  
Additional concessions granted to KCM and 
MCM 
Duty concessions and other tariff reductions 
• Mining companies are exempted from 
customs or import duties on all imported 
capital items that are used for implementing 
the agreed programme of operations, in 
accordance with the Mines and Mineral Act  
• A 5% reduction on the electrification levy, or 
excise duty 
Duty concessions and other tariff reductions 
• Duty rebates were extended to imported 
mining consumables, which were, however, 
capped at US$18 million per annum for 5 
years511 
• The aggregate rate of import duty is not to 
exceed 15% of the value of the imported 
items. Other mining companies have to pay 
between 5% and 20% duty on most 
consumables and spares 
• Exemptions from paying excise duty on 
electricity consumed (Rural Electricity Levy), 
which was 10% for other mining companies in 
2002  
• The companies enjoy lower electricity tariffs 
of 2.7 cents per kilowatt-hour for 15 years, 
instead of 3.3 cents per kilowatt-hour that 
applied to other mining companies 
• Anglo American (through ZCI), obtained a 7-
year contract for the supply of lime, at a fixed 
price of US$90 per ton, afforded from low 
costs of heavy fuel that Ndola Lime obtained 
from Indeni  
• The price for fuel was kept constant for KCM, 
despite the contract company, TST, wanting to 
increase the price of oil, and the high increases 
in the price of heavy fuel oil (HFO)512 for 
other users 
• No council rates would be charged for KCM 
and MCM for 15 years 
Other concessions 
• Companies were allowed to externalise 100% 
of their funds, proceeds, profit or dividends 
• CEC was allowed to keep its books in dollars, 
while paying taxes in kwachas 
• CEC enjoyed debt forgiveness and interests 
were cancelled to compensate it for reducing 
the electricity rate it charged KCM and MCM 
• Exemptions from certain environmental laws  
• Exemptions from taking over the liabilities of 
the ZCCM (eg. pensions due to employees 
from the ZCCM) 
 
Other concessions 
• The social security contributions of KCM and 
MCM were paid to a South African-based 
social security company and not to NAPSA, a 
Zambian-based social security company  
• Anglo American was granted concessions to 
compensate for the lower internal rate of 
return it was able to obtain from the Nkana 
smelter it utilised, compared to the Mufulira 
Smelter that proved more efficient on account 
of its use of electricity 
• The costs and settlements of retrenchment 
packages of those employees that Anglo 
American did not want to employ, before 
KCM was privatised, were transferred to the 
Zambian government and paid through a 
US$65 million loan from the World Bank. 
Moreover, except for the 1 000 workers that 
                                                 
511
    One consignment of steel for the mines could, however, already go up to US$10 million, before any other consumables were 
imported (Kaunda, 2002:165). 
512
    HFO, which accounts for about 55% of the cost of quicklime production, greatly increased during the negotiation period, rising 
by about 300% from April 1998, when it was US$0.17 per kilogram, to US$0.51 per kilogram in late 1999/early 2000. 
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Concessions enjoyed by privatised mining 
companies  
Additional concessions granted to KCM and 
MCM 
J and W wanted to retain at the Luanshya 
Mines by 2004, the government would 
possibly pay off all the workers that J and W 
intended to lay off  
• KCM and MCM are indemnified, for 20 years, 
from on-going environmental liabilities, while 
in compliance with their environmental plans 
• ZCI received a five-year option to buy the 
Nkana smelter 
• ZCI got the legislation changed to include its 
incentives as a statutory instrument 
 
Sources: Africa Research Bulletin (2000a:14302); Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour (2001:48, 
70, 340); Dow Jones Commodities News via Comtex (12 June 2008); Kaunda (2002:83, 131, 148, 165); 
Lungu (2001:15); Fraser & Lungu (2007:2); Transparency International (2002:6, 2007:2), Africa 
Confidential (2007:10); and interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; John Lungu, 12 
November 2003; Zion Simwanza, 1 December 2003; Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003; Honourable 
Dipak Patel, 15 October 2003; Stella Motale, 23 October 2003; Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 
2003; Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003; Liang Tun, 4 November 2003; Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 
2003; Andygean Luombe, 8 October 2003; Gary Loop, 29 October 2003; L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 
2003 and Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003.  
 
Most significantly, Anglo American ensured a change in the Zambian legislation 
allowing for the inclusion into the constitution the provisions of its development 
agreement that provided for the incentives. The change made government compliance to 
the concessions granted to the company legally enforceable and subject to an 
international arbitration process.513 Subsequently, other mining companies followed suit, 
through renegotiations with the government, to make their incentives legally 
enforceable as well. 
 
It is noted from the above discussion that within a weak state, the TNCs tended to use 
their dominant bargaining power to shift benefits in their favour. The dominant 
bargaining leverage of the mining TNCs encouraged them to consolidate their 
advantages in the mining industry by collaboration, through the formation of a 
consortium, in the bidding process for the privatisation of the mines. It also enabled 
them to extract highly favourable concessions from the government.  
 
The negative outcomes arising from the dominant bargaining leverage of mining TNCs 
                                                 
513
    Interviews with Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 October 2003 and Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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in Zambia contradict the relative optimism of the proponents of bargaining as to the 
long-term negotiating prospects that developing countries possess for extracting 
favourable terms from TNCs. Rather, these outcomes support the structuralists’ 
argument that gains from foreign interests through bargaining are not inevitable 
(Padayachee, 1995:164). The bargaining proponents further failed to take into account 
the impact of other factors and interest group divergences in influencing the decisions of 
the Zambian government.  
 
In particular, pressure from donors that the mines be privatised swiftly and the higher 
bargaining edge that mining TNCs possessed enabling them to make increasing 
demands on the Zambian government, greatly reduced the leverage of the MMD 
government to extract favourable gains from mining TNCs for the Zambian economy. 
The significant demands that mining TNCs were able to exert on the weak MMD 
government that often lowered benefits for the host country, further validates the 
argument that mining activities require strong government bargaining skills, to ensure 
that the greatest possible share of the rent element from mining accrues to the host 
country (Chang, 1998:238). 
 
6.3 RETURNS TO THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY FROM THE EXTRACTION OF 
COPPER 
 
Main determinants of returns for the national economy from mining investigated below 
are: (i) government tax revenue from mining; (ii) the repatriation of mining resources; 
(iii) Zambia’s foreign currency earnings from mining; and (iv) the roles of TNCs in 
promoting the development of local capital, in particular the development of local 
suppliers and workers in the mining sector. 
 
It is noted in Chapter 3 that adequate capturing of rent of exhaustible resources by the 
government is fundamental for promoting national development and to maximise long-
term revenue to compensate for their limited income and employment potential. In 
particular, sufficient tax revenue is necessary to increase rent capturing, in addition to 
reinvestment of the capital allowance component from mining in alternative forms of 
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capital assets viz. investment in new wealth and forms of renewable capital, such as 
human, social and physical capital to achieve sustainable development, beyond mining 
(see, for example, Pedro, 2004:6; Blignaut & Hassan, 2002:99-101; Blignaut & Hassan, 
cited in Cawood et al., 2001:157). Excessive repatriation of profits would reduce or 
cancel out gains through investment and tax revenue and may even amount to a draining 
of the surpluses of developing countries. An investigation of the generation of effective 
renewable capital in Zambia from mining surpluses is pursued by assessing the benefits 
from mining to the local suppliers and workers in Zambia.  
 
6.3.1 Government tax revenue from mining 
 
Adequate fiscal take from mining,514 balancing the firms’ willingness to invest and the 
maximisation of rent capturing for the government from mining, is crucial to enable the 
government to meet the requirements of capital generation for reinvestment in projects 
and social capital (see, for example, Lewis, 1982; Auty, 1993, cited in Cawood et al., 
2001:220, 221). Too low taxes would result in rent from copper extraction accruing 
mostly to mining TNCs (Macfarlane, cited in Cawood et al., 2001:220, 221). While low 
taxes from the extraction of copper would serve profit-maximising aims of mining 
TNCs these would diminish the share of surpluses obtainable from mining to the 
Zambian economy and people.  
 
The discussion below investigates the fiscal take of the government from mining TNCs 
in Zambia by reviewing firstly the government taxes from mining and the impact of the 
concessions granted to mining TNCs on government revenue. Next, the motivation for 
higher mining taxes from TNCs is considered. The leverage of the government in 
increasing government revenue from mining TNCs is then explored.  
 
6.3.1.1 Government taxes and the impact of concessions on government revenue 
 
Unlike the case under government ownership, income to the government from mining 
under private TNCs’ ownership is not obtained directly from sales and profits from the 
mines but is confined under private ownership of the mines to various taxes levied on 
                                                 
514
    Considered by various theorists as the strongest linkage between the mining sector and the national economy. 
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the mining TNCs. The mining taxes include income tax of employees, border tax paid 
on imports and exports, corporate tax on profits and mineral royalties on the sales of 
copper. Further revenue is obtained from 15% withholding tax and from reverse VAT 
(whereby mining companies have to pay tax when they outsource work to foreign 
workers, while local expertise is available).515  
 
The extensive tax concessions granted to mining TNCs, especially on corporate tax, 
VAT, duty tax, mineral royalty tax and the additional concessions granted to the latter 
privatised mines, KCM and MCM (detailed in Table 6.1), reduced even further the 
potential government tax revenue obtainable from private mining TNCs. The tax 
revenue from mining is illustrated in Figures 4.22 and 4.23 of Chapter 4 (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:55). In the first year of the privatisation of some of the mines in 1997, tax 
and other concessions granted to the mining TNCs cost the government ZK18 billion 
(US$7.83 million) in lost revenue. The additional concessions extended to KCM and to 
MCM in 2000 exacerbated the losses in government revenue (Afronet et al., 2001:16, 
42).  
 
In the short term, under private ownership of all the major copper mines, mining tax 
(namely total company tax, withholding tax and mineral royalty tax but excluding 
PAYE for workers), remained at very low levels of less than US$2.4 million between 
2000 and 2004. This was largely as a result of the various concessions that mining 
TNCs continue to enjoy. However, during the copper price boom mining tax rose from 
a mere US$1.3 million in 2004 to US$10.1 million in 2005 and to US$49.7 million in 
2006. It increased further to about US$174.3 million in 2007 (Figure 4.22). These 
increases in government revenue from mining from 2005-06 were a considerable 
improvement on the low levels of 1998 and 1999, before the transfer of ownership of all 
the major copper mines to private ownership and from even more marginal levels until 
2004, under private ownership.  
 
However, the higher levels attained during the copper price boom were still 
                                                 
515
    Interview with Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003. 
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significantly lower than the contribution that the ZCCM made to the national treasury in 
1991, under government ownership (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:55). Figure 4.22 shows that 
the 1990-91 financial year, mining taxes were about US$236.7 million and in 1991-92 
these were US$194.6 million. However, mining taxes fell to about US$42 million in the 
1994-95 financial year and continued to decline to US$13.1 million in 1996. 
 
The poor contribution of taxes from mining to total government revenue is further 
mirrored in the fact that at the height of the copper price boom the share of mining taxes 
rose to only about 10% in 2006. In Chile the contribution was 20% (Bova, 2009:18-19). 
The low Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR – describing how much each industrial 
sector is taxed) of the mining sector, at around 0%,516 further manifests the poor 
contribution of the mining sector to government revenue (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:55).  
 
Another surprising aspect of the Zambian taxation system is the fact that PAYE taxes 
from mining employees’ salaries517 constitute the government’s main source of revenue 
from the mining sector (Figure 4.24). As such, personal income tax generated an 
unusually high share of the total tax take, of just under one third of the total government 
revenue, in 2003. In contrast, by 2006 during the copper price boom, the gains in 
government revenue from mining corporate tax to US$36.34 million (that was 
negligible until 2005) still contributed very little to government revenue, even less than 
smaller sectors, such as the financial services and telecoms sectors (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:55, 56, 61, 62). Corporate tax increased further to US$156.73 million in 2007. 
Section 4.4.20 explains the trends in government tax obtained from mining. 
 
The overall company tax518 contributed only 2.5% of total government revenue in 2006, 
while it had generally brought in over 6% of the total annual income of the government 
in the 1990s (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:62). Likely transfer pricing practices aided by the 
possibility to remit 100% of their mining profit out of Zambia519 probably accounted, 
                                                 
516
    According to the calculations of the World Bank. 
517
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Reibner Hoffner, 15 October 2003 and Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 
2003. 
518
    From mining and non-mining companies. 
519
    Interview with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003. 
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together with the concessions, for the poor corporate tax gains and other taxes for the 
government from mining. In particular, concessions allowing mining companies to 
carry losses from previous years forward for 15 years (and for 20 years in the case of 
KCM and MCM) and to write them off against future profits and to deduct 100% of 
their capital expenditure and fixed assets from the accounting profit as tax allowance 
greatly reduced the corporate tax base for the Zambian government.520 The enormity of 
the losses is well illustrated in the significant differences in accounting losses in the first 
year of the operations of the Chibuluma mines that amounted to US$1.8 million, and net 
losses that came to US$18.8 million, after US$17 million worth of assets bought from 
the government (100% of fixed assets) was taken into account for that particular year.521 
 
Other non-corporate tax concessions granted to mining TNCs also significantly reduced 
the potential government revenue obtainable from taxing mining companies. These 
include the lowering of royalty tax for extraction522 that led to mining TNCs 
contributing to just 0.2% of government revenue in 2003,523 VAT on goods bought 
locally and duty exemptions on various imports. In particular, duty exemptions 
significantly lowered the potential government revenue, especially in light of the METR 
on machinery of the mining sector enjoying the largest subsidy (-18.3 percent) received 
in any sector and asset (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:62). Moreover, the strategy of mining 
TNCs of building the labour costs into the capital equipment expenditure, making the 
isolation of the labour content difficult, enables mining TNCs to pay no or very low 
reverse VAT (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:55, 56, 62).524 Furthermore, reductions on other 
tariffs, such as the concessions on excise duties granted to some of the mining 
companies, likely contributed to the collection of excise duties being 10.9% below 
target in 2003 (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2003:5). 
 
Furthermore, the advantage often cited by mining TNCs that price participation clauses, 
                                                 
520
    Interviews with Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003 and Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003. 
521
    Interview with Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003. 
522
    Namely a tax on the revenue from the sales of copper. 
523
   Also, since 2003, the Zambian government no longer gains royalties from Bwana Mkubwa (which paid mineral royalty tax on 
Zambian copper for 5 years), as the company now obtains its copper ore from the DRC, while processing it in Zambia (interview 
with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003). 
524
    Interview with Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003. 
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whereby the government is able to claim back a percentage of each sale made if the 
price of copper at the LME exceeds a specific benchmark (US$2 700 per ton), would 
increase government revenue is misleading. This is because the tax-deductible 
incentives granted to mining companies for the price participation payments would 
cancel out gains in government revenue from price participation. Also, the capping of 
price participation benefits to the government, at US$9 million per annum for MCM 
further reduces this benefit (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:15, 57, 64, 65; ZPA, 2000c:33). In 
addition, returns in government revenue by way of its minority interests in the mining 
companies, through tax dividends paid to the ZCCM-IH, would only emerge once the 
companies commence reaping major profits (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:57). Despite the 
boom, the government did not receive any dividends from mining TNCs by 2008, 
through its stake in the privatised mining companies525 (varying from 10% to 21%), 
mainly owing to the accumulation of liabilities (Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, cited in Bova, 2009:11).  
 
Owing to the long-term nature of the concessions, higher gains for the government from 
tax revenue will be achieved not when mining companies begin to make a profit but 
only once they become eligible for tax, in some cases after 20 years. In the process the 
government will forfeit substantial potential revenue from mining.526 These concessions 
would, at times, outlive the life cycle of some of the mines (Committee on Economic 
Affairs and Labour, 2000:42-43; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:2; The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007b:36).  
 
Moreover, despite the general increase in government revenue in recent years, 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP has in fact dropped sharply since 2001, 
even during the years of the copper boom, and became volatile (Figure 4.22 of 
Chapter 4). This indicates that the government’s share of benefits during the boom was 
in fact declining (Bova, 2009:20). Accordingly, the government taxes from mining 
would in the absence of interventions to reduce the concessions, likely remain low for a 
                                                 
525
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
526
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003; Bernadette Mwakacheya, 
17 October 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Charles Muchimba, 18 November 
2003. 
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considerable time,527 precluding greater benefits for Zambia from better performance of 
the mining sector following increased investments in the mines under the ownership of 
TNCs (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:29, 36). 
 
6.3.1.2 Motivation for higher mining taxes  
 
The increases in PAYE and VAT to boost government revenue during Chiluba’s 
government to make up for the shortfall in revenue obtainable from the mining sector, 
were highly unsuitable for Zambia. This is because the unusually higher tax on workers 
through PAYE of 37.5%, which had been significantly raised since 1991, and of VAT 
of 17.5% (from which TNCs are excluded), especially on agricultural produce, which 
pushed up food prices, increased the tax burden of the poorer sectors of society (Fraser 
& Lungu, 2007:61; Africa Confidential, 2006:4). Moreover, increases in non-tax 
revenues, such as user fees or utilities bills for health and educational services, also 
lowered public access to these services (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:17, 18-
19).528  
 
Concessions represent a highly inappropriate policy for non-renewable resources that 
instead require the maximising of rent to compensate for their finite opportunities and to 
enable the reinvestment of the revenue from mining into renewable resources to ensure 
more sustainable development. Rather, higher import tariff rates, corporate tax and 
mineral royalty rates,529 which would be less disadvantageous to the poor, would be 
more appropriate and would considerably improve government revenue from mining 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007:61, 62, 64, 65). Higher copper prices, the poor corporate 
behaviour of some mining companies and the unlikelihood that most of the mining 
companies would have volunteered to pay more in taxes further justify an alteration of 
the concessions that mining companies enjoy. However, mainly as a result of the 
                                                 
527
    Interviews with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003; Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003; Andrew Hickman, 7 
November 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
528
    However, the reintroduction in 2002 of a free basic education policy led to an upturn in primary-school enrolment. and the 
raising of the numbers of medical personnel and the scrapping of user fees in rural clinics in April 2006, facilitated through debt 
relief granted to the country, in 2005-2006, would improve access to health facilities in Zambia (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2007b:18-19). 
529
    Possibly to an average of 2.5% that the IMF recommended in its 2005 report, on the overall Zambian tax policy, prepared for 
the government. A 2.5% mineral royalty represents a significantly less radical approach than what the Chilean government adopted 
in its 'pro-poor' mining policy and is still at the lower end of international averages and compared to their neighbours. An IMF 
survey of tax and royalty rates in developing country found that no other African country is charging royalty rates below two per 
cent (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:62). 
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dramatic increases in the price of copper since 2004, First Quantum, still well within the 
period of its tax holiday, decided to start paying company taxes that contributed 
US$19 million towards the revenue of the Zambia Revenue Authority in 2006 (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:57).530  
 
6.3.1.3 Government leverage to increase tax revenue from mining TNCs  
 
Public and donor pressures forced the Mwanawasa government to pass a new tax 
regime, via the Income Tax Amendment Bill introduced in April 2008, that prescribes 
increases in several taxes from mining and the removal of some mining incentives 
(Action Aid International et al., 2009:26, 47; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2008a:10, 11, 2008b:17).531 Key features of the tax amendments were the imposition of 
an additional 25% windfall tax and a variable profit tax on mining exports. The windfall 
tax was to apply when the international copper price rose above US$5 512 a ton. The 
variable profit tax (ranging from 0% to 15%) became payable if the taxable income of 
companies was above 8%. The windfall tax532 would have enabled the government to 
collect part of the extra rent generated from mining during times of windfall profit. The 
amended tax laws further allowed the companies to deduct only 25% of capital 
expenditure in each year of mining production (instead of 100%); increase royalties to 
3%, rather than 0.6%; and raise corporate tax to 30% from 25% (Action Aid 
International et al., 2009:26, 27, 32, 47; Bank of Zambia,533 2010; Zulu, 2008). 
 
High copper prices and increased sunk costs that mining companies incurred especially 
during the copper price boom that raised the costs to mining companies of pulling out of 
Zambia are likely to deter withdrawals and raise the leverage of the government to 
make demands on the mining companies. However, certain constraints continue to 
prevent the government from significantly reducing concessions, introducing additional 
tax over those stated in the Income Tax Amendment Bill of 2008 and from re-imposing 
levies or increases in import duty tariff rates in the mining sector. The constraints entail 
                                                 
530
    The decision was possibly to allay protests against the lack of redistribution of the high gains that the private mining companies 
enjoy. 
531
    The incentives were introduced at a time when copper prices were low and were deemed necessary to attract investors. 
532
    That was already withdrawn in 2009. 
533
    Current state of affairs confirmed by e-mail on 17 May 2010 from: Dinde Simacheche, SDINDE@boz.zm, Bank of Zambia, in 
response to questions by author. 
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hostility of the mining companies to the new tax regime,534 capacity constraints of the 
government and the possibility that those mining companies that had their concessions 
inserted in the Zambian constitution (Statutory Instrument 32)535 are legally able to 
dispute such increases through international arbitration. The gazetting of the 
concessions of several mining TNCs in the legislation536 securely locks the government 
into demands made by the TNCs, making it extremely difficult to reduce these 
concessions (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:36; Fraser & Lungu, 2007:15).537 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) restrictions and various free trade agreements to 
which Zambia is a signatory also limit reductions in trade concessions (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:61, 62, 64; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:4, 10; Africa Confidential, 
2007:10). 
 
As a result, the increases of some of the taxes through the Income Tax Amendment Bill 
were short-lived. Pressure from mining companies to take the matter to international 
arbitration and the fall in the copper prices in 2009 from the high levels of June 2008 
obliged the government to reduce or abolish some of the new tax increases. This was 
ruled in the 2009 National Budget (Action Aid International, et al., 2009:58; Bank of 
Zambia,538 2010). Accordingly, following the announcement in the National Budget the 
windfall tax was withdrawn and the capital allowance of 100% was reinstated.  
 
Moreover, the provision to treat income and losses from hedging activities as a separate 
activity from mining was repealed. Furthermore, the National Budget made provisions 
for the removal of customs duties of certain imports.539 The difficulty the government 
                                                 
534
    Already, some investors blame the freezing of new mining projects on uncertainties in the mining industry, the higher tax 
regime introduced in the mining sector, in 2008 and because of difficulties in raising funds for mining projects (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008a:2, 11). In 2008 MCM, the country's second-largest producer, shelved plans to sink a new shaft that could 
have created employment for 2000 people and increased output at the Mufulira mine, because of difficulties it experienced in raising 
capital (Chekwe-Puta, cited in The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:11). 
535
    Interviews with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003 and Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 October 
2003. 
536
    Bwana Mkubwa also intended to have their development agreement gazetted in the Zambian legislation (interviews with 
Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003; Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003 and Zion Simwanza, 1 December 2003). 
537
    By increasing corporate tax, from 25% to 30%, raising royalty taxes to 2.5%, and by reintroducing withholding tax on 
dividends, interests, royalties, management fees and the payments to affiliates or subcontractors in the mining sector, at a standard 
rate of 15%. 
538
    Confirmed by e-mail on 17 May 2010 from: Dinde Simacheche, SDINDE@boz.zm, Bank of Zambia, in response to questions 
by author. 
539
    For instance, copper flakes, powder and blisters were exempted from custom duties; excise duty on heavy fuel oils were 
reduced from 30% to 15%; and the import VAT deferment scheme were extended to include copper and cobalt concentrates (Bank 
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experienced in unilaterally reducing the concessions granted to mining TNCs indicates 
that lengthy re-negotiations between the government and the mining companies would 
be necessary to enable greater benefits for Zambia from copper mining (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:62, 65; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:36). 
 
The poor gains in government taxes under private TNCs’ ownership of the mines 
discount the neo-classical argument that privatisation plays an important role in 
increasing government revenue, in addition to revenue from the proceeds from the sales 
of the mines. Rather, the limited tax income from privatisation, among other factors, 
reduces a successful outcome of the privatisation process, as is argued by Cook and 
Kirkpatrick (2000a:121). However, rather than due to an inherent flaw of the operations 
of TNCs in host countries, the weak returns in government revenue under TNCs’ 
ownership of the mines seem largely the outcome of the poor bargaining leverage of the 
host government, enabling the mining TNCs to extract excessive concessions from the 
government.  
 
The excessive concessions that mining TNCs were able to extract from the Zambian 
government again challenge the bargaining proponents’ relative optimism regarding the 
negotiating prospects that developing host countries possess to extract beneficial terms 
from the activities of TNCs. Conversely, the poor gains that the weak government 
obtained from the mining TNCs, through taxes, reinforce the argument of 
developmental state theorists that a strong capacity of the government is fundamental in 
ensuring more economic benefits for countries from the activities of TNCs. 
 
6.3.2 Repatriation of mining resources 
 
High repatriation of profits under private TNCs’ ownership of the mines, also through 
possible transfer pricing policies, reduced rent for the Zambian government from the 
extraction of copper under TNCs’ ownership of the mines. This represented a large 
drain on Zambia’s exhaustible resource. The difficulties of getting figures on transfer 
pricing practices and on the exact amount of mining revenue repatriated out of Zambia 
                                                                                                                                               
of Zambia (confirmed by e-mail on 17 May 2010 from: Dinde Simacheche, SDINDE@boz.zm, Bank of Zambia, in response to 
questions by author). 
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since the mines were privatised, make it impossible to determine precisely the extent of 
these practices of TNCs in more recent years. The income balance account, illustrated in 
Figure 4.10 of Chapter 4, does though provide an indication of the repatriation of profits 
of mining TNCs.  
 
It is noted from the income balance account that at the time of the unprecedented boom 
in the price of copper during 2005-2006, a high repatriation of profit took place. This is 
depicted in the dramatic fall in the income balance of Zambia from -US$410 million in 
2004, to -US$609 million in 2005, and finally to -US$1 005 million in 2006, at the time 
that the country enjoyed significant increases in its GDP from 2005 and 2006. The 
decline indicates that a large portion of gains from mining surpluses during the boom 
was lost to the Zambian economy. Weaknesses in certain regulatory and policy 
measures of the government, however, continue to facilitate the repatriation of profits 
from mining. 
 
6.3.3 Foreign currency earnings for Zambia from mining 
 
Mining TNCs have significant leverage in influencing Zambia’s foreign currency 
earnings, on account of the foreign earnings from copper sales (Zambia’s dominant 
export earner) accruing to them under their ownership of the mines. Under state 
ownership of the mines these accrued to the Zambian government. The externalisation 
of profits to offshore accounts, also through transfer pricing practices, greatly 
contributed to the high volatility (Figure 4.13 of Chapter 4) and lower foreign currency 
earnings accruing to Zambia from mining than was expected under TNCs’ ownership of 
the mines.540 The failure of TNCs to fulfil all their investment obligations and the high 
concessions mining TNCs enjoy, further reduced foreign currency earnings for the 
country from mining. The foreign currency reserve levels are discussed in Section 
4.4.12 of Chapter 4. 
 
Excessive outflows of mining surpluses undermined the stability of Zambia’s foreign 
exchange reserves with likely disastrous outcomes for the country, especially in the 
                                                 
540
    Interview with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
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context of the country’s limited foreign exchange reserves. The repatriation of mining 
surpluses increased at the height of the copper price boom (Figure 4.4.9 of Chapter 4). 
Accordingly, the increases in foreign exchange reserves, especially in 2005 and 2006, 
were most likely attributable to the highly significant debt forgiveness that was 
extended to Zambia, rather than to TNCs’ ownership of the mines. 
 
The repatriation of a significant portion of foreign currency earnings under private 
ownership of the mines further diminished the country’s savings from mining. Savings 
from mining would enable the establishment of a stabilisation fund, necessary to reduce 
the negative impact of high volatility in the foreign currency reserves, owing to 
fluctuations in the price of copper. Furthermore, the far more aggressive auction system, 
whereby private mining companies tend to deal only with the banks that offer the 
keenest rates, encouraged bidding wars among the banks, benefiting the mining TNCs, 
at the expense of the banks in Zambia (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001c:14687). 
Additionally, a shortage of foreign exchange in a strongly import-dependent economy 
greatly increased the costs of imported inputs for the local supply industries to the 
mining sector (cost-push inflation), reducing local entrepreneurial capacities that are 
highly dependent on imports for manufacturing inputs. 
 
The influence that mining TNCs possess on the level of foreign currency earnings also 
impact on the exchange rate, illustrated in Figure 4.12 of Chapter 4. The repatriation of 
mining profit and strategies of TNCs to manipulate the exchange rate (such as by way 
of withholding foreign exchange obtained from the sales of copper from the BoZ)541 
were greatly responsible for the high volatility and for the significant devaluation of the 
kwacha to the US dollar and the rand under private ownership of the mines before 
2004.542 It is noted in Section 4.4.11 of Chapter 4 that the value of the kwacha dropped 
from about US$1=ZK42 in 1990 to about US$1=ZK1 282 in 1996, immediately before 
the commencement of the privatisation of the mines in 1999, to US$1=ZK2 632, before 
the last and most lucrative mines were privatised. The value plunged further to 
                                                 
541
    That they for example employed as bargaining chips against the government to hedge themselves against increases in workers’ 
salaries during negotiations on the salaries of workers (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001c:14687; Van Buren, 2003:1151). 
542
    Ex-President Chiluba blamed the siphoning off of foreign exchange out of Zambia by new mine owners and other foreign 
investors for the fall in the value of the kwacha under TNCs’ ownership of the mines (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001c:14687). 
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US$1=ZK4 157 in 2000 and US$1=ZK4 771 in 2004, under private ownership of the 
mines. 
 
An unstable exchange rate limits, among other things, export diversification (World 
Bank, 2002a:18; Nalwamba, 2002:25).543 In contrast, the continued leverage that TNCs 
have in influencing the levels of foreign currency reserves and the exchange rate of the 
kwacha in Zambia544 enable them to extract more favourable outcomes in negotiations 
with the government.545 The tendency of mining TNCs to function in foreign currencies, 
mainly in US dollars, protects them somewhat against the depreciation of the kwacha to 
the dollar and is in fact highly beneficial to the foreign mining companies that receive 
payments for their copper and cobalt exports in hard currencies. Weaknesses in 
government policies, elaborated upon in Section 6.5.1.8, also greatly facilitate the 
externalisation of foreign exchange from mining. 
 
6.3.4 The roles of TNCs in promoting the development of local capital  
 
This section examines the benefits from mining to local capital, namely the local 
suppliers and workers in Zambia, under the ownership of TNCs that are necessary for 
more sustainable development from the exploitation of mining resources. The 
development of local capital would be gauged in particular by way of the advancement 
of local backward-linked suppliers to the mines, higher employment and the human 
capital development of Zambians. 
 
6.3.4.1 Local suppliers  
 
With the exception of Binani, increased investment and the greater resources of mining 
TNCs for payments to suppliers546 encouraged the development of more supply 
companies to the mining sector in the Copperbelt547 from what was the case immediately 
prior to the privatisation of the mines, that generated higher employment levels. Delays 
in payments from the ZCCM and especially the inability of various local industries to 
                                                 
543
    Interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
544
    By withholding dollars to effect a depreciation of the kwacha and by changing dollars into kwachas if an appreciation of the 
kwacha becomes desirable for TNCs. 
545
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
546
    Interview with Willie Sweta, 15 December 2001. 
547
    Interview with Willie Sweta, 15 December 2001. 
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compete in a liberalised environment were largely responsible for the closing down of 
many mining companies before the mines were privatised (discussed in Section 4.2.2.1 
of Chapter 4). The repayment of government debts, worth about K227 billion,548 to the 
suppliers of the ZCCM from an EU grant, however, also facilitated the process.  
 
The strong influence of the mines for developing backward linkages is depicted in the 
high coefficient of 2.4 that the mining sector possessed for backward linkages in 2001 
according to the IQ model. This indicates that for each kwacha of copper output 
produced, 2.4 kwacha from other sectors’ inputs were generated (World Bank, 
2002a:14).549 In contrast, the coefficient for the forward linkage of the mining sector, of 
about 1.5550 in 2001, is weak, since the mining sector does not directly provide inputs to 
other sectors and because almost all of the output are for exports (World Bank, 
2002a:14).551  
 
However, a closer examination of the benefits to local suppliers under TNCs’ ownership 
reveals that the growth was predominantly in the service sector that is less labour 
intensive, rather than in the manufacturing sector, limiting greater employment benefits 
for Zambia from the high coefficient for backward linkages in the mining sector. The 
contribution of the service sector to GDP increased considerably in 1994 to 43.8% from 
30.2% in 1993, consequent to the introduction of stricter SAPs. The service sector 
continued to grow under private ownership of the mines to 57.5% in 2007, moving the 
sector from fourth position in 1992 to first position in 2007 (Figure 4.6). This shifted 
the economy towards a service-driven economy (elaborated upon in Section 4.4.4 of 
Chapter 4) (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:28, 2008b:20; Mwanawina & 
Mulungushi, 2002:30).  
 
The potential benefits that a strong coefficient for backward linkages hold for local 
suppliers are further eclipsed by the regular practice of mining TNCs to replace local 
                                                 
548
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 15 December 2001. 
549
    The IQ coefficient is 1.1 for agriculture, 2.1 for manufacturing and 1.9 for finance. 
550
    Compared to 1.8 in agriculture, 2.4 for manufacturing and 3.8 in finance. 
551
    Accordingly, Zambia imports a wide range of manufacturing goods produced from copper (World Bank, 2002a:14; Seidman, 
1977:222). 
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companies in the procurement of mining inputs with likely cheaper and better quality 
imports from foreign manufacturers and suppliers. In particular, South Africa 
consolidated its position as the pre-eminent source of Zambia's imports, supplying a 
wide range of goods and services to Zambia. These include mining equipment and also 
non-capital goods,552 such as food, security, cleaning and building materials (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:16, 42). 
 
The mining TNCs even tended to buy copper cables from outside Zambia, rather than 
from Metal Fabricators of Zambia Limited (ZAMEFA),553 the only copper cable-
producing company in Zambia that used to supply the ZCCM with copper cable 
inputs.554 The mining companies also increasingly import refined petroleum products, 
rather than sourcing these from the Indeni refinery in Zambia, partly owing to repeated 
domestic supply disruptions, making petroleum a major component of the import bill. 
Many maintenance and repair services, largely because of guarantees that are in place, 
will also typically come from the same foreign source, at least for the first five years 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007:59; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:41).  
 
Moreover, while Zambians are able to tender for smaller purchases,555 perhaps reflecting 
a lack of capacity in Zambian businesses to supply high-cost goods, foreign companies 
are given sole suppliership for more expensive inputs into the mines. The high amount 
of inputs that are imported under private ownership of the mines is depicted in the 
dramatic and progressive increases in merchandised imports into Zambia from 2000 to 
2007, mainly as a result of the substantial import component that greater investment in 
the mining sector holds (refer to Figure 4.9 of Chapter 4). Imports rose by 28% from 
2000 to 2001, when they reached US$1 253 million, primarily owing to sharp increases 
in petroleum oil prices, a major component of the import bill, with capital goods 
accounting for the remainder.  
 
                                                 
552
    Despite the capability of several industries and suppliers in Zambia to supply some of these inputs to the mines (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:4, 58, 60). 
553
    That added value to copper through the manufacturing of copper cables, achieved under the Kaunda government’s protectionist 
policies. 
554
    Interview with Alick Lungu, 20 December 2001. 
555
    Interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003. 
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Imports increased further to US$1 393 million in 2003. Subsequently, they almost 
doubled in 2006 to US$2 634 million, from the 2003 level, and rose even further to 
US$3 622 million in 2007 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:23). However, 
imports in more recent years were more than offset by rising copper exports, due to the 
increases in the copper price from 2004 to 2006, leading to a fall in the drag that net 
trade placed on GDP (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:26). 
 
Allegedly, in some instances the mining companies do not necessarily select suppliers 
on the basis of x-efficiency objectives but to favour their subsidiary supplier companies. 
Such alleged practices increase the opportunity of mining TNCs to earn monopoly 
profits, restrict competition, facilitate transfer-pricing practices556 and limit multiplier 
benefits for local suppliers from the privatisation of the mines (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:59). In particular, Anglo American is alleged to have imported a number of its 
inputs into the KCM from its subsidiaries in South Africa.557 Some Zambian suppliers 
allege that Mopani also tends to support South African suppliers.558 Furthermore, NFCA 
favours equipment and service inputs from its Head Office, Transmetal Industrial 
Corporation of China, a Chinese SOE,559 according to its own managers. 
 
Additionally, the benefits of increased Zambian participation are possibly, at times, 
reduced because some South African supply companies allegedly disguise their 
effective foreign ownership in Zambia by using Zambians merely as fronts.560 However, 
the high volume of supplies, the many cross-holdings and side-holdings that several 
mining companies possess and the controlling of their stakes through offshore 
companies make detection of collusion in the purchase of supplies difficult through a 
normal auditing process.561 Furthermore, difficulties in obtaining data from mining 
TNCs on their suppliers has made it impossible within the scope of the study to 
independently confirm and to gauge the extent of TNCs’ practices to substitute Zambian 
suppliers. 
                                                 
556
    Interview with Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003. 
557
    Interviews with Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003 and L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003. 
558
    Interview with James Chalwe, 23 November 2003. 
559
    Interviews with Liang Tun, 4 November 2003 and Yu Zhongqin, 4 November 2003. 
560
    Interview with Alick Lungu, 20 December 2001. 
561
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
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Nonetheless, an investigation of several indicators delineating manufacturing 
performance provides some indication of the benefits of mining to local backward 
linkages to the mining companies. Figure 4.3 of Chapter 4 shows that the average 
manufacturing growth rate increased under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines. 
However, the increases took place from the very low base of 1998.  
 
Moreover, it is noted in Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4 that the growth was largely confined 
to the production of non-capital consumer goods mainly in the food, beverage and 
tobacco production, rather than in the local backward-linked industries to the mining 
sector. These commodities contributed about 65.8% to total manufacturing output in 
2007, from 59.3% in 2000 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008b:19; Central 
Statistical Office, 2008). The increasing growth primarily in consumer commodities 
reduces diversity in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Furthermore, in spite of the better performance of the mining sector from 2004 to 2006, 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 of Chapter 4 show that the contribution of manufacturing to GDP 
remained lower under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines. The contribution of 
manufacturing was 11.1% in 2006 according to World Bank figures (10.5%, CSO), at 
the height of the copper price boom, compared to the 1997 level of 13.2% (11.8%, 
CSO) (World Bank, 2009; Central Statistical Office, 2008). The decline in the 
contribution of manufacturing to GDP during the copper price boom, together with the 
weaker correspondence between local manufacturing and mining growth rates (refer to 
Figure 4.3 of Chapter 4), reflect a poor linkage of the local manufacturing sector to 
mining under private ownership of the mines. These trends possibly portray practices of 
mining TNCs to replace several local companies with foreign companies in the supply 
of mining inputs.  
 
Additionally, although a short spike occurred in manufacturing employment in the short 
term under private ownership to 67 752 in 2002, from the 2001 level of 47 679 and 
from the poor employment levels in the 1990s, manufacturing employment dropped 
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sharply to 39 385 in 2003 (Figure 4.7 of Chapter 4). The steep decline in employment 
further emphasises the point that TNCs did not promote sustainable development of the 
local manufacturing sector over the short term. In addition, the weak development of 
manufacturing backward linkages to the mining sector challenges the validity of the 
argument that better mining performance has a positive knock-on effect on the 
manufacturing sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:34). Rather, the poor 
benefits to the local backward linkages to the mines affirm the arguments of Lewis 
(1982) and Auty (1993) that the capital nature of modern mining operations renders 
them heavily reliant on foreign capital with poor local production linkages. Instead of 
local backward-linked industries to mining, fiscal linkages are the strongest linkage 
between the mining sector and the national economy (cited in Cawood et al., 2001:220, 
221).  
 
Private mining TNCs cite the inefficiencies of local suppliers, particularly lower 
technical standards and quality, poor capacity for timely deliveries and lack of price 
competitiveness of products and services of local companies as the major motivations 
behind their decisions to opt for foreign suppliers (World Bank, 2002b:26; 
Transparency International, 2002:6). The cyclical problems562 linked to difficulties in 
meeting supplies and in stockholding that local companies experienced further 
encouraged the foreign sourcing of goods (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:59). The withdrawal 
of Anglo American from Zambia before the commencement of the local business unit 
that would have assisted future retrenchees of these companies to develop businesses, to 
which KCM might have contracted work,563 precluded greater benefits for local 
businesses. Certain weaknesses in government policies, elaborated upon in 
Section 6.5.1, especially the lack of an effective industrial policy to promote local 
suppliers under the ownership of mining TNCs, further contributed to the undermining 
of local suppliers and to their limited gains from the participation of mining TNCs in 
the economy. 
 
                                                 
562
    For instance, once overlooked, local companies would be discouraged from stocking the goods that mining TNCs required, 
which in turn diminished their capacity to meet subsequent short notice demands from multinational companies, again reinforcing 
the reluctance of mining TNCs to source inputs locally. 
563
    Interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003. 
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6.3.4.2 Local workers 
 
The reopening of the mines that had been closed improved employment opportunities at 
these mines. For instance, employment at Chambishi Non-Ferrous Metals increased 
from a skeleton staff of only 130 employees before the mines were privatised, to 
537 workers in 2006 that were directly employed at NFCA. The total permanent and 
non-permanent employees at NFCA increased to 1 200 in 2003, at a time when the 
company was running at half capacity,564 and rose further in 2006 to a total of about 
2 100 employees that were also employed in subcontracting firms (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:48). Moreover, the opening of Bwana Mkubwa enabled the employment of 
200 permanent local workers at the facility in 2003 and 640 workers were employed at 
Chambishi Metals under AVMIN that increased further to 660 employees in 2003, after 
the smelter was built (Lungu, 2001:16).565  
 
However, notwithstanding the higher employment levels in the mines that reopened, the 
overall employment levels, particularly permanent employment dropped far below the 
1990s’ levels, when many mineworkers were also retrenched, under government 
ownership (elaborated upon in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5). Permanent employment 
levels in the mining sector declined dramatically, from 47 700 in 1996 before the copper 
mines were privatised to 22 000 in 2000, when all the mines were privatised, to only 
19 000 in 2002 (refer to Figure 4.7 of Chapter 4). The more recent marginal increases in 
permanent employment levels, to 19 900 in 2004 and to 21 000 in 2006, were 
seemingly mainly because of the improved performance of the mines, following huge 
hikes in copper prices from 80.3 US cents/lb in 2003 to 305.6 US cents/lb in 2006 (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:31).  
 
The increasing shift in the employment of mineworkers under private ownership of the 
mines from permanent to non-permanent employment further reduced greater 
advantages to workers. The non-permanent workers include those employed in external 
contract firms, fixed-term workers and casual workers, comprising 47% of the total 
mining sector labour force in Zambia in 2006. As noted in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5, 
                                                 
564
    Interview with Yu Zhongqin, 4 November 2003. 
565
    Interview with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003. 
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the poorer conditions of employment that non-permanent workers endure limit the 
benefits to local workers from the more recent increases in mining sector employment.  
 
Advantages to local workers are further lowered through the tendency of external 
contractors to employ many foreign workers, especially from South Africa and from 
Zimbabwe, for semi-skilled work566 as well as for unskilled work.567 This was done 
despite the availability of highly skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled unemployed 
workers in Zambia. AVMIN employed mainly unskilled South African workers in the 
building of the Chambishi smelter at Chambishi Metals (Lungu, 2001:16).568 Only 52 
Zambian mineworkers, compared to 180 Chinese workers, were employed on 
permanent contracts at NFCA in 2006 reducing the benefits to Zambians of increased 
employment at the company (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:49). 
 
In contrast, the pro-worker policies of the Kaunda government motivated by its 
electoral-maximising motives favoured higher employment levels, over the x-efficiency 
measures of mining TNCs that encourage a more streamlined workforce. However, 
continued high losses in the mines under government ownership might have manifested 
into even greater losses in employment in the mines than under private ownership and 
into zero employment within the highly pessimistic scenario of a closure of the mines, 
because of poor performance. The uncertainty as to what would have happened to the 
mining industry had the mines remained under government ownership precludes 
definitive judgment on the influence of changes in ownership of the mines to TNCs on 
the employment levels of workers in the mines.  
 
Moreover, with the exception of KCM, CEC and J and W, expatriates (from countries 
of origin of the mining TNCs) were favoured to take over the senior positions under 
private ownership of the mines by TNCs.569 This was the case despite the availability of 
well-trained and experienced Zambians that previously occupied many of the senior 
                                                 
566
    Such as bricklayers and security firms. 
567
    Interview with Tom Goodman, 18 December 2001. 
568
    Interview with David Chilipamushi, 17 December 2001. 
569
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 
2003; Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003 and Jack Jones, 22 October 2003. 
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technical570 and managerial positions.571 Under private ownership of the mines, 
expatriate managers are also paid much higher wages than local experts of similar 
qualifications and experience.572 Under government ownership and management of the 
mines, highly qualified Zambians (fostered through 30 years of free education and 
through the Zambianisation policies, introduced during Kaunda’s government) mostly 
dominated the senior management positions (Transparency International, 2002:6; 
Muchimba, 1998:29). 
 
In some mining companies, expatriates make up almost the entire new management 
team, under TNCs’ ownership of the mines. For instance, only one Zambian manager 
out of 12 was employed in management positions at NFCA in 2003, while the rest were 
from China (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:28, 57, 58).573 Chibuluma Mines and Mopani574 also 
employed mainly expatriates at higher management levels in 2003.575  
 
However, CEC, KCM and J and W were more conscientious about employing 
Zambians at management levels. CEC employed only two foreign managers out of 
seven senior managers by 2003 and KCM, under the majority control of Anglo 
American, also retained most of the Zambian executives and managers576 and brought in 
very few expatriates577 (World Bank, 2002b:27).578 Furthermore, in contrast to AVMIN 
that employed mainly foreign managers, J and W placed Zambians in top positions 
when it took over Chambishi Metals from AVMIN in late 2003 (Kaunda, 2002:166).579 
Additionally, Vedanta Resources brought in Indian management wholesale at KCM in 
2004, but subsequently lowered the number of expatriates in the company (Fraser & 
Lungu, 2007:58).  
 
                                                 
570
    Such as metallurgical engineers. 
571
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
572
    Interview with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
573
    Interviews with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003 and Yu Zhongqin, 4 November 2003. 
574
    With the exception of the Vice President, who is Zambian. 
575
    Interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003. 
576
    Including the Vice President, the Director of Finances, the Company Secretary, the Director of Public Relations and the 
Director of Human Resources at KCM (interviews with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003 and Charles Muchimba, 18 November 
2003). 
577
    Such as the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer and the Chief Operations Officers. 
578
    Interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
579
    Interview with Agnes Bwalya, 9 November 2003. 
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Notwithstanding that it is an international practice of foreign investors to appoint 
employees of choice in key managerial positions, to maintain technical control of their 
operations, the selection of expatriates in preference to equally qualified Zambians 
prevents greater development of local capacities from the participation of mining TNCs 
in the economy. Also, the above discussion shows that some foreign mining investors 
also appointed expatriates in non-key positions. The absence of limitations on the 
contract period and on the number of times an expatriate can renew his/her contract,580 
together with the fact that expatriates in Zambia are paid twenty or more times the 
salary of Zambians with similar qualifications, encourages expatriates to adopt 
measures ensuring their continued stay in the mining companies (Regional Investor 
Survey, 2001:42; Muchimba, 1998:30).  
 
Insufficient investments in the training of local Zambians by several mining companies, 
which are often confined to small-scale in-house training of employees, further limited 
the potential benefits that TNCs hold in developing the human capital of Zambians, 
through the transferring of skills to the host country. However, CEC stands out as 
having provided an effective retraining and replacement programme for its redundant 
employees, at a cost of US$400 000 and committed a further US$0.25 million for 
overseas training of Zambians in the first year of its operations in Zambia.581 The 
retraining programme culminated into the establishment of almost 40 companies, owned 
and operated by former employees of the Power Division. CEC contracted work to 
these companies that in turn provided employment to almost 250 people at the end of 
2003.582  
 
More recently, Vedanta Resources also trained 40-50 Zambian business leaders on a 
management training scheme and employed Zambian staff in its international 
programme to gain international experience – the only company other than CEC to do 
so by 2006 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:58). The training programme that Vedanta 
Resources provided enabled the company to reduce its expatriate managers. The 
                                                 
580
    Unlike the case in Zimbabwe and Botswana. 
581
    Interviews with Gary Loop, 29 October 2003 and Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003. 
582
    Interview with Gary Loop, 29 October 2003. 
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company further re-established a similar training scheme to what was undertaken under 
the ZCCM, including the recruitment of 1 200 school leavers throughout the country to 
be trained and with the potential of working at KCM (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:58). The 
skills training provided in general supervision, motivation, expertise and safety 
promoted the human capital development of employees at KCM.583  
 
However, the refusal of most mining companies to assume responsibility for non-core 
facilities, including the educational facilities of the ZCCM, greatly lowered the 
development of the human capital of the Copperbelt community. In contrast, under 
government ownership of the mines during Kaunda’s government, the redistribution of 
mining surpluses584 also for improving the social services of Zambians, including 
educational facilities provided by the ZCCM, greatly benefited among others the human 
capital development of the Copperbelt community. Also, loopholes in laws and 
particularly, poor implementation of laws protecting local workers (detailed in Section 
6.5.1) further facilitated their replacement by foreign workers and suppliers and enabled 
the importing of jobs. 
 
The practice of TNCs to substitute local capital limits the scope of the arguments of 
neo-classical proponents and neo-fundamentalists that TNCs complement local capital 
and reduce dependence. Rather, these activities support the views of neo-imperialists 
and Global Reach proponents that TNCs displace indigenous capital. This would likely 
reduce the most profitable local capital, the local bourgeoisie, into a ‘comprador’ or a 
dependent bourgeoisie, incapable of playing its historic role of promoting capitalist 
development, according to neo-imperialists (cited in Jenkins, 1987:29). The 
substitutions also affected local production adversely and generate an externally 
dependent economy, as is argued by Helleiner (1989:1454) and Padayachee (1995:14). 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that within a weak state, returns to the Zambian 
economy from the extraction of copper under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines 
became highly limited. Rather, certain opportunistic activities of mining TNCs, enabled 
                                                 
583
    Interview with Norman Mbazima, 18 December 2001. 
584
    Mainly deposited with the BoZ. 
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through their stronger bargaining edge over the Zambian government, had a negative 
impact on the Zambian economy. The high concessions that mining TNCs for the most 
part continue to enjoy greatly reduced government tax revenue from mining. This, 
together with the repatriation of profits out of Zambia, limited a greater optimising of 
returns from the rent element of mining under TNCs’ ownership of the mines. The 
meagre mining surpluses that the government was able to capture under private 
ownership also lowered the options of the country for saving and for accumulating 
foreign currency reserves from mining. In the context of the finite benefits that pertain 
to mining, as a non-renewable resource and because of the short life-spans of some of 
the mines, the granting of especially long-term concessions to mining companies seems 
highly illogical. 
 
Moreover, the poor reinvestment of rent from mineral extraction to develop non-
exhaustible sectors as well obstructed diversification and more sustainable development 
of the Zambian economy from mining surpluses. These also restricted higher 
employment levels. The practices of most mining TNCs to increasingly replace local 
suppliers and workers with foreign capacities further fuelled these trends. The combined 
effect of taxation and spending represents an important avenue through which a more 
equitable distribution of income from mining becomes possible (Volkerink, 2009:3). 
 
The poor returns from mining, the lack of redistribution of the surpluses from mining 
and the high repatriation of revenue from mining out of Zambia under TNCs’ ownership 
of the mines somewhat discredit the neo-classical argument that TNCs supplement the 
resources, foreign exchange earnings and local savings of Third World host countries. 
Instead, these weaknesses support the argument of neo-imperialists that TNCs drain the 
surpluses of host countries. This impedes capital accumulation that is essential for 
economic progress and contributes to the ‘underdevelopment’ of Third World host 
countries, according to these theorists (Helleiner, 1989:1453; Jenkins, 1987:27, 28, 29). 
The poor development consequences of these activities of mining TNCs also confirm 
the ‘resource curse’ argument that resource-abundant economies tend to grow less 
rapidly than resource-scarce economies. However, the poor capacity of the government 
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greatly facilitated these outcomes.   
 
6.4 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE DECISIONS OF MINING TNCs TO 
DEPART FROM ZAMBIA 
 
Regardless of the excessive concessions, probable transfer pricing practices and the 
ability of TNCs to use foreign suppliers, Anglo American and AVMIN nevertheless 
departed from Zambia, raising important questions as to the factors that influence the 
locational decisions of TNCs. The investigation below of the factors that accounted for 
the departure of these two mining companies from Zambia provides insight as to the 
locational decisions of mining TNCs.  
 
6.4.1 Anglo American 
 
Anglo American withdrew within 18 months of beginning its operations at KCM, 
announced on 24 January 2002, before it was to commence committing US$523 million 
for KDMP and to start paying, as agreed in its sale agreement, the US$60 million 
deferred cash consideration (payable in six monthly instalments, starting on 1 January 
2006) (Zambia Daily Mail, 2002:3).585 Anglo American cited financial losses as the key 
reason for its decision to suspend trading in ZCI shares and to depart from KCM. 
Technical problems and a higher than estimated cost of production and investment 
required for implementing the rehabilitation programme586 also accounted for the poorer 
performance of KCM (The Economist, 2002b:1, 59; Craig, 2002:366; World Bank, 
2003b:132, 2002a:4, 7, 26). KCM experienced heavy losses that amounted to about 
US$l08 million in the 21 months ending December 2001, and US$159.9 million for the 
year ending 31 December 2002. 
 
A failure to secure non-recourse project funding on reasonable commercial terms,587 
through commercial borrowing from capital markets and from shareholders for its key 
project, KDMP, also seems a major reason for the departure of Anglo American. The 
cost of construction of KDMP was then estimated between US$500 million and 
                                                 
585
    Interview with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003. 
586
    Largely because the delay in the rehabilitation was accompanied by a looting of the mines, stripping of machinery, rusting of 
vehicles and a flooding of shafts. 
587
    Without recourse to shareholder guarantees. 
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US$1 billion (Craig, 2002:365, 366; The Economist, 2002b:1, 2; World Bank, 2002a:2, 
26; Times of Zambia, 2002:2; Kaunda, 2002:184, 187). The funding problems that 
Anglo American experienced were caused by the inability of ZCI to provide further 
funding to KCM, beyond its obligations under the Shareholders Subscription and Loan 
Agreement, over and above US$370 million in commitments that have already been 
given by shareholders (Kaunda, 2002:184; Ministry of Mines and Mineral 
Development, 2003:5; Craig, 2002:366; Zambia Daily Mail, 2002:3).588 The government 
was also unable to secure the concessional funding from the World Bank that Anglo 
American requested to assist it in its mining operations in Zambia (World Bank, 
2002a:26). 
 
Furthermore, the losses that Anglo American experienced at KCM rendered the 
company’s strategy, viz. to finance a significant proportion of the cost of developing 
KDMP mainly from cobalt proceeds from existing operations at the Nchanga open 
pit,589 unfeasible (Craig, 2002:365, 366; The Economist, 2002b:1; Kaunda, 2002:186; 
World Bank, 2003b:132, 2002a:6, 26; Africa Research Bulletin, 2003b:15601). Without 
KDMP, an enormous greenfield copper project that would have ensured the 
continuation of copper mining in Zambia and its re-establishment as a major copper 
mining country, further investment in KCM, with its small, difficult and short lifespan, 
would unlikely have produced the required rate of return acceptable to Anglo American 
(Kaunda, 2002:184; World Bank, 2002a:7; Times of Zambia, 2002:2). The copper price 
that reached less than US$400/ton in 2001 needed to exceed US$1 700/ton for a period 
of 12 months before it would have been feasible to proceed with KDMP (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 2001d:14977).  
 
The poor copper prices that dropped from an average of 88 cents per pound in 
September 2000 to just under 60 cents per pound in November 2001, the lowest price in 
15 years, also affected the performance of Anglo American in Zambia adversely 
(Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2002c:63). However, the low copper prices 
                                                 
588
    These funds were redeployed owing to losses that KCM experienced in the day-to-day operations of KCM, rather than for the 
development of the KDMP project for which these funds were intended. 
589
    Estimated to contribute cash of about US$300 million. 
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alone do not appear a major reason for Anglo American’s decision to pull out of 
Zambia, since smaller mining companies that would have been affected more by the 
poor copper prices did not withdraw from Zambia (The Economist, 2002a:59; Business 
in Africa, 2002:2; Business Day, 2002c; Mining News, 2002). Moreover, Anglo 
American’s refusal to reverse its decision to withdraw, despite expectations of recovery 
in the price of copper, and its subsequent investment of US$1.3 billion in a copper mine 
in Chile shortly after its withdrawal from Zambia, regardless of the low copper price, 
further discredit this argument.  
 
Anglo American also cited the poor grading of ZCI in the base metal division on a 
global risk return basis, under its then CEO, Tony Trahar, as a further reason for its 
decision to exit from Zambia (Business Day, 2002a; Business Day, 2002b). In 2001, the 
base metal division experienced losses of US$19 million, with ZCI in Zambia and 
Anaconda Nickel in Australia carrying particularly high risks, which reduced Anglo 
American’s global competitiveness in the base metal division. An increase of only 7.3% 
in Anglo American’s shares in 2001 made it the worst performer of the six-member 
Bloomberg Europe Metal and Mining Index (Bloomberg, cited in The Star, 2002a; 
Business Day, 2002a).  
 
However, the global objective of its shareholders in London to diversify away from 
Africa appears to be a more plausible reason for Anglo American’s departure from 
Zambia than low copper prices and a decision to get out of base metals.590 This is 
mirrored in the fact that Anglo American invested in the copper mines in Chile almost 
immediately after its departure from KCM. Anglo American’s shareholders in the 
transformed board in London, which largely consisted of members unconnected to 
Southern Africa, blamed negative risk perceptions of investments in Africa for the 
lower share prices suffered by Anglo American,591 who possessed significant 
investments in Africa (Kaunda, 2002:187).592  
 
                                                 
590
    To focus on different minerals to spread the risks associated with price changes. 
591
    Over bigger mining companies, such as Rio Tinto. 
592
    Interviews with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003 and Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003. 
  
274
The relocation of Anglo American’s headquarter or its primary listings from 
Johannesburg to London in 1999 and the decision of Anglo American to sell the 35% 
shares it had bought from AVMIN593 in Zambia, somewhat vindicate the argument that 
Anglo American intended to reduce its portfolio in Africa594 and to shed its ‘regional’ 
image (Kaunda, 2002:187; Africa Confidential, 2002:1; The Economist, 2002a:59). The 
less favourable attitude of the shareholders towards investments in Africa was also 
behind the board’s vetoing thrice the decision for Anglo American's re-entry into 
Zambia's mining industry during the privatisation of the ZCCM, before it was finally 
passed (Kaunda, 2002:187). Moreover, the greater short-term profit-maximisation 
motives of the new board members further influenced the exit strategy of Anglo 
American. The decisions of the new board members represented a change from 
decisions of founding members of Anglo American, the Oppenheimers, who previously 
also based decisions to some extent on sentiments towards Zambia’s mines595 and on 
longer-term mining investments in Africa (Kaunda, 2002:187). 
 
However, higher returns on investment in the Chilean mines over those of Zambia also 
contributed to the decisions of Anglo American to shift its mining investments to Chile 
(The Economist, 2002b:1; Africa Research Bulletin, 2003a:15551). The higher returns 
were primarily because of the lower copper production costs at an average of 50 cents 
per pound at the Chilean mines, enabling the achievements of profit even when the 
copper price dropped to 62 cents per pound.596 Mining in the South American countries 
have additional advantages over Zambia that render them more attractive to investors.  
 
These include: 
• the higher transport costs of Zambia as a landlocked country (1 860 km from the 
closest port);  
• the open-cast mining, prevalent in South American countries, that lowers the costs of 
mining porphyry ore bodies, while the deeper sedimentary ore bodies prevalent in 
                                                 
593
    Some believe the purchase of AVMIN’s shares constituted an avenue to facilitate Anglo’s return to Zambia once it freed itself 
of its onerous obligations through its withdrawal from Zambia. 
594
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
595
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003 and Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003. 
596
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003.  
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Zambian mines necessitate underground mines;597  
• the superior infrastructure of Chile in comparison to that of Zambia, accounting for 
its greater cost competitiveness (Kaunda, 2002:188); and 
• the conflicts in the neighbouring Congo and Zimbabwe.598  
 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the extensive concessions that it enjoyed in Zambia and 
the stricter regulatory framework for mining TNCs in Chile, Anglo American withdrew 
from KCM in Zambia and subsequently invested in the more cost-effective Chilean 
copper mines. Also, the government was unable to attract a suitable investor for KCM 
until the end of 2004, after Anglo American left in 2002. The lack of an exit clause, as 
well as the failure of government policies to ensure higher sunk costs from mining 
TNCs and the weak enforcement of legislation further facilitated the withdrawal of 
Anglo American from Zambia. 
 
6.4.2 AVMIN 
 
Liquidity problems, high costs and its failure to win the bid for the Luanshya/Baluba 
mines largely accounted for AVMIN’s departure from Chambishi Metals in 2002. Low 
cobalt prices of between US$5.9 and US$7 per pound in 2002,599 high costs associated 
with the refurbishing of its smelter, a US$104 million impairment charge and 
limitations that the South African Reserve Bank placed on the amount of money 
AVMIN could send out of South Africa greatly contributed to the liquidity problems of 
the company (Africa Research Bulletin, 2003b:15601). 
 
The high costs of production were mainly owing to AVMIN having to replace a faulty 
smelter in 2002.600 Technical problems at its main furnace and smelter and the poor 
design of the new plant that AVMIN built for treating the smelter slag dump added to 
the costs of the company. These factors contributed to Chambishi Metals’ experiencing 
losses of US$195 million in 2002 that exacerbated the company’s already onerous debt 
                                                 
597
    Despite these being of a higher grade. 
598
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, December 2003. 
599
    Following decreases in orders for jets after 11 September 2001 (interview with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003). 
600
    Which resulted in the copper coolers taking much longer at 18 months to rectify, than the six months it envisaged (interview 
with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003). 
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service burden (The Economist, 2002a:59; Africa Mining Intelligence, 2003b:3; Africa 
Analysis, 2003a:16; World Bank, 2003b:132).601 The high debt of the company 
obstructed the construction of a US$l0 million cobalt solvent extraction plant (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 2003b:15600-15601).  
 
An unsuccessful bid for the Luanshya/Baluba Mines further contributed to its decision 
to withdraw from Zambia.602 The good ore grades of the Luanshya/Baluba mines that 
require less refinement would have supplemented the company’s production, lowered 
AVMIN’s costs of production603 and promoted its longer-term sustainable production 
(Sittard, cited in Times of Zambia, 2003:1; Africa Research Bulletin, 2003b:15600).604 
Since the long-term viability of Chambishi Metals was dependent on its obtaining 
cheaper copper ores,605 it was logical for AVMIN to sell its shares in Chambishi to 
J and W Holdings, following the success of the latter company in securing the bid606 for 
the Luanshya/Baluba mines.607 AVMIN was forced to write down US$135 million (half 
the value of its Zambian operations) on its balance sheet in 2002 (World Bank, 
2003b:132; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002:42). 
 
The above discussion shows that locational decisions of Anglo American were not 
significantly influenced by concessions and liberalised policies as the company 
withdrew from Zambia despite all the concessions it enjoyed. Economic factors, 
especially the competitiveness of the country in relation to other countries, determined 
through global profit-maximising motives of the mining TNCs and the location and 
quality of minerals in the mining sector, proved overwhelming in determining the 
locational decisions of Anglo American. Factors accounting for the lower 
competitiveness of Zambia in relation to Chile were a high-risk perception of its 
                                                 
601
    Interview with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003. 
602
    That AVMIN banked on to supply it with copper and cobalt concentrate that would have ensured a more sustainable existence 
for Chambishi Metals. 
603
    Interviews with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 
2003 and Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
604
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003. 
605
    Which would have been possible if AVMIN had won the Luanshya/Baluba bid. 
606
    Rumours of an on-going agreement between AVMIN and J & W to eventually sell Luanshya/Baluba and Chambishi to J & W 
once it won ownership of Luanshya/Baluba at a great profit led to the government short-circuiting the process by allocating 
Luanshya/Baluba to J & W instead of to AVMIN (interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003). 
607
    Interviews with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003, Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003, Silane Mwenechanya, 24 
October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003 and Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 2003. 
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shareholders of African investments, the relatively high costs of production and the 
greater inaccessibility of copper from deep-level mining in Zambia over the open-cast 
mining that is prevalent in Chile.  
 
Moreover, losses and liquidity problems common to both Anglo American and AVMIN 
further contributed to their departure from Zambia. The poor prospects of the long-term 
feasibility of Chambishi Metals subsequent to its failure to win the Luanshya/Baluba 
bid also proved highly significant in influencing AVMIN’s decision to depart. The 
limited influence of concessions, liberal policies and more restrictive economic policies 
of the Chilean government on the locational decisions of Anglo American is in line with 
the argument of Chang (1998:240) that concessions and liberal policies are not a 
guarantee for sustainable investment. It also vindicates the finding of a number of 
studies that concessions would not necessarily lead to more Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Rather, they serve merely to lessen the net value of investments made by mining 
TNCs that would likely have been made in any case, even in the absence of the 
concessions (Action Aid International et al., 2009:25).  
 
It further supports the argument of Padayachee (1995:166) that tax incentives, tax 
holidays and differentiated structures prove less important than factors such as the 
general investment climate and policies affecting specific sectors in attracting foreign 
investment. The significant influences of the competitiveness of the country in relation 
to others and the quality of minerals on the locational decisions of Anglo American and 
AVMIN confirm the argument of Helleiner (1989:1461) that the location and quality of 
minerals prove especially important in determining the locational decisions of TNCs in 
the mineral sector. 
 
6.5 THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES CONTROLLING 
MINING TNCs AND OF TNCs’ ACTIVITIES IN THE MINING SECTOR 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that various weaknesses in the public sector and 
loopholes in the enforcement of regulations affecting mining TNCs greatly contributed 
to the poorer gains of the government under private TNCs’ ownership of the mines. 
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Several theorists stress the importance of strong institutions and effective legislative 
measures in regulating of the activities of TNCs, discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
In particular, strong institutional capacities are necessary to protect the interests of the 
nation against some of the activities of TNCs, to ensure that the greatest possible share 
of the rent element from mining accrues to the host country, and to promote more 
beneficial outcomes from mining in resource-abundant economies (see, for example, 
Padyachee, 1995:166; Chang, 1998:238; Action Aid International et al., 2009:x; 
Bebbington et al., 2008:10). Criteria that enhanced the capacity of developmental states, 
according to developmental theorists (but also relevant to mining economies) are 
economic bureaucracies that enjoy power and competence and are insulated, a state that 
has a corporatist role and effective industrial policies (see, for example, Leftwich, 1995, 
Chang, 1993, 1994, Amsden, 1989, 1997). The formidable institutional and state 
capacities of developmental states enable them to direct the activities of TNCs towards 
more advantageous outcomes for the host country. 
 
Broadly, Section 6.5 examines and assesses first the capacities of various regulatory and 
institutional measures and the monitoring and enforcement capacity of the government in 
controlling and directing the activities of mining TNCs and their political-economic 
consequences. The political-economic implications of the activities of TNCs in the 
mining sector are then considered.  
 
6.5.1 Political economy and assessment of capacities of regulatory and institutional 
measures controlling the activities of mining TNCs 
 
Table A10 (in the Annexure), lists the main legal measures established to regulate the 
operations of private companies since Chiluba’s rule, which also apply to mining TNCs. 
The various institutional and regulatory measures for controlling and monitoring the 
activities of private mining companies in Zambia during Chiluba’s government broadly 
encompass government regulatory measures, bilateral agreements between the 
government and the private mining companies and the various government bodies 
commissioned to monitor private sector activities.  
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The principal measures that specifically regulate the activities of mining companies 
under private TNCs’ ownership entail the Investment Act, the Mines and Minerals Act 
and the development agreements. Government measures that seem necessary to control 
and ensure more beneficial outcomes from the activities of mining TNCs in Zambia are 
also investigated. These include: (i) legal measures regulating bankruptcy and the 
securities and exchange in Zambia; (ii) measures to protect both the mineworkers and 
local suppliers against certain activities of TNCs and to direct the activities of TNCs 
towards more beneficial outcomes for local capacities; (iii) statutory provisions to 
enforce payments of exit damages by TNCs, should they withdraw from Zambia; (iv) 
government measures to encourage greater investments and higher sunk costs from 
mining TNCs; and (v) measures to curb instability in the foreign exchange market.  
 
6.5.1.1 Investment Act (1995) and the Mines and Minerals Development Act (1995) 
 
The reforms of the Investment Act of 1995 and of the Mines and Minerals Development 
Act of 1995 were the most significant policy changes established to accommodate the 
activities of private companies and of the mining sector respectively. These reforms, 
largely driven by the IMF and the World Bank, altered many of the measures that the 
state had previously established to control the activities of companies (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:3, 11). The poor bargaining leverage of the Zambian government, and the 
economy’s high dependence on aid forced the government to adopt these reforms. The 
World Bank made the reforms conditional on the release of the Privatisation and 
Industrial Reform Credit (PIRC) 11 loan of 1993.  
 
The reforms introduced in the Investment Act of 1995 and in the Mines and Minerals 
Development Act of 1995608 were highly favourable to foreign investors in mining, by 
way of special incentives.609 The incentives specified in the Investment Act provided 
further assurances against nationalisation and eliminated foreign exchange controls.610 
                                                 
608
    That superseded the Mines and Minerals Act of 1972. 
609
    Special incentives were also granted to the Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ), at Chambishi, specified in the 2007 budget, 
through which they would receive various tax incentives. A number of Chinese companies, expected to create 60 000 new jobs in 
Chambishi, are likely to be the first to take advantage of the facility.  
610
    Via the Zambian Investment Centre (ZIC). 
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The elimination of foreign exchange still enables foreign companies to repatriate all 
funds in respect of dividends, principal and interest on foreign loans, management fees 
and other charges (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007b:29, 38). However, the 
exclusion of local investors from these concessions undermined local suppliers to the 
mines.611  
 
Moreover, incentives granted under the Mines and Minerals Development Act of 1995 
considerably reduced the income tax returns to the government from mining companies. 
These concessions entailed deducting the investments made in the mining sector from 
taxes and exempting mining companies from customs duties on imported machinery 
and equipment. Provisions of the Act also entitled specific companies to enter into 
bilateral 'development agreements' with the government. The bilateral agreements 
enabled mining TNCs to gain additional incentives to those granted by the Act (Fraser 
& Lungu, 2007:11). The incentives that both of the Acts granted to the mining TNCs 
and the concession allowing bilateral agreements to override the provisions of the 
Mines and Minerals Development Act were highly favourable to the mining TNCs. 
Conversely, these incentives disadvantaged the local entrepreneurs (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:11).  
 
The various concessions granted under both of the Acts greatly reduced government 
revenue obtainable from foreign mining TNCs (as is noted in Section 6.3.1) limiting the 
gains to the government from the rent element of mining. The concessions amount, in 
various ways, to the government’s subsidising the operations of TNCs in Zambia. 
However, the more recent adoption of the Zambia Development Agency Act of 2006 
(executed under the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)612 established in 2007), which 
replaced the Investment Act of 1995, aims to raise the profile of manufacturing 
companies and to eliminate discrimination between local and foreign manufacturing 
companies, which existed in the Investment Act. The ZDA Act further restricts the 
scope for incentives and makes it more difficult to employ foreign workers (Ministry of 
                                                 
611
    Interviews with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003 and Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003. 
612
   The ZDA was to act as a one-stop shop for investors to promote more efficient awarding of licenses for starting businesses in 
Zambia. The ZDA consists of an amalgamation of the ZIC, the Export Board of Zambia, the ZPA, the Zambia Export and 
Processing Zones and the Small Enterprise Development Board. 
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Mines and Mineral Development, 2003:4; The Post, 2003b:4; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2006:15; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2007b:38). Moreover, the higher taxes that the amendments to the Mines and Minerals 
Development Act that came into force in 2008 impose on mining TNCs would promote 
more favourable outcomes for the Zambian economy (Bloomberg, 2008, cited in The 
Zambian Chronicle, 2008). 
 
6.5.1.2 Development agreements 
 
Similarly, within the development agreements that entail bilateral agreements between 
the government and the mining companies, the dominant bargaining position of TNCs 
over the Zambian government enabled them to negotiate highly beneficial terms for 
themselves. These terms were often at the expense of the Zambian economy, 
demonstrating that within an unequal bargaining relation bilateral agreements tend to 
favour the stronger party. Additional pressure that the government faced from donors to 
swiftly privatise the final assets of the ZCCM enabled the mining companies that were 
later privatised to negotiate for additional concessions to those granted to earlier 
privatised companies.  
 
Within the development agreements the mining TNCs were able to further reduce the 
royalty tax rates, from the 3% of the net back value of the minerals produced, specified 
in the Mines and Minerals Development Act of 1995 (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:11). The 
legislation of certain terms of the development agreements of KCM and MCM, making 
external arbitration possible in the event of a breach of these terms, ensured a stable 
physical environment for mining investors. A stable environment promotes investor 
confidence that is favourable to mining TNCs.613 On the other hand, the legislation of 
clauses of the development agreements, including those allowing for concessions, 
renders it difficult to make changes to these agreements, to ensure more favourable 
outcomes for Zambia. 
 
 
                                                 
613
    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003 and Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003. 
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6.5.1.3 Bankruptcy laws and regulations controlling securities and exchange 
 
The laws that the Zambian government established to cover bankruptcies of companies 
and to regulate securities and exchange, which is important in a privatised setting for 
achieving greater efficiency and equity, have however proved inefficient (Stiglitz, 
1998:19 and 20).614 The bankruptcy laws that shield the liquidated companies from 
paying terminal benefits to workers further favoured mining TNCs, but disadvantaged 
the workers.615 The Securities and Exchange Commission in Zambia also has various 
shortcomings and is in need of further revision.616  
 
Despite the various measures introduced through the banking system to curb money 
laundering, detection of money laundering becomes difficult when money transactions 
take place on a cash basis outside the banks. International effort is required for more 
effective monitoring of money laundering.617 Poor monitoring over securities and 
exchange, in the absence of exchange controls, facilitated the repatriation of resources 
out of Zambia, also from mining TNCs. This affected the Zambian economy in a 
negative fashion, in loss revenue.618  
 
6.5.1.4 Measures to protect mineworkers against malpractices by TNCs 
 
Poor implementation of several labour regulations and of certain clauses in the 
development agreement on aspects of the training of local Zambians is a major 
weakness in measures to protect mineworkers.619 Fear on the part of the government that 
increasing demands on powerful mining TNCs may discourage foreign investment 
greatly contributed to the poor implementation of regulations protecting mineworkers.  
 
Significant reductions of the labour force and other measures that render it more 
difficult to organise collective action have reduced the capacity of Zambian workers to 
demand better working conditions. Under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines, the mine 
                                                 
614
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
615
    Interview with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
616
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Jack Jones, 22 October 2003; John Kangwa, 21 November 2003 and John 
Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
617
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
618
    A tribunal, which would have been more independent of the government and which would have been a less costly option for 
Zambian taxpayers, might likely have been a better alternative than the Task Force for investigating corruption in Zambia. 
619
    Interviews with Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003 and Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003. 
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unions that possessed significant power during Kaunda’s government consisted by 
2006/2007 of only 16 000 members at the MUZ and 4 000 to 5 000 members at the 
National Union of Miners and Allied Workers (NUMAW) (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:24, 
26, 52). Several strategies of mining TNCs that undermine effective operations of trade 
unions are contrary to the Industrial and Labour Relations Act and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions that prohibit practices curtailing the 
unionisation of workers. 
 
Moreover, poor enforcement of the provision of the Investment Act that only 
professional people may be recruited from outside Zambia620 and then only if the skills 
are unavailable in the country, which also limits the employment of expatriates, have 
hindered greater participation of Zambians at higher levels. These omissions enabled 
the external contract companies that the mining TNCs enlisted, to employ many foreign 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers (World Bank, 2002b:27 and Committee on 
Economic Affairs and Labour, 2000:17, 44).621 This also points to deficiencies in the 
Ministry of Labour in the control of work permits. The absence of clauses in the 
development agreements promoting greater participation of Zambians in the 
management of private mining companies,622 further curtailed their participation, even 
though many Zambians possessed the required skills.623  
 
Furthermore, the non-obligatory nature of the clauses in the development agreements 
that refer to training, financial assistance to aid the retrenched workers in gaining 
alternative skills and succession charts for employing local workers limits the 
enforcement capacity of the Zambianisation Committee, established to oversee the 
training of Zambians.624 These omissions also reduced the employability of those that 
lost their jobs.625 Additionally, the precedence given to development agreements that 
largely promote the interests of mining TNCs, over the provisions of the Safes 
                                                 
620
    Interview with Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003. 
621
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003. 
622
    Deemed the prerogatives of the respective boards of private companies (interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 
2003). 
623
    Interview with M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
624
    Interviews with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003; Jack Jones, 22 October 2003; 
Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003 and Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
625
    Interview with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
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Agreement that the ZPA employed for the privatisation of non-mining assets, has 
proven less beneficial to the local mining community. The Safes Agreement provides 
for explicit commitments to promoting Zambia's interests, including those of the 
employees. The provisions of the Safes Agreement typically covers conditions of 
service, training and development, the possibility of equity purchase by employees and 
other forms of employee involvement, plans for sourcing goods in Zambia, the sale of 
shares to Zambians and Zambian participation at management and board levels (ZPA, 
2002:5). 
 
The absence of government measures to ensure horizontal linkages between mining 
TNCs and local capacities that would reduce their reliance on expatriate employees 
further hindered significant development of Zambia’s human capital that such linkages 
potentially hold for the host country (see, for example, Evans, 1998; Kozul-Wright, 
1995:150, 153; Padayachee, 1995:173), noted in Chapter 3 (Kaunda, 2002:176). The 
higher returns of human capital, which could translate into a dynamic comparative 
advantage for the host country together with the transfer of technology skills, hold 
greater returns than research and development in countries that are not operating at the 
technological frontier. This underscores the importance of building the human capital of 
developing countries, which is unlikely to be filled by the market (Stiglitz, 1998: 24, 25, 
26, 32). While the mining sector still possessed a good level of residual middle-level 
skills up to 2001,626 most investors expressed a concern as to the longer-term impact of 
the declining educational standards, lower levels of public health and of declining 
government efficiency on the future skills of Zambians (Regional Investor Survey, 
2001:44). An adverse impact on the quality of human capital in the privatisation of 
SOEs, also through reduced training and worker health, would hinder growth (Pineda & 
Rodriguez, 2002, cited in Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005:528). 
 
Additionally, the poor capacity of the relevant formal bodies in implementing 
regulations protecting the safety standards of mineworkers undermined better safety 
standards for mineworkers. The measures established to protect the safety of workers 
                                                 
626
    Largely attributable to the achievements made by Kaunda’s Zambianisation policies (Muchimba, 1998:29). 
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include the Mines and Minerals Environmental Regulations, the Mines Safety and 
Explosives Regulations, revised in 1996627 and the Workers Compensation Act. The 
safety of workers is further monitored through the Mentor Council of Zambia.628 The 
diminished capacity of mining trade unions to effectively execute their roles in 
regulating and pressurising for safer working conditions also limited higher safety 
standards for mineworkers. Building the capacities of the Department of Mining,629 and 
of the inadequately funded Mines Safety Department630 are important for ensuring more 
effective implementation of safety measures in the mines (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:24 and 
26).  
 
6.5.1.5 Measures to protect local suppliers against certain activities of TNCs and in 
directing TNCs’ activities towards more beneficial outcomes for local capacities  
 
Several weaknesses in the regulatory measures governing the relations between local 
suppliers and the mining TNCs under MMD rule disadvantaged local suppliers. Many 
of these loopholes though favoured foreign suppliers. Broadly, these weaknesses 
encompass firstly, the absence of effective measures to curb various activities of mining 
TNCs that prove harmful to local suppliers. Secondly, the government failed to 
establish an effective industrial policy to encourage the development of local suppliers 
to the mines under the ownership of mining TNCs. This was mainly owing to its weak 
bargaining position at the time that the mines were privatised enabling the IMF and the 
World Bank to pressurise the MMD government into adopting liberal policies and a 
foreign investor-friendly regulatory regime, ahead of the privatisation of the ZCCM. 
 
The weaknesses in measures for curbing certain activities of TNCs631 that harm local 
suppliers and manufacturers, while favouring foreign suppliers, encompass a failure of 
government measures to effectively address:  
• Tendencies of TNCs to replace many Zambian backward-linked suppliers and firms 
                                                 
627
    Largely owing to a lack of funds. 
628
    Interview with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003. 
629
    That initially provided detailed comments to encourage mining companies to meet their commitments but that neglected, 
subsequently, to do so. It also neglected to play its role in formulating regulations (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:26). The Department of 
Mining suffers from a shortage of legal draftsmen. 
630
    That is supposed to participate in the formulation of new regulations and to manage an inspections regime that would secure 
effective implementation of mining regulations (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:26). 
631
    Facilitated through liberalisation policies introduced by the Chiluba government. 
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to the mines with mainly South African firms in the supply of various mining 
inputs.632 
• Alleged collaboration between the private managers of the mines and foreign 
suppliers of mining inputs.633  
• Lack of transparency in the tendering process of suppliers, which tends to favour 
foreign companies.  
• The poor capacity of local suppliers to the mines to comply with stringent 
procurement criteria of price competitiveness and International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) 2000 standards that private mining companies employ.634 The 
selection of suppliers is also largely based on their bank statements, auditors, 
premises, capacity and delivery time.635 
• Alleged practices of TNCs of employing Zambians mainly as agents, rather than as 
partners to foreign support industries to the mines. Lack of collateral that constrains 
Zambian businesses from buying shares in multinational companies and the 
tendencies of some companies, which may start off in partnership with Zambians, to 
buy them out after some time, curtailed the development of Zambian businesses. 
• Inclinations of foreign companies to merely set up small operations or representative 
offices in Zambia to supply the mines, instead of establishing manufacturing 
industries in the country.636  
• Alleged tendencies of some multinational manufacturing companies to strip and to 
transfer the assets of their Zambian companies to their home countries, while 
converting the existing premises in Zambia merely into warehouses or storehouses.637 
 
Secondly, the failure of the MMD government to introduce an effective industrial 
policy, also policies directing the activities of TNCs towards greater advantages for 
local suppliers, have deprived the country of substantial benefits that industrial policies 
                                                 
632
    Such as chemicals and copper cables (interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003). The institutions differ from what 
was the case under government ownership of the mines, also under Chiluba’s rule, during which time continued preference was still 
given to local suppliers (interview with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003). 
633
    Interview with Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003. 
634
    Interview with Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003. 
635
    Interviews with Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003; Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003; Honourable Dipak 
Patel, 15 October 2003 and Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003. 
636
    Interview with Mark O’ Donnell, 16 October 2003. 
637
    Interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003. 
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hold for developing countries (Amsden, 1997:469 and 470). Industrial policies 
additional to those discussed in Section 4.2.2.1 but applicable specifically to the 
participation of mining TNCs in the economy, which would have had positive spin-offs 
for local industrial development, include in particular, the establishment of effective 
vertical and horizontal linkages between the global TNCs and local suppliers. Such 
linkages would have generated employment opportunities and led to the transfer of 
know-how (that would promote human resource capabilities of host countries). The 
linkages would also have transferred appropriate resources (including technology) to 
local suppliers and provided finance and managerial assistance to local firms (Gordon, 
1994, cited in Padayachee, 1995:166; Kozul-Wright, 1998:150, 152, 153, 154).  
 
Vertical linkages between local mining suppliers and mining TNCs that would have 
promoted the development of local capacities would further have limited the tendencies 
of TNCs to substitute local suppliers with foreign suppliers (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:4, 
60). The absence of effective enforcement measures to promote local procurement also 
curtailed such benefits. However, more recently, the Mining Liaison Committee of the 
Chamber of Commerce negotiated with KCM to try and match the needs of the 
company638 with the local manufacturers of goods (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:59). The new 
Development Agency Act of 2006 that encourages such a partnership639 came into force 
only after many mining TNCs had already established their own suppliers and after 
many Zambian suppliers became bankrupt. Trade liberalisation policies contributed 
significantly to the bankruptcies of local companies. 
 
Moreover, an industrial strategy to attract and support forward linkages in the mining 
sector in addition to smelting, including the production of electrical products in Zambia 
is necessary.640 Incentives and a supply of a certain percentage of the copper cathodes 
that mining companies produce to local manufacturers that need copper inputs could 
also encourage the development of value-added industries to the mining sector (Fraser 
& Lungu, 2007:17, 60). 
                                                 
638
    Such as foundry, fabrication and machinery products. 
639
    Interview with Fred Yamba, 25 November 2003. 
640
    Namely copper wires, electrical plugs, pipes and other light industrial goods. 
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Furthermore, the failure to establish effective horizontal linkages or joint ventures 
between mining TNCs and local suppliers deprived Zambia of significant development 
of especially its human capital, through the transfer of valuable resources, technology 
know-how and training to local suppliers that such linkages hold for the economy. This 
would especially be the case if the research activities of global TNCs, particularly of 
deeper integrated production systems, include horizontal linkages with similar local 
industries that would have positive local spillover or externality effects (Padayachee, 
1995:173). Horizontal linkages with local suppliers would further promote greater 
sustainability of local businesses if foreign companies decided to leave the country 
(World Bank 2002b:27). 
 
Additionally, a failure to establish an industrial policy to protect and support local 
capacities, in the face of excessive foreign investor-friendly and liberal policies, 
elaborated in Section 4.2.2.1 of Chapter 4, favours foreign suppliers, whilst facilitating 
the substitution of local capacities in the supply of mining inputs. In Chapter 4 it is 
noted that in particular, trade liberalisation policies, at a time when Zambia’s industries 
were weak and when markets were highly imperfect, precluded the development of an 
effective industrial strategy during Chiluba’s government. Instead, the rapid influx of 
lower priced foreign equipment and of services firms, especially from more competitive 
South African firms641 that free trade policies facilitated challenged the entry of local 
suppliers into the lucrative supply market of the mining sector (World Bank, 2002b:26; 
Regional Investor Survey, 2001:40). Duty exemptions on imported equipment granted 
to foreign companies but not extended to local companies, that reduces the incentive to 
source and build such facilities locally, are also favourable to foreign companies. 
 
While donors pushed for liberal policies and a foreign investor-friendly regulatory 
regime in Zambia, they showed little interest in supporting productive investment in the 
Zambian economy or encouraging a transformation of its productive mode, which 
represents a rapid means of promoting development. A stronger capacity of local 
                                                 
641
    South Africa was Zambia’s largest supplier in 2001 with 56.8%, with the United Kingdom at 8.3% in second place (Van Buren, 
2003:1155). 
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industries in Zambia would also have improved the government’s bargaining leverage 
to direct the activities of TNCs, as was the case with developmental states (Leftwich, 
1995:417). On the contrary, the totally liberalised economy reduced the bargaining 
power of the government over those of the mining TNCs.  
 
Ineffective monitoring and the omission by the appropriate committees to challenge the 
failure of private mining companies to implement local sourcing policies also curtailed 
more beneficial outcomes for local businesses from the privatisation of the mines 
(Fraser & Lungu, 2007:4, 17). Loopholes in agreements obliging mining TNCs to 
support local suppliers, alongside clauses in development agreements allowing 
companies to choose their own suppliers642 and to freely move goods in and out of the 
country,643 reduced the scope of plans in some development agreements644 to transfer 
skills to Zambian majority businesses (Bwana Mkubwa Development Agreement, 
2004:14). Other factors discussed in Section 4.2.2.1 of Chapter 4 and those listed in 
Table A7 (in Annexure) such as insufficient capital and the high costs of production of 
local suppliers further influenced suppliers adversely. These factors also need to be 
addressed to improve the competitiveness of local suppliers. 
 
6.5.1.6 Statutory provisions to enforce the payment of exit damages by TNCs 
 
The weak bargaining position of the Zambian government compared to mining TNCs 
that enabled TNCs to steer the bilateral development agreements in their favour 
contributed to the government’s neglecting to impose exit damages or penalties on 
TNCs, should they withdraw from Zambia. The omission contributed considerably to 
the less generous terms that the government was able to extract from Anglo American at 
its departure, than what was expected (Business in Africa, 2002:2).645 It further enabled 
Anglo American to threaten the withdrawal of the US$30 million it paid for KCM, 
should the Zambian government make further demands on the company (Mwanawasa, 
cited in Business in Africa, 2002:2). The absence of an exit clause in government 
                                                 
642
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, December 2003. 
643
    With minimal controls and payments of duty. 
644
    Which outline the employment of full-time staff experienced in setting up and managing small-business enterprises and to 
provide advice and assistance in the development and implementation of long-term business enterprises with Zambian majority 
ownership businesses that could have continued after the termination of mining operations at Bwana Mkubwa. 
645
    Interviews with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003 and L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003. 
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regulations facilitated the withdrawal of three of the seven initial mining investors from 
Zambia and before Anglo American and Binani fulfilled most of their investment 
pledges (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:20).646  
 
The lack of punitive measures in development agreements in case TNCs abrogated their 
responsibilities also enabled RAMCOZ to disregard certain obligations during 
receivership, such as a failure to pay its workers and creditors,647 without recourse to 
significant punitive action for corporate irresponsibility. A further significant weakness 
is the failure of the development agreements to link the activities of TNCs to have 
recourse to the ultimate shareholders. Such a linkage would have imposed a significant 
penalty on the ultimate shareholder (the obligation of the vehicle), in the case of 
withdrawal.648 
 
In contrast, the put option clauses that the IFC and CDC established with Anglo 
American protected their interests, through obligations in the shareholders agreement 
that obliged Anglo American to buy out the IFC and CDC for the same amount for 
which they bought their shares in ZCI,649 should it depart from KCM.650 The put option 
clause also enabled the IFC and CDC to pull out of KCM, together with Anglo 
American.651 The protection that the put option clause provided to the IFC and CDC 
highlights the importance of an exit clause in protecting various participants, should 
mining companies depart from Zambia.  
 
Accordingly, the easy exit that the lack of an exit clause enabled for the mining TNCs 
and the failure to link their activities to having recourse to the ultimate shareholders of 
the mining TNCs, have benefited the mining TNCs. However, these omissions had a 
harmful impact on the Zambian economy. Higher sunk costs, discussed below, would 
also have thwarted withdrawals of TNCs from Zambia. 
 
                                                 
646
    Interview with Stella Motale, 23 October 2003. 
647
    Which the government decided to settle (interview with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003). 
648
    Interview with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
649
    An amount of US$25.4 million each (Africa Research Bulletin, 2002b:15349; Times of Zambia, 2002:2). 
650
    Interviews with Stella Motale, 23 October 2003 and Simon Capper, 30 October 2003. 
651
    Interview with Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003.  
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6.5.1.7 Measures encouraging greater investment and higher sunk costs from mining 
TNCs in the mining sector 
 
The dominant bargaining leverage of TNCs enabled them to, generally, set the terms of 
their investment obligations in the mining sector, which curtailed higher investment 
levels that potentially pertain to mining TNCs. In the short term, most of the mining 
companies failed to fully honour their investment pledges as set out in the development 
agreements. Lower investments of mining TNCs, in the face of the ability of mining 
TNCs to externalise 100% of their profit that limited higher sunk costs of TNCs, 
facilitated the exit of mining TNCs from Zambia.652 
 
Various loopholes in government measures enabled mining TNCs to lessen or delay, in 
the short term, their investments in Zambia. These measures still entail, firstly, a failure 
of the government to hold TNCs firmly accountable for fulfilling their investment 
pledges that enabled TNCs to delay or to abrogate their investment obligations, as noted 
in Section 6.1.2. Secondly, the clause in the agreement of mining companies entitling 
some mining TNCs to a proportional reduction of their capital expenditure commitment 
for the first three years and to close or significantly curtail operations temporarily or 
permanently,653 also limited higher investments. Such restrictions are subject to the 
commercial viability of their operations, determined at the discretion of TNCs.  
 
Thirdly, the sanctioning of deferred cash payments to mining companies that was 
against a clause in the Privatisation Act, stipulating that these terms be made available 
only to Zambian nationals and MBOs and only for the purchase of shares, also hinders 
greater investments in Zambia. These concessions would have an unfavourable impact 
on Zambia if mining TNCs exit before paying their deferred cash obligations. This was 
the case with Anglo American that was able to depart from Zambia before paying the 
rest of the US$60 million for the mines it had acquired (ZPA, 2003:2).654 Fourthly, the 
non-recourse nature of investments by TNCs in Zambia precludes the government from 
demanding compensation from shareholders of TNCs, should these companies fail to 
                                                 
652
    Interviews with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003 and Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003. 
653
    For reasons such as certain force major events, or, adverse economic circumstances. 
654
    Interview with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003. 
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fulfil their commitments.  
 
The poor enforcement of their investment obligations has advantaged the mining TNCs. 
It has had however, a negative influence on the Zambian economy. A stipulation in the 
bid process for secured investments well ahead of the allocation of bids, rather than 
pledged investments, which also limited greater public finances from the privatisation 
of the mines, would have ensured higher investments from mining TNCs in the host 
country (Pennings, 2008:489). Moreover, the imposition of higher sunk costs that would 
extend the timeframe before investors get their return on investment, making it more 
costly for foreign investors to pull out of Zambia, would in the short run have acted as a 
disincentive for TNCs to depart from the host country. The capacity of TNCs to extract 
concessions from the host country would also decline once they had sunk their own 
input into the host country.  
 
Higher sunk costs of TNCs, through significant investments into Zambia, would further 
improve the bargaining leverage of the Zambian government for making greater 
demands on the mining TNCs. This is because the bargaining strength of a host country 
is weakest during the periods before foreign firms have sunk inputs into the country 
(Heilleiner, 1989:1463). A stronger capacity of the state and its institutions would also 
have enabled the government greater leverage to ensure that mining TNCs respect their 
investment commitments. 
 
6.5.1.8 Measures to control instability in the foreign currency reserves and the exchange 
rate  
 
Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 and Section 6.2.3 above show that under TNCs’ ownership 
of the mines the TNCs also utilised their ability to influence the exchange rate to 
promote their x-efficiency objectives and to elicit favourable terms during negotiations 
with the government. Weaknesses in government policies abetted the high 
externalisation of foreign currency and money laundering.655 In particular, the liberal 
policies that the IMF and World Bank imposed on the government enabling mining 
                                                 
655
    Interviews with Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003 and Reibner Hoffner, 15 October 2003. 
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companies to repatriate 100% of their profit from copper sales656 and policies allowing 
companies to retain a large portion of foreign currency from mining in offshore 
corporate accounts continue to facilitate these practices (Africa Research Bulletin, 
2001c:14687; Van Buren, 2003:1151). These policies preclude government intervention 
in the foreign exchange market,657 necessary to safeguard against sudden outflows of 
foreign exchange.  
 
However, policies that the Central Bank and the Commerce, Trade and Industry 
Ministry recently introduced to stop goods (including equipment) and services from 
being quoted in foreign currencies, to prevent the US dollar from undermining the 
Zambian kwacha as the local tender in Zambia, has created greater stability in the 
exchange rate (Bank of Zambia, cited in Africa Research Bulletin, 2003c:15633). Some 
restrictions on the repatriation of mining surpluses would also have created greater 
stability in Zambia’s foreign currency reserves. Laws compelling foreign companies to 
retain some of their foreign exchange earnings from mining in Zambia, also through 
deposits with the BoZ for conversion into the local currency,658 would have curbed 
significant depreciations and fluctuations in the value of the kwacha (US & Commercial 
Service and US Department of State, 2005:19; ZDA, 2009:8; Bank of Zambia,659 
2010).660 However, despite the Zambian Finance Ministry announcing in 2003 to limit 
repatriation activities, partly through introducing laws requiring that 75% of export 
proceeds be banked locally, these policies were still not introduced by 2010.  
 
In contrast to the liberal policies of the Chiluba government, certain policies of the 
Kaunda government led to good control and accountability over Zambia’s foreign 
exchange.661 These encompassed the depositing of all mining sales revenue with the 
                                                 
656
    Which encourage private companies to retain most of the foreign exchange obtained from copper sold at the London Stock 
Exchange in external accounts in the short run. 
657
    Such as laws forcing the mining companies to reinvest a portion of their profit from mining activities into Zambia. 
658
    Under government ownership, most revenue from mining was deposited with the Reserve Bank. 
659
    Confirmed by e-mail on 17 May 2010 from: Dinde Simacheche, SDINDE@boz.zm, Bank of Zambia, in response to questions 
by author. 
660
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 
2003. 
661
    However, despite efforts to improve export earnings in the late 1980s the supply of foreign exchange remained inadequate to 
meet imports, exports and external debt service requirements (Africa Now, 1987:31). 
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BoZ662 and a requirement that mining executives apply to the BoZ for foreign 
exchange.663 In the late 1960s, the Kaunda government also placed restrictions on the 
amount of capital that companies could repatriate out of Zambia (and only in the form 
of dividends and royalties). However, severe limitations on the amount of foreign 
exchange that local companies were able to access, which significantly restricted the 
foreign supplies that local companies could buy, stifled their development.664 
 
Accordingly, the foreign exchange regime that the IMF and the World Bank imposed on 
the MMD government, to promote their neo-liberal policies, was highly beneficial to 
mining TNCs. Conversely, in the short-term these policies as well as government 
policies enabling mining TNCs to repatriate all their profit had a destabilising impact on 
both the exchange rate and on the level of foreign currency reserves of Zambia from 
mining, under the ownership of TNCs. Effective state intervention is necessary to 
enable the retention of higher foreign currency reserves from mining in the Zambian 
economy and to safeguard against sudden outflows of foreign exchange under TNCs’ 
ownership of the mines. 
 
6.5.2 The monitoring and enforcement capacity of the government in controlling 
the activities of private mining TNCs  
 
Weaknesses in the monitoring and enforcement capacity of the government in 
controlling the activities of mining TNCs hinder effective control of the government 
over the activities of the TNCs and of the follow-up of the post-privatisation process, 
enabling the mining TNCs to frequently abrogate their responsibilities.665 The weak 
monitoring and enforcement capacities and the legal loopholes represent major 
limitations of the privatisation process, the post-privatisation monitoring process and of 
the operations of TNCs in Zambia.666 Some academics consider these limitations 
amongst the greatest weaknesses that Zambia had experienced, by 2003 under private 
                                                 
662
    Unlike at present where sales revenue is deposited into company accounts. 
663
    With supporting documentation as to how these were to be used (interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003). 
664
    Interview with Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003. 
665
    Interviews with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; 
Andygean Luombe, 8 October 2003 and Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003. 
666
    Interviews with Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003 and Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003.  
  
295
ownership of the mines by TNCs.667  
 
Proactive and transparent monitoring of results is important to analyse the impact of 
policies and to introduce remedial action that would facilitate the enforcement of 
binding agreements. It is also important, together with the enforcement of laws, for 
curbing corruption (World Bank, 2002b:31; Rose Ackerman, 1997:48). The main 
factors accounting for the weaknesses in the monitoring and enforcement capacity of 
the Chiluba government in controlling the activities of the mining TNCs are the poor 
bargaining leverage of the government over the mining TNCs, the poor capacity of 
government institutions, the untransparent nature of the development agreements and 
the slow court system. These are briefly considered below. 
 
Firstly, the significant power of mining TNCs over the weakened and poorly resourced 
government enabled these TNCs to often abrogate their obligations. Politicians, 
apprehensive that investors might withdraw from their countries, tended to 
accommodate these practices (ZCCM-IH, 2001:1).668 The lack of voting rights of the 
directors of the ZCCM-IH, representing the government in the private mining 
companies, except for issues that are of critical importance,669 has also weakened the 
leverage of the government in its relation with mining TNCs.  
 
Secondly, the poor capacity of institutions tasked with monitoring the operations of 
mining companies, in accordance with the development agreements,670 in particular the 
Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development and the ZCCM-IH, also reduced more 
effective monitoring and implementation of laws regulating the activities of TNCs.671 
Inadequate resources (also of manpower),672 poor access to information and the absence 
of longer-term development plans for the country have largely accounted for the poor 
                                                 
667
    Interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003 and Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
668
    Interviews with Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003; Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 
October 2003 and David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003. 
669
    In which case the golden share the government enjoys in the mining company would enable it to influence decisions. 
670
    Interview with Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003. 
671
    Interviews with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 
2003; Mark O’ Donnell, 16 October 2003; Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003 and M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003. 
672
    As many of the skilled technocrats departed for the private sector. 
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capacity of these institutions.673 The brevity of many of the ministerial terms674 further 
undermined the capacity of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development to monitor 
the activities of mining TNCs.675 These weaknesses also prevented more effective 
implementation of government mining policies (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2002:8).676 Moreover, the erosion of the power of mining trade unions and the anti-
union bias of TNCs diminished their capacity to enforce the protection of the Zambian 
mineworkers against certain operations of mining TNCs.  
 
Poor access to information regarding certain mining activities further degrades the 
capacity of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development to monitor the activities of 
mining TNCs. In particular, the disbandonment of the Mineral Marketing Corporation 
(MIMACO) that collected various information on mining in Zambia, during Kaunda’s 
rule, and the subsequent decentralisation of information of different activities of the 
mining sector contributed considerably to the inaccessibility of metal sales figures.677 
Moreover, subsequent to the disbandonment of MINDECO that was in charge of 
mineral development during the Kaunda government, the absence of good annual 
reports of mining TNCs and their inaccessibility to the public under private ownership 
of the mines, make it difficult to monitor mining sector activities in Zambia.678 The 
annual reports of mining TNCs, submitted to the Mines Safety Department, the Ministry 
of Mines, the ZRA, the BoZ and the ECZ, often lack clear data on the contributions of 
each of the mining firms to national tax that prove difficult to obtain (Fraser & Lungu, 
2007:17).  
 
The elimination of long-term development plans during Chiluba’s rule, with the 
dissolving of the Ministry of National Planning and associated institutions such as the 
NCDP, further lowers the capacity of the government to effectively monitor and 
implement laws, also those governing the mining TNCs.679 The NCDP was involved in 
                                                 
673
    Interviews with Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Reibner Hoffner, 15 
October 2003; Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003 and Dindiwe, 11 December 2001. 
674
    Which makes it difficult for ministers to master their briefs. 
675
    No monitoring was done in 2001 (interview with Dindiwe, 11 December 2001). 
676
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, 1 December 2003. 
677
    Such as information on the receipt of money to the BoZ, which was easily available before. 
678
    Interview with Zion Simwanza, 1 December 2003. 
679
    Interviews with John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003 and Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
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planning, monitoring and evaluation, and set five-year development plans during 
Kaunda’s government. The absence of national development plans, without itemised 
accounts of government spending, which made the retracing of government spending 
difficult, also obstructed enforcement and facilitated corruption in the mining sector 
under the Chiluba government. The abolishment of long-term development plans also 
led to the uncoordinated functioning of many state bodies (Committee on Economic 
Affairs and Labour, 2001:110). Chang (1994:13) considers long-term development 
plans as necessary to assist the ‘entrepreneurial vision’ of the state.  
 
The replacement of the national policies by shorter-term IMF and World Bank austerity 
programmes during Chiluba’s rule, further weakened the power of economic 
bureaucracies and of other institutions to adequately implement government policies680 
and their ability to attain embedded autonomy. Powerful economic bureaucracies, an 
important ingredient in the development of developmental states, that organise the 
interaction between the state and the economy for strategic economic direction and 
co-ordination, possess effective power and high technical competence. These 
institutions also enjoy relative autonomy or insulation for developing economic policies 
(Leftwich, 1995:425). The National Economic Advisory Council that the MMD 
government established in an advisory role proved to be weak.681 The reintroduction of 
longer-term development plans in 2006, during Mwanawasa’s government, culminating 
in the establishment of the country's FNDP,682 points to some extent to an admission that 
the abolishment of the national development plans in Zambia during Chiluba’s 
government was a mistaken policy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008a:4).683   
 
Thirdly, the confidential nature of development agreements684 precludes access to their 
contents obstructing better monitoring and enforcement of investor compliance of these 
agreements.685 The public, trade unions and even the regulating authorities mandated to 
                                                 
680
    Interviews with Chansa Chifumbe Winston, 15 December 2001; David Chilipamushi, 17 December 2001; Danny Kalyalya, 14 
December 2001 and Alick Lungu, 20 December, 2001. 
681
    Interview with John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
682
    The FNDP sets out, in detail, the plans for reform and direct the economic development of Zambia. 
683
    Interview with Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003. 
684
    Interview with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003. 
685
    Interviews with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; John Kangwa, 21 November 2003 and Agnes Bwalya, 9 November 
2003. 
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ensure that the private mining companies fulfil commitments specified in the 
development agreements do not have easy access to these agreements. The 
untransparent nature of the development agreements left certain obligations, specified in 
the development agreements, unfulfilled (Committee of Economic Affairs and Labour, 
2000:38).686 However, the development agreements of J and W Holdings (that acquired 
ownership of the mines more recently) were more transparent and involved the active 
participation of the mining trade unions as well.687 Fourthly, difficulties in obtaining a 
swift conviction, largely due to the slow court system,688 also rendered enforcement 
difficult.689 The recent establishment of the Commercial Court and Arbitrators, obliging 
the Chief Justice to appoint a tribunal when a complaint is lodged, is nevertheless likely 
to speed up the long delays in the legal process in commercial disputes.690  
 
From the above discussion, it is noted that despite the existence of various laws to 
address malpractices of mining TNCs,691 the Zambian government possesses a poor 
monitoring and enforcement capacity in controlling and directing the activities of 
private mining TNCs to ensure greater developmental and equitable outcomes for 
Zambia. An adequate, coherent post-privatisation monitoring unit is necessary to enable 
the new mining investors to respect their obligations (Committee of Economic Affairs 
and Labour, 2000:52, 72). Certain weaknesses in the regulations, institutions and in the 
monitoring and implementation of laws governing the activities of mining TNCs, that 
also limit the retribution capacities of the government in the event of malpractices or 
withdrawal,692 favoured mainly the mining TNCs with severe negative repercussions for 
Zambia. Institutional weaknesses in the public sector,693 as well as shortcomings in the 
private sector, constrained the government's ability to address more effectively the 
problems that arose under private ownership of the mines (Burnell, 1995:677-678).694 
 
                                                 
686
    Interview with Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003. 
687
    Interviews with Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003 and John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
688
    Interviews with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003 and Andygean 
Luombe, 8 October 2003. 
689
    For instance, it is unlikely that Chiluba, who faces 169 counts against him, will be convicted in his lifetime, given that each 
count takes several years to be addressed (interview with Honourable Captain Moono, 2 December 2003). 
690
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003. 
691
    Interview with Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003. 
692
    Interviews with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003 and Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003. 
693
    Interview with Danny Kalyalya, 14 December 2001. 
694
    Interview with John Kangwa, 21 November 2003. 
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These weaknesses, owing mainly to the poor bargaining position and capacity of the 
Zambian government, have in particular eroded benefits to the mineworkers and the 
suppliers of the mines. This is contrary to the strong corporatist roles that governments 
of developmental states enjoy in guiding the activities of TNCs towards more 
favourable outcomes for their countries. A stronger state capacity that would have 
enabled the government to play a greater corporatist role in directing the activities of the 
TNCs and to act more independently of donors seems necessary for more advantageous 
outcomes for the host country from the participation of mining TNCs in the Zambian 
economy (Leftwich, 1995).  
 
6.5.3 Political-economic implications of the activities of TNCs in the mining sector  
 
The impact of the activities of the mining TNCs on different stakeholders of Zambia, 
namely the mining TNCs, the Zambian suppliers, the mineworkers and the mining 
community and on the Zambian economy are examined below. 
 
The influence on mining TNCs 
 
The dominant leverage of mining TNCs over the Zambian government enabled them to 
influence the government into adopting policies that promoted their interests. This 
resulted in a shift of a major portion of the rent element from mining in favour of 
mining TNCs. The mining TNCs continue to be advantaged especially through the 
concessions that they have negotiated with the government. In particular, KCM and 
MCM and more recently J and W benefited the most from the additional concessions 
that they still enjoy over mining companies that privatised earlier. Moreover, foreign 
investor-friendly policies pushed by the IMF and the World Bank that the country’s 
high dependence on aid forced it to adopt were also greatly beneficial to foreign 
investors. The inclination of the TNCs to invest a large proportion of profits as 
dividends rather than allocate them for reinvestment into the mining sector, as well as 
the non-recourse nature of the activities of TNCs in Zambia, also favoured 
predominantly foreign shareholders of the mining TNCs.  
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It is further noted from the above discussion that certain weaknesses in government 
capacities mainly of their institutions, laws and policies regulating the activities of 
mining TNCs and in their implementation also proved beneficial to the mining TNCs. 
This is partly due to these weaknesses making it difficult to hold the TNCs accountable 
should they abrogate their responsibilities. While the limitations in government laws 
and institutions shifted gains in favour of mining TNCs, these had a highly negative 
impact on the Zambian economy.  
 
The weaknesses in laws and policies that continue to favour the mining TNCs include:  
• excessive foreign investor-friendly government policies (also through incentives and 
concessions) that limit government tax revenue from mining TNCs;  
• lack of exit clauses in development agreements limiting recourse to punitive action in 
the event of TNCs’ exiting from Zambia. The lack of exit clauses may have a 
devastating effect on the Zambian economy if the mining TNCs do withdraw from 
the country;  
• loopholes that curtail higher investments and sunk costs from mining TNCs in 
Zambia;  
• liberal policies in exchange controls that enable mining TNCs to repatriate all their 
profits out of Zambia and facilitate transfer pricing practices of mining TNCs;  
• the choice of bilateral agreements for regulating the mining TNCs over the Safes 
Agreement (that would have promoted the interests of Zambians). Within a weak 
state these bilateral agreements adversely influenced the interests of the 
mineworkers, the mining community and the Zambian economy;  
• poor monitoring and enforcement of legislation; and 
• the limited shares that the government retained in the mines, which reduce returns for 
the government from improved performance of the mining sector that instead accrues 
mainly to the mining TNCs.  
 
Impact on suppliers 
 
The preference of mining TNCs for replacing local suppliers with foreign suppliers, 
possibly also from their own subsidiaries, to meet their x-efficiency and profit-
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maximising objectives enabled the foreign backward-linked companies to the mining 
sector greater entry into the Zambian market. However, the practices of TNCs to 
displace local capital with foreign suppliers disadvantaged the local suppliers. This 
corresponds with the argument of dependency theorists that TNCs contribute to a highly 
unequal income distribution in host countries, with negative redistributive implications 
that may deflect the host country’s development from a more desired path (Helleiner, 
1989:1454).  
 
Various shortcomings in government regulations and policies and enforcement 
measures, elaborated upon in Section 6.5.1, also limited greater gains for local suppliers 
from the activities of mining TNCs. Most notably, the government failed to protect 
local suppliers against practices of mining TNCs that influenced them adversely. 
Bilateral development agreements between the government and mining TNCs, entitling 
the TNCs to select their own suppliers, also typically favoured foreign suppliers.  
 
Moreover, the continued lack of effective industrial policies for promoting local 
capacities, which were crucial to the progress of developmental states further 
disadvantaged local suppliers. Rather, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.1 of Chapter 4, 
foreign investor-friendly government policies from which local suppliers were 
excluded, liberal policies and the higher costs of production that certain policies of the 
Chiluba government imposed on local suppliers695 lowered benefits to the local 
suppliers. These policies further assisted foreign companies to gain increasing entry into 
the market of backward-linked industries and suppliers to Zambia’s mining sector. 
Accordingly, the highly liberal foreign investor-friendly policies represent the antithesis 
of an effective industrial policy necessary to promote the development of local 
industries. The failure to establish industrial policies encouraging greater vertical and 
horizontal linkages between local suppliers and mining TNCs also deprived Zambia of 
significant benefits that such linkages hold for the local suppliers.  
 
                                                 
695
    The policies that increase the cost of local production include the high interest rates and the depreciation of the kwacha, which 
respectively accompanied the auctioning of the financial market and the exchange rate, as well as the higher taxes and duties placed 
on local businesses over foreign businesses. These policies increased especially the price of imported mining inputs. 
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Impact on the mineworkers and mining communities 
 
A major shift occurred in the political economy of the mineworkers and of the mining 
community under private ownership of the mines by TNCs. The stronger bargaining 
leverage of TNCs, enabling them to demand the retrenchment of many mineworkers 
during the bidding process reduced the redistribution of benefits to the mineworkers. It 
likewise diminished the power of the government to demand better conditions of 
employment for workers. In contrast, under Kaunda’s government, the mining policies 
were highly favourable to the mineworkers and the mining community, discussed in 
Section 4.3.2.3 of Chapter 4.  
 
Additionally, as is noted in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5, certain x-efficiency objectives 
under the TNCs’ majority ownership of the mines encouraging the mining TNCs to 
lower conditions of employment affected the mineworkers adversely. It is noted that 
conditions of employment were lowered through high reductions in the number of 
permanent mineworkers and an increasing shift of permanent workers to contract 
employment and casual employment. The refusal of the mining TNCs to assume 
responsibility for non-core mining facilities had a further unfavourable influence on the 
welfare of the mining community. The substitution of local managers with expatriate 
managers in several mining companies also favoured expatriates over local managers.  
 
Furthermore, several loopholes in government institutions and in their regulatory and 
enforcement capacity, noted in Section 6.5.1 enabled the TNCs to pursue less worker-
friendly policies than was the case under Kaunda’s government. Briefly, these loopholes 
continue to entail the weak implementation of labour laws, a reduction of the power of 
mining trade unions, insufficient obligations placed on mining TNCs to train Zambian 
mineworkers and to allow for a greater participation of Zambians in the management 
structures of TNCs. The absence of policies encouraging horizontal linkages between 
local capacities and mining TNCs that would have enabled the transfer of greater know-
how from TNCs to the host country further deprives Zambia of the significant 
development of its human capital that such linkages with mining TNCs hold for the host 
country. The weak enforcement of the legislation was mainly because of the poor 
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bargaining power of the government and because of the capacity constraints of the 
institutions governing the protection of workers.  
 
Influences on the Zambian economy 
 
Within a weak state the government lacked the leverage to ensure a greater capturing of 
returns from mining and to direct the activities of mining TNCs to more favourable 
outcomes for Zambians under private ownership of the mines by TNCs. Rather, as 
noted above, the shift in the returns from the exploitation of the copper mines under 
private TNCs’ ownership of the mines mainly in favour of the mining TNCs, caused a 
poor redistribution of mining surpluses to the Zambian economy. This was also the case 
during the copper price boom when the mining companies enjoyed high profits. The 
shift in returns had a highly negative impact on the economic development of Zambia. 
Moreover, certain activities of some mining TNCs, in particular those of Binani at 
RAMCOZ, together with the government’s acceptance of the liabilities of the company 
and its assumption of the role of the receiver of RAMCOZ constituted a great drain of 
Zambia’s resources.  
 
The factors that for the most part continue to account for the weak transfer of benefits to 
the national economy under TNCs’ ownership of the mines are: 
• The significant reduction in government tax from mining mainly because of the high 
concessions granted to mining companies. Instead, the tax burden is shifted to the 
local population in the form of the high VAT and electricity rates imposed on the 
local population and through the higher PAYE tax rate.  
• The repatriation of mining profits and resources out of Zambia (also likely through 
transfer pricing practices and as dividends to the foreign shareholders of mining 
TNCs). 
• The ability of mining TNCs to manipulate the foreign currency reserves of Zambia 
and the value of the kwacha contributing considerably towards the volatility in both 
Zambia’s foreign currency levels and in the exchange rate of the kwacha, 
jeopardising the economic security of the country.  
  
304
• The absence of a stabilisation fund, established from mining surpluses. Such a fund 
would have diminished the negative impact of fluctuations in copper prices on the 
government revenue from mining. 
• Several of the profit-maximisation pursuits of the mining TNCs, often aimed at 
fulfilling the global interests of the parent company that might clash with the 
interests of the host country, such as the departure of Anglo American from Zambia.  
 
Nonetheless, the mining TNCs contributed significantly towards much needed capital 
and technology investment in the mining sector, in comparison to what was the case in 
the late 1990s. However, their failure to fulfil several of their investment commitments 
also detracted from this benefit.696 
 
The poor redistribution of resources, under private ownership of the mines, represents a 
classic example of a predominantly mining-dependent economy, suffering from the 
‘Dutch disease’. The ‘curse’ of a resource-rich economy that the Zambian economy also 
experienced under government ownership, especially in the context of low copper 
prices and Zambia’s  high economic debt, was considerably amplified under private 
TNCs’ ownership of the mines. This is mirrored in the increases in poverty levels under 
private ownership of the mines largely as a result of the high repatriation of profits. The 
repatriation of profit together with concessions reduced Zambia’s foreign currency 
reserves and savings from mining. However, the ‘curse’ needs not be inevitable.  
 
Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 and the above discussion show that various loopholes within 
government institutions and laws regulating the activities of mining TNCs in Zambia 
and the poor monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the government to curb 
regulatory diversions of TNCs also limited greater gains for Zambia from the mining 
TNCs. A strong capacity of the state in mining, which the Zambian government has 
failed to establish, is crucial to maximise rent from mining and to limit opportunistic 
operations and negative outcomes of the participation of mining TNCs in the economy. 
                                                 
696
     These loopholes entail a failure of government measures to hold TNCs firmly accountable for fulfilling their investment 
commitments, policies entitling mining TNCs to a proportional reduction in the short term of their capital expenditure commitment 
and to close or significantly curtail operations, temporarily or permanently at their discretion, subject to the viability of their 
operations and the sanctioning of deferred cash payments from the sales of the mines. 
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It is also necessary to define and direct the activities of mining TNCs towards more 
favourable outcomes for Zambia. Moreover, under a strong state capacity, as is the case 
with Botswana, the country is likely to escape the ‘curse’ of a minerals-based economy 
(Iimi, 2006:1). 
 
In the mining sector, a stronger state capacity requires high institutional capacities, 
deemed also important to reverse the ‘paradox of plenty’ in resource-abundant countries 
(Action Aid International et al., 2009:x; Bebbington et al., 2008:10). Additionally, 
industrial policies which promote the nurturing of local capacities, through tariffs, 
quotas and through a degree of good government discipline that would have enabled it 
to make greater demands on TNCs, are essential to increase state capacity. A greater 
corporatist role of the state over TNCs represents a further important element to 
augment the capacity of the state to direct the activities of TNCs towards higher gains 
for the Zambian economy.  
 
In summary, under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines, within a weak state in which 
mining TNCs dominated the negotiations over investments and over the returns from 
copper mining, and alongside liberal and excessive foreign-investor friendly policies, 
the political-economic landscape of Zambia was fundamentally altered. The poor 
returns and redistribution of surpluses from the extraction of minerals shifted benefits to 
the mining TNCs, their shareholders, and the foreign suppliers of mining inputs in 
Zambia. Expatriate managers are also favoured over local managers in several of the 
mining companies. These policies have marginalised the local mineworkers and 
suppliers to the mines and affected the Zambian economy adversely.  
 
The advantages to the national economy from the participation of mining TNCs in 
Zambia were severely limited and were mainly in the sphere of technological and 
capital inputs that the TNCs invested in the mining sector. Even then, these benefits 
were lowered, in the short term, as the technological and capital inputs from mining 
TNCs were less than they had pledged. Instead of promoting Zambia’s development 
some of the activities of mining TNCs, in fact, amounted to a draining of the resources 
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of Zambia that promoted underdevelopment. These outcomes correspond closely with 
the arguments of Global Reach theorists and of neo-imperialists that TNCs’ activities 
drain the resources of developing host countries. 
 
Broadly, the various costs to the Zambian economy associated with the activities of 
mining TNCs in Zambia included: 
• significant decreases in government revenue and in foreign exchange from mining 
mainly owing to the high concessions granted to the mining TNCs; 
• the repatriation of mining profits out of the country; 
• the degrading of the conditions of employment of mineworkers; and 
• the undermining and substitution of local capacities largely as a result of practices of 
TNCs to replace them with foreign capacities. 
 
However, the weak government capacities, rather than the activities of TNCs per se 
greatly contributed to the ‘resource curse’. The poor returns to the Zambian economy 
from the participation of TNCs in the mining sector were also largely the result of the 
limited bargaining leverage of the government and shortcomings in laws and 
institutions and in their enforcement to steer the activities of TNCs towards greater 
returns for Zambia. These enabled the mining TNCs to behave opportunistically. A 
higher capturing of rent and investments also into alternative non-exhaustible sectors 
would have increased the sustainability of the economy and the economic diversity of 
Zambia and diminished the effects of the ‘Dutch disease’ from which the Zambian 
economy is suffering. A higher state capacity, largely achieved through competent 
institutions, industrial policies to also promote a stronger economic development of the 
country and a greater corporatist role of the government, would have ensured more 
successful outcomes from the activities of mining TNCs in Zambia. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The study sought to assess: the impact of different policies of the Kaunda and Chiluba 
governments on the mining sector; the privatisation of the mining sector and the impact 
of changing ownership and management structure and objectives of Zambia’s copper 
mines on the economy; and the roles of TNCs in the mining sector of Zambia. The 
socio-economic and political-economic consequences of the activities of TNCs and of 
the government are important subsets of this examination. 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the findings and postulates recommendations for 
more beneficial privatisation and private ownership of the mining sector, as well as for 
greater advantages for Zambia from the activities of mining TNCs. This is followed by 
concluding remarks of the study.  
 
7.1 THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT POLICIES OF THE KAUNDA AND 
CHILUBA GOVERNMENTS ON THE MINING SECTOR 
 
The different policies that the Kaunda and the Chiluba governments adopted for the 
mining sector influenced the development of Zambia’s mining sector in distinct ways. 
The IMF and World Bank policies that were intermittently introduced during Kaunda’s 
government from 1983-91 and fully adopted from 1992 under Chiluba’s government 
further impacted on the mining sector.  
 
7.1.1 Economic outcomes of the policies of the Kaunda government  
 
The accrual of surpluses from the returns of copper mining mostly to the TNCs that 
enjoyed full ownership of the mines, and their practices of investing a large proportion 
of mining profits as dividends, significantly motivated the nationalisation of the mines 
in 1969. The transfer of considerable profits as dividends resulted in gross 
undercapitalisation of the mines and excessive borrowing after independence. However, 
government policies granting the mining TNCs preferential treatment in foreign 
exchange control regulations also aided the externalisation of mining surpluses during 
private management of the mines. The preferential treatment included permitting the 
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mining TNCs to automatically externalise non-taxable profits, dividends, management 
fees and income from the sales of the private mining companies. Poor application of the 
Zambianisation policies697 by the TNCs and their transfer pricing policies and practices 
to externalise profits precipitated the Kaunda government’s revoking of the 
management contracts of mining TNCs in 1974 under government ownership of the 
mines.  
 
Contrary to private ownership, during the majority government ownership and 
management of the mines the electoral-maximising motives of the Kaunda government 
favoured a redistribution of a considerable proportion of mining revenue to other areas 
of the economy. The redistributive measures, together with industrial policies that the 
Kaunda administration adopted, enabled a significant period of development in the 
1960s and 1970s for the Zambian economy. These policies precipitated the notable 
development, especially of social services and the human capital of local Zambians. 
Zambianisation policies proved particularly instrumental in developing the human 
capital of Zambians. 
 
The redistributive policies were highly effective in redressing the significantly uneven 
distribution of income and wealth that adversely influenced local Zambians during 
Federal rule. However, adequate reallocation of revenue from mining was only possible 
when mining surpluses were readily available. Void of effective recapitalisation of the 
mines and growth, the reallocation of mining surpluses into unproductive sectors 
undermined the sustainability of the redistributive capacity of the government. 
 
The industrial policies of the Kaunda government, nurtured mainly through ISI policies 
introduced between 1965 and 1980, and the development of the parastatal sector largely 
from revenue from mining, contributed to the rapid development of the manufacturing 
sector, mainly during the first decade of Kaunda’s rule. Manufacturing was almost non-
existent at independence (in 1964). The development of the manufacturing sector 
promoted greater diversification of the economy than was the case during the pre-
                                                 
697
    Entailing greater Zambian participation in the economy at higher employment levels and in managerial positions of companies. 
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independence period. However, the poor integration of the mining sector with the local 
manufacturing sector, and the high import content of locally based backward-linked 
industries to the mining sector698 reduced the impetus of the mining sector as an engine 
of growth for other sectors.  
 
Furthermore, without the setting of strict targets that local industries had to meet, to 
encourage infant industries699 to ‘grow up’ and become internationally competitive, the 
protectionist policies (extended mainly to the parastatal-dominated manufacturing 
sector) encouraged inefficiencies in these firms. The extension of protectionist policies 
mainly to the parastatal sectors also disadvantaged private sector businesses. The 
emergence of several inefficient industries or ‘lame ducks’ that remained highly 
dependent on subsidies under the protectionist policies of the Kaunda government 
obstructed sustainable growth in the manufacturing sector. As a result, the lifting of 
controls and the full-scale introduction of trade liberalisation policies in the 1990s under 
Chiluba’s government culminated in the bankruptcies of many local support industries 
to the mining sector. Protectionist policies are therefore a necessary but insufficient 
condition for promoting the development of competitive local industries.  
 
7.1.2 The impact of the policies of the Chiluba government on the development of 
the mining sector 
 
The pervading influences of the SAPs and liberal policies promoted by the IMF and the 
World Bank on mining and on other policies of the Chiluba government significantly 
diminished the government’s role in setting its own industrial policies in the mining 
sector. The SAPs, in particular demand management and supply measures, had a similar 
but more severe adverse impact respectively on workers and local suppliers under 
Chiluba’s government than during Kaunda’s government. This was reinforced by the 
MMD government adopting these policies more rigorously.  
 
Although a lowering of government expenditure required by the demand management 
                                                 
698
    Or industries that supply the mines with inputs. 
699
    New industries in their early stages of development, and in need of protection from predatory competition through tariff and 
non-tariff barriers until they become established (Businessdictionary.com, 2010). 
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programmes of the SAPs was necessary to reduce the high government deficit, the 
decline in government investments in productive sectors affected the mining sector and 
the Zambian economy unfavourably. Moreover, while reductions to the excess labour 
force in the mining sector subsumed in demand management measures were necessary, 
a failure to create alternative employment to absorb those that became unemployed 
contributed to the high unemployment levels of mineworkers in Zambia. Mining 
employment declined from 62 100 in 1992 immediately prior to the Chiluba 
government coming into power to 47 700 in 1996 before the mines were privatised. 
Furthermore, the lower spending on social services caused a deterioration of social 
services to the mining community. 
 
Supply-side measures, in particular the higher interest rates that accompanied their 
decontrol and the negative impact of high inflation as a result of the hike in the costs of 
mining inputs on local suppliers, adversely affected the local support industries linked 
to the mining industry. The high import content for intermediate inputs of local 
manufacturers overrode the benefits that a lower exchange rate, following the 
depreciation of the kwacha, generally hold for reducing local costs and for encouraging 
a switch to the local procurement of mining inputs. On the contrary, the crash in the 
value of the kwacha against the currencies of Zambia’s major trade partners caused a 
large rise in inflation, and subsequently resulted in a macro-economic meltdown that 
compounded Zambia’s debt problems. Greater inter- and intra-industry linkages of 
Zambia’s industries that would have reduced their dependence on imports for 
intermediates before liberalisation policies were introduced, would have ensured a more 
beneficial impact on locally-based suppliers from the depreciation of the local currency.  
 
Moreover, in the context of the weak local industries and the highly imperfect markets, 
aggressive foreign competition encouraged by free trade policies caused the bankruptcy 
and relocation of many locally-based industries and suppliers, including those linked to 
the mines. Especially more competitive South African suppliers that entered the 
Zambian market following the introduction of free trade policies replaced several 
locally-based backward-linked industries in the supply of mining inputs. These 
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consequences of free trade policies contrast with those of protectionist policies that the 
Kaunda government introduced that favoured local suppliers. Other foreign investor-
friendly policies that the Chiluba government adopted also had a detrimental impact on 
the local backward linkages to the mining sector. Summaries of the impact of the 
privatisation policies and the private ownership of the mines by mining TNCs during 
Chiluba’s government are respectively considered in Section 7.2 and 7.3 below. 
 
7.2 THE PRIVATISATION OF THE MINES AND THE IMPACT OF THEIR 
CHANGING OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE ON THE 
ECONOMY 
 
Various interest groups influenced the privatisation decisions of the mines. In particular, 
the World Bank and the IMF possessed significant command in influencing the decision 
to privatise the mines that the government was obliged to adopt because of its weakened 
bargaining position, mainly due to its huge debts. Furthermore, Anglo American 
acquired strong control in influencing recommendations for the structure of the 
privatisation of the mines. Despite the poor leverage of the government in the decisions 
on the privatising of the mines, political interference strongly marked the privatisation 
of the ZCCM.  
 
The privatisation of the mines faced major challenges that had negative consequences 
for the Zambian economy. Moreover, changing management objectives and structures 
under different ownership had dissimilar outcomes on mining performance and on the 
socio-economic development of Zambia. The privatisation and the private ownership of 
the mines also influenced the political economy of Zambia in distinct ways. 
‘Privatisation’ refers to the processes involved in transferring ownership of the SOEs 
from the public to the private sector and therefore precedes private ownership. Private 
ownership refers to the enterprise under the ownership of the private sector. 
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7.2.1 Challenges limiting positive outcomes for Zambia during the privatisation of 
the mines 
 
Weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework in the privatisation process, and a 
failure of privatisation to improve the public finances, significantly limited more 
advantageous outcomes from the privatisation of the mines. 
 
7.2.1.1 Weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework in the privatisation of the 
ZCCM  
 
The institutional and policy changes that the Chiluba government introduced, which 
undermined the institutional capacities of those bodies established to execute the 
privatisation of SOEs of Zambia, were contrary to prerequisites needed for more 
successful privatisation of SOEs. The changes that the Chiluba government introduced 
entailed: (i) the introduction of political interests into the privatisation process; (ii) 
irregularities and non-transparency in the ways in which the proceeds from the sales of 
the ZCCM were managed; and (iii) insufficient protection of mineworkers. Poor 
enforcement measures to promote more successful privatisation also limited the success 
of the privatisation of the ZCCM.  
 
In the absence of effective checks and balances, increases in the discretionary power of 
the Chiluba government in the privatisation of the mining sector compromised the 
independent functioning of the ZPA (the body established to privatise all SOEs) in the 
privatisation of these assets. It also facilitated the alleged corruption by senior 
government officials during the privatisation of the mines. Non-transparent ways in 
which the proceeds from the sales of the ZCCM were managed further abetted corrupt 
practices.  
 
The primary weaknesses in the protection of mineworkers during the privatisation of the 
mines included the failure of the government to create alternative employment before 
the mines were privatised to absorb workers left unemployed as a result of privatisation 
and under private ownership of the mines. The government also neglected to introduce 
effective social safety nets to protect workers against adverse consequences arising from 
the privatisation of the mines. The establishment of robust institutional and legal 
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prerequisites, adequate social safety nets and alternative employment to absorb those 
left unemployed as a result of the privatisation were necessary before privatisation 
policies were introduced for ensuring more favourable outcomes for countries from 
privatisation policies (Stiglitz, 1998:19, 20; 2002:182). 
 
7.2.1.2 Failure to improve public finances 
 
Contrary to the neo-classical argument that the privatisation of SOEs and the private 
ownership of enterprises would improve public finances, the privatisation of the ZCCM 
failed to achieve increases in public finances through higher government revenue from 
the sales of the mines, and through reductions in government debt. In fact, the net gains 
in revenue from the sales of the mines were obliterated, providing support to the 
empirical study of Buchs (2003: 11, 12) that found public finances did not improve in 
sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the privatisation of SOEs. 
 
The failure of the privatisation of the copper mines to improve the public finances of the 
Zambian government was predominantly due to: 
• the poor state of the ZCCM (largely owing to the lack of reinvestment in the mines) 
and the Zambian economy that diminished the bargaining leverage of the 
government, which significantly contributed to the concomitant reduced selling 
price of the mines; 
• the extensive concessions granted to the mining TNCs, in particular the concession 
allowing TNCs to pay only a small portion of the total cash consideration at the 
conclusion of the sales of the mines. The rest of the cash consideration constituted 
deferred/conditional future payments; 
• weaknesses in the institutional and regulatory measures during the privatisation of 
the mines that encouraged opportunistic practices; 
• alleged corruption by government officials; 
• the use of gross receipts from the privatisation of the ZCCM to pay the liabilities of 
the ZCCM; and 
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• the government’s assumption of various liabilities of the ZCCM that was primarily 
responsible for the failure of the privatisation of the ZCCM to reduce the country’s 
debt. 
 
The blame for the poor gains in government revenue that the World Bank and the ZPA 
placed on the delays in the privatisation process of the mines that opens the debate as to 
whether a gradual or a rapid privatisation should be favoured is a misconception. This is 
because the delays did not initiate the corruption and degrading of the mining assets, but 
merely exacerbated them. Indeed, the rapid move to privatise the mines in the latter part 
of the 1990s, mainly due to pressure from the IMF and the World Bank and other 
donors, enabled opportunistic practices and the alleged corruption that marked the 
privatisation of the mines in Zambia.  
 
Instead of a swift privatisation, a gradual process allowing for the strengthening of legal 
and institutional measures and for better planning of the privatisation, would likely have 
been more beneficial for Zambia. Moreover, rather than due to privatisation per se, the 
poor gains in government revenue from the sales of the mines were largely attributable 
to inadequate consideration given to the manner in which the privatisation proceeded. 
Poor institutions, which facilitated corruption, played a particularly negative role in 
limiting higher public finances from the privatisation of the mines. 
 
7.2.3 Changing objectives and management structure under different ownership 
and the impact on mining performance and Zambia’s socio-economic development  
 
Main observations from the study were that changing objectives under different 
ownership affected the performance of the mining companies, and the socio-economic 
development of Zambia in distinct ways. Moreover, organisational weaknesses under 
government ownership of the mines also eroded the performance of the mines. The 
argument that better incentives improve company performance was unclear under 
government ownership but private management of the mines. Also, the neo-classical 
argument that more effective control of managers under private ownership, compared to 
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SOEs, further contributes to better performance of private companies, was less evident 
in the case study. An explanation of these conclusions follows. 
 
The study found that the profit-maximisation objectives of the principals under private 
ownership of the mines (their shareholder) contributed to improved company 
performance, by way of higher worker productivity and a lower cost of production or x-
efficiency, than was the case under government ownership. Based on the assumption 
that total revenue remained equal or increased under private ownership compared to 
government ownership, these improvements support the neo-classical argument that 
profit-maximising motives of private companies’ shareholders contribute to the better 
performance of private-owned enterprises. In contrast, under government ownership of 
the mines, the electoral-maximising and multiple objectives of the state curtailed greater 
reductions in the costs of production and improvements in the productivity of workers.  
 
On the other hand, as noted above, the electoral-maximising motives of the Kaunda 
government encouraged higher employment levels of mineworkers, and an 
improvement in the standard of living and welfare of the Zambian nation. However, the 
redistributive activities had a negative impact on the growth in the mining sector when 
the copper mines performed poorly. These outcomes vindicate the argument of neo-
classical theorists that electoral-maximising objectives of the government limit better 
company performance. 
 
Definitive conclusions on the role of ownership on production levels could not be 
drawn from the study. This is because the influences of various factors on production, 
the short span within which the private companies operate in the mines, and the positive 
impact of the unprecedented rise in copper prices on production levels under private 
ownership obscure such conclusions. Production levels, however, were high in the late 
1960s and in the 1970s under government ownership of the mines, when the mines 
performed more effectively. However, in the absence of measures to increase growth in 
the mining companies to reinvest into the mining sector and to encourage the savings of 
a portion of mining surpluses, the state was unable to sustain high production levels. 
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Organisational weaknesses of the mines under government ownership, namely 
bureaucracy that obstructed quick decision-making and political influence introduced in 
the operations of mining companies, further accounted for the poor performance of the 
mining sector. In the short term, increased costs and lower productivity as result of 
Zambianisation policies because of reduced know-how and efficiency and a 
‘fragmentation’ of skilled jobs also limited greater improvements of the copper mining 
companies. However this was not the case in the medium to longer term, as the very 
effective training policies provided to indigenous Zambians in fact significantly 
enhanced the skills of Zambian managers. The organisational weaknesses that the 
mining companies experienced under state ownership confirm the neo-classical 
perspective that lack of management autonomy, internal inefficiencies in bureaucracies 
and multiple and contradictory government objectives further account for poorer 
company performance under government ownership.  
 
Under private ownership of the mines, the superior incentives provided to managers, 
brought the objectives of the principal closer to those of the agent. In contrast, poorer 
incentives provided to managers under government ownership dampened the motivation 
of managers to pursue greater profit-maximising objectives. The poorer incentives 
occurred as a result of lower wages, a reluctance of the government to replace managers 
who did not make a profit and the elevation of political interests and electoral-
optimising objectives over profit-maximising motives in the government-dominated 
board. Although private managers enjoyed higher incentives it is not possible within the 
confines of the study to draw definitive conclusions on a direct relation between higher 
manager incentives and improvements in company performance. 
 
Moreover, higher incentives failed to induce better performance of the copper mining 
companies in Zambia when the mines were under private expatriate management 
control but under government ownership (between 1970 and 1973). On the contrary, the 
higher costs that curtailed greater x-efficiency reduced further improvements in the 
performance of the mines under private foreign control of the mines. The high costs 
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were largely owing to the manipulation of profits, through transfer pricing policies and 
also through high service fees charged by parent companies of mining TNCs that 
enjoyed exclusive rights in the provision of these services. The practices of the mining 
TNCs of repatriating a large portion of their share of profits, among others as dividends 
to their foreign shareholders, instead of using them for reinvestment in the mining 
sector, also led to a significant portion of mining surpluses leaving Zambia. 
 
The failure to achieve greater improvements in company performance when the mines 
were under government ownership but under the control of private management 
discounts the view of property rights theorists that better incentives provided to 
managers would improve company performance. Accordingly, superior incentives 
provided to private managers per se were not a sufficient condition for improved 
company performance in the Zambian mining sector under government ownership of 
mining companies. Improved company performance during government ownership but 
foreign private management of the mines also required effective government controls to 
curb both transfer pricing practices and the externalisation of mining profits out of 
Zambia.  
 
In more recent examples, the takeover constraint did not represent an effective deterrent 
against the poor performance of the private mining companies either. For instance, the 
poor performance of RAMCOZ under private ownership and the departure of Anglo 
American from Zambia did not result in a smooth takeover. A substantial delay of two 
years took place from the decision of Anglo American to withdraw from Zambia and 
the eventual resale of KCM to Vedanta, at the end of 2004. Moreover, delays and 
difficulties that the government experienced in getting new private sector interests to 
take over Luanshya/Baluba imposed a huge cost on the Zambian economy. This 
contradicts the argument of pro-privatisation proponents that superior monitoring and 
control of managers under private ownership, because of capital markets and the 
takeover constraints that are absent under government ownership, also account for the 
poorer performance of SOEs. Rather, these outcomes are consistent with the view of 
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Craig700 that uncompetitive capital markets curtail the monitoring and control of private 
companies, rendering them ineffective as regulators of manager performance within 
private firms in developing countries. 
 
Socio-economic costs of cost-cutting or profit-maximisation objectives of private 
companies 
 
Several of the profit-maximising and cost-cutting measures of private TNCs that might 
have been necessary as a damage control exercise to improve company performance 
had a negative influence on the socio-economic development of the Zambian economy. 
Principal x-efficiency measures that impacted negatively on the socio-economic 
development of Zambia were: (i) the large concessions granted to mining TNCs; (ii) the 
reductions in the labour force and a lowering of their conditions of employment; (iii) the 
shifting onto the government of some responsibilities, such as the payment of 
retrenchment and pension packages, as well as the provision of social services and for 
the treatment of some pollution; (iv) temporary closures and withdrawals of mining 
companies; (v) measures supporting foreign suppliers over local suppliers; and (vi) a 
depreciation of the kwacha.  
 
The reductions in the costs of production of private mining TNCs through lowering 
permanent employment levels, degrading the conditions of work of mineworkers and 
through diminishing the provision of social services of the mining community degraded 
the welfare of the nation, increased poverty levels and polarised wealth in favour of 
mining TNCs. The de-industrialisation of the local economy further contributed to 
increases in poverty levels. Moreover, enormous costs imposed on the government 
(owing to concessions granted to TNCs and its assumption of various liabilities of the 
mines and for the maintenance of non-core mining services, previously performed by 
the ZCCM) and the volatile exchange rate had a highly negative impact on the Zambian 
economy. Various problems evident in the privatised setting were, however, also 
attributable to failures in government regulations and in their implementation.  
 
                                                 
700
    Cited in Cook and Kirkpatrick, 2000b:17. 
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Accordingly, the benefits of several cost-cutting and profit-maximising measures of 
private companies to improve company performance need to be weighed against their 
socio-economic costs for the Zambian people. The poor socio-economic outcomes 
under private ownership of the mines support the argument of Kiken (1998) that the 
tendency of private enterprise to neglect the economic, political and social 
consequences of their activities in lower-income economies might undermine 
sustainable improvements in the standard of living and the welfare outcomes. In such 
instances, the economic growth, distribution and poverty effects of privatisation may 
not necessarily be positive (cited in Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2005:529; Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 2000b:24).  
 
7.2.4 Political-economic implications of the privatisation, changing ownership and 
government policies of the mines and the impact on development 
 
In the absence of various prerequisites for a more successful privatisation and a greater 
redistribution of gains from improved company performance, privatisation and private 
ownership tended to undermine the socio-economic development of the country. The 
flawed manner in which the mines were privatised, marked by poor governance, likely 
benefited the senior government officials that were allegedly involved in the corruption 
that transpired during the privatisation of the ZCCM. On the other hand, the losses in 
revenue from corrupt practices, poor sales prices, concessions granted to mining TNCs 
and the government’s assumption of the huge liabilities of the ZCCM negatively 
affected the Zambian economy, in loss of revenue. Moreover, the inadequate protection 
of the interests of mineworkers impeded a greater redistribution of benefits of the 
privatisation of the mines to the mineworkers. 
 
A major shift occurred in the political economy under private ownership of the mines 
from what was the case under government ownership of the mines. Under private 
ownership of the mines, profit-maximising objectives and the poor redistribution of 
gains from mining, together with an ineffective enforcement of existing legal measures 
governing private ownership of the mines concentrated gains from mining mainly with 
the private mining TNCs, their shareholders and foreign suppliers. Conversely, the 
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deficiencies in government policies and especially the cost-cutting measures of the 
private companies to achieve x-efficiency objectives had a detrimental influence 
especially on the local mineworkers, the Zambian-based suppliers to the mines and the 
Zambian economy, limiting development gains for the country. 
 
In contrast, under government ownership of the mines, the main beneficiaries of 
Kaunda’s redistributive policies in the mining sector were the Zambian mineworkers, 
the local managers that took over from the expatriates701 (with the assistance of the 
Zambianisation policies) and the mining community. The welfare of the mining 
community improved considerably due to the greater accessibility of social services 
under Kaunda’s rule. Moreover, the protectionist policies that the Kaunda government 
instituted and the reallocation of mining revenue to develop the local manufacturing 
sector were highly beneficial to the locally-based industries to the mines. However, the 
manufacturing sector had several limitations. For example, their poor inter- and intra-
industry linkage that rendered these industries highly dependent on intermediate inputs 
and their lack of competitiveness eclipsed the scope and sustainability of the local 
industries. 
 
On the other hand, under the MMD government a significant change took place in the 
political economy of Zambia (already before the privatisation of the mines), following 
its rigorous adoption of the SAPs and liberalisation policies imposed by the IMF and 
World Bank. As is noted above, in the absence of creating alternative employment to 
absorb the unemployed workers, the high number of retrenchments of workers as a 
result of demand management measures had a negative impact, especially on those 
mineworkers left unemployed. Demand management programmes further degraded the 
social services of the Zambian community. Supply-side measures and free trade policies 
affected especially the local suppliers adversely. Conversely, the SAPs and liberal 
policies predominantly favoured the private mining TNCs, the foreign suppliers and the 
expatriate managers. 
 
                                                 
701
    Expatriates were from the countries of origin of the mining TNCs. 
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7.2.5 Recommendations for more beneficial privatisation of SOEs 
 
Measures that would have promoted greater advantages for Zambia from the 
privatisation for the mines include: 
• More gradual and effective planning of the privatisation of the mining sector to 
allow for:  
o The building of stronger and more competent institutions and a rigorous 
regulatory framework, before the mines were privatised, as well as for better 
monitoring and enforcing of regulations. Such measures would have been more 
effective in curtailing non-transparent activities and corruption and negative 
consequences of privatisation on the Zambian economy. 
• Government-introduced safety nets and redistributive measures needed to promote 
better outcomes for the mineworkers and the mining community, namely: 
o Alternative employment creation, before the mineworkers were retrenched, to 
absorb ‘surplus capacity’ as a result of privatisation policies.  
o The provision of adequate social security to the mining community and 
unemployed mineworkers that were negatively influenced by the privatisation of 
the ZCCM.  
• Measures ensuring higher government revenue from the privatisation of the ZCCM 
through:  
o A higher bargaining leverage of the government.  
o Better performance of the Zambian economy and of the ZCCM, partly through 
greater reinvestment within the ZCCM before it was privatised. 
o Demanding the total cash considerations from mining TNCs immediately at the 
conclusion of the sales of the mines, rather than granting private mining 
companies deferred cash considerations. 
o Limiting the time-frame of investment obligations of mining TNCs. 
o The state refraining from assuming the debt of the ZCCM, including the 
payment of retrenchment packages of many mineworkers that lost their jobs, 
partly as a result of some mining TNCs making these demands conditional on 
the conclusion of the sales of the mines. 
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o Curbing corruption during the privatisation of the mines, through stronger 
institutions and regulations.  
o Increasing mining companies’ taxes, which are limited by the concessions 
granted to the mining TNCs. Privatisation has been less decisive than profound 
tax administration reform for revenue performance (Buchs, 2003:12, 13). 
• Redistributive measures to ensure a greater ‘trickle down’ of the benefits of 
improved performance of private mining companies to local Zambians. In the 
absence of such measures greater x-efficiency and profit-maximising objectives of 
private companies might in fact disadvantage the local Zambians.  
• An exploration of alternatives other than the privatisation of the mines, in light of the 
strategic importance of mining to the Zambian economy and because of the highly 
negative impact that the privatisation of the mining sector has had on the socio-
economic development of Zambia. 
o A corporatisation of the mining sector, allowing for a continuation of government 
majority ownership but under private-sector management, and in some cases a 
private-sector minority stake in the mines. Government ownership would have 
constrained the leakages of profits out of Zambia, while private management 
would have limited both the political influence of the government and its 
tendency to over-extend the resources of the mining sector into unproductive 
sectors. 
o Measures ensuring higher Zambian private sector participation in the ownership 
of the copper mines that would have enabled a greater redistribution of benefits to 
the locals from the privatisation of the ZCCM. 
o Greater reinvestment in the mines before they became cash-strapped, which 
would have enhanced the capacity of the government to augment the performance 
of the ZCCM under government ownership. 
o A significant reduction of Zambia’s external debt, also under government 
ownership of the mines. The reduction could possibly have been on a similar basis 
to the HIPC initiative and the MDRI that Zambia qualified for recently when the 
mines were under private ownership. 
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7.3 THE ROLES OF TNCs IN THE MINING SECTOR OF ZAMBIA (WITHIN 
A WEAK STATE) 
 
Significant findings that emerged from the assessment of the roles of TNCs in the 
mining sector of Zambia were first that their technological and capital inputs in the 
mines were their principal contributions in the development of Zambia. Second, the 
bargaining leverage of the government against those of the mining TNCs played a 
crucial role in determining the outcomes of the participation of these TNCs in Zambia. 
Third, in the short term, significant reductions in government revenue and foreign 
exchange obtained from mining and an erosion of certain benefits of local suppliers and 
workers under TNCs’ ownership of the mines severely eclipsed the transfer of greater 
returns for Zambia from the surpluses of mining under the TNCs’ ownership of the 
mines. Fourth, factors other than concessions and liberal policies were more dominant 
in influencing the locational decisions of the mining TNCs in Zambia. Furthermore, the 
activities of the TNCs in the mining sector, together with the more extensive and liberal 
policies that the Chiluba government adopted, and the poor capacity of the Zambian 
government altered the political-economic landscape of the mining sector and the 
Zambian economy. These findings are explained in the next sections. 
 
7.3.1 The roles of TNCs in supplementing technology and capital 
 
The notable contribution of TNCs in augmenting much needed technology and capital 
stock of the copper mines in Zambia enabled greater exploration of minerals, the 
opening of unused mines and the development of the mining sector. The capital and 
technological input were crucial especially in light of the poor recapitalisation of the 
mining sector in the late 1990s, which was a major contributing factor of their weak 
performance. The significant contribution of virtually all the mining TNCs, with the 
exception of Binani, in increasing the technology and capital stock of the mining sector 
validates the neo-classical702 and neo-fundamentalists’ views703 that TNCs play a pivotal 
role in supplementing the capital and technology of the host country (cited in Helleiner, 
1989:1451; Jenkins, 1987:19, 20, 32). 
 
                                                 
702
    See, for example, proponents of the product cycle model (Vernon, 1979) and of ‘internalisation’ (Buckley, 1985 and Casson). 
703
    See, for example, Warren, 1980 and Emmanual, 1976. 
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However, despite considerable investment by the mining TNCs that took ownership of 
the mines compared to that under government ownership in the mid-1990s, in the short 
term their investment levels were lower than what were pledged in the development 
agreements. In fact, the investment levels of these TNCs were less in real terms over the 
short term under private ownership from 1997-2003, than the average investment levels 
from 1990-96, under government ownership. Moreover, within a weak state, investment 
from the mining TNCs in Zambia was significantly influenced by factors such as the 
price of copper, their practice of delaying investments and the excessive concessions 
granted to them. In particular, the concession allowing for pledged rather than definite 
investments from mining TNCs enabled the delaying of their investment commitments. 
Moreover, the reliance of several mining TNCs on existing mining operations in 
Zambia, instead of on their foreign sources to finance the development of greenfield 
projects that they have pledged to develop further limited the scope of their capital 
inputs in the host countries. 
 
Accordingly, in the short term the impact of all these factors on investments 
considerably contributed to the fluctuations in investment levels under TNCs’ 
ownership of the mines. However, in the longer run, improved company profits as a 
result of greater efficiencies pertaining to private ownership of the mines could 
encourage higher investments in the mining sector. The poor bargaining leverage of the 
government over those of mining TNCs and certain weaknesses in the institutional, 
regulatory and the implementational capacity of the government also curtailed the 
extent of the technological and capital transfers from mining TNCs to the mines. 
 
Furthermore, the activities of Binani at RAMCOZ in Zambia demonstrate that TNCs do 
not always transfer capital and technology to the host country. In fact, various activities 
of Binani, together with the government’s subsequent assumption of the role of receiver 
of the company, amounted to a draining of the resources of TNCs, at great cost to the 
state coffers. Most notable among these activities were Binani’s failure to pay its huge 
liabilities to the national bank, suppliers, workers and statutory bodies in Zambia (for 
which the Zambian government largely assumed responsibility), and its asset-stripping 
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activities. These activities of Binani contradict the neo-classical argument that TNCs 
have a positive role in host countries, while affirming the counter-perspective of the 
Global Reach and neo-imperialist theorists that TNCs drain the resources and 
undermine the development of the host country. However, the alleged corrupt 
relationship that the Chiluba government had with Binani probably abetted some of the 
actions of the mining company. 
 
Despite lower investment levels than were pledged and the practice of TNCs to raise 
capital locally rather than internationally, in the late 1990s however, under state 
ownership of the mines, the government would unlikely have obtained sufficient capital 
required to reinvest in the mines. The diversion of mining revenue for developing other 
sectors to fulfil the multiple objectives and electoral-maximising motives of the 
government, alongside the huge debt of the country and the poor performance of the 
ZCCM especially in the 1990s, severely limited greater investment in the mines under 
government ownership. External factors, in particular IMF and World Bank policies 
barring higher government investment in the mines earmarked for privatisation from 
1996, were also significantly responsible for huge reductions in investment in the mines 
in the late 1990s, under government ownership.  
 
7.3.2 The bargaining position of the government over mining TNCs (and primary 
consequences) 
 
The opportunistic manner in which the mining TNCs conducted themselves is 
fundamentally also a function of the poor leverage of the Zambian government over 
those of the mining TNCs. Most significantly, the weak bargaining position of the 
government enabled the mining TNCs to consolidate their advantages in the mining 
industry by collaborating through the Kafue Consortium during the bidding process for 
the final and most lucrative assets of the ZCCM. It further enabled the mining TNCs to 
obtain excessive concessions from the government. In turn, the government imposed 
very few obligations on the mining TNCs. 
 
The formation of the Kafue Consortium reduced competition and enabled the 
consortium to undervalue the assets of the ZCCM it was to gain during the bidding 
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process and to demand highly favourable terms from the government. The weak 
economic position of the country and the poor capacity of the government to value the 
mines independently of the advisors and of the buyers, and to assert higher prices for 
the mines enabled the mining TNCs to adjust bids in their favour. Moreover, the 
concessions granted to mining TNCs dramatically reduced government revenue from 
mining.  
 
The strong leverage of mining TNCs to act opportunistically points to weaknesses in the 
argument of the bargaining proponents that governments are able to influence the 
activities of TNCs towards advantageous outcomes for the host country. On the 
contrary, it demonstrates that a weak state and liberalised economy significantly limited 
the government’s ability to dictate terms to the mining TNCs that would optimise its 
returns from mining. This, together with the failure of liberal policies that the Chiluba 
government adopted in promoting greater benefits for Zambia from the activities of 
mining TNCs, affirms the argument of development theorists (such as Leftwich, 
1995:415; Kim & Leipziger, 1993:29, 30) that a strong government bargaining leverage 
is pivotal in enabling the government to direct the activities of TNCs to more favourable 
outcomes. A strong bargaining leverage of the state (a corporatist role) over those of the 
mining TNCs is also crucial to ensure that the greatest possible share of the rent element 
from mining accrues to the host country (Chang, 1998:238).  
 
7.3.3 Returns to the Zambian economy from the extraction of copper 
 
The confining of the government’s revenue base from mining to mining tax revenue 
under private ownership of the mines, alongside the finite benefits pertaining to 
exhaustible resources, necessitates the optimising of tax revenue under private 
ownership of the mines to ensure the maximisation of returns for the government from 
mining. Under government ownership of the mines, government income from mining 
was obtained both from mining tax and directly from sales and profits from the mines. 
The externalisation of surpluses from mining under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines 
also reduced the foreign currency reserves obtainable from mining for Zambia. 
Moreover, reinvestment of a proportion of mining rent into non-exhaustible resources, 
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including the development of human capital and of lateral sectors to mining, is 
necessary to ensure more sustainable development from mining (see, for example, 
Blignaut & Hassan, 2002:89-101; Blignaut & Hassan, cited in Cawood et al., 2001:157; 
Pedro, 2004:6). 
 
7.3.3.1 Government tax revenue from mining 
 
In the short term, the large concessions granted to mining TNCs on corporate tax, VAT, 
duty tax, mineral royalty tax and other taxes, virtually obliterated instead of optimised 
government taxes from mining under private ownership of the mines (until 2004). Even 
during the copper price boom, from 2004 to 2007, the taxes from mining were still 
considerably lower than those in the early 1990s. Conversely, under TNCs’ ownership 
of the mines the tax burden was shifted away from the private mining TNCs to the 
Zambian population, through increases in VAT and non-tax revenue of Zambians, and 
especially to the mineworkers through PAYE. The government’s share from mining 
declined, also during the years of the copper price boom, despite the general increase in 
total government revenue in subsequent years.  
 
However, the limited gains in government revenue under TNCs’ ownership of the mines 
were not owing to an inherent flaw in the operations of TNCs in host countries. Rather, 
these arose significantly as a result of the poor bargaining leverage of the host 
government that enabled the mining TNCs to extract excessive concessions from the 
government. Additionally, weaknesses in certain laws and in their enforcement 
obstructed a greater capturing of mining surpluses for the government. The inclusion in 
the constitution of certain clauses of development agreements providing for incentives 
continues to limit reductions in concessions. This is because their inclusion in the 
constitution makes compliance to the concessions legally enforceable and subject to an 
international arbitration process. The difficulty the government experienced in 
enforcing additional tax increases proposed in the new Income Tax Amendment Bill 
(Act 1) of 2008 that subsequently obliged it to reverse some of the tax increases 
demonstrates the obstacles the government faces in reducing concessions. 
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7.3.3.2 The repatriation of mining resources and foreign currency earnings from mining 
 
The significant repatriation of mining surpluses that increased dramatically during the 
boom in copper prices (from 2004 to 2006) under private TNCs’ ownership of the 
mines, as well as through possible transfer pricing policies, further limited the capturing 
of rent from mining by the MMD government. The resultant reduction in returns for the 
Zambian economy from the surpluses obtained from the extraction of copper reduced 
gains through investment and tax revenue under TNCs’ ownership of the mines. It also 
curtailed greater savings from mining activities for the Zambian economy. High 
reductions in returns for the Zambian economy under TNCs’ ownership of the mines 
relative to benefits in technological and capital inputs would cancel gains from the 
participation of mining TNCs and could amount to a draining of the resources of 
Zambia.  
 
The repatriation of mining revenue also caused volatility and sudden outflows of 
foreign exchange, which are likely to continue their destabilising impact both on the 
level of Zambia’s foreign currency reserves and on the exchange rate. Weaknesses in 
government policies also facilitated the repatriation of surpluses from mining. In 
particular, the weak control over securities and exchange and the absence of exchange 
controls enabled the repatriation of all after-tax profits from mining under the TNCs’ 
ownership of the mines.  
 
7.3.3.3 The roles of TNCs in promoting the development of local capital  
 
The activities of TNCs did not promote significant improvements for local capacities, 
namely the locally based suppliers and the mineworkers, either. The improvements in 
the short term in the growth and employment of local suppliers under private TNCs’ 
ownership of the Zambian mines (due to the greater ability of the mining TNCs to pay 
the local suppliers than was the case immediately prior to the privatisation of the mines) 
were at levels still lower than those of the early 1990s. Certain practices of the mining 
TNCs in fact considerably offset and at times undermined greater improvement in the 
development of local suppliers. 
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In particular, the continued practice of the mining TNCs to replace local suppliers in the 
procurement of mining inputs with cheaper and mostly better quality imports from 
foreign manufacturers and suppliers, allegedly also from their own foreign subsidiary 
supplier companies, has limited higher growth in the manufacturing sector. The poor 
participation of local suppliers in the inputs of mining also precluded a greater transfer 
of technological know-how from TNCs to the local suppliers. However, certain 
inefficiencies of local companies and weaknesses in government policies reinforced 
these trends.  
 
As far as the mineworkers are concerned, a large reduction in the labour force under 
TNCs’ ownership of the mines, mainly at the major operational copper mines, led to a 
significant overall decline in the short term in the employment levels of the mines. This 
was in spite of the higher employment opportunities for mineworkers in those mines 
that re-opened. Permanent mining employment declined from 47 700 in 1996 
immediately prior the privatisation of the mines to 19 000 in 2002.  
 
The cuts in excess capacity in the labour force might have been a necessary damage 
control exercise to improve the performance of the loss-making mines. However, the 
reductions in permanent employment also appear to be a strategy to enable an 
increasing shift of permanent workers into non-permanent employment. This was 
mainly achieved through the increasing use of foreign contractors. Non-permanent 
workers enjoy much lower conditions of employment than permanent employees, 
mostly through lower wages, lack of pensions and union representation. Moreover, the 
rise in total employment in the mining sector during the boom in copper prices from 
2005-07 (from the 2001 levels) were still considerably lower than the levels in the early 
1990s. 
 
Moreover, insufficient training of local workers at several mining companies limited the 
transfer of skills from TNCs to the local capacities. Such skill transfers are highly 
beneficial in developing the human capital of the host country, according to various 
theorists (see, for example, Padayachee, 1995:173 and Stiglitz, 1998:25, 26, 32). 
  
330
Human capital development, in turn, possesses enormous potential for speeding up the 
development of host countries. The replacement of many Zambian workers with foreign 
workers and Zambian managers with expatriates (from the countries of origin of mining 
TNCs) at most of the mining companies under the TNCs’ ownership of the mines, 
further reduced advantages for the affected parties. Various loopholes in government 
measures also accounted for the poor benefits to local capacities from the activities of 
mining TNCs. 
 
7.3.4 Factors influencing the decisions of mining TNCs to depart from Zambia 
 
The study found that the concessions and liberal policies proved insignificant in 
determining the locational decisions of mining TNCs, contradicting the argument of 
Rugman that unrestricted trade and industrial policies are crucial for attracting TNCs 
(cited in Jenkins, 1987:22). Other economic factors, especially the global profit-
maximising objectives of the parent companies of mining TNCs, the competitiveness of 
Zambia in relation to other countries and the quality of minerals in the mining sector 
proved more fundamental in determining their locational decisions in Zambia. The 
decision of Anglo American to depart from the country is a case in point.  
 
The lower competitiveness of Zambia was mainly as a result of the high-risk perception 
of Anglo American’s shareholders of African investments, the relatively high 
production costs and the greater inaccessibility of Zambia’s copper, which requires 
deep-level mining, whereas open-cast mining (that is cheaper to extract)704 is 
predominant in Chile. Moreover, losses and liquidity problems that both Anglo 
American and AVMIN experienced contributed further to their decision to depart from 
Zambia. The failure to win the Luanshya/Baluba bid, which would have secured 
Chambishi Metal’s long-term feasibility, was also highly significant in influencing 
AVMIN’s decision to depart. Weaknesses in laws, considered in Section 7.3.5 below, 
further facilitated the exit of Anglo American from Zambia.  
 
                                                 
704
    Mainly due to construction of costly sink shafts necessary to reach the ore in deep-level mining. 
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7.3.5 The political-economic implications of the state’s regulatory and institutional 
capacities governing mining TNCs and of mining TNCs’ activities  
 
Under the TNCs’ ownership of the Zambian mines, within a weak state, the power 
asymmetry between the Zambian government and mining TNCs enables the mining 
TNCs to behave opportunistically and to skew gains over investments and the returns 
from copper mining in their favour. Consequently, the mining TNCs, their shareholders, 
the foreign suppliers of mining inputs in Zambia and expatriate managers that are 
preferred over local managers are mostly favoured. On the other hand, the local 
mineworkers (that were largely advantaged during Kaunda’s administration), the local 
suppliers to the mines and the Zambian economy continue to be adversely affected by 
several practices of mining TNCs.  
 
The various weaknesses in government policies, laws, institutional and enforcement 
capacities regulating the activities of mining TNCs, and donor driven economic policies 
that the government was forced to adopt mainly due to its huge external debt, reinforced 
these trends. These weaknesses benefited mainly the mining TNCs, often at the expense 
of the Zambian economy and local capacities, viz. the mineworkers and the Zambian-
based suppliers. Most important weaknesses in the government measures were firstly, 
the deficiencies in government policies limiting higher technological and capital inputs 
of mining TNCs. These included: (i) the general inability of the government, primarily 
due to its weak bargaining position, to set the terms of TNCs’ investment obligations in 
the mining sector; (ii) the concession allowing for pledged rather than definite 
investments; (iii) clauses in the development agreements entitling TNCs to a 
proportional reduction of their capital expenditure commitment in the short term, and to 
close or significantly curtail operations, subject to the viability of their operations; (iv) 
the sanctioning of deferred cash payments to mining companies; and (v) the non-
recourse nature of investment commitments of TNCs in Zambia.  
 
Secondly, the significant concessions granted to mining TNCs through the Investment 
Act (1995), the Mines and Minerals Act (1995) and bilateral development agreements 
between the government and the mining companies favoured mining TNCs.  
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Concomitantly, these policies deprived the government considerably of higher revenue 
from the rent element from mining. Thirdly, the lack of an exit clause for the mining 
TNCs and, in the short term, the low sunk costs705 of mining TNCs facilitated the exit of 
mining TNCs from Zambia. Higher sunk costs of the TNCs would also have improved 
the bargaining leverage of the Zambian government, among other factors, to make 
greater demands on the mining TNCs.  
 
Fourthly, poor industrial policies and weaknesses in regulations governing the relation 
between local suppliers and the mining TNCs under Chiluba’s government contributed 
considerably towards undermining the development of locally-based suppliers. Liberal 
policies largely precluded the development of industrial policies necessary to promote 
local industries. This vindicates the argument of Fine and Stoneman (1996:19) that the 
minimalist government policies subsumed in liberal policies favoured by the IMF and 
the World Bank are not neutral. Rather, these policies have especially advantaged 
private capital. In particular, foreign suppliers are largely benefiting from these 
deficiencies in government policies and from practices of mining TNCs to replace 
several local suppliers with foreign suppliers. 
 
Broadly, the weaknesses in the industrial policies under MMD rule precluding greater 
advantages for local suppliers from the participation of mining TNCs in Zambia 
encompassed: 
• failure by the government to protect local suppliers against the practice of mining 
TNCs of replacing them with foreign suppliers;  
• excessive foreign investor-friendly policies not extended to local companies;  
• liberal policies that facilitated the substitution of locally-based industries in the 
supply of mining inputs;  
• omissions in agreements obliging mining TNCs to support local suppliers; and 
• agreements allowing mining companies to choose their own suppliers.  
 
                                                 
705
    A cost that has been incurred and cannot be reversed (Investopedia, 2010). 
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Moreover, a failure to encourage vertical and horizontal linkages between the global 
mining TNCs and local capacities deprived Zambian suppliers and mineworkers of 
significant benefits pertaining to the transfer of technology and know-how to local 
capacities. The transfer of knowledge from TNCs would have played a pivotal role in 
augmenting the human capital development of Zambians. Other factors, in particular 
insufficient capital and the high costs of production of local suppliers, also adversely 
influenced these suppliers and need redress to improve their competitiveness. 
 
Fifthly, various weaknesses in the legal and enforcement capacity of the government in 
promoting the development and protection of mineworkers have made it possible for 
mining TNCs to lower gains to the mineworkers, especially by way of the reductions in 
permanent employment and of their conditions of work. Additionally, poor 
implementation of labour regulations limiting the displacement of local workers with 
foreign workers and weak protection of workers to organise collectively also 
disadvantaged local mineworkers. The non-obligatory nature of clauses in the 
development agreements to aid the retrenched workers in gaining alternative skills and 
weaknesses in certain clauses on the training of local Zambians and the employment of 
local workers further limited the employment opportunities of Zambians. Moreover, the 
weak capacity of formal regulatory bodies to protect the safety of mineworkers 
undermined better safety standards for mineworkers.  
 
The shift in benefits away from workers is consistent with the argument of Bond and 
Manyanya (2002: 62, 63, 71, 79) that an increasing acceptance of IMF and World Bank 
policies, together with corrupt practices, signify a realignment of the government away 
from the more marginalised communities (workers included), which especially favour 
foreign capital and the government elite. The poor development outcomes for Zambia, 
significantly as a result of a weak state capacity, validate the arguments of theories of 
the developmental state that favour a greater interventionist role of the state. The 
prerequisites that accounted for the high state capacities and concomitantly for the 
enviable progress of developmental states were largely lacking in Zambia. Some of 
these measures that Zambia could draw from, include economic bureaucracies that 
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enjoy power and competence and are insulated from the influences of other interest 
groups, a corporatist role of the state and effective industrial policies.  
 
7.3.6 Recommendations of government measures necessary for greater benefits for 
Zambia from mining TNCs’ activities  
 
The measures necessary to direct the activities of mining TNCs towards more 
advantageous outcomes for Zambia require: 
1. The redressing of various deficiencies in the laws governing the activities of mining 
TNCs to curtail the harmful consequences of the activities of mining TNCs to the 
country, whilst steering their activities towards greater benefits for Zambia. These 
would necessitate the government: 
a. Encouraging greater investment of mining TNCs in Zambia through:  
• Setting the terms and enforcing investment obligations of mining TNCs. 
• Limiting tax holidays that significantly curtail increased investments in 
Zambia. This would require the government eliminating clauses in the 
development agreements allowing mining companies to reduce their capital 
expenditure commitments at their discretion, or to temporarily or permanently 
close their operations and to defer their cash payment commitments.  
• Ensuring that TNCs possess sufficient funds, before investing in Zambia, 
rather than employing profits from existing mines to develop new mines. 
• Demanding definite rather than pledged investment obligations that have to 
be determined during the bidding process.  
• Linking investment commitments to have recourse to shareholders of the 
mining TNCs. 
• Ensuring that the investments of mining TNCs exceed the repatriation of their 
profits out of the country. 
b. Providing the country with greater protection against withdrawals of mining 
TNCs. Withdrawals of mining TNCs from Zambia could have been curtailed by:  
• The introduction of a considerable exit penalty in agreements, penalising 
mining TNCs should they withdraw from Zambia. 
• Linking the activities of TNCs to have recourse to their shareholders. 
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• Ensuring that TNCs incur greater sunk costs, by way of higher investments in 
Zambia, soon after their takeover. 
2. A greater capturing and redistribution of returns by the government from mining 
TNCs to the Zambian economy through the government: 
a. Prompting TNCs to reinvest a greater portion of their profit in Zambia. 
b. Increasing its shares in the mines. 
c. Renegotiating with mining TNCs to reduce their concessions. Higher corporate 
and other taxes on mining companies seem necessary to ease the high tax burden 
on workers and on the Zambian population, and to enable greater benefits for the 
country from the surpluses from mining. 
d. Limiting the repatriation of profits and resources of mining TNCs out of Zambia 
(also through dividends). 
e. Introducing laws in the financial sector to curb the high repatriation of foreign 
currency earned from mining. These would include measures obliging the 
mining TNCs to deposit or exchange (for the local currency) a higher portion of 
foreign currency acquired from copper sales with the Bank of Zambia to 
improve the foreign currency reserves of the country. 
f. Ensuring greater accessibility of social services to Zambians and their adequate 
maintenance under private ownership of the mines, through the government: 
• Transferring the responsibility for the provision of these services and for the 
upkeep of mining townships706 to the mining companies. 
• Specifying in the development agreements that mining TNCs provide all the 
services that the ZCCM previously provided to the mining community.  
3. Government measures promoting the development of local suppliers under TNCs’ 
ownership of the mines: 
a. State-directed investment that pertains to developmental states to promote more 
favourable outcomes for local suppliers from the participation of mining TNCs 
in the Zambian economy requires: 
• An industrial policy promoting the development of local suppliers, by way of 
protectionist policies, through the use of subsidies, taxes and tariffs whilst at 
                                                 
706
    That were transferred to the ill-resourced local municipal authorities. 
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the same time encouraging local industries to become internationally 
competitive.  
• The elimination of government policies that undermined local suppliers, such 
as the excessive foreign investor-friendly policies, especially the concessions 
granted to foreign companies. Policies that place high import duties on raw 
materials and intermediary products and that reduce duties on finished goods, 
which sabotage the local manufacturing sector, should be reversed. 
• Government industrial policies obliging TNCs to provide greater support to 
local suppliers.  
• The establishment of vertical and horizontal linkages between local suppliers 
and TNCs that hold significant potential benefits for the development of the 
host country. 
• The development of local forward linkages or value-added products to the 
copper mining sector, also other than smelting (where most of the forward 
linkages of mining is concentrated),707 in which Zambia has a comparative 
advantage.708 Policies that would promote forward linkages to copper mining 
include:  
o Incentives and supplying the local manufacturers that need copper inputs 
with a certain percentage of copper cathodes from copper mining 
companies. 
o The introduction of higher export duties on copper concentrates. 
o Lower charges for the treatment of copper concentrates that would create 
an economic incentive for mining companies to smelt copper or to process 
these concentrates in Zambia (Fraser & Lungu, 2007:4, 17, 60). 
• Measures curbing practices of mining TNCs to substitute locally-based 
suppliers with foreign suppliers. 
• The government limiting the adoption of liberalisation policies before or 
alongside the privatisation of the mines at a time when local capacities are 
weak and when markets are highly imperfect. In particular, free trade 
                                                 
707
    As most of Zambian copper ores are concentrated and smelted in Zambia and a number of new smelters are being built. 
708
    Namely; electrical products (copper wires, electrical plugs, pipes) and other light-industrial goods. 
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policies, as well as the liberalisation of the capital market and the exchange 
rate undermined local manufacturing companies in Zambia. 
b. Low interest rates would enable greater local participation in the supply of inputs 
of the mines under private ownership.  
c. Greater inter- and intra-industry linkages of Zambia’s industries. Such linkages 
should have been in place before liberalisation policies were introduced. They 
would have reduced the high dependence of local industries on imports for 
intermediates and ensured more beneficial consequences for local suppliers from 
the depreciation of the local currency.  
4. Greater protection of local workers against certain activities of mining TNCs that 
would be enhanced through the government: 
a. Curbing practices of TNCs to increasingly shift permanently employed workers 
into contract and casual employment. 
b. Limiting the employment of foreign workers.  
c. Ensuring greater Zambian participation in the management structures of the 
mining TNCs. 
d. Adopting measures obliging TNCs to transfer skills to Zambians, through 
training local mineworkers, to make them more employable. Furthermore, 
training provided by mining TNCs is important to promote the development of 
Zambia’s human capital.  
e. Strengthening the government institutions and other bodies overseeing the 
protection of workers, such as the Ministry of Labour and those bodies 
regulating the safety of workers (including the Mines Safety Department). This 
would enable a better enforcement of workers’ rights. 
f. Reforming labour legislation that would strengthen trade unions. 
g. Addressing the weaknesses in the bankruptcy law in Zambia that shield 
liquidated companies from paying terminal benefits to workers.  
5. A higher government capacity. This would be achieved through: 
a. Competent economic bureaucracies necessary to implement government policies 
more effectively. This requires the:  
• Reintroduction of long-term development plans to guide development.  
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• The establishment of more effective networking structures between state and 
non-state actors, at the national, provincial, district, and sub-district level. 
• Strengthening of the capacity of institutions taxed with enforcement and 
monitoring the operations of TNCs through:  
o The provision of adequate resources, such as sufficient and competent 
manpower. 
o Better access to information as to the obligations of the mining TNCs to 
Zambia, partly through greater transparency of development agreements. 
o Swifter penalisation of malpractices by TNCs.  
b. The promotion of a greater corporatist role of the government by way of:  
• Measures raising the bargaining leverage of the government, which would 
have increased its capacity to work more independently of other stakeholders 
and improved its leverage in dictating terms to TNCs. A higher bargaining 
leverage would have been better accomplished through the government first 
consolidating its power, before the mines were privatised. 
• The government limiting the influence of foreign donors on the Zambian 
economy. 
c. The establishment of effective industrial policies to promote the local industrial 
sector, also backward- and forward-linkages to the mines. 
6. The employment of mining tax revenue to diversify the economy to alleviate the 
‘Dutch disease’ from which the Zambian economy is suffering, owing to its 
immense dependence on the mining sector. 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Key features identified from the examination of the mining policies of the Kaunda and 
Chiluba governments are that the redistribution of mining surpluses, motivated strongly 
by the electoral-maximising objectives of the Kaunda government, played a crucial role 
in promoting the socio-economic and welfare development of Zambians. These policies 
further reduced inequalities that featured strongly in the Zambian economy under 
Federal rule. However, economic growth is a fundamental prerequisite for both 
reinvestment in the mining sector and sustainable redistribution. In the absence of 
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sufficient growth, the allocation of mining surpluses into unproductive sectors has 
rendered redistribution of mining resources unsustainable in Zambia. 
 
Furthermore, the protectionist industrial policies that the Kaunda government adopted 
proved fundamental in the notable development of the manufacturing sector, albeit from 
the very low base that prevailed at independence (and with several limitations). 
However, the failure of the government to incorporate measures alongside its 
protectionist policies that encouraged higher competitiveness of local industries, 
prevented an acceleration of the development of the local industries beyond their 
infancy stage (also backward-linked industries to the mining sector). Additionally, poor 
linkages between the industrial and mining sectors and the concomitant high 
dependence of the locally-based industries on imports for intermediary inputs severely 
diminished the scope of the mining sector as an engine of growth for the manufacturing 
sector.  
 
The introduction of SAPs and strict liberal policies that the IMF and the World Bank 
imposed on the MMD government, in particular, the application of demand- and 
supply-side measures and liberal policies, without sufficient protection provided to local 
capacities, severely undermined especially the mineworkers and suppliers to the mines. 
The movement from low productivity towards zero productivity, as a result of the 
bankruptcy of many backward-linked companies to the mining sector in Zambia 
(especially following the introduction of trade liberalisation policies in the 1990s), 
reduced the benefits to the country (Stiglitz, 2002:59). The liberal policies were 
contrary to the policies of developmental states that encouraged industrial policies 
involving strong and effective state-directed investments that promoted local capacities 
(Leftwich, 1995:410; Amsden, 1997:469, 470). 
 
The main findings identified from this study on the privatisation of the mines are that 
net benefits from privatisation are not inevitable. On the contrary, Zambia failed to 
improve its public finances from the privatisation of the mines. The zero gains in public 
finances from the privatisation of the mines were also significantly attributable to the 
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weak state capacity of the Chiluba government. The weak state capacity enabled corrupt 
practices and forced the government to provide concessions to the bidders, and to 
assume the liabilities of the ZCCM. On the other hand, rather than privatisation per se, 
the mode of privatisation, which is not neutral, strongly determined the economic and 
the political-economic outcomes of the privatisation of the Zambian copper mines. This 
points to the need for establishing several prerequisites before privatising the mines, that 
would have guaranteed greater advantages for Zambia (from their privatisation). As is 
noted in Section 7.2.1.1, these include robust legal and institutional measures (also 
better monitoring and enforcement of obligations of private companies) ensuring greater 
gains for the Zambian economy, as well as the creation of alternative employment and 
safety nets protecting Zambians against negative influences of privatisation and the 
private ownership of the mines.  
 
Furthermore, a better planned privatisation, invariably more successfully achievable 
through a gradual process to facilitate the establishment of these prerequisites before the 
mines were privatised, would likely have been more appropriate than the swift 
privatisation that the IMF and World Bank favoured. A stronger bargaining leverage 
would also have enabled the government to gain more from the privatisation of the 
mines. In the absence of the various prerequisites, the opportunistic practices that have 
strongly featured during the privatisation of Zambia’s mines are likely to replicate. 
 
Important elements identified from the assessment of the state and private ownership of 
the mines are that company performance improved under private TNCs’ ownership of 
the mines (in the case of Zambia mainly through greater productivity and x-efficiency). 
However, improved company performance is a necessary but insufficient ingredient for 
sustainable development. In the absence of adequate redistributive measures of mining 
profits, improved company performance did not result in higher development gains for 
Zambia. On the contrary, in the short term, several cost-cutting measures of private 
companies promoted poor socio-economic outcomes. This was expressed in increases in 
the unemployment rate, and reduced welfare that escalated inequalities of wealth and 
poverty levels. Wealth though concentrates in favour of the private mining TNCs. 
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Accordingly, jobless growth (in the case of Zambia especially pertaining to permanent 
employment), despite increases in GDP growth and the huge profits of mining TNCs 
from the boom of copper prices, did not translate into meaningful development for 
Zambians. 
 
A weighing of the advantages of improved x-efficiency against the socio-economic 
costs of profit-maximising measures on the Zambian population and economy provides 
a more accurate assessment of benefits for Zambia under private ownership of the 
mines, compared to the partial picture that a simple growth- or company performance-
based determination of benefits provides. A correct balance between growth in the 
mining sector and a redistribution of mining surpluses seems paramount for the 
sustainable and more equitable development of Zambia. 
 
Better incentives of private managers likely contributed to the improved performance 
under private ownership of the mines. However during the 1970-73 period, transfer 
pricing practices and the repatriation of a significant portion of surpluses to mining 
TNCs’ parent companies rendered private management under majority government 
ownership of the mines insufficient for significantly improving company performance. 
However, government oversight enabled such practices from private expatriate 
managers. Furthermore, the takeover constraint was not an effective deterrent against 
the poor performance of RAMCOZ under private ownership, nor did it ensure a smooth 
takeover following the departure of Anglo American from Zambia. A delay of two 
years followed before Vedanta Resources took over KCM. 
 
Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the minimalist role of the state that the IMF 
and the World Bank favour has reduced the capacity of the government to implement 
policies that would have been more advantageous to Zambians during the privatisation 
and under private ownership of the mines by TNCs. A minimalist state role is largely 
contained in liberal policies that the Chiluba government adopted. Indeed, these 
measures alongside several weaknesses in government institutional, legal and 
enforcement measures contributed to the poor development outcomes. This underscores 
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the importance of a strong state capacity for ensuring a more effective implementation 
of certain prerequisites necessary to facilitate a more significant ‘trickling down’ of 
benefits to the rest of the Zambian economy, from the privatisation and private 
ownership of the mines. 
 
In light of the strategic importance of the mines to the Zambian economy and the highly 
negative consequences in the short term of the privatisation of the copper mining 
companies on Zambia’s socio-economic development and in increasing the poverty 
levels, the privatisation option might not have been the best choice for maximising the 
development of the country. In instances involving strategic activities in a competitive 
market, SOEs would, in fact, be desirable over private ownership (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 
2000a:211, 212). A greater exploration of suitable alternatives to the privatisation 
option, probably a restructuring through a highly improved management of the ZCCM, 
possibly within a continued government ownership of the mines, was necessary before 
the decision to privatise the mines was pursued. Such an arrangement would also 
require rigorous government oversight to minimise the transfer-pricing policies that 
characterised the operations of managers under private management and government 
majority ownership of the mines between 1970 and 1973. 
 
The principal conclusions from this study of the roles of mining TNCs in the mining 
sector of Zambia are that in the short term within a weak state, the costs of the 
participation of TNCs in the Zambian mining sector greatly reduced the advantages for 
the Zambian economy. On the other hand, the capital and technological contributions of 
mining TNCs to the Zambian economy, at present their most significant contribution to 
the mining sector, enabled much-needed investment also for recapitalising the mines. 
However, various factors, together with loopholes in government measures 
(respectively considered in Section 7.3.1 and 7.3.5), limited the extent of TNCs’ 
technological and capital contributions to the mining sector. 
 
An assessment of the overall gains for the host country from the participation of mining 
TNCs requires an evaluation of the benefits of technology and capital inputs from the 
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mining TNCs against the net gains for the Zambian economy from mining surpluses. 
Poor returns for the government of surpluses from mining severely curtailed the 
capturing of higher gains for Zambia from the exploitation of mining resources under 
TNCs’ ownership of the mines. The poor returns to the government from mining were 
mainly due to: (i) low government tax revenue (mainly as a result of excessive 
concessions granted to mining TNCs); (ii) limited foreign currency earnings to Zambia 
from copper earnings (largely as a result of transfer pricing policies); and (iii) the weak 
development of local capacities. In particular, long-term concessions granted to mining 
TNCs and the repatriation of mining revenue that obstructed the accumulation of higher 
foreign currency reserves in Zambia greatly limited advantages for the Zambian 
economy from improved company performance under private ownership. Moreover, the 
excessive concessions granted to mining TNCs, whilst eliminating subsidies to local 
companies, created distortions and effectively amounted to a transfer of subsidies from 
local to foreign capacities and to the government subsidising the operations of TNCs. 
This constituted a ‘dead loss’ to the treasury.  
 
In addition, lower gainful employment of the mineworkers, the degrading of the 
conditions of employment of mineworkers, and the substitution of local capacities to the 
mines with foreign capacities undermined rather than promoted local capacities. The 
poor returns to the government from mining through taxes and investment also into 
alternative non-renewable sectors, such as the development of local workers and 
suppliers, is the opposite of what is needed for non-renewable resources. These are also 
inappropriate in light of the short life-spans of some of the mines. Rather, non-
renewable resources require the maximising of rent capture by the government to 
compensate for their depletion or finite income, and employment opportunities and 
investment into the development of lateral sectors and human capital development and 
to ensure more sustainable development of the economy (see, for example, Blignaut & 
Hassan, 2002:89-101; Pedro, 2004:6). The poor returns from mining also precluded a 
greater diversification of the economy.  
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This study further found that the concessions and liberal policies were not significant in 
the locational decisions of mining TNCs that were more fundamentally influenced by 
other economic factors. In particular, the quality of the minerals and the 
competitiveness of the country relative to others played a crucial role in the locational 
decision of companies. The global profit-maximisation decisions of the parent company 
also strongly influenced Anglo American’s decision to leave Zambia. 
 
The limited trickle-down of surpluses from mining to the Zambian economy, and the 
consequent negative development outcomes from mining under TNCs’ ownership of the 
mines, within a weak state, compared to under government ownership, challenges the 
neo-classical arguments that ascribe highly beneficial outcomes to host countries from 
the activities of TNCs. On the other hand, it supports the ‘resource curse’ argument that 
resource-abundant economies tend to grow less rapidly than resource-scarce economies. 
However, the ‘curse’ was amplified under TNCs’ ownership of the mines. 
 
Nonetheless, weak returns and adverse consequences from mining TNCs are not 
inevitable. Rather, the power asymmetry between the host government and the mining 
TNCs in favour of the TNCs significantly influenced these outcomes. The poor capacity 
of the government enabled the TNCs to behave opportunistically and to tip the balance 
of advantages in their favour. It further contributed to the degrading of the political 
economic development of the mineworkers and suppliers to the mines, and of the 
economic development of Zambia. The main factors that contributed to the weak state 
were the poor performance of the economy, the high external debt and the resultant 
dependence on IMF/World Bank aid and policies, loopholes in regulation, poor 
institutional and enforcement capacity, and the concomitant weak bargaining leverage 
of the government. 
 
These findings highlight the importance of stronger government capacities and certain 
government measures and interventions to steer the activities of mining TNCs to greater 
advantages for Zambia. A stronger state capacity also appears pivotal to enable 
countries to escape the ‘curse’ of a minerals-based economy. Fundamental blocks for a 
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stronger state capacity, applicable to the mining sector are competent institutions (in 
particular, economic institutions), a greater corporatist role of the government and 
effective industrial policies. Effective industrial policies also need to promote efficient 
and competitive local industries. The liberal policies that the MMD government 
adopted, however, precluded the development of a greater corporatist role for the 
government and the adoption of effective industrial policies to encourage the 
development of local suppliers to the mines. Sustainable economic development also 
requires a greater diversification of the economy to reduce Zambia’s high dependence 
on copper mining, a non-renewable resource that accounts for the ‘Dutch disease’ from 
which Zambia has historically suffered.  
 
Finally, the overall conclusions from this study are that under government ownership of 
the mines, redistributive measures of mining surpluses in the absence of growth 
contributed to problems of unsustainability. On the other hand, while growth is 
necessary for sustainable development, this study demonstrates that it is not by itself a 
sufficient condition for equitable development. Growth without redistribution, the case 
under private ownership of the mines, undermined the welfare of Zambians. Sustainable 
and more equitable development requires both growth and a redistribution of benefits to 
more disadvantaged sectors of the economy. 
 
The privatisation and the private ownership of the mines by mining TNCs do not have 
inevitable positive or negative outcomes on the development of the country. However, 
within a weak state and alongside the liberal policies that the IMF and the World Bank 
imposed on the MMD government, privatisation and the private ownership of the mines 
by TNCs failed to generate positive political-economic and development consequences 
for the host country. On the contrary, within a weak state, opportunistic practices of the 
private mining TNCs invariably skewed gains in their favour, at the expense of the 
Zambian economy, the mineworkers and the suppliers of the mines. The concentration 
of the political-economic benefits from copper mining mainly with the mining TNCs 
that manifested into increased inequality and poverty levels in the country following the 
privatisation and the private ownership of the mines by TNCs represents the antithesis 
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of development. Accordingly, the building of a strong state capacity and the institution 
of fundamental prerequisites before the mines were privatised were crucial for ensuring 
more advantageous outcomes for Zambia from the privatisation of the mines. These 
measures were also necessary to steer the activities of mining TNCs to more favourable 
gains for the country. 
 
Topics for future research 
 
Topics and aspects for future research of the mining sector in Zambia, not addressed in 
this study, include:  
• A study of asymmetric responses in the supply elasticity of copper to changes in 
copper prices under private and government ownership of the mines. 
• A quantitative analysis of the contribution of different factors to the production 
levels of copper. 
• A quantitative analysis of the benefits of private ownership of the mines by mining 
TNCs and of the costs, especially losses through outflows of surpluses from mining 
through transfer pricing practices, the repatriation of profits and through huge 
concessions granted to mining companies. 
• A profit-based evaluation of the performance of private mining companies in 
Zambia. 
• An investigation of the development consequences for Zambia of TNCs’ ownership 
of the mines, post the copper price boom of 2004-07. 
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ANNEXURE 
 
Table A1: Privileges that AAC and RST enjoyed under government majority 
ownership but under their management control over the mines, 1970-73 
 
 
During 1970-1973, the management and other powers that the private mining TNCs, AAC and RST, 
enjoyed enabled them to benefit from: 
• Managerial responsibilities that these companies, respectively, enjoyed over NCCM and RCM, for 
10 years. 
• The ‘sole and exclusive rights’ over the sales and marketing of minerals and metals, through their 
parent companies, at a very high fee of 1.5% of the gross turnover, plus 2% of the profits. 
• The provision of financial, commercial, technical and other services granted, respectively, to 
NCCM and RCM, at a considerable consultancy fee of 0.75% of turnover and 2% of profit, after 
mineral tax but before income tax. 
• Recruitment being left entirely in the hands of these minority shareholders, at a high fee. 
• The considerable powers of veto that they enjoyed. These included the power to decide on: the 
winding up of operating companies; the disposal of assets; the granting of mining concessions or 
other substantial rights to others; enlarging the companies’ activities; financial commitments; the 
borrowing of money; and the appropriation of capital expenditure (also for exploration or 
prospecting), etc. 
• The preferential treatment granted to them in exchange control regulations, permitting the 
automatic externalisation of non-taxable profits, dividends, management fees and from the sales of 
the private mining companies. 
• The provision in the agreement protecting them against any increases in mineral taxes, export 
taxes, income taxes, royalty payments, withholding taxes, or any other revenue measures, as long 
as their bonds (owed to private mining companies for nationalising the mines) were outstanding. 
• The permission granted to them to write off all their expenditure, in full, in the year in which they 
were incurred.709  
• The formula for the redemption of bonds and the provision in the agreement for a fixed minimum 
amount of ZIMCO bonds, to be paid each year to these private mining companies,710 irrespective 
of the profitability of the mines, and through the acceleration of the redemption of bonds when 
profits were high. No provision existed for extending the period of these bond redemptions, should 
the mines experience a sharp decline in their profits. 
• Protection against default, by: (i) shielding AAC or RST against the government’s defaulting on its 
ZIMCO bonds; (ii) requiring the government to redeem all outstanding ZIMCO bonds in the event 
of an unlawful cancellation of management and sales, or marketing contracts by the state; (iii) 
granting these companies the privilege to appoint the managing directors of RCM and NCCM; and 
(iv) government assurances not to raise taxes above 73% of company profits.  
• Borrowing from external sources a major part of their capital for expansion programmes, rather 
than employing internal profits. 
• Sourcing several services from outside Zambia, despite many of the services having being 
available in the country. 
 
 
Sources: Sardanis (2003:268, 269); Saasa (1987:40). 
                                                 
709
    Prior to the agreements, the capital expenditure was spread over the life of the mine. 
710
    To compensate them for the government majority ownership of the mines. 
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Table A2: Policies of the NERP (1987-88) 
 
 
The policies of the NERP introduced by the Kaunda government encompassed: 
• Suspending part of Zambia’s debt payment to the IMF and the World Bank by:  
o Placing a ceiling on the country's debt service payment to 10% of net foreign exchange 
earnings (but only after essential import requirements were met), estimated to cover only 
one-sixth of the unrescheduled debts. 
o Suspending interest payments to both the IMF and the World Bank. 
• Suspending the foreign exchange auctioning system, which was followed by the government over-
inflating the currency and fixing the exchange rate, from 21 May 1987 until 1988, at 
US$1=ZK8.00, from the previous rate of US$1=ZK21. 
• Reintroducing controls in foreign exchange earnings, through allocated foreign exchange control 
measures, via the Foreign Exchange Management Committee. 
• Fixing the interest rates: 
o The interest rate that was 35% during the 1984-86 period was reduced to 15% but with a 
flexible margin, not to exceed 5% to 20%. This was partly done to assist indigenous firms that 
had been priced out of the market by the high interest rate policy of the IMF. 
• Reintroducing direct price controls through the Price and Incomes Commission: 
o The government nationalised the private maize meal milling companies, and also reintroduced 
a subsidy on maize meal. 
• Setting up a revolving fund facility to support small-scale entrepreneurs, previously bypassed by 
the IMF policies. 
• Establishing an Export-Import Bank to help exporters of non-traditional exports.  
• Planning, after a five-year neglect in public investment programmes, to expand public works 
schemes in rural areas, to stimulate employment opportunities and to expand its future revenue 
base. 
• Reaffirming its support for collective bargaining. 
 
 
Sources: Cherv (1989:133, 138, 139); Hanson and Hentz (1999:484); Lungu and Silengo (1997:15); 
McGrath and Whiteside (1989:172, 176, 178, 179); Simutanyi (1996:827); The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2002:5); ZCTU File (cited in Akwetey, 1994:56). 
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Table A3: Different structural adjustment policies that the Kaunda government adopted in the 1980s 
 
1983 June 1984 October 1985 1989-93 (the policies extended two years 
into Chiluba’s government) 
1st SAPs adopted, which was a 
fundamental policy shift from 
previous attempts at economic 
reform. Zambia was granted a credit 
of SDR 270 million 
 
The policy reforms broadly included: 
• Fiscal and budgetary reforms to: 
o Restore financial discipline 
o Improve the government’s  
debts servicing capacity, through 
demand management 
• A diversification of the economy to 
agriculture that was to be funded 
through copper revenues 
 
More specific major objectives of the 
1983 agreements included:  
• A devaluation of the currency by 
20%711  
• A restriction of wage increases to 
5% 
• The decontrol of prices of essential 
commodities and 
• The removal of subsidies on maize 
and fertilisers  
Zambia adopted a new standby 
agreement with the IMF for 
SDR 225 million. However, 
only SDR 85 million was 
drawn, as a sudden fall in the 
price of copper prevented the 
government from servicing its 
arrears of about US$800 
million 
A very comprehensive economic 
adjustment programme was adopted, 
including: 
• Most of the measures adopted in 1983  
• Demand-side measures: 
o Cuts in government expenditures 
(including the closure of three mines 
o Reductions in civil service employment 
o Freezing of wages 
o Removal of subsidies  
o Eliminating new investments in public 
projects 
• Supply-side measures  
o A foreign exchange 
auction system was central to the 
programme (introduced in October 
1985) and was aimed at streamlining 
the allocation of foreign exchange  
o Pricing policy 
 Most of the prices of 
consumer goods, apart from maize, 
were decontrolled 
 The import licensing system was 
eliminated 
 
The strategy of the SAPs of 1989, set out 
in the PFP of 1989-93, included: 
• A deregulation of all price controls and a 
market determination of all consumer 
prices, with the exception of maize, 
maize meal712 and fertiliser 
• Changes in the exchange rate system:  
o The currency was depreciated by 50% 
in 1989 
o The introduction in 1989 of a dual 
exchange rate allocation system with 
two windows713  
o A market exchange rate was 
introduced in 1990, with the 
deregulation of the foreign exchange 
o A unification in 1991 of the official 
rate and the market exchange rate 
• A more open trade regime was 
encouraged through: 
o The cutting of the maximum tariff rate 
from 100% to 50% in 1990 and to 
40% in 1993  
o Reductions in the tariff bands in 1993 
from 6 to 4 
 
                                                 
711
   That led to a sharp increase in interest rates. 
712
    A coupon system was introduced for the purchasing of maize meal, to soften the impact of the SAPs on the poorer sections of the population. 
713
    At the first window, foreign exchange earnings were sold to copper-related importers and importers of oil and of fertiliser, while foreign exchange at depreciated rates was sold at the second 
window for the use of others (Lungu and Silengo, 1997:15). 
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1983 June 1984 October 1985 1989-93 (the policies extended two years 
into Chiluba’s government) 
Zambia’s failure to pay its overdue 
debt to the IMF of SDR 75 million 
and to meet its budgetary targets led 
to a suspension of the 1983 Standby 
Agreement, in June 1984, with 
SDR 67 million undrawn 
 o Decontrol of interest rates 
o Reform of the public sector to improve 
efficiency 
• The liberalisation of the agricultural 
market 
• The raising of the reserve requirements 
of the banks, which reduced funds for 
lending of the commercial banking 
sector  
• The raising of interest rates from 18% to 
42% that greatly discouraged borrowing 
 
 
Sources: Africa Now, June (1987:31); Cherv (1984:132, 136; 1989:131, 132); Lungu and Silengo (1997:14, 15, 16); Simutanyi (1996:826, 827); McGrath and 
Whiteside (1989:172); World Bank (2002b:28). 
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Table A4: Stabilisation and adjustment policies that the Chiluba government 
adopted 
 
 
• Price decontrols of all products (except maize) and inputs 
o Price controls on all products and inputs were dismantled by early 1993, save for a policy of 
restraint on wages 
o By the end of 1993 all subsidies on maize meal and fertilisers had been withdrawn that led to 
a dramatic increase in the price of maize meal from K250 to K4 000 in November 1991 
 
• Exchange rate adjustments in real terms and the elimination of exchange rate restrictions 
o The liberalisation of the foreign exchange, following the unification of the previously dual 
exchange rate in 1993, was partly achieved through the introduction of the Bureaux de 
Change 
o The Exchange Control Act was abolished in 1994. Zambia has some of the most liberal 
banking regulations in Southern Africa 
 
• Monetary policy measures to adjust interest rates and to tighten monetary policy 
o The objective of monetary policy was to reduce and contain levels of inflation and to 
maintain money supply at levels consistent with the desired economic growth  
o The borrowing and lending interest rates were decontrolled in October 1992, with the 
elimination of all interventions in credit allocations and in interest rates, following the 
establishment of the Treasury Bill Auction 
o The Treasury Bill Auction, as a less inflationary form of public borrowing, however, led to a 
substantial rise in the nominal interest rate and the real rate has been positive for most of the 
time 
o Public revenue was increased through mechanisms such as user charges and a semi-
autonomous revenue service 
 
• The liberalisation of export and import trade, while providing export incentives 
o Product and factor markets (excluding land) were liberalised 
o Trade liberalisation was introduced by the end of 1995, facilitated through: 
 Simplifying the tariff structure, by further reducing the maximum tariff rate from 100% to 
40% in 1993 (although a temporary 5% import levy was introduced across the board in 
October 1995 to meet revenue needs). By 2002 the average tariff rate was about 10% and 
the maximum tariff rate was 25% 
 Reducing the number of tariff bands in 1996 from 6 to 4 (namely, 0%, 5%, 15% and 25%) 
 The elimination of tariff exemptions. This was partly achieved through a progressive 
increase in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) tariff 
preference, to a minimum of 40% of the corresponding rate for general imports 
 Abolishing, in July 1995, the 20% uplift factor on duties that applied to import values 
 The elimination of import sales tax in 1995 
 Removing quantitative restrictions on imports and exports 
o A more outward-oriented trade regime was favoured through export incentives  
 Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and export bans and taxes were eliminated in 1991, with the 
ban on the export of maize being lifted in 1993 (although temporarily reinstated in mid-
1995) 
 A system of export incentives (duty drawback, manufactures-under-bond) was introduce 
 An Export Promotion Board was set up 
 
• Fiscal austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit and to control inflation 
o Fiscal austerity measures to reduce the public budget deficit would be implemented and were 
aimed at curbing public expenditure 
 
• The reform of the civil service and parastatals to improve efficiency and performance 
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This was to be achieved through: 
o Huge retrenchments of public sector workers 
o The reconstitution of public expenditures to phase out subsidies 
o Reductions on social expenditure and on bureaucracies  
o The control of inflation 
 
• The reform of the public investment programmes to focus on resource allocation to priority 
sectors and programmes 
 
• The privatisation programme  
o State assets were privatised and some state enterprises were liquidated 
 
 
Sources: Bank of Zambia (2003:5); Craig (2002:2); MUZ (1994:3); Simutanyi (1996:828, 829); The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2002:29, 44); Tshoedi (2000:86); World Bank (1996:11, 2002a:18, 
2002b:28) and interview with Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003. 
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Table A5: Summary of the main transactions in the privatisation of the ZCCM 
 
Date of 
agreement 
Assets Buyer Principal terms of 
sale 
Name of new 
company 
January 
1997 
Cyprus Amax Minerals 
Company (USA) 
• Cash US$3 million 
• Conditional cash up 
to US$25 million  
• Committed 
investment US$20 
million 
•  The ZCCM retained 
interest 20% 
 
Phelps Dodge took over 
from Cyprus Amax for 
1 year  
 
1999 
Kansanshi Mine 
Package “E” 
First Quantum took over 
from Phelps Dodge in 
1999 
Ownership in 2001: 
• First Quantum – 80% 
• ZCCM-IH – 20% 
First Quantum paid 
US$25 million for the 
Kansanshi mine 
Cyprus Amax 
Kansanshi plc 
changed to 
Kansanshi plc 
June 1997 RMC Trading (Irish): 
Comprises of: 
• Binani Industries 
(India) 
• Dallah Albaraka Bank 
(Saudi) 
• Ispat International 
(owned by Lakshmi 
Mittal) 
Ownership 
• Each of the above 
companies had equal 
ownership, amounting 
to a total of 85% and 
• ZCCM-IH – 15% 
Ownership of RAMCOZ 
changed, however, with 
it being placed under 
receivership in 
November 2000 
• Cash US$35 million 
• Committed 
investment US$69 
million 
• The ZCCM retained 
interest 15% 
Roan Antelope 
Mining 
Corporation of 
Zambia plc 
(RAMCOZ) 
2004 
Luanshya Division 
Package “B” 
J and W Investment 
Group, a subsidiary of 
Enya (Switzerland) took 
over from RMC 
Ownership changed to: 
• Enya – 85% 
• ZCCM-IH – 15% 
 
• J and W intends to 
close down Luanshya 
Mine and keep only 
Baluba 
• The company intends 
to retain only 1 000 
employees and 
expects the 
government to pay 
the retrenchment 
packages and 
indebtedness of the 
laid-off workers 
Luanshya 
Copper Mines 
(LCM) 
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Date of 
agreement 
Assets Buyer Principal terms of 
sale 
Name of new 
company 
 
• Demands more 
concessions than 
KCM did 
October 
1997 
Consortium consisting 
of: 
• Crew Development 
Corporation (Canada) 
• Maranda Mines 
(South Africa) 
• Genbel Securities 
(South Africa) 
Ownership before 2003: 
• Metorex Consortium 
– 85% 
• ZCCM-IH – 15% 
• Cash US$17.5 
million  
• No deferred payment 
• Committed 
investment US$34 
million 
• Conditional copper 
and cobalt price 
participation of 
US$7.6 million714  
• Accepted no 
liabilities, except for 
terminal benefits of 
employees 
• The ZCCM retained 
interest of 15% (all 
free carry) 
 
Chibuluma Mine 
Package “A” 
Ownership in late 2003:  
With IDC’s (South 
Africa) involvement in 
Chibuluma South the 
ownership changed to: 
• Metorex – 80% 
• ZCCM-IH – 9.78% 
• IDC – 10.2% 
Metorex bought a new 
copper licence to reopen 
its Chibuluma South 
Mine  
Ownership of 
Chibuluma South: 
• Chibuluma Mines – 
65% 
• IDC – 35% 
 
Chibuluma 
Mines plc 
 
November 
1997 
Power Division  
Package “J” 
CEC comprised of: 
• Midland Power 
International (UK) 
• National Grid (UK) 
• Synergy Global 
Power (USA) 
• Zambian managers 
(five senior managers) 
Ownership: 
• Synergy – 38.5% 
• National Grid –38.5% 
• ZCCM-IH – 20% 
• Cash US$50 million 
at close 
• Conditional deferred 
cash US$7.5 
million715 
• Unconditional debt 
assumption US$73 
million  
• Committed 
investment US$25.5 
million 
• Conditional debt 
Copperbelt 
Energy 
Corporation plc 
(CEC) 
                                                 
714
    Copper price participation level was at US$l/lb, amounting to US$1.2 million, and cobalt contribution of 40% at US$15 a 
pound, amounted to US$6.4 million. 
715
    Contingent upon signing a long-term power agreement for KDMP (Kaunda, 2002: 175, 176). 
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Date of 
agreement 
Assets Buyer Principal terms of 
sale 
Name of new 
company 
• Five Zambian 
managers – 3% 
 
assumption US$61 
million716 
• Contingent capital 
expenditure US$60 
million over 15 years  
• An employee share 
ownership was to be 
made available also 
to employees other 
than senior managers 
• The ZCCM retained 
interests 20% 
June 1998 Chambishi Mine  
Package “D” 
China Non-Ferrous 
Metal Industries (China) 
Ownership: 
• NFCA – 85% 
• ZCCM – 15% 
• Cash US$20 million 
• Committed 
investment US$70 
million 
• Employee-accrued 
terminal benefits 
taken over by buyer 
• The ZCCM retained 
interests 15% 
NFCA Mining 
plc 
September 
1998 
Anglovaal Ltd 
(AVMIN)(South Africa) 
Ownership: 
• AVMIN – 90% 
• ZCCM-IH – 10% 
Ownership changed to: 
• AVMIN – 55% 
• Anglo – 35% 
• ZCCM-IH – 10% 
Anglo, however, sold its 
shares back to AVMIN, 
following its decision to 
withdraw from KCM 
• Cash US$50 million 
• Conditional cash up 
to US$45 million, 
conditional on future 
cobalt prices717 
• Committed 
investment US$70 
million 
• Employee accrued 
terminal benefits 
taken over by buyer 
• The ZCCM retained 
interest 10% (5% 
free and 5% interest 
repayable carried) 
Chambishi 
Metals plc 
2004 
• Chambishi Cobalt 
and Acid Plant 
Package “G” and 
• Nkana Slag 
Dumps Package 
“A” 
J and W Investment 
Group, a subsidiary of 
Enya (Switzerland) took 
over ownership of 
Chambishi Metals from 
AVMIN 
Ownership changed to: 
• Enya – 90% 
• ZCCM-IH – 10% 
J and W paid AVMIN 
an amount that net the 
liabilities and the assets 
Chambishi 
Metals 
September 
1998-2000  
after which 
Binani left 
Ndola Precious 
Metals Plant 
 
Binani Industries (India) 
Ownership: 
Binani – 100% 
• Cash US$0.35 
million 
• Deferred cash 
US$0.18 million 
• Conditional cash up 
Minerva (PMP) 
Limited 
                                                                                                                                               
716
    Contingent upon achieving higher demand forecasts (Kaunda, 2002:176). 
717
    Over a period of about five years (ZCCM, 1999:8). 
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Date of 
agreement 
Assets Buyer Principal terms of 
sale 
Name of new 
company 
to US$0.8 million 
31 March 
2000 
• Mufulira Division 
(Package “C”) 
o Underground 
mine 
o Concentrator 
o Metal treatment 
assets 
comprising of: 
 smelter718 
 refinery719  
 
• Nkana Assets 
(Package “A”)∗∗ 
o Mines 
o Concentrator 
Cobalt Plant 
Buyers comprised of: 
• Glencore International 
(Switzerland)  
• First Quantum 
Minerals (Canada) 
Ownership before 
19 April 2002: 
• Glencore International 
– 46% 
• First Quantum 
Minerals – 44% 
• ZCCM-IH – 10% 
Ownership after 19th 
April 2002720 changed 
to: 
• Glencore International 
– 73.1% 
• First Quantum 
Minerals – 16.9% 
• ZCCM-IH – 10% 
• Cash US$20 million  
• Deferred cash up to 
US$23 million, 
conditional on future 
copper prices, 
payable in five equal 
instalments of 
US$4.6 million, 
commencing on 1 
January 2003721 
• Committed 
investment US$159 
million722 within 3 
years following close  
• Conditional 
investments of about 
US$343 million,723 
while that for Nkana 
remained unchanged, 
subject to further 
evaluation of the 
assets 
• Upwards adjustment 
of the ZCCM’s 
payment by copper 
price participation on 
a pro-rata monthly 
basis, calculated at 
2% for every 
US$0.01 of the 
copper price, over 
and above 
US$0.85/lb, payable 
for five years from 
2003 and capped at 
US$4.4 million. 
Payments were to be 
capped at US$9 
million per annum  
• Employee accrued 
terminal benefits 
taken over by buyer 
• Glencore was to 
provide Mopani with 
a 3-yr revolving 
Mopani Copper 
Mines plc 
(MCM) 
                                                 
718
    Most cost-effective of Zambia's three smelters. 
719
    Most efficient of the three refineries available in Zambia, which include Luanshya and Nkana. 
720
    Following heavy losses at MCM in 2001. 
721
    The first instalments were, however, not paid by 2003 (interviews with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003 and Chuma 
Kabaghe, 18 November 2003). 
722
    US$75 million for the operations of Nkana and US$84 million for Mufulira. 
723
    US$103 million for operations at Mufulira and US$240 million for operations at Nkana. 
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Date of 
agreement 
Assets Buyer Principal terms of 
sale 
Name of new 
company 
US$25 million 
working capital 
facility at 
LIBOR+3% and an 
additional US$15 
million standby 
working capital 
facility 
• The ZCCM retained 
interests 10% (5% of 
which will be free 
carried interest and 
the other 5% will be 
repayable carried 
interest) 
March 
2000-2002 
after which 
the Anglo 
led 
consortium 
left 
• Nchanga 
Division724 
(Package “A”) 
comprising of:  
o An open pit and 
an underground 
mine 
o Nampundwe 
Pyrite Mine725 
(Package “F”); 
o Chingola 
Refractory Ores 
(Package “L”); 
o Infrastructure 
associated with 
the above 
(including 
Konkola, 
Nchanga, 
Nampundwe 
Concentrators 
and Nchanga 
Anglo American led 
consortium comprising 
of: 
• ZCI,727 a subsidiary of 
Anglo American728 
(Anglo American 
invested indirectly in 
KCM, through ZCI in 
which it had 51% 
equity interest and 
49% of ZCI is owned 
by market investors). 
Since ZCI, in turn, 
owns 65% of KCM 
the shareholding 
attributable to Anglo 
in KCM was 33%, 
which made Anglo the 
largest individual 
shareholder 
• IFC729 
• CDC730 
• Cash US$30 million 
• Deferred cash 
payment US$60 
million, payable in 
six annual 
instalments, starting 
from 1 January 
2006731  
• US$125 million 
conditional on 
copper and cobalt 
price participation732  
• Committed 
investment733 for 
existing operations 
US$208 million 
• Committed 
investment for 
Konkola Deep 
US$523 million734 
• Anglo American sold 
Konkola 
Copper Mines 
plc 
                                                 
724
    Comprising of an open pit that commenced operations in 1957, an underground mine that started operation in 1937, a 
concentrator and a tailings leach plant. It was ZCCM’s largest copper and cobalt producer and is the most productive mine on the 
Copperbelt, but by 2003 it had only six to eight productive ore years left (The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2002:40; 
Kaunda, 2002:81). 
725
    Nampundwe Mine, which started operations in 1970, produces pyrite concentrate used for the production of sulphuric acid at 
Nkana Mine and at the fertiliser plant Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (Kaunda, 2002:81). Anglo bought the Nampundwe mine that 
had little value mainly to utilise pyrite at this mine for the production of sulphuric acid used at Nchanga's Tailings Leach Plant 
(Kaunda, 2002:186).  
726
    That was Anglo’s main interest to develop and exploit (Kaunda, 2002:186). 
727
    ZCI is listed on the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, the London Stock Exchange plc and the Paris Bourse (Times of 
Zambia, 2002:2).  
728
    The merger of Minorco SA and Anglo American Corporation in October 1998 formed Anglo American plc, which became one 
of the world's largest mining and natural resources companies (ZPA, 2000c:39). 
729
    Arm of the World Bank. 
730
    The CDC. 
731
    Interview with L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003. 
732
    This amount is to apply over the life of the assets and is subject to a maximum payment in any year of US$16 million (ZPA, 
2000c:38 and ZPA, 2000d:152). 
733
    For existing Konkola and Nchanga operations within three years following close (Kaunda, 2002:89). 
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Date of 
agreement 
Assets Buyer Principal terms of 
sale 
Name of new 
company 
Ownership before 
Anglo’s withdrawal: 
• ZCI – 65% 
• IFC – 7.5% 
• CDC – 7.5% 
• ZCCM-IH – 20% 
Ownership after 
Anglo’s departure 
before Vedanta 
Resources took over: 
• ZCCM-IH – 42% 
• ZCI Holdings (SA) – 
58%  
its 27.3% stake in the 
ZCCM to the 
Zambian government 
for US$30 million in 
cash; the payment 
was to be effected in 
8 annual instalments, 
commencing on 1 
January 2006  
• Employee accrued 
terminal benefits to 
be taken over by the 
buyer  
• Costs of 
retrenchments of 
mineworkers to be 
paid by the 
government with the 
assistance of the 
World Bank that 
contributed over 
US$65 million as a 
loan 
• Various tax breaks 
• Anglo ruled out 
taking on any of the 
ZCCM-funded local 
schools and hospitals 
• The ZCCM retained 
interest 20% (5% 
free:15% carried) 
End 2004 
tailings leach 
plant)  
∗∗ 
• Konkola Division 
that includes: 
o Nchanga 
Smelter 
o Refinery 
o Acid plant 
o KDMP, a large 
underground 
copper-rich ore 
body below the 
current mining 
level at the 
Konkola 
Division726 
 
Vedanta Resources, a 
company of Sterlite 
Industry (British/Indian) 
took over ownership 
from Anglo, CDC and 
IFC  
Ownership end-2004 
• Vedanta Resources – 
79% 
• ZCCM-IH – 21% 
• Cash US$48.2 
million 
 
 
∗∗ Denotes that both agreements also included options relating to parts of the Nkana Division processing plant. 
 
Sources: Africa Mining Intelligence (2002c:1, 2002d, 2006a:3); Africa Research Bulletin (2000a:14302); 
Craig (2002:368); Engineering and Mining Journal (2000a:36, 2000b:11, 2000c:26); Fraser and Lungu 
(2007:13); Metals Place (2007); Regional Investor Survey (2001:38); Kaunda (2002:16, 46, 72, 82, 88, 
89, 90, 111, 116, 175, 176); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2002:40, 41, 42; 2007b:35); World Bank 
(2002a:26, 2003b:132); Zambia Daily Mail (2002:5); ZCCM (1999:8, 2000:7, 8); ZPA (2000c:33, 37, 
38, 39; 2000d:127; 2002:33) and interviews with Simon Capper, 30 October 2003; Andrew Hickman, 7 
November 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003; Gary 
                                                                                                                                               
734
    Commencement of the implementation of KDMP was to start 18 months after close, provided that long-term limited recourse 
project finance was available from third party lenders on reasonable commercial terms. The investment was not to be internally 
generated by KCM but by ZCI and any parties selected by them (Kaunda, 2002:89). 
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Loop, 29 October 2003; Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003; L. M. Lishomwa, 29 October 2003; 
Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003 and Chuma Kabaghe, 18 November 2003. 
  
360
Table A6: Factors that reduced the bargaining leverage of the government at the 
time that the mines were privatised 
 
(a) The poor economic position of the ZCCM and of the Zambian economy: 
• The ZCCM experienced great financial losses immediately before KCM and MCM were 
privatised: 
o The huge financial losses and accumulated arrears that the mines incurred threatened the 
ZCCM with possible bankruptcy. Privatisation was therefore a ‘damage control exercise’, 
partly to relieve the national budget from covering the losses of the mines, according to the 
World Bank.  
 Losses of the ZCCM increased from a net loss of K198 722 million in the 1996-97 financial 
year (ending 31 March 1997) to a net loss of K260 385 million in the 1998-99 financial 
year. This was however an improvement on the loss of K604 028 million registered in the 
1997 financial year. The net losses were exacerbated in the financial year ending 31 March 
2000, at K807 470 million. Accordingly, the average operating losses were US$935 million 
from 1997 to 2001, amounting to an average of over US$15 million per month.735 However, 
the ZCCM continued to operate until the mines were privatised but immediately prior to its 
privatisation focused mainly on short-term returns and on saving the ZCCM from possible 
collapse.  
 The losses to the economy had an adverse impact on Zambia’s:  
 Current-account balance, as a result of declines in the country’s foreign exchange 
consequent to the drop in copper production.736  
 Debt. 
• High government debt before the ZCCM was privatised lowered its bargaining leverage. The high 
debt was mainly owing to: 
o The enormous external debt of the country of US$7 billion in 1996. In 2000, the debt of the 
government comprised of: (a) US$273 million to suppliers, including about US$100 million 
owed to ZESCO; (b) US$298 million to the Paris Club; and (c) US$195 million to multilateral 
agencies. These debts of the government amounted to about US$770 million in 2000 that 
became a significant burden for the government, especially in light of the balance of payment 
difficulties that the country experienced. 
o The government’s assumption of the liabilities of the ZCCM that added about US$300 million 
to the domestic debt immediately before the ZCCM was privatised. The external loan portfolio 
of the ZCCM stood at US$436 million in May 1998.  
 Government guarantees required for expensive external short-term loans that the ZCCM 
and other bodies737 were forced to resort to, as bankers were reluctant to lend to the loss 
making ZCCM, further raised the debt burden of the government. The government had to 
pay over US$30 million for the old ZCCM debt and US$20 million for cleaning up the 
ZNCB portfolio in 2002. 
o Difficulties the Zambian government experienced in keeping up with servicing its international 
loans, partly due to loans being used to cover losses at the ZCCM. 
o The government being forced to pay the miners’ monthly wage bill from its general revenue 
accounts, just prior to the sale of the remaining assets of the ZCCM. 
• The lack of recapitalisation of the ZCCM signified the most significant constraint on the mining 
sector,738 according to research conducted by Kapika et al. (1996:8). About US$100 million was 
required to manage the transition until buyers were found.  
o The lack of recapitalisation was largely due to: 
 A shortage of capital, partly as a result of the decline in the copper price in the late 1990s 
and the lack of significant inflows of funds for capital expenditure, except for recurrent 
expenditure to merely sustain the mines.  
 The poor credit profile of the ZCCM, and those of the country, especially owing to the 
                                                 
735
    The Chairman of ZACCI and ZPA experts put the figure at $2 million per day, especially just before core assets of the ZCCM 
were privatised, in March 2000. 
736
    From about 321 000 tons in 1997 to only 226 000 tons in 1999. 
737
    Including Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ), ZANACO and ZESCO. 
738
    Technology and skills from the private sector that was locally available was of less importance than the injection of finance in 
the privatisation drive (interview with Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003). 
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high debt of the ZCCM and the government’s enormous external debt, prevented the 
ZCCM from borrowing US$0.5 billion in 1995 required for investment into the 
mines.739 By March 1996, the ZCCM required an injection of about US$2 billion to 
avoid a complete collapse, which local sources were unable to provide.  
 The private shareholders were unwilling to put cash into the ZCCM.  
 The operations of the ZCCM were sustained through short-term borrowings from local 
and foreign financial institutions. 
 Government policies to redistribute much of the revenue from copper mining to develop 
non-mining sectors and to address electoral-maximising concerns.740 
 The significant decline in the real value of the world copper price, over the last 20 years. 
o The lack of reinvestment of the ZCCM contributed to: 
 Accelerating the aging and degrading of mining machinery, rendering them inefficient and 
unreliable.741  
 Destroying the internal culture of the mining sector, which proved highly disruptive. 
 Limiting improvements in capacity building through investments in more efficient mining, 
underground mines, the development of new mines, and through ventures into prospecting 
and exploration activities. New mining methods were required to extract ore from the thin, 
irregular and deep-seated ore bodies and to improve recoveries, especially as the grades of 
ore began to dwindle. Under-investment in exploration and in developing the mining sector 
led to the need for huge capital investments, of about US$0.5 billion, by 1995/96, to 
revitalise the existing mines and to open up new mines.  
 A decline in the value of the mines as the ZCCM’s assets deteriorated. 
 The fall in the production and productivity levels of the ZCCM, especially after the mid-
1990s. 
 A decrease in mining revenue, largely as production levels declined.  
 An increase in the costs of production. 
 The high costs of production, in excess of US$1.0 per pound of copper for most of the 
mines of the ZCCM, with Konkola experiencing unit costs of US$1.2 per pound of 
copper, rendered the ZCCM uncompetitive, inefficient and unprofitable.  
 A significant lowering of the global competitiveness of Zambia, as a result of diminished 
production levels and the increases in the costs of production. Zambian mining fell to the 
95th percentile on the world’s copper production cost curve in 1995, mainly due to the 
relatively high fixed costs (labour and other fixed costs) and higher costs associated with 
deeper level mining. About 70% of the ZCCM’s copper came from underground sources. 
• The acute decline in the foreign exchange earnings of Zambia contributing to the near collapse of 
the Zambian economy in the late 1990s: 
o The drop in the foreign exchange earnings was largely due to the increase in the cost of 
production of copper, alongside the drop in the production of copper and cobalt. 
o A substandard practice within the ZCCM, immediately prior to the privatisation of the mines, 
to mix waste with ores into the concentrator, which reduced the grade value of copper of 4% by 
up to 50% after extraction, caused a serious problem of dilution of ores, lowering Zambia’s 
revenue from mining. 
o While export earnings averaged about US$1.2 billion in the 1980s, it dropped on average to 
                                                                                                                                               
739
    A lack of skills and of technology did not constitute significant factors in the poor performance of ZCCM (interview with 
Simon Capper, 30 October 2003). 
740
    That contributed, among others, to the mines being overmanned during Kaunda’s government, but the number of mineworkers 
was significantly reduced during Chiluba’s government (interviews with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 
October 2003 and Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003). 
741
    For example, the Nkana Smelter technology, which by 1996 was one of the most critical plants in the production of copper in 
Zambia, was over three decades old. Moreover, Nchanga Open Pit, which was the largest copper producer in the ZCCM, 
experienced a shortage of basic inputs, such as shovels and trucks and the available machinery was unreliable and circumspect. 
742
    Such as chemicals, reagents, pump spares, machinery and equipment, for example, mill rods, refractories and loco spares and 
safety inputs. 
743
    For instance, the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) of South Africa prevented all its clients from exporting to the 
ZCCM, while demanding full settlements of long overdue payments before restoration of insurance covers and permission to export. 
744
    This demonstrates the non-independence of advisors, according to Francis Kaunda (2002:28). 
745
    The demand was likely to discourage the government from making counter-proposals and favoured the buyers, according to 
Kaunda (2002:29). The request was, though, rejected on an understanding that the liquidation of the ZCCM would likely have 
culminated in serious political and social instability in Zambia (Kaunda, 2002:28 & 29; Craig, 2001:406). 
746
    Donors were rather uncritical of these tactics, according to Kaunda (2002:78). 
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only US$1 045 million in the 1990s. An amount of about US$3 billion per annum in foreign 
exchange was required in 2003, to enable the industries in Zambia to operate at full capacity.  
o The donors withheld balance of payments support in 1998, before the KCM and MCM were 
privatised, forcing the Zambian government to use about US$237 million of its reserves. This 
left the country with a residual reserve of only US$9 million towards the end of 1998. In 1999, 
the ZCCM sold less than US$20 million in foreign exchange to the BoZ, owing to its poor 
performance.  
o The shortage of foreign exchange in the mining sector was also transmitted to the 
manufacturing sector and to industries that imported raw materials.  
• The tax revenue of the ZRA and the customs revenues declined as the economy shrank.  
 
(b) Pressure from suppliers and shortages of supplies 
• Stringent demands from local and in particular foreign suppliers of mining inputs in 1998 that the 
ZCCM settle outstanding payment in arrears of up to six months and for upfront cash payment 
before further spares were to be supplied to the ZCCM severely restricted access to critical 
production inputs,742 to the ZCCM. Many resorted to embargoes and litigation threats to limit their 
financial risks.743  
• The accumulated arrears of the ZCCM to its Zambian suppliers of goods and services prompted 
Zambian suppliers’ demand for a swifter privatisation of the ZCCM. 
 
(c) Pressure from donors and from foreign actors: 
• The linking, shortly before the Paris Club meeting, of the conclusion of the privatisation of the 
remaining mining assets of the ZCCM (that was also made a benchmark for the debt relief 
programme), on the release of US$530 million in donor balance-of payment support, pledged in 
May 1998, proved decisive in hastening the privatisation of the ZCCM. 
• Foreign Advisors, Rothschild and Clifford Chance pressurised the government, by tabling a 
resolution for the voluntary liquidation of the ZCCM,744 on 28 February 1997, at the same time the 
first bids were received, which threatened the company with collapse.745 
• Allegations exist that foreign advisors also divulged information regarding the value of the mines 
to the Kafue Consortium, further lowering the government’s bargaining leverage. 
 
(d) Unfavourable external factors: 
• The declines in copper and cobalt prices on the international market (especially in 1998), lowered 
the investment attraction of copper and the likelihood of the ZCCM becoming a viable concern. 
• The volatile political climate in some neighbouring countries created uncertainty as to the foreign 
investment prospects in Zambia. 
 
(e) Certain strategies that the TNCs employed and factors that increased their bargaining leverage: 
• Strategies that TNCs employed and factors that increased their bargaining leverage over those of 
the government included: 
o Anglo American’s knowledge of the ZCCM’s poor economic status (enabled through its 
position as a shareholder on the board of that company); the pressure of a time limit within 
which the Zambian government had to privatise the ZCCM and; the possibility that the 
government would otherwise forfeit balance of payments support from donors.  
o The strengthening of the bargaining leverage of the Kafue Consortium, through donors linking 
the completion of the ZCCM’s privatisation (specifically the disposal of Package ‘A’), to 
further balance of payments support. This encouraged the Kafue Consortium bidders to harden 
their stance and to make significant demands just before Consultative Group meetings with 
donors.746 The Kafue Consortium flexed its muscles partly through a walkout in the London 
meeting, on 14 April 1997, following a request from the Negotiating Team for further changes 
to their bid and for clarification on the reduction of their first bid by US$100 million, within 
only one and half months of the initial bid. 
o The pre-emptive rights that Anglo American enjoyed over the sales and some mining activities 
that increased its bargaining leverage above those of other mining companies. 
o Anglo American being the sole bidder for the ‘Aco’ package that, in the context where the 
government was pressurised to privatise the ZCCM within a certain timeframe, left it 
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vulnerable to accept the mining company’s offer. 
o The possible threat that TNCs could locate elsewhere, because of their ability to shift resources 
to other countries.  
o Possible collusions by some mining TNCs in the bidding process, through the formation of 
consortiums and through the cross-sharing of ownership, which, the Third World has great 
difficulty in dissecting. 
o Foreign mining companies exaggerating the poor state of the mines to obtain more concessions 
from the government. 
o The huge investment benefits that the TNCs pledged for the Zambian mines, especially the 
Konkola Deep Mines, encouraging the government to concede to many of the concessions 
demanded from Anglo American. 
 
 
Sources: Bull, cited in Profit Magazine (1998:128, 129); Business in Africa (2002:2); Craig (2001:405, 
406); Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour (2000:47, 48, 49, 58); Kaunda (2002:24, 34, 35, 37, 
60, 149, 162); Kapika et al. (1996:6, 7); Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (1996:57); 
Maambo (1998:Fig. 7); New York Post (1998:1); SADC (2000:340); The Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2002:29); Transparency International (2002:17); Van Buren (2003:1152, 1155); World Bank 
(2002a:14; 2002b:1, 7, 14, 15, 17, 24; 2003b:131, 132, 133); ZCCM (1996:6;1997:22; 1998:38;1999:6, 
11; 2000:5, 10, 11); ZPA (2000b:14, 2000c:34) and interviews with Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 
2003; Stuart Cruickshank, 28 October 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003; Honourable Dipak 
Patel, 15 October 2003; Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003; Ohene Nyanin, 29 November 2003; Jack 
Jones, 22 October 2003; Honourable Eugene Appel, 24 November 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; 
Andygean Luombe, 8 October 2003; Zion Simwanza, 1 December 2003; Francis Kaunda, 20 October 
2003; Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Chama Kapambwe, 
11 November 2003; Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; Alick Lungu, 14 October 2003; Honourable 
Captain Moono, 2 December 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Willie Sweta, 30 October 
2003; Sipho Phiri, 30 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003; Simon Capper, 30 October 2003; 
John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 2003; Andrew Sardanis, 19 October 
2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; Danny Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Gilbert Temba, 13 
October 2003, Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003; Andrew 
Hickman, 7 November 2003; Kasote Singogo, 16 October 2003; Fred Yamba, 25 November 2003 and 
Isaac Masonda, 11 November 2003. 
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Table A7: Factors that undermined the capacity of local industries and suppliers 
in the mining sector 
 
 
Major factors and policies prior to and subsequent to the privatisation of the mines that undermined 
more effective participation of local industries and suppliers in the mining sector during Chiluba’s 
government included: 
• The introduction of liberalisation policies in Zambia, before the mines were privatised, which led 
to the bankruptcy of many local suppliers. Several others had to downsize in order to survive. 
The closing down of many industries lowered employment in these sectors. In particular: 
o The immense competition from more competitive, lower-cost foreign manufacturers as a 
result of trade liberalisation policies proved particularly harmful to the manufacturing 
companies in Zambia.747 For instance: 
 The increased influx of goods into Zambia, especially from South Africa and from 
Zimbabwe (that are under-reported, as official figures are likely to capture less than half 
the total), assisted by Zimbabwe's dual exchange rates, caused the closures of several 
major operations in Zambia.  
 The range of global and regional free trade agreements to which Zambia is bound, such as 
the COMESA,748 which came into force on 8 December 1994, limiting the use of tariffs 
and quotas to manage the flows of goods, services and capital, undermined the 
manufacturing sector in Zambia. Moreover, the Free Trade Area (FTA) that would be 
applicable to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that would also 
promote duty free trade would further intensify regional competition. 
o The liberalisation of the financial markets and the foreign exchange market that, respectively, 
increased the interest rates and the inflation of Zambia raised the production costs of locally-
based manufacturing companies (discussed below). 
• The absence of an industrial policy and of laws to protect and support local suppliers, while 
promoting foreign investor-friendly policies.  
o The government failed to provide appropriate safety nets to limit negative consequences of 
trade liberalisation to local suppliers to the mines and the manufacturing industry in Zambia. 
o The lack of active government intervention, partly through strategic incentives to help local 
industries surpass the infant industry stage, before trade liberalisation policies were 
introduced, severely limited their chances to withstand fierce competition from foreign 
industries.  
o The absence of greater government participation in the development of the manufacturing 
sector in Zambia under MMD rule, discouraged higher growth in the local manufacturing 
sector. Alliances with local entrepreneurs were crucial in the building of local capacities and 
accounted, considerably, for the successful development of the IT industries in India, Brazil 
and South Korea and which, in turn, attracted TNCs. 
o Increases in import duties on raw materials for manufacturing in the 1990s, over finished 
goods, which enjoyed substantial reductions in customs duties749 (the main trade policy 
instrument employed by the Chiluba government, instead of import controls, which were 
maintained only for health, security and associated reasons), discouraged manufacturing in 
Zambia. Conversely, these policies encouraged many Zambian-based companies to switch 
from the local production of mining inputs to the trading of cheaper imported finished 
products, mainly consumption products, which flooded the Zambian market after the 
introduction of trade liberalisation policies. 
o Granting new foreign investors broad incentives,750 such as duty exemptions on imported 
equipment751 and tax exemptions,752 not extended to existing local companies, while 
                                                 
747
    For example, the expiry of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, in 2005, encouraged imports from especially Asian 
countries that constrained greater growth, mainly in the textile and clothing manufacturing sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2008a:6). 
748
    The successor organisation to the regional Preferential Trading Area (PTA). 
749
    That enjoys a maximum tariff of 25%. 
750
    Provided in the Investment Act of 1991 and through the Investment Centre. 
751
    For example, new foreign investors are, generally, exempted from paying import duties on motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
bicycle assembly plant machinery for the first five years of operating in Zambia. In this instance, though, the policy benefited 
Zambia, as it secured the establishment of a motor vehicle industry, by Tata, of India in Zambia (Africa Confidential, 2006:4). 
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removing subsidies previously granted to Zambian companies. The new Investment Act of 
2006 is however likely to improve the benefits to local businesses.  
o Zambian manufacturers received no export incentives.  
o Zambia still lacks an industrial policy to attract and encourage forward linkages to the mining 
sector. Policies and factors that inhibit the development of forward linkages entail: 
 A failure to introduce higher export duties on copper concentrates to encourage the 
development of local processing industries. 
 High charges for the treatment of copper concentrates in Zambia and the reluctance of 
local smelters to process the concentrates of some companies including those of 
Chambishi Metals, forcing the company to export its concentrates to Namibia. 
 The absence of an industrial strategy to encourage forward linkages of mining in Zambia, 
also other than smelting (where most of the forward linkages of mining at present are 
concentrated),753 in which Zambia has a comparative advantage, namely, electrical 
products (copper wire, electrical plugs, pipes) and other light-industrial goods.  
o The government failed to provide adequate entrepreneurial training to local suppliers who 
were used to a socialist mindset. 
o In contrasts to the policies of the Kaunda government that gave preference to local suppliers, 
the MMD government typically, adopted a low-key approach to leverage local businesses in 
the mining sector. These policies of the MMD government obstruct the development of local 
industries and facilitated the substitution of Zambian suppliers. More specifically:  
 Besides recent ad hoc appeals to mining companies to support local suppliers, the 
government failed to establish definitive policies, articulating specific levels of local 
procurement content and skills transfer in agreements to compel TNCs to support local 
suppliers (as the companies function in a liberalised economy).  
 The loose commitments from companies to support procurement from local suppliers, as 
opposed to a legal commitment,754 render these commitments unenforceable.  
• Local suppliers having insufficient capital or access to affordable credit mainly due to: 
o The high real interest rates755 or lending rates that increased their costs of borrowing, which is 
a major obstacle to the growth of the local manufacturing sector in Zambia. The high interest 
rate exists despite measures to improve the availability of funds in the local banks (through 
the lowering of the statutory reserve requirements of banks, on both the kwacha and the 
foreign-currency deposits), to encourage banks to cut their lending rates to the private 
sector.756 The high interest rates were mainly as a consequence of: 
 The deregulation of the financial markets in the 1990s. 
 The excessive government borrowing of treasury bills in the financial market that also 
added to the high inflation. 
 Risk-averse tendencies of local commercial banks, rendering them unresponsive to lower 
private sector lending rates757 that the BoZ encourages. These are reflected in: 
 The preference of banks to invest most of the freed-up funds instead in higher yielding 
government debt or treasury bills. Whilst this reduced the debt-servicing costs of the 
government it considerably restricts the development of the private sector. 
 The large spread between high lending rates and real negative deposit rates, owing to 
the low financial intermediation, despite the significant improvement of the financial 
sector in recent years, aided by the implementation of the government’s Financial 
                                                                                                                                               
752
    For instance, three-year tax holidays, concessions on imported mining equipment and exemptions on excise duties (including 
power tariffs) generally enjoyed by new foreign companies. 
753
    As most of Zambian copper ores are concentrated and smelted in Zambia and a number of new smelters are being built. 
754
    For instance, the clause in the development agreement of Bwana Mkubwa that merely indicates that mining TNCs would not 
discriminate against registered Zambian business, over international suppliers, proved insufficient in fostering the development of 
local manufacturing industries (Bwana Mkubwa Development Agreement, 2004:13). 
755
    The consistently high lending rates of banks in Zambia prompt companies that are able to do so, to obtain credit, especially for 
long-term financing requirements, from outside Zambia, which tends to be less expensive and more predictable (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2007b:39). 
756
    That promoted a slight reduction in lending rates. 
757
    The fact that commercial banks continue to buy bonds, even when yields fall, highlights their risk-averse nature. 
758
    Rendering it difficult to obtain credit information on possible borrowers. 
759
    Which can take up to four years. 
760
    For about six to seven months. 
761
    In 2006, it cost around US$l00/ton to transport cargo from Zambia to the coast. 
762
    Which are not subsidised. 
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Sector Development Plan (FSDP). 
 The small ratio of broad money to GDP and the low private-sector credit (even 
compared to other sub-Saharan African countries), at less than 10% of GDP.  
 The high lending rates of banks in Zambia, despite greater macroeconomic stability in 
the country.  
 Higher operating costs of banks, rather than as a result of a lack of competition, as the 
market share of the three largest banks, at around 75%, corresponds to the average 
African standard. The higher operating costs of banks were mainly as a result of: 
 The high costs of transport and communications. 
 The weak credit culture,758 with most Zambian businesses and individuals tending to 
default on their loans.  
 The lengthy court proceedings involved in recouping bad loans.759  
 A failure of the banks to generally disclose to local entrepreneurs the availability of EU 
and World Bank funds, placed under their care, which are at a lower interest rate than 
bank rates, and the stringent lending conditions attached to these loans, requiring 
substantial collateral. 
Accordingly, even if the spread between lending and deposit rates were to be 
substantially reduced, many other bank charges will keep the cost of borrowing high. 
o Accumulated arrears and delays in the ZCCM paying its debt to suppliers,760 from 1999 to 
2000, aggravated the liquidity and cash flow problems of especially those suppliers of the 
ZCCM that were not part of multinational corporations. 
 The payments, in many instances, were too late to save local suppliers from bankruptcy. 
 The debt to suppliers accounted for a large portion of Zambia’s domestic debt prior to and 
immediately after the privatisation of the ZCCM. The government had to pay 
US$97 million to the suppliers of the ZCCM in 1999/2000 and the 2000/01 budget 
allocated K423 000 million for the same purpose. An EU grant to pay part of the debt to 
the suppliers, together with funds from the government led to all the suppliers being paid 
out only by 2003. 
 The establishment of the Mine Suppliers and Contractors Association only in 2000, to 
ensure that suppliers would be paid for services rendered to the ZCCM, were too late for 
many of the suppliers of the ZCCM that had already became bankrupt. 
• The high costs of locally-based manufacturing companies in Zambia over foreign companies that 
are mainly attributable to: 
o Increases in the interest rates (especially as a result of the auctioning of the financial 
markets).  
o The high inflation rate (arising from cost-push inflation, following the depreciation of the 
kwacha that accompanied the liberalisation of the exchange rate), which increased the costs 
of inputs of the highly import-dependent Zambian-based manufacturing suppliers to the 
mines. 
o The higher utility costs, such as the steep transportation costs, the increased petroleum fuel 
costs and the rising electricity tariffs 
 The high production and transportation costs of Zambia,761 owing to its landlocked status 
and the poor transportation system, adversely affect the competitiveness of local 
companies also in the export of their goods.  
 The exorbitant retail petroleum prices762 (among the steepest in the region) which raised 
the transport costs in Zambia. The high retail petroleum prices were due to a weak 
domestic currency, high transport costs, the inability of the Indeni refinery to guarantee 
supplies to the energy sector and, until recently, because of the maladministration within 
the ZNOC. ZNOC had a monopoly in the procurement and processing of crude oil for 
many years. However, the liquidation of ZNOC and the government’s assumption of 
US$150 million of the company’s debt owed to the ZANACO in April 2002, may reduce 
the price of petroleum in the longer term.  
 The more recent increases in electricity shortages also constrained growth in the 
manufacturing sector. 
o The higher tax on local businesses, including excessive duties on many manufacturing inputs 
over foreign business.  
o Outdated technology, poorly maintained assets, high costs, under-capacity production, rising 
debts and poor management by some supplier companies that increases the inefficiencies of 
Zambian manufacturing companies. 
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• A weak domestic market, as a result of poor demand and purchasing power and the subdued 
regional market (despite increased regional integration), affecting also foreign manufacturing 
companies based in Zambia adversely. 
• Local companies lacking aggressive marketing campaigns. 
 
 
Sources: Africa Research Bulletin (2001a:14627); Aked, cited in Profit Magazine (1995a:31, 32, 34); 
Evans (1998); Fraser and Lungu (2007:4, 17, 58, 59, 60); Leistner (1996:11.13, 11.14, 11.20); Maambo 
(1998:Fig. 14); Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2002a:15); Regional Investor Survey 
(2001:41); SADC (2000:335); Singogo (2000:11, 12); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2002:26; 
2007b:15, 25, 37, 38, 39, 42, 46, 48; 2008a:5, 6; 2008b:15, 17, 18, 20); Van Buren (2003:1153, 1154, 
1155); World Bank (2002a:8; 2002b:29, 30; 2003b:132, 133); ZPA (2000a:16, 2000b:16, 2002:3) and 
interviews with Kojo Asiedu, 28 October 2003; Simon Capper, 30 October 2003; James Chalwe, 23 
November 2003; David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Valentine Chitalu, 22 October 2003; Andrew 
Hickman, 7 November 2003; Jack Jones, 22 October 2003; Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; Danny 
Kalyalya, 31 October 2003; Eddy Kapungulya, 13 November 2003; John Kangwa, 21 November 2003; 
Wilphred Katoto, 12 November 2003; Alick Lungu, 20 December 2001; John Lungu, 12 November 2003; 
Andygean Luombe, 8 October 2003; Charles Muchimba, 18 November 2003; Isaac Masonda, 11 
November 2003; Silane Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003; Fred 
M’membe, 14 October 2003; Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003; Mark O’ Donnell, 16 October 2003; 
Honourable Dipak Patel, 15 October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; Zion Simwanza, 1 December 
2003; Kasote Singogo, 16 October 2003; Willie Sweta, 30 October 2003; Gilbert Temba, 18 October 
2003; Fred Yamba, 25 November 2003. 
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Table A8: Main exploration and prospecting activities of various TNCs in Zambia 
 
Company Exploration and prospecting activities 
Equinox 
Resources and 
Phelps Dodge 
Equinox Resources and Phelps Dodge invested US$13.3 million763 for the feasibility 
study of the Lumwana copper project (that is estimated to contain over 1 billion tons 
of low-grade copper), at the end of 2001.  
 
In 2002, Equinox Resources was to invest a further US$450 million to develop its 
Lumwana copper project.  
 
Cyprus Amax  Cyprus Amax invested US$7 million, by 1998, on detailed exploration activities for 
copper ore bodies at Kansanshi in the North Western Province. 
 
First Quantum First Quantum, who subsequently bought the Kansanshi mines,764 plans to develop 
reserves at Kansanshi at a capital cost of US$290 million that would considerably 
augment Zambia’s copper production capacity.765 
 
In 2003, First Quantum undertook a wide-ranging grassroots exploration programme, 
in a joint venture with BHP Billiton who provided high technical equipment, such as 
the Falcon Aircraft, with drilling programmes ongoing on several targets, to search 
for new major copper deposits on wholly owned properties in Zambia and in the 
DRC.  
 
Anglo 
American and 
Equinox 
Resources  
Anglo American, in a joint venture partnership with Equinox Resources, participated 
in the US$12.5 million ‘Zambezi exploration programme’, established by Equinox 
Resources in 1999.  
 
Mopani and 
Gecamine 
The joint operation between Mopani and Gecamine would enable them to mine 
copper and cobalt deposits located on both sides of the Zambia-Congo-K frontier at 
Luansobe and Mufulira.766 
 
AVMIN AVMIN spent US$20 million, by 1999, on a two-year exploration and drilling 
programme for major copper-cobalt deposits at Konkola North, near the DRC border. 
 
 
Sources: Africa Mining Intelligence (2001a:3; 2002a:3; 2002d:2, 4; 2003d:3); Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (2000:62); Maambo (1998:Fig. 13); Engineering and Mining Journal (1998:14, 
1999:22); Martin Creamer’s Mining Weekly (2003a, 2003c, 2003d:18).  
 
                                                 
763
    Partly financed by the European Investment Bank. 
764
    First Quantum bought the Kansanshi mines from Phelps Dodge that in turn bought the mines from Cyprus Amax. 
765
    Since large deposits of copper were discovered at Kansanshi. Though the copper deposits are not of a high-grade quality they 
are sufficient to enable a feasible mining operation (interview with Andrew Hickman, 7 November 2003). 
766
    Facilitated by First Quantum’s position as owner of the Dikulushi mine in Katanga. 
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Table A9: Technological and capital inputs from mining TNCs in the mining 
sector 
 
Company Technological and capital inputs 
First 
Quantum 
First Quantum developed the solvent extraction-electrowinning (SX/EW) facility767 at 
Bwana Mkubwa,768 to treat most oxide ores, enabling Bwana Mkubwa to expand its 
design output and to increase its lifespan by at least seven years.  
 
The expansion of Bwana Mkubwa’s copper production capacity, under the ownership of 
First Quantum, enabled the company to participate in further mining acquisition and 
exploration activities for additional sources of oxide feed.769 
 
First Quantum Minerals plans to build a US$8-million sulphur burning acid plant, at its 
Kansanshi mining subsidiary,770 which would enable it to produce 100 000 tons of 
sulphuric acid, annually, to supply the mine with all its acid requirements.771 
 
MCM  New mining technology into the Nkana and Mopani mines extended mining beyond a 
depth of 1 340 metres772 that boosted the life-spans of the Nkana part of the Mopani 
mine (from 5 years to 15-20 years) and of Mufulira (from 10 years to 25 years), from 
2003.773  
 
The new electrolysis facility that MCM introduced, at a cost of US$5.5 million, was to 
maximise processing operations and boost annual production,774 from 2001 to 2003, at 
the Mufulira plant at Mopani.  
 
The expansion of the productivity of the Mufulira refinery and smelter (owned by 
Mopani) that was working at only 65% of its capacity,775 by 2003, will further promote 
the resources of the mining sector. The expansion plans were partly to accommodate 
plans of First Quantum to process both copper ores, imported from its mining facility at 
the DRC776 and copper concentrates from Kansanshi, at the Mufulira smelter and the 
refinery. The expansion of the capacity of the smelter at MCM, which is able to handle 
850 000 tons of ore per year, would also likely boost copper output in Zambia. 
 
Vedanta The KDMP777 that Vedanta commenced in 2005, almost immediately after its takeover, 
in which it already committed US$750 million and invested US$400 million, from 
2006-2007. The KDMP, involving a deepening of the existing mine, is expected to lift 
the firm's total copper output to 500 000 tons within three to four years, from a projected 
                                                 
767
    Which provided it with the ability to treat or process conventional oxide ores from reserves at its Lonshi mining operation. 
768
    The company First Quantum established in 1998 as a facility to treat copper tailings. 
769
    The exploration activities of Bwana Mkubwa  was partly achieved through significant investments in the DRC, whereby copper 
ore at Lonshi, about 40 km from Ndola, is trucked to Bwana Mkubwa for further processing (World Bank, 2003b:132). First 
Quantum obtained financing of US$6 million from Africa Merchant Bank and Banque Belgolaise SA to buy up equipment for the 
Lonshi copper mine, in the DRC (Africa Mining Intelligence, 2003d:3). 
770
    This development falls within the US$225 million of the mines’ total project funds. 
771
    Any surplus will be exported. 
772
    This was accomplished partly through a loan of US$248 540 from the U.S. Trade Development Agency to the MCM, which 
made the feasibility study to extend Mufulira's life span possible (Africa Mining Intelligence, 2001b:3). 
773
    Minister Kaunda Lembalemba, cited in Martin Creamer’s Mining Weekly Online, 2003c. 
774
    By roughly 20 000 tons. 
775
    Concentrates from Kansanshi might also be refined at the Nkana Smelter owned by KCM or would be exported if both the 
Mufulira and the Nkana smelters were to be full (Martin Creamer’s Mining Weekly Online, 2003c). 
776
    From its Lonshi project in Congo-K that will be transported to Zambia for processing (Africa Analysis, 2001:12; Africa Mining 
Intelligence, 2002b:1). 
777
    Vedanta contracted China Nonferrous Metal Mining Company, who owns Chambishi Copper Mine, to assist in the initial work 
of the KDMP, namely the removal of water, the building of sinking shafts and to widen the ventilators (Africa Confidential, 
2007:10). 
778
    Outokumpu Technology of Finland. 
779
    The existing smelter run by KCM for the Konkola in Nchanga, Napundwe and Nkana mines, has an annual turnover of 
US$75 million and employs about 14 000 people Africa Confidential, 2006:4. 
780
    Resident Director, cited in Fraser and Lungu, 2007:20. 
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Company Technological and capital inputs 
200 000 tons in 2007.  
 
A new Finnish designed and constructed smelter778 that Vedanta is establishing at KCM, 
in Chingola, at a cost of US$300 million, which was to start operations in 2008, would 
process about 400 000 tons of copper, annually.779 
 
Vedanta intends to establish a concentrator aligned to the KDMP.780 
 
AVMIN 
 
The establishment of a new plant at Chambishi, at a cost of more than US$266 million 
for the treatment of 20M of the Nkana smelter slag dump of AVMIN, before its 
departure from Zambia in 2003, constitutes a major technological investment that made 
possible the recovery of cobalt and copper. It was projected that the Nkana smelter slag 
dump would have produced about 4 000 tons of cobalt a year.781 
 
The smelter that AVMIN built that entered into full operation only in December 2002 
(due to major operational difficulties) would have significantly augmented the cobalt 
and copper production levels of the company in 2003, had AVMIN not departed from 
Zambia.  
 
NFCA NFCA782 established an ultra-modern new copper smelter, for US$220 million, at 
Chambishi that would produce about 150 000 tons of copper annually. The smelter of 
NFCA, at Chambishi, would also process ore from some mines in neighbouring Congo-
Kinshasa and from the Lumwana Copper Mine, agreed to in a five-year deal. 
 
Chibuluma The construction of a decline shaft at Chibuluma South, in partnership with South 
Africa’s IDC, started in September 2003, contributed to the increase in Zambia’s capital 
stock.  
 
CEC CEC upgraded the power system of the Copperbelt and expanded the transmission 
system, with a US$10 million loan it received from the Development Bank of South 
Africa, in August 2000, which increased the mining sector’s energy supply capacity. 
 
 
Sources: Africa Analysis (2003a:16); Africa Confidential (2006:4, 2007:10); Africa Mining Intelligence 
(2001a:3, 2002b:1, 2007:2, 2006b:2); Engineering and Mining Journal (1999:22, 2000c:26); Fraser and 
Lungu (2007:20); Martin Creamer’s Mining Weekly (2003b, 2003c, 2003d:18); Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (2002c:61); The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007b:35, 36), World Bank (2003b:132) 
and interviews with Fortune Kamusaki, 25 November 2003 and John Lungu, 12 November 2003. 
                                                 
781
    AVMIN received the bulk of its revenue from toll treatment of cobalt concentrates for KCM, MCM and RAMCOZ, before the 
latter went into receivership (World Bank, 2003b:132). 
782
    In collaboration with Yunnan Copper Industry Group. 
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Table A10: Institutional and regulatory measures controlling the activities of 
private companies in Zambia since Chiluba’s government 
 
 
The institutional and regulatory measures to monitor the activities of private companies, including the 
mining TNCs, are as follows: 
• The government regulatory measures include: 
o The Companies Act, amended in 1994, which has to be in line with private ownership that 
confers constraints or obligations and rights to companies. 
o The Investment Act and the Mines and Minerals Act, which cover competition (monitored 
through the Zambian Competition Commission that was established in 1996), contracts, 
bankruptcy (addressed through the BoZ) and corporate governance (covered by the Companies 
Act). The Investment Act of 1991 was revised in 1993 and was replaced by the Investment Act 
of 2006. 
o A Securities and Exchange Commission, established in 1993, after the Zambian economy was 
liberalised to regulate the Stock Exchange and was revised in 2000, in collaboration with the 
Stock Exchange. 
o A new insurance law adopted in 1995, to address issues that the newly opened insurance industry 
faces.  
o Measures to curb money laundering: 
 The Prevention and Prohibition of Money Laundering Act was established in 2001 and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission (a new institution comprising of the security wing of 
government) that works closely with the BoZ and draws on different institutions, including 
the commercial banks, was instituted to address money laundering, also in the mining sector. 
The greater independence granted to the Anti-Corruption Commission in more recent years 
improved its effectiveness.  
 A change in the Banking and Financial Services Law in 1993 places all financial institutions 
under the supervision of the BoZ. 
 Clients are required to state the source and destination of their money and specify the purpose 
of money transactions of over US$5 000 and which have to be done by application. 
 The Task Force, established under the Mwanawasa government, investigates the plundering 
of Zambia’s natural resources. 
However, the absence of exchange controls and the fact that investors are free to repatriate capital 
investments, dividends, management fees, profits, technical fees and royalties facilitate the outflow 
of mining surpluses. 
• Bilateral agreements regulating the operations of mining companies in Zambia entail: 
o The sales and purchase agreement that sets out the conditions for the purchase of assets. 
o Marketing agreements established with private companies.  
o The development agreements that are bilateral agreements, comprising of commitments between 
the government and some mining TNCs (dealt with in Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act) 
that broadly determine the legal rules in which they would want to conduct their business. The 
year-by-year account of the investment and spending plans, as well as of the obligations of the 
mining companies, including a stipulation of the production levels that the government expects 
from the mining companies in the development agreements enable the government and the 
companies to check compliance with obligations set out in the agreements.  
o The shareholder’s agreement that governs the relationship between the shareholders, including 
the government and the investors. 
• The government bodies mandated to monitor private sector activities include:  
o The Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development and the ZCCM-IH, mandated to oversee the 
implementation of development agreements. 
 Directors of ZCCM-IH, on the boards of privatised mining companies, monitor whether 
obligations are met, in terms of investment, increasing production and in the training of 
manpower, as stipulated in the development agreement. The ZCCM board, under government 
ownership, also monitored mining-related transactions. 
o The golden share that the government enjoys, by way of the one Director representing 
government on the boards of each of the privatised mining companies that enables the 
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government to veto only those decisions deemed against the interests of the country. 
• The mechanisms established through which private sector activities are monitored include: 
o Quarterly and annual returns that the mining companies submit to the Ministry of Mines and 
Mineral Development and to the BoZ, stipulating amongst other things the production levels and 
costs incurred by mining companies. 
o The customs office, which monitors the sales of cobalt. 
o The checking of company accounts, through the recently established ZRA. Transfer pricing 
practices of companies are, however, likely to hide the true profits of companies. International 
companies originating from countries that are members of the OECD having to adhere to a strict 
code of conduct, on account of nationals from their countries being able to seek court action 
against these companies.  
• The monitoring of environmental pollution: 
The monitoring of environmental pollution seems less problematic on account of likely global 
repercussions that environmental scandals will have on the reputation of private mining companies. 
However, KCM and MCM, partly because of the poor environmental standards they have inherited, 
are exempted against adhering to certain environmental standards. The major bodies and measures 
established to control and monitor environmental pollution of the mining companies are:  
o The Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development, the ECZ and the Mine Safety Department.  
o Mining companies being required to submit environmental management plans that encompass 
environmental impact assessment reports that are open to the public, through a public disclosure 
process and, at times, involve various stakeholders, including villagers and the chiefs, before 
approval is granted. 
o Additional control that is exerted over quoted or listed companies,783 by way of strict standards 
required from both the Stock Exchange, bankers that are funding the mining companies and from 
environmental lobby groups. A failure to meet these standards would adversely influence the 
share prices of listed companies. 
 
 
Sources: Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development (2003:4); The Post (2003b:4); World Bank 
(2002b:28) and interviews with David Chilipamushi, 20 October 2003; Andrew Hickman, 7 November 
2003; Reibner Hoffner, 15 October 2003; Jack Jones, 22 October 2003; Chuma Kabaghe, 18 November 
2003; Thomas Kabandama, 13 November 2003; Danny Kalyalya, 31 0ctober 2003; Fortune Kamusaki, 
25 November 2003; John Kangwa, 21 November 2003; Chama Kapambwe, 11 November 2003; Wilphred 
Katoto, 12 November 2003; Francis Kaunda, 20 October 2003; John Lungu, 12 November 2003; Charles 
Muchimba, 18 November 2003; Emmanuel Mutati, 18 November 2003; Fred M’muembe, 14 October 
2003; Ladslous Mwansa, 7 October 2003; Bernadette Mwakacheya, 17 October 2003; Silane 
Mwenechanya, 24 October 2003; Dave Phiri, 23 October 2003; M. Shandavu, 10 October 2003; Willie 
Sweta, 30 October 2003; Dennis Wood, 21 October 2003 and Yu Zhongqin, 4 November 2003. 
                                                 
783
    Such as Bwana Mkubwa. 
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Kitwe 
Friday, 14 November 2003 Mr Charles Muchimba 
Director of Research and Organisation 
Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) 
Kitwe 
Tuesday, 18 November 2003 Mr Charles Muchimba 
Director of Research and Organisation 
Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) 
Kitwe 
 
Mr Emmanuel Mutati 
Chief Services Officer 
Mopani Copper Mines plc 
Kitwe 
 
Ms Chuma Kabaghe 
Manager (Special Projects) 
Mopani Copper Mines plc 
Kitwe 
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Date Interviewees 
Friday, 21 November 2003 Mr John Kangwa 
Lecturer 
Land Surveyor Division 
Copperbelt University 
Kitwe 
Sunday, 23 November 2003 Mr James Chalwe 
Supplier to the Mines 
Kitwe 
Monday, 24 November 2003 Mr Eugene B. Appel 
Member of Parliament 
Deputy Minister (Industry) 
Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
Lusaka 
Tuesday, 25 November 2003 Mr Hudson Mulumbi 
Economist 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
Lusaka 
 
Mr Fred Yamba 
Senior Economist 
Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
Lusaka 
 
Dr Fortune Kamusaki 
Senior Economist 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
Lusaka 
Saturday, 29 November 2003 Dr Victor C. Wells 
Administrative Director/ Executive Producer 
Fathom Ideas Ltd 
Lusaka 
 
Mr Ohene Owusu Nyanin 
Country Manager (Resident Representative) 
The World Bank 
Lusaka 
Monday, 1 December 2003 Mr Zion E. Simwanza 
Senior Mining Engineer (Mines Development) 
Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development 
Lusaka 
Tuesday, 2 December 2003 Mr Nchima Nchito 
Lawyer 
Task Force (to investigate corruption during Chiluba’s rule) 
Lusaka 
 
Honourable Captain Moono 
Member of Parliament 
Chilanga Constituency 
Lusaka 
Monday, 10 January 2005 Mr Kevin Hodges 
Senior Project Manager 
IDC 
Johannesburg 
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List of interviews conducted in Zambia 2001 (in chronological order) 
 
Thursday, 13 December 2001
  
 
Mr Chansa Chifumbe Winston 
Principal Mining Engineer (Projects)  
Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development 
Lusaka 
Friday, 14 December 2001 
  
Mr Danny Kalyalya 
Bank of Zambia 
Director of the Economics Department 
Lusaka 
Saturday, 15 December 2001
  
 
Mr Danny Kalyalya  
Bank of Zambia 
Director of the Economics Department 
Lusaka 
 
Mr Willie Sweta 
Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development 
Director of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development  
Lusaka 
Monday, 17 December 2001
  
Mr David Chilipamushi 
Copperbelt University 
Lecturer 
Kitwe 
 
Mr Mavuto Gondwe 
Mine workers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) 
Director of Safety and Occupational Health 
Kitwe 
 
Mr Charles Muchimba 
Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) 
Director of Information and Research 
Kitwe 
Tuesday, 18 December 2001 Mr Tom Goodman 
ZCCM Smelterco Limited 
Vice President  
Kitwe 
 
Mr Lori Hanchar 
ZCCM Smelterco Limited 
Manager  
Kitwe 
 
Mr Robin Mills  
Konkola Copper Mines plc 
Chief Operating Officer  
Chingola 
 
Mr Norman B. Mbazima 
Konkola Copper Mines plc 
Chief Financial Officer  
Chingola 
Thursday, 20 December 2001
  
 
Mr Alick B. Lungu 
Catholic Centre for Justice Development and Peace 
Economist at Economic Justice Programme 
Lusaka 
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